The American Political Science Review

Vol. 75 September 1981 No. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Elite Integration in the United States and Australia . . . . . John Higley & Gwen Moore 581

Constitution-Making: Alignment and Realignment in the Federal Convention of 1787 . . . . . Calvin C. Jillson 598

Madison's Analysis of the Sources of Political Authority . . . . . Robert J. Morgan 613

The Language of Equality in a Constitutional Order . . . . . Timothy J. O'Neill 626

Citizenship and the Right to Leave . . . . . Frederick G. Whelan 636

Dewey and Marx: On Partisanship and the Reconstruction of Society . . . . . Alfonso J. Damico 654

Political Finance and Political Reform: The Experience with State Income Tax Checkoffs . . . . . Jack L. Noragon 667

Party and Bureaucracy: The Influence of Intermediary Groups on Urban Public Service Delivery . . . . . Bryan D. Jones 688

Research Frontier Essay: *When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women* . . . . . Virginia Sapiro 701

Comment . . . . . Irene Diamond & Nancy Hartsock 717

Communications 722

Editorial Note 733

Book Reviews

- Political Theory and Methodology 734
- American Politics 757
- Comparative Politics 788
- International Politics 826
- Reference Sources 847

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Composition by TypoGraphics, Columbia, Maryland.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright 1981 by The American Political Science Association, publisher of *The American Political Science Review* (ISSN-0003-0554).

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory and Methodology

Abrams, Robert. *Foundations of Political Analysis: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice* . . . . Douglas Muzzio 734
Adamson, Walter L. *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory* . . . . Arpad Kadarkay 735
Bacharach, Samuel B., and Edward J. Lawler. *Power and Politics in Organizations: The Social Psychology of Conflict, Coalitions, and Bargaining* . . . . Lewis C. Mainzer 736
Brown, Steven R. *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science* . . . . Ted W. Meckstroth 737
Dunn, John. *Political Obligation in its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory* . . . . Patrick Riley 738
Ellul, Jacques; trans. by Joachim Neugroschel. *The Technological System* . . . . Victor Ferkiss 739
Ferguson, Kathy E. *Self, Society, and Womankind: The Dialectic of Liberation* . . . . Judith H. Stiehm 740
Freeman, Michael. *Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism* . . . . Francis Canavan 741
Freeman, Michael, and David Robertson, eds. *The Frontiers of Political Theory: Essays in a Revitalised Discipline* . . . . Stephen Holmes 742
Hage, Jerald. *Theories of Organization: Form, Process, and Transformation* . . . . Lawrence B. Mohr 743
Harvey, Simon, et al., eds. *Reappraisals of Rousseau: Studies in Honour of R. A. Leigh* . . . . Stephen G. Salkever 745
Held, David. *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* . . . . Gertrude A. Steuernagel 746
Mansbridge, Jane J. *Beyond Adversary Democracy* . . . . D. A. Strickland 747
Merquior, J. G. *Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy* . . . . Lawrence A. Scaff 748
Pennock, J. Roland, and John W. Chapman, eds. *Property: Nomos XXII* . . . . Lyman T. Sargent 749
Qualter, Terence H. *Graham Wallas and the Great Society* . . . . Sugwon Kang 750
Salvadori, Massimo; trans. by Jon Rothschild. *Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938* . . . . John H. Kautsky 752
Schoolman, Morton. *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse* . . . . Tracy B. Strong 751
Steenson, Gary P. *Karl Kautsky, 1854-1938: Marxism in the Classical Years* . . . . John H. Kautsky 752
Steiner, Jürg, and Robet H. Dorff. *A Theory of Political Decision Modes: Intraparty Decision Making in Switzerland* . . . . Moshe M. Czudnowski 754
Whitfield, Stephen J. *Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism* . . . . James T. Knauer 755
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, et al. *Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model* . . . . Howard H. Lentner 756

American Politics

Adams, Willi P.; trans. by Rita and Robert Kimber. *The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era* . . . . John P. Roche 757
Barbrook, Alec, and Christine Bolt. *Power and Protest in American Life* . . . . Jerry W. Calvert 758
Boyte, Harry C. *The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement* . . . . Arthur Stein 759
Break, George F. *Financing Government in a Federal System* . . . . G. Ross Stephens 760
Burger, Edward J., Jr. *Science at the White House: A Political Liability* . . . . Daniel Martin 761
Burton, Dudley J. *The Governance of Energy: Problems, Prospects and Underlying Issues* . . . . Donald C. Menzel 762
Campbell, Angus. *The Sense of Well-Being in America: Recent Patterns and Trends* . . . . Richard M. Merelman 763

Campbell, Bruce A., and Richard J. Trilling, eds. *Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory* . . . James A. Stimson 764
Cole, Jonathan R. *Fair Science: Women in the Scientific Community* . . . Kristi Andersen 765
Crotty, William J., ed. *Paths to Political Reform* . . . Howard L. Reiter 766
Dubois, Philip L. *From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Accountability* . . . Richard J. Richardson 767
Finger, Seymour M. *Your Man at the UN: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy* . . . A. LeRoy Bennett 767
Gaventa, John. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley* . . . Vernon N. Martin 768
Gray, Virginia, and Bruce Williams. *The Organizational Politics of Criminal Justice: Policy in Context* . . . Craig R. Wanner 769
Gross, Bertram. *Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America* . . . Merlin Gustafson 770
Hamilton, Howard D. *Electing the Cincinnati City Council: An Examination of Alternative Electoral-Representation Systems* . . . Bernard Grofman 771
Hunter, Floyd. *Community Power Succession: Atlanta's Policy-Makers Revisited* . . . Bert E. Swanson 772
Jacob, Herbert. *Crime and Justice in Urban America* . . . Charles M. Lamb 773
Kettl, Donald F. *Managing Community Development in the New Federalism* . . . John G. Sanzone 774
LeLoup, Lance T. *The Fiscal Congress: Legislative Control of the Budget* . . . Louis Fisher 776
McBeath, Gerald A., and Thomas A. Morehouse. *The Dynamics of Alaska Native Self-Government* . . . Elmer R. Rusco 777
Merry, Henry J. *Five-Branch Government: The Full Measure of Constitutional Checks and Balances* . . . Carl Lieberman 777
Mitnick, Barry M. *The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms* . . . Kenneth A. Shepsle 778
Morgan, Richard E. *Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America* . . . Stephen L. Wasby 779
Novak, Michael, ed. *Democracy and Mediating Structures: A Theological Inquiry* . . . Paul J. Weber 780
Pastor, Robert A. *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976* . . . Christopher J. Deering 781
Rosenthal, Donald B., ed. *Urban Revitalization* . . . Beverly A. Cigler 782
Schulman, Paul R. *Large-Scale Policy Making* . . . Richard I. Hofferbert 783
Shaffer, William R. *Party and Ideology in the United States Congress* . . . Jerrold E. Schneider 784
Shank, Alan. *Presidential Policy Leadership: Kennedy and Social Welfare* . . . David C. Kozak 785
Spragens, William C., with Carole A. Terwoord. *From Spokesman to Press Secretary: White House Media Operations* . . . John J. Havick 786
Wallerstein, Mitchel B. *Food For War—Food For Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context* . . . William Anderson 787

Comparative Politics

Arian, Asher, ed. *The Elections in Israel—1977* . . . Jerrold D. Green 788
Arian, Asher, ed. *Israel: A Developing Society* . . . Ian Lustick 789
Ashford, Douglas E., ed. *Financing Urban Government in the Welfare State* . . . Raymond E. Owen 790
Aspaturian, Vernon V., et al., eds. *Eurocommunism Between East and West* . . . Joan B. Urban 791
Berger, Suzanne, and Michael J. Piore. *Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies* . . . Gary Freeman 792
Bailer, Seweryn. *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* . . . John A. Armstrong 793
Braunthal, Julius. *History of the International: World Socialism 1943-1968*, Vol. 3. . . . David L. Williams 794
Carstairs, Andrew McLaren. *A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe* . . . Wayne G. Reilly 795

DeWitt, Sherri. *Worker Participation and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy* ... G. David Garson 823
Elliott, Charles F., and Carl A. Linden, eds. *Marxism in the Contemporary West* ... A. P. Simonds 796
Fadia, Babulal. *Pressure Groups in Indian Politics* ... M. Lal Goel 797
Gran, Guy, ed. with the assistance of Galen Hull. *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* ... Herbert F. Weiss 798
Hardach, Karl. *The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century* ... Wolfram F. Hanrieder 800
Harris, Peter. *Political China Observed: A Western Perspective* ... John R. Handelman 800
Hartrich, Edwin. *The Fourth and Richest Reich: How the Germans Conquered the Postwar World* ... Wolfram F. Hanrieder 800
Heskin, Ken. *Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis* ... Paul F. Power 802
Horowitz, Donald L. *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* ... Stephen Sloan 803
Johnson, Roberta A. *Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony?* ... Evelyn P. Stevens 804
Kohl, Wilfrid L., and Giorgio Basevi, eds. *West Germany: A European and Global Power* ... Wayne C. Thompson 804
Lawson, Kay, ed. *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective* ... Charles J. Nagy, Jr. 806
Lewis, Paul H. *Paraguay under Stroessner* ... George I. Blanksten 807
Martin, Ross M. *TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group 1868-1976* ... William D. Muller 807
Merkle, Judith A. *Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement* ... Victor A. Thompson 808
Mosse, George L. *Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality* ... Anthony J. Joes 809
Newton, Kenneth. *Balancing the Books: Financial Problems of Local Government in Western Europe* ... Douglas E. Ashford 810
Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza. *Answer to History* ... Richard W. Cottam 812
Penniman, Howard R., ed. *Venezuela at the Polls: The National Election of 1978* ... Austin G. Linsley 813
Rintala, Marvin. *The Constitution of Silence: Essays on Generational Themes* ... Neal E. Cutler 814
Rose, Richard. *Do Parties Make a Difference?* ... Charles Kunsman, Jr. 815
Rose, Richard, and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds. *Presidents and Prime Ministers* ... James B. Christoph 816
Rotberg, Robert I. *Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa* ... L. Gray Cowan 817
Saikal, Amin. *The Rise and Fall of the Shah* ... John H. Lorentz 818
Sayeed, Khalid B. *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* ... William L. Richter 819
Semprun, Jorge; trans. by Helen R. Lane. *The Autobiography of Federico Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain* ... Gary Prevost 819
Shinn, Terry. *Savoir Scientifique et Pouvoir Social: L'Ecole Polytechnique, 1794-1914* ... Ezra N. Suleiman 820
White, Caroline. *Patrons and Partisans: A Study of Politics in Two Southern Italian Comuni* ... Alan S. Zuckerman 821
Williams, Philip M. *Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography* ... Leon D. Epstein 822
Witte, John F. *Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work: Workers' Participation in an American Corporation* ... G. David Garson 823
Wright, J. F. H. *Mirror of the Nation's Mind: Australia's Electoral Experiments* ... Joseph F. Zimmerman 824

International Politics

Ashley, Richard K. *The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique* ... Edward E. Azar 826
Beaulac, Willard L. *The Fractured Continent: Latin America in Close-Up* ... William M. LeoGrande 826
Beres, Louis R. *Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics* ... William D. Jackson 827
Bertram, Christopher, ed. *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s* ... Richard D. Hughes 828

Best, Geoffrey. *Humanity in Warfare* . . . . William V. O'Brien 829
Brubaker, Earl R. *Individual Values and Global Sharing* . . . . Michael D. Ward 830
Charles, Milene; Eng. text ed. and Soviet documents trans. by Jo Fisher. *The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement* . . . . Roger E. Kanet 831
Handel, Michael. *Weak States in the International System* . . . . Keith S. Petersen 831
Swang, In K. *The Neutralized Unification of Korea in Perspective* . . . . B. C. Koh 832
Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World* . . . . Ronald H. Chilcote 833
Lasswell, Harold D., et al. *Propaganda and Communication in World History*. Vol. 1, *The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times;* Vol. 2, *Emergence of Public Opinion in the West;* Vol. 3, *A Pluralizing World in Formation* . . . . Steven R. Brown 834
LeoGrande, William M. *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980* . . . . Kenneth W. Grundy 836
Marer, Paul, and John Michael Montias, eds. *East European Integration and East-West Trade* . . . . Josef Kalvoda 837
Meyer, Gail E. *Egypt and the United States: The Formative Years* . . . . H. Paul Castleberry 838
Myers, Kenneth A., ed. *NATO—The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting* . . . . Eugene J. Rosi 839
Mytelka, Lynn K. *Regional Development in a Global Economy: The Multinational Corporation, Technology, and Andean Integration* . . . . Markos Mamalakis 840
Patti, Archimedes L. A. *Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's Albatross* . . . . Kenneth P. Landon 841
Payne, Anthony. *The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79: Regional Integration among New States* . . . . Anthony P. Maingot 842
Rubin, Barry. *Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* . . . . James A. Bill 843
Shiels, Frederick L. *Tokyo and Washington: Dilemmas of a Mature Alliance* . . . . John H. Esterline 844
Thies, Wallace J. *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968* . . . . Richard K. Betts 845
Thompson, Kenneth W. *Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis* . . . . N. G. Onuf 846

Reference Sources

Bryce-Lapore, Roy Simón, ed. *Sourcebook on the New Immigration: Implications for the United States and the International Community*. 847
Converse, Philip E., et al. *American Social Attitudes Data Sourcebook, 1947-1978*. 847
Countries of the World and Their Leaders: Yearbook 1980, and *Yearbook 1980—Supplement*. 848
Craig, F. W. S., and T. T. Mackie, eds. *Europe Votes I: European Parliamentary Election Results 1979*. 848
DeLancey, Mark W. *African International Relations: An Annotated Bibliography*. 848
Findling, John E. *Dictionary of American Diplomatic History*. 848
Gallup, George H., ed. *The International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion 1978*. 848
Higgins, Rosalyn. *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary*. Vol. 3: *Africa*. 849
Iggers, Georg G., and Harold T. Parker. *International Handbook of Historical Studies: Contemporary Research and Theory*. 849
Janda, Kenneth. *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. 849
Li, Tze-chung. *Social Science Reference Sources: A Practical Guide*. 849
Link, Arthur S., ed. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* Vols. 33-35. 850
Low, W. Augustus, and Virgil A. Clift, eds. *Encyclopedia of Black America*. 850

Maki, John M., ed. *Japan's Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report.* 850

Mickolus, Edward F., compiler. *The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography.* 850

Mickolus, Edward F. *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979.* 850

Miller, Warren E., et al. *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978.* 851

Norton, Augustus R., and Martin H. Greenberg. *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide.* 851

Norton, Philip. *Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979.* 851

Rhode, Grant F., and Reid E. Whitlock. *Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1978: An Annotated Compilation.* 851

Rossi, Ernest E., and Jack C. Plano, eds. *The Latin American Political Dictionary.* 851

Rowat, Donald C., ed. *International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization: Contemporary Developments.* 852

Russell, James. *Marx-Engels Dictionary.* 852

Staar, Richard F., ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1980.* 852

Stammen, Theo; trans. by Gunda Cannon-Kern. *Political Parties in Europe.* 852

Survey Research Consultants International, Inc. Hastings, Elizabeth H., and Philip K. Hastings, eds. *Index to International Public Opinion, 1978-1979.* 852

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT: Charles E. Lindblom, *Yale University;* PRESIDENT-ELECT: Seymour Martin Lipset, *Stanford University;* VICE-PRESIDENTS: Henry J. Abraham, *University of Virginia;* Doris Graber, *University of Illinois, Chicago Circle;* Robert Salisbury, *Washington University, St. Louis;* SECRETARY: Marian Lief Palley, *University of Delaware;* TREASURER: William J. Keefe, *University of Pittsburgh;* PROGRAM CHAIRPERSONS: Theodore J. Lowi and Sidney G. Tarrow, *Cornell University;* EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Mann; MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR:* Charles O. Jones, *University of Virginia.*

COUNCIL: (Above-named officers ex officiis), 1980-81: Nazli Choucri, *Massacchusetts Institute of Technology;* Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Johns Hopkins University;* John Ferejohn, *California Institute of Technology;* Francine R. Frankel, *University of Pennsylvania;* Robert Jervis, *Columbia University;* Malcolm E. Jewell, *University of Kentucky;* Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;* Raymond Tanter, *University of Michigan;* 1981-82: Bernard C. Cohen, *University of Wisconsin, Madison;* William J. Daniels, *Union College;* Dorothy Buckton James, *American University;* Samuel Kirkpatrick, *Texas A&M University;* Naomi B. Lynn, *Kansas State University;* Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., *Harvard University;* Frank J. Munger, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill;* Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Michigan State University.*

FORMER PRESIDENTS: Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernst Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Garner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederic A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. Macmahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau, Robert E. Ward, Avery Leiserson, Austin Ranney, James MacGregor Burns, Samuel H. Beer, John C. Wahlke, Leon D. Epstein, Warren E. Miller.

MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: *The American Political Science Review,* published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category		*Dues*	
Regular			
Annual Income:	Under $20,000	$ 40	
	$20,000-29,999	$ 50	
	$30,000-39,999	$ 65	
	$40,000 and over	$ 75	
Student		$ 15	
Retired		$ 20	
Family		$ 5	
Life		$1000	
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)		$ 75	domestic

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $4 per year for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $20.00 per copy; for back issues prior to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Notices of change of address should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INDEXING: Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts,* the *United States Political Science Documents,* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review,* Volumes 1-62; 1906-1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

EDITORIAL BOARD: Charles O. Jones, *Managing Editor, University of Virginia;* Robert M. Axelrod, *University of Michigan;* Steven J. Brams, *New York University;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* William J. Daniels, *Union College;* Jorge I. Dominguez, *Harvard University;* Ada W. Finifter, *Michigan State University;* Dante Germino, *University of Virginia;* J. Woodford Howard, *Johns Hopkins University;* George A. Kateb, *Amherst College;* Henry C. Kenski, *Office of Representative Morris Udall;* Nannerl O. Keohane, *Wellesley College;* Anthony King, *University of Essex;* Gerald H. Kramer, *Yale University;* Arend Lijphart, *University of California, San Diego;* Jesse M. McCorry; Joseph L. Nogee, *University of Houston;* Elinor Ostrom, *Indiana University;* Samuel C. Patterson, *University of Iowa;* Nelson W. Polsby, *University of California, Berkeley;* Kenneth Prewitt, *Social Science Research Council;* Jorgen S. Rasmussen, *Iowa State University;* Bert A. Rockman, *University of Pittsburgh;* Donald A. Searing, *University of North Carolina;* James L. Sundquist, *The Brookings Institution;* Henry Teune, *University of Pennsylvania;* Edward R. Tufte, *Yale University;* Susan Welch, *University of Nebraska;* Dina A. Zinnes, *University of Illinois.* EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Kendall S. Stanley.

BOOK REVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD: Holbert N. Carroll, *Book Review Editor, University of Pittsburgh;* Paul Allen Beck, *Florida State University;* James R. Kurth, *Swarthmore College;* Mary L. Shanley, *Vassar College.* EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Nancy Majeski.

MANUSCRIPT EDITOR: Jane Flanders.

EDITORIAL INTERNS: Christopher J. Bosso, Sharon K. Fitzgerald, Susan K. Sowinski.

Instructions to Contributors: Address correspondence about new contributions to the *Review* to Dina A. Zinnes, 50C Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, 702 South Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801. Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material *double-spaced* (including quotations and footnotes). Use standard typewriter paper—avoid colored and light-weight stock. The typewritten lines should not exceed 5½ or 6 inches in length. Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of *less than 150 words* should accompany the manuscript.

The reference form is that used by most scientific journals (for illustration, see any issue of the *Review,* June 1978, and after); brief parenthetical references are included in the text and all sources are listed alphabetically at the end of the article. The work of classical authors such as Aristotle or Plato may be cited by the standardized code familiar to scholars in the field and passing allusions to such authors do not require mention in the list of references. Conventional foot-of-column notes are used only for explanatory comments or in unusual cases to avoid lengthy in-text references.

Articles which draw on survey data not documented through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research should include the following information in an appendix: (1) a description of the population sampled, including definition of the geographical area covered, and details about how the sample was drawn sufficient to permit fairly exact replication; (2) response rate (for quota designs, the number of refusals); (3) exact question wordings; and (4) interviewer characteristics.

Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Those over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, footnotes, and references will be included in the page count.

Figures should be professionally presented: use high-quality white paper and India ink for maximum sharpness and clarity of line. Copies only should accompany the submitted manuscript, original art work being retained until requested by the editorial office. Tables should be typed on separate pages, with guides, e.g., "Table 1 about here" at the appropriate places in the manuscript.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must not exceed five double-spaced pages, including references, footnotes, and tables. All but the briefest letters will be refereed.

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to Steven T. Seitz, Book Review Editor, *American Political Science Review,* 50C Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, 702 South Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801. Authors are urged to call their books to the attention of the Book Review Editor to insure that the books will be considered for review.

Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Eloise French, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Elite Integration in the United States and Australia

JOHN HIGLEY
Australian National University

GWEN MOORE
State University of New York, Albany

Taking its point of departure in the elitist paradigm and the much-discussed relationship between elite integration and stable democratic political systems, this article offers a typology of fragmented and integrated national elites and investigates the structure of the "consensually integrated" elite type. It is hypothesized that "consensually integrated" elites have largely similar structures consisting of personal interaction networks which are more inclusive and less class-based, and which contain more extensive and centralized connections among all major elite groups, than the plural elite, power elite or ruling class models of elite structure separately depict. Support for these hypotheses is found in a comparison of the network structures of two consensually integrated national elites, the American and Australian, as these structures are revealed by issue-based sociometric data taken from closely comparable elite samples and studies in the two countries.

The relationship between elite integration, political stability and democracy is one of the central questions in political science and political sociology. Aron (1950, p. 129) insists that only where there is "true collaboration" and "unity of opinion and action on essential points" among otherwise divided elites can democracies function and societies prosper. Dahrendorf (1967, pp. 229-31) concludes that a national elite which combines "intimate cohesion" with "multiform political attitudes" is a precondition of stable democratic government. Lijphart (1968) argues that Dutch democracy depends on cooperation and "accommodation" within an elite cartel, a thesis which has been used to explain the democratic politics of several other plural societies (Presthus, 1973; McRae, 1974; Lijphart, 1978). Field and Higley (1980) contend that an historically rare kind of elite integration, which they term "consensual unity," necessarily precedes sustained adherence to constitutional rules, serious practice of civil liberties, and competitive elections which determine government personnel. More generally, Keller (1963, p. 146) claims that "what is required for effective social life is moral accord among the strategic elites," adding, "As societies become more differentiated a considerable degree of cohesion and consensus is needed at the top." Reviewing the literature, Putnam (1976, p. 128) asserts, "The argument that elite integration fosters political stability and effectiveness is very prevalent and very persuasive."

Deliberately or not, such contentions exemplify the elitist paradigm in political and social analysis. This holds, in part, that elite behavior and structure vary independently of non-elite configurations, institutional frameworks, political cultures and the like, and that these independent variations in elites are causally related to political instability and stability, as well as to different kinds of political systems, including stable democratic ones (Field and Higley, 1980). While the elitist paradigm has been largely ignored by social scientists in recent years, we contend that it deserves renewed attention for its ability to explain some of the important variations in political systems. If one accepts that the elitist paradigm and the contentions it generates are worth exploring, a number of questions arise. What are the major variations in elite behavior and structure, and what typology of elites can be constructed from them? Why and how do these variations occur? With what kinds of political systems are the differing elite types associated? What are the detailed characteristics of the elite type that is associated with stable democratic political systems? How accurately do the familiar plural elite, power elite and ruling class models describe this type of national elite?

This article addresses these questions. First, we

The authors are listed alphabetically to indicate equal work on this article, which had its genesis in many years of discussions with Professor Richard Alba, of SUNY, Albany, and Professor Charles Kadushin of the CUNY Center for Graduate Studies. The comparative network data reported here were originally analyzed under a National Science Foundation grant to Professor Kadushin. Moore wishes to thank the SUNY Research Foundation for funding part of the analysis and the Australian National University for an appointment as Visiting Fellow. The authors are indebted to Professor G. Lowell Field, University of Connecticut, and to David Carrick, Desley Deacon, Dr. Terry Halliday and Dr. Alden Klovdahl, all at the Australian National University, for valuable assistance and suggestions.

offer a typology of a fragmented national elite, and two types of integrated national elites, indicating their different origins, and the most prominent examples of each elite type, as well as their relationships with different kinds of political systems. We then inquire into the more detailed operation of the elite type which seems to be associated with stable democratic political systems, postulating that it involves a distinctive interaction structure which gives all major elite factions a substantial, and presumably a satisfactory, amount of access to each other and to key decision-making centers. Next, we compare and contrast this interaction structure with the structures which seem to be implied by the plural elite, power elite and ruling class models. Fourth, we assess the empirical accuracy of the several models by examining the interaction structures of American and Australian national elites. Finally, we discuss the implications of our research for the debate about elite structure in these and similar political systems.

Fragmented and Integrated Elites

Until recently, the term "elites" was applied mainly to powerful, high-status groups of business, professional, political, military, and civil service leaders (Bottomore, 1964, p. 14). "Counter-elites" was often used to describe politically dissident, low-status leaders of radical parties, trade unions, and various other reform and protest organizations. This distinction has tended to fade in recent writing, however, and all such powerful leadership groups are now commonly called "elites" (Parry, 1969, p. 13; Giddens, 1973, p. 120; Higley, Field and Gröholt, 1976, pp. 13-19; Putnam, 1976, p. 14). Therefore, when we speak of fragmented or integrated national elites, we have in mind the relations and connections between a large number of institutionally distinct, socially disparate, and politically diverse national leaders.

Elite fragmentation and integration have a number of dimensions. Putnam (1976, pp. 107-32) discerns at least six: social homogeneity, recruitment patterns, personal interaction, value consensus, group solidarity, and institutional context. However, he notes that a national elite may be integrated even though not all these dimensions are positively intercorrelated. In our view, the principal dimensions of integration or fragmentation in a national, as distinct from a sectoral, elite are a consensus on values and personal interaction. Thus a national elite may be said to be integrated when there is (a) comparatively widespread value consensus, cooperation and trust among the different factions which make it up, and (b) comparatively extensive and inclusive personal interaction ties among all these factions. The absence of value consensus and interaction ties among factions indicates a fragmented elite.

It is fairly obvious that most national elites in the modern world have been and are fragmented. That is, deep schisms clearly exist between elite factions, violent struggles for power occur frequently and openly, and the members of most factions appear to see political power as resting on one group's personalized access to military and police forces. Value consensus and interaction structures which would knit different factions together are conspicuous by their absence. It is equally obvious that where national elites are fragmented, political systems are prone to *coups d'état,* serious crises, and other manifestations of instability. For example, fragmented national elites and the unstable, usually undemocratic systems with which they appear to be associated are readily observable in the histories of France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and most other European countries down to the middle part of this century, and they are just as observable in most Third-World countries today.

By contrast, integrated national elites appear to exist in about three dozen countries at present. While most of these countries are situated at high levels of socioeconomic development, some are not and some others appear to have had integrated elites when they were still quite underdeveloped. This variation of elite types independent of socioeconomic development levels illustrates Aron's dictum that "the structure of the elite is not merely a reflection of the structure of society" (1950, p. 130).

There are, however, two types of integrated national elites, the separate features of which are widely recognized. One type, which we shall call "ideologically integrated," is created in the victories of radical forces in revolutionary circumstances, as in Russia in 1921, Italy between 1922 and 1926, Germany in 1933, Yugoslavia and Albania between 1943 and 1945, China in 1949, North Vietnam in 1954, Cuba in 1959, or it is imposed on societies which are conquered in warfare, as in Eastern Europe and North Korea after World War II. Elite integration is effected by a totalitarian party which requires party membership and close adherence to party ideology in public utterances as conditions of elite position-holding (Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963; Rigby, 1968, pp. 412-25). Outwardly at least, there is the appearance of a comprehensive value consensus among all elite groups. Apparently, there is also an extensive, if sharply hierarchical and centralized, structure of personal interaction among different elite factions (Hough and Fainsod, 1979, pp. 518-55). Accordingly, elite disagreements and conflicts occur almost entirely behind the scenes, thereby giving the political systems operated by this type of elite a marked stability. But while ideologically integrated elites appear to support stable political systems, the requirements of ideological uniformity and centralized interaction among elite persons prevent any serious practice of freely competitive elections or civil liberties.

In the other type of integrated elite, different elite groups espouse conflicting ideologies and policies, and they operate or are associated with competing parties, organizations and movements. As many observers have speculated, integration in this case appears to depend on an underlying, largely tacit value consensus among elite groups. In effect, elites agree not to push partisan interests to the point where compromise becomes impossible, to obey largely unwritten rules of conduct, and thereby to support and protect existing political processes and institutions (Prewitt and Stone, 1973, pp. 151-56; Putnam, 1976, p. 116). The importance of value consensus for this type of elite integration makes the term "consensually integrated elite" apt. However, by this term we do not want to imply that value consensus is the overriding dimension of integration, for in a moment we will consider the personal interaction structure in which this value consensus may itself be anchored.

First, it is important to sketch the three ways in which consensually integrated elites appear to originate. In highly exceptional circumstances the warring factions which make up a fragmented elite sometimes achieve consensual integration by voluntarily settling their principal differences and agreeing to cooperate under existing institutions, as English elites did in 1688 and 1689, as Swedish elites did in 1809, as Mexican elites did in 1933, and as Colombian and Venezuelan elites appear to have done during the late 1950s. Second, colonial or "native" elites have sometimes achieved consensual integration while operating the political institutions of largely self-governing colonies or dependencies. Further strengthened by successful struggles to gain national independence, elite integration formed in this way persisted in the United States from the end of the eighteenth century, in Canada and New Zealand from the mid-nineteenth century, in Australia and Ireland from early in this century, and it has so far persisted in Kenya, India, Malaysia and a few other developing societies from the early postwar years. Third, in countries which reach high levels of socioeconomic development with fragmented elites, an erosion of mass support for more radical, usually left-wing, elite factions seems to occur. To retain suport, these radical factions gradually water down their programs and aims, and a consensually integrated elite is formed. This is how elites in Norway and Denmark became integrated in the 1930s, it is one aspect of how Austrian, West German, and Belgian elites achieved integration during the 1950s and 1960s, and it appears to be the process which French, Italian, Japanese, and possibly Spanish and Portuguese elites have been undergoing in recent years (Field and Higley, 1978).

Like ideologically integrated elites, consensually integrated ones are associated with stable political systems. But unlike the former, consensually integrated elites are also conducive to a substantial degree of democratic politics and civil liberties. In more formal terms, a consensually integrated national elite appears to be a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for a stable democratic political system. A case in point is Mexico. According to Purcell and Purcell (1980, p. 195), Mexico's political stability arises from "a constantly renewed political bargain" among the principal Mexican elites. First struck during the 1930s, this bargain "was and remains an agreement to share power among proponents of quite different interests and constituencies." Describing the elite rules of the game which have grown up around this bargain and how these rules allow different elites to assert divergent ideologies and policies, the Purcells portray the Mexican national elite as, in effect, consensually integrated. However, neither they nor most other students of Mexican politics think that the political system is "democratic" in the American, Canadian or West European sense of the term. Rather, with the elite condition for a stable democratic political system seemingly satisfied, the most one can say is that strong economic growth or other "sufficient" conditions may create a significant broadening of Mexican democracy.

We have taken a good deal of space to distinguish types of national elites comparatively and historically because we think that a global perspective is necessary if the essential features of consensually integrated elites, such as the American and the Australian, are to be brought into focus. This perspective highlights the collectively deliberate, always somewhat precarious character of a national elite's consensual integration. In keeping with the elitist assumption that elite behavior and structure vary somewhat independently of non-elite pressures and forces, a global perspective reminds us that there is nothing inevitable about this form of integration. Created in largely unique political circumstances, a consensually integrated elite persists only so long as its members have the will and the political capacity to contain potentially deep conflicts and to keep the political and social situation manageable. A key question is thus what prompts and enables the disparate persons and factions who make up a consensually integrated elite to act in this way.

An important part of the answer has to do with the existence of a particular kind of personal interaction structure in all consensually integrated national elites.[1] Constructed in the wake of the circumstances in which consensual integration is first achieved, this is an interaction structure which enables all major elite groups to defend and advance their interests satisfactorily. Its most crucial feature is a personal interaction network which gives governmental and non-governmental elites relatively direct, unfettered access to each other and especially to those elite persons who occupy the most central public and private decision-making positions. Possessing this access, each elite group can be reasonably certain that on salient policy questions or national issues it can make itself heard effectively. Elite factions and groups which are otherwise diverse and competing thus have a common interest in observing the informal rules by which the interaction structure operates and in upholding the institutions in which it is embedded. As Putnam has observed (1976, p. 116), "Elite commitment to 'the system' is doubtless . . . related to the gratification the system gives them. Leaders are more likely to agree on the rules of the game, because it is fundamentally their game." Paradoxically, in other words, the only type of national elite that is associated with stable democratic political systems has as one of its key features a distinctly elitist (i.e., comprehensively and tightly integrated) structure of personal interaction.

If we think of the interaction structure we have begun to describe in terms of a model, we might call it the *consensually integrated elite model.* This facilitates comparing and contrasting the structure we have in mind with the familiar plural elite, power elite and ruling class models of elite structure. The consensually integrated elite model has affinities with, but is also different from, each of these familiar models. We propose to show that it is more accurate empirically, at least as revealed by data on American and Australian elite interaction, than any of the latter. But first, we must specify the similarities and differences between the consensually integrated elite model and the plural elite, power elite and ruling class models. Unfortunately, this is not as straightforward a task as one would like because the familiar models have always been vague and imprecise about the interaction structure which they purport to describe. It is necessary to infer what each of them predicts. Additionally, such inferences must be limited to the dimensions of elite interaction for which data are available. In the present case, these dimensions are (1) the *inclusiveness* of personal interaction among top position holders and major elite groups, and (2) the *structure* of interaction contacts between these individuals and groups.

Consensually Integrated Elite Model. There is an inclusive network of formal and informal communication, friendship, and influence-wielding among top position holders in all major elite groups (i.e., business, trade union, political-governmental, mass media, voluntary association, academic elites, etc.). Location in the interaction network depends on incumbency of prominent formal organizational positions and on involvement in national policy making irrespective of class, education, or other social background variables. No single elite group predominates in the network. Instead, interaction among all elite groups is frequent, and it is markedly centralized in and between a relatively small number of persons from all major groups. Because ready access to key decision makers is the structure's *raison d'être,* political-governmental elites bulk large as the targets of elite interaction and as switching points in the interaction network.

Plural Elite Model. As in the consensually integrated elite model, leaders of all major sectors, organizations and interest groups are present in the interaction network of the plural elite model, and network location depends on positional prominence and policy-making involvement, not on class membership or other background characteristics (Dahl, 1958, 1961, 1967; McConnell, 1966; Rose, 1967). Here too, no single elite group predominates. However, interaction between elite groups is not conspicuously centralized in an "inner circle" or "core" group, and while there is certainly contact between different elites, it is issue-specific and generally less frequent. Because of sectoral autonomy and specialization, intra-sector interaction is greater than inter-sector interaction, and the latter occurs mainly with political-governmental elites.

Power Elite Model. In this model there is a clear hierarchy of power and influence among elite groups, with business, political and perhaps military elites located at its apex (Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1959; Porter, 1965). Consequently, the interaction network is not as inclusive of all major elite groups as the consensually integrated and plural elite models predict. As a result of position holders' shared objectives and relatively homogenous social and educational backgrounds, there are extensive positional overlaps, interlocks and interchanges and, accordingly, frequent interaction between the uppermost elites. Among these, the business elite has primacy and its most important leaders occupy central positions in the interaction network. The cabinet and other members of the executive portion of the political elite are also centrally located, but legislators (or backbenchers) and top civil servants occupy more peripheral positions in the network, along with members of trade union, media, academic, and other non-business elites. Interaction among all these latter elite groups is mainly concerned with secondary or non-critical issues, and it occurs in accordance with the plural elite model.

---

[1] It is interesting to note that in their analysis of the Mexican national elite, Purcell and Purcell (1980, pp. 204-08) focus on "the extraordinary stability of elite interaction in Mexico in recent decades," a stability which they attribute to a fluid system of alliances and "personalistic networks" between the major elite groups.

Ruling Class Model(s). The inclusiveness and structure of elite interaction are largely incidental to the much more general imperatives of the capitalist system in this model, and many configurations of elite interaction are compatible with this system's operation (Domhoff, 1967, 1970, 1978; Miliband, 1969; Esping-Anderson et al., 1976; Connell, 1977; Therborn, 1978). However, the most probable configuration is roughly that described by the power elite model, the important differences between the two models arising at the level of interpretation rather than of description.

We now assess the empirical accuracy of these models by analyzing the inclusiveness and structure of national elite interaction in the United States and Australia, the only countries in which closely comparable studies of national elite interaction have been carried out. Historically, national elites in these two countries have avoided the kinds of schisms, power struggles, and unstable political systems that mark fragmented elites, and they have also avoided the tight uniformity displayed by ideologically integrated elites. Instead, American and Australian elites have given many indications of the tacit value consensus, trust and cooperation which indicate the consensually integrated elite type, and both national elites have long operated stable democratic political systems.

American and Australian societies differ importantly, however, in population size and distribution (225 million spread across a continent, versus 14 million concentrated in six coastal cities), in political institutions (a presidential system in a relatively centralized federal structure, versus a parliamentary system in a markedly decentralized federal structure), and in the size and organization of large corporations, trade unions and most other major institutions. Nevertheless, because both countries appear to have consensually integrated national elites, we hypothesize (1) that the inclusiveness and structure of elite interaction in both countries accord with the consensually integrated elite model, and (2) that the plural elite, power elite and ruling class models do not as accurately describe these American and Australian configurations.

Research Design

Our data on American and Australian elite networks are taken from studies having similar designs. The American study, a survey of 545 top position holders in business, trade unions, politics, government bureaucracy, mass media, key voluntary associations, and academic institutions, was conducted in 1971-72 by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University (Moore, 1979; Barton et al., 1981). In the Australian study, 370 top position holders in the corresponding sectors were interviewed in 1975 by researchers at the Australian National University (Higley, Deacon and Smart, 1979). The studies used identical or closely comparable interview questions to obtain information on respondents' policy-influencing and policy-making activities on major national issues. Extensive data on attitudes and social backgrounds were also collected. The studies' wide coverage of elite sectors, collection of data on elite interaction, and focus on the most pressing national issues of the time make them uniquely suited for comparing the inclusiveness and structure of elite integration in the two countries.

1. **Samples.** Both studies began with institutional sectors assumed to be influential in national policy making. The universe of key organizations in each sector and the top position holders in each organization were identified. Then a sample of organizations was chosen from each sector and its top official or officials interviewed. Tables 1 and 2 show the sectors and positions sampled in each study. These positional samples were supplemented by snowball samples of other persons named as interaction partners on specific national issues by three or more of the American and four or more of the Australian respondents (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Kadushin, 1968). In this way, 61 respondents, including a number of White House staff, academics and economists, entered the final American sample of 545, and 7 persons, most of whom were economists, entered the final Australian sample of 370. Completed interviews were obtained with just over 70 percent of the Americans and 74 percent of the Australians in the original combined positional and snowball samples.

2. **Interviews.** Each respondent was asked to name the one national issue on which he or she had most actively attempted to influence national policy and/or public opinion in the past year or so. Reflecting economic crises in each country during the interview period, the issue most frequently named was economic policy, mentioned by 29 percent of American respondents in 1972 and by 42 percent of Australian respondents in 1975. Other issues included: foreign policy and trade (21 percent in the U.S., 3 percent in Australia), social problems (25 percent in Australia, 10 percent in the U.S.), race relations (10 percent in the U.S., none in Australia), federal-state relations and other issues of political structure (13 percent in Australia, virtually none in the U.S.), and ecology, population and resources (10 percent in the U.S., 4 percent in Australia). Most of these were already public issues, rather than potential or undiscussed ones (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Lukes, 1974), although respondents frequently cited legislation and various policies and decisions that they had tried to prevent.

Respondents were questioned extensively about their assessments of, and activities on, the national issue they specified. Among other things, this involved a series of sociometric questions that sought the names of the persons with whom they had formal or informal interactions over this issue. While the precise content of these reported interactions is unknown, each is important as an indicator of a communication link between elite persons. All respondents were asked to name the members of Congress/Parliament, the federal officials/public servants, and the private individuals with whom they had discussed their main national issue.[2] Similarly, all respondents were asked to name the other persons whom they had lobbied to support or oppose legislation on this issue, as well as those who had said the most useful and interesting things to them about it. In short, the two studies used five identical questions to gather data about issue-specific national elite networks.

In a further effort to obtain data on these networks, we specifically asked all Australian respondents to name the persons with whom they had discussed their main issue in the following

Table 1. American Elite Sample Sectors and Positions

Sector	N	Positions (sampled randomly)
Politics	180	(a) Congress (N=58): all senators plus representatives in following categories: chairperson and ranking minority member of all committees, all members of Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means Committees; (b) executive branch appointees (N=66): secretaries, assistant secretaries, general counsel of cabinet departments, heads and deputy heads of independent agencies, plus White House staff identified through snowball sample; (c) parties (N=51): members of Democratic and Republican National Committees, state and city chairpersons of these parties; (d) state and local government (N=5): governors and mayors identified through snowball sample.
Civil Service	54	Two highest civil service grades from all cabinet departments and independent agencies.
Business	132	(a) Industrial corporations (N=49): chief executive officers of *Fortune* 500 largest corporations; (b) non-industrial corporations (N=54): chief executive officers of *Fortune* 300 largest corporations; (c) centimillionaires (N=29): holders of fortunes worth at least $100 million.
Labor Unions	48	Presidents of 76 largest labor unions, plus AFL-CIO officials.
News Media	63	Editors of largest-circulation newspapers and public affairs periodicals; syndicated columnists; news executives; broadcasters and commentators on national television networks.
Voluntary Associations	52	Elected heads and full-time directors of major professional, farmers', civil rights, women's, veterans', public affairs, religious and business organizations.
Academic Professions	16	Academics identified through snowball sample.
Total	545	

Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study.

---

[2] See the appendix for a list of the sociometric questions asked in each study.

Table 2. Australian Elite Sample Sectors and Positions

Sector	N	Positions (approximately 75 percent of universe sampled)
Politics	80	(a) Federal (N=40): cabinet and shadow cabinet ministers; former prime ministers and independent MPs in Parliament; presidents and national secretaries of Labor, Liberal, National Country, and Democratic Labor parties; (b) State (N=40): leaders and deputy leaders of the two or three major parties in state parliaments; full-time state secretaries of these parties.
Public Service	50	Secretaries of federal government departments; chairpersons and managing directors of the largest statutory authorities.
Business	90	Chief executive officers, board chairpersons and managing directors of the 78 largest industrial and nonindustrial corporations; presidents or executive directors of stock exchanges, key business and agricultural pressure groups.
Labor Unions	50	Federal and state secretaries of the largest or most strategically situated unions; presidents and secretaries of major peak union organizations.
News Media	40	Proprietors, managers, editors and news directors of the major commercial news media groups; principal commissioners and top executives of Australian Broadcasting Corporation and Australian Broadcasting Control Board.
Voluntary Associations	40	Presidents, executive directors and coordinators of major professional, women's, public affairs, consumers, veterans', welfare, and conservationist organizations, plus archbishops of major churches.
Academic Professions	20	Vice-chancellors of largest universities; presidents and heads of scholarly academies and research institutes; prominent economists identified through snowball sample.
Total	370	

Source: Computed from data collected in the Australian Leadership Study.

sectors: business and finance, trade unions, mass media, state governments, and universities and research institutes. This sector-specific battery of questions was administered only to the American snowball sample respondents, however.

3. **Network analysis.** A brief outline of the network analytic procedure employed and its rationale is necessary before we discuss the comparability of the two sociometric data sets. This procedure, developed by Alba (1972, 1973), is well suited to evaluating network integration since it identifies the more cohesive parts of networks, i.e., those regions with extensive interconnections among sets of individuals. Dense interconnections may be face-to-face, as in cliques, or through short chains of interaction, as in social circles (Kadushin, 1968; Alba and Moore, 1978). Because cliques involve direct interaction among all of their members, they tend to be small. Social circles, with both direct and indirect interaction, may be much larger. We are particularly interested in elite social circles because there are several reasons for thinking that these are a principal means of elite integration.

Unlike cliques, social circles can constitute a mechanism for substantial communications and interaction among large numbers of persons who are located in otherwise disparate organizations and sectors. Exactly because they are usually informal groups without defined leaders, social circles draw together persons who have similar interests and concerns but who also have differing formal affiliations and obligations (Kadushin, 1968). By providing their members with ready access to persons in a variety of other organizations and institutions, moreover, social circles can enhance the power and influence of their members. They are, in short, well structured for the management of highly complex national societies by differentiated and specialized elites.

In specific terms, the procedure for identifying cohesive groups begins with the network of relations formed by all interaction nominations made by sample members. A connection or link between two persons is defined as present if one person reports talking to the other and absent if neither person named the other as an interaction partner. The network formed in this way is not limited to respondents, however. It also includes persons outside of the sample who are named as interaction partners by two or more respondents, thus forming links between them. The full network in the U.S. includes 480 of the 545 respondents and 396 persons outside of the sample. The Australian network is composed of 363 of the 370 respondents, as well as 383 nonrespondents. The inclusion of nonrespondents is important because of the impossibility of interviewing all potential respondents in studies of national elites.

In this way, 876 American leaders and 746 Australians formed networks in the sense that all of them were directly or indirectly connected to one another. Neither of these networks is very dense, however. Of the total possible direct links between persons in these networks, only about 1 percent actually existed in our data.

The procedure next identifies all cliques (i.e., groups of three or more persons, each of whom is directly connected to all others) in the network. Last, these cliques are used to locate social circles in the network. Social circles can be thought of as webs of densely interconnected cliques in which indirect communication is facilitated because circle members are also members of highly overlapping cliques. Thus, those cliques with two-thirds or more of their members in common are merged to form social circles in which members are linked directly or through only a few intermediaries. When all highly overlapping groups were merged, the result was 32 cliques and social circles in the U.S. network and 11 cliques and circles in the Australian.

4. **Comparability of data sets.** While the two studies are very similar in design, there are some differences between them which may affect the relative similarity of the network structures that are found. One difference is related to sampling. The Australian sample is more exclusively focused on the 50 or 75 top position holders in most sectors, while the American sample is drawn randomly from a larger list of position holders, often at least several hundred in a given sector. For example, the Australian business elite sample is drawn primarily from the 76 largest corporations while the U.S. sample covers the 800 largest corporations. Partly the result of somewhat different sampling strategies, this difference also reflects the larger size of the American elite universe. The difference in universe size means that the sampling density in the U.S. is somewhat lower, possibly resulting in a less dense network. On the other hand, the U.S. snowball sample partly corrects for this lower sampling density by adding to the final sample persons designated by several others as influential. In this way, it provides better coverage of important elite persons than a random sample allows. The U.S. snowball sample completion rate of 62 percent indicates that the majority of such persons were interviewed.

A further difference, as noted previously, is that all Australian respondents were asked specifically not only about their contacts with persons in the political-governmental sectors, but also with persons in business, unions, media, state governments, and universities. Only snowball respondents in the U.S. were asked similar questions. With more opportunities to name interaction partners, therefore, Australian respondents designated a larger number of interaction partners, on the average, than did the Americans. Nearly one-third of the total designations in Australia were in response to questions not asked of positional American respondents. The result is a wider range of nominations of persons in the business, union, media, state government, and academic sectors in Australia than in the U.S.

The effects of this difference on network structure are twofold. First, the American network, as we describe below, is more focused on the political-governmental elites. While this undoubtedly overestimates the importance of these elites relative to those in other U.S. sectors, political-governmental elites are in fact more central in the U.S. than in the Australian network. Thus, American political and governmental leaders predominate even among persons nominated on sociometric questions which did not ask about respondents' contacts with specific sectors. In response to the question asking who had the most useful and interesting things to say on the respondent's issue, for example, nearly half of the persons designated in the U.S. but less than a third in Australia, were in the political-governmental elites.

A second effect is that the Australian network data are the more comprehensive of the two. However, the larger number of designations obtained from Australian respondents does not inevitably lead to finding a more integrated network. The network found might still be fragmented, with small, disparate groups, if tightly connected, highly overlapping social circles do not join many of these groups' members. Had more interaction questions been asked of all American respondents, a fuller picture of that network would have been obtained. The absence of such additional questions means that, in comparison with the Australian network, the amount of elite integration in the U.S. may be underestimated. Nevertheless, the crucial point for this article is that, because interviews do not produce exhaustive lists of all personal connections between elite persons, our data necessarily *underestimate* the true extent of integration in *both* national elites; they cannot overestimate it.

Overall, these differences between the data sets prevent a definitive conclusion about which national elite is the more integrated, or about the comparative centrality of political-governmental elites in the two countries. On the other hand, the differences do not affect our observation that national elite networks in both Australia and the United States appear to be far more integrated than fragmented.

Results

As we have explained, the network analysis located 32 cohesive groups in the American network and 11 in the Australian. Table 3 shows that there are numerous issue-based or geographically based social circles and cliques in each network. Most of these groups overlap in membership, with only two of the American and one of the Australian circles and cliques isolated from all others. As the listing of these groups in Table 3 suggests, the American network appears to be the more diverse of the two. Nevertheless, this table also shows a striking similarity between the two networks; each contains a large, inclusive social circle (circle #1 on each list), consisting of several hundred elite persons, and having numerous connections to other circles and cliques. In both countries, this large circle joins elites from all sectors, geographic regions and issue areas in relatively cohesive groups whose members can contact one another with little difficulty, either directly or through one or a few intermediaries. Because of their size, inclusiveness and location in the center of each network, we call these two groups "central circles."

The existence of a central elite circle in each country as well as its conections to most specialized groups are evidence of substantial elite integration in the United States and Australia. However, these configurations are not consistent with any of the familiar models of elite integration. While each circle's inclusiveness would be predicted by the plural elite model, the two circles represent a frequency and centralization of contacts among diverse groups and sectors that are greater than this model seems to allow, something we will explore further below. On the other hand, neither the inclusiveness of each central circle nor the bases of circle membership would be predicted by the power elite and ruling class models.

1. **Circle composition.** When we examine the positions, activities and other attributes of members of these central circles (by comparing respondents in each sector who are in the circle with those who are not), we can see that they consist mainly of the more prominent and senior elite persons in each country. Respondents in the American central circle were more active than those outside it in policy advisory capacities, such as testifying before Congress and serving on federal commissions, and they were more visible in the mass media, as measured by the frequency with which they gave TV, radio or magazine interviews, presented lectures, and wrote articles and books. In addition, they were more frequently nominated as influential by other respondents on a separate battery of "reputational" questions (see Moore, 1979, for details).

Respondents in the Australian central circle were sometimes more prominent than those outside it according to the same policy advisory and media visibility measures, but they were most strongly distinguished from nonmembers by their more frequent incumbencies of the highest positions in each sector studied. For example, leaders of the Australian trade union federations were much more likely to be central-circle members than were secretaries of individual unions. Among federal politicians in the Australian central circle, three-quarters were cabinet and shadow-cabinet ministers, and only about one-fifth were backbenchers. Similar comparisons in all other sectors point strongly to the conclusion that in Australia, as in the United States, the central circle is mainly an aggregation of the most strategically influential elite persons.

Not only are both central circles composed primarily of the most influential elite persons, as one would expect, but their members are not drawn disproportionately from upper-class families, which is contrary to what many proponents of the power elite and ruling class models would predict (e.g., Mills, 1956; Porter, 1965; Domhoff, 1967, 1970). When we compare the social backgrounds of respondents inside and outside of these circles, we find no systematic differences between the social origins of circle members and nonmembers in any sector in either country, as measured by father's occupation, parents' education, national origin and religion. With the exception of a couple of sectors in each country, moreover, attendance at exclusive private secondary schools and membership in highly selective social clubs are also unrelated to central circle membership (see Higley, Deacon and Smart, 1979, and Moore, 1979, for details). In short, members of the two circles are distinctive mainly for the power and influence attributes connected to their organizational positions and activities, not for social attributes independent of their positions.

If the central circles are composed of highly active and visible elite persons, in what *sectors* are these persons located? More specifically, are the circles dominated by particular elites, as predicted by the power elite and ruling class models, or are all major elite groups well represented in them? Table 4 shows the sector composition of each cen-

Table 3. Sector Composition and Issue or Geographic Orientation of Elite Circles and Cliques in the United States and Australia

Group ID No.	Size (No. of Members)	Overlaps with Other Groups (ID Nos.)	Sector/Location	Issue Orientation
United States				
1	227	*	All	All
2	3	1	News Media	Several
3	3	19, 20	Several	Several
4	3	1	News Media	Several
5	3	1, 6	News Media	Vietnam War
6	3	1, 5	News Media	Vietnam War
7	5	1, 13, 15, 24	Several	Defense policy
8	3	1	News Media	Freedom of press
9	3		News Media	Freedom of press
10	3	1	Voluntary associations	Race relations
11	3	29	Voluntary associations	Agriculture
12	5	1	California	Ecology
13	6	7, 15, 24	Arizona	Several
14	4	1	New York City	Vietnam War
15	7	1, 7, 13, 24	Several	Defense
16	3		Civil service	Veterans' affairs
17	3	1	Several	Urban affairs
18	3	1, 28, 32	Department of Commerce	Economy
19	13	1, 3, 20	Several	Ecology
20	4	1, 3, 19	Administration/White House	Ecology
21	3	22	Administration/White House	Health care
22	6	1, 21	Administration/White House	Social policy
23	3	1, 30	Administration/White House	Transportation policy
24	5	7, 15	Congress	Defense policy
25	3	1, 29	Congress	Several
26	3	29	Administration/White House	Agriculture
27	3	1, 32	Congress	Economy
28	3	1, 18, 32	Several	Labor unions
29	19	1, 11, 25, 26	Several	Agriculture
30	3	1, 23	Several	Transportation policy
31	3	1	Labor unions	Labor unions
32	5	1, 18, 27, 28	Several	Economy
Australia				
1	418	**	All	All
2	3	1	Academic	Superannuation
3	3	1	Melbourne	Anti-communism
4	3	1, 5	Public service	Women's health
5	6	1, 4	Women's organizations	International Women's Year
6	3		Church of England	Family Law Bill
7	20	1	Government legal associations	Legal aid
8	5	1	Perth	Federalism
9	3	1	Several	Trade practices
10	6	1	Perth	Perth labor
11	7	1	Several	Consumer affairs

Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study and Australian Leadership Study.

*U.S. Group No. 1 overlaps with 23 of the smaller circles and cliques.

**Australia Group No. 1 overlaps with 9 of the 10 smaller groups.

tral circle. The most striking similarity between the two circles is the prevalence of political leaders and government officials among central-circle members in both countries. Probably because Australian respondents were asked specifically to designate business, union, media and academic leaders with whom they had discussed their national issues, the prevalence of politicians and civil servants is somewhat less marked in the Australian circle (45.6 percent versus 55.9 percent in the American circle). But even though the Australian study deliberately sought designations of private sector leaders, the numerical predominance of political-governmental leaders in the American circle is largely duplicated in the Australian, a finding which reinforces our confidence that this is not merely an artifact of the interview questions the two studies did or did not employ. In this context, it is also pertinent to note that while both studies specifically asked all respondents about their interactions with government officials, there is a major difference in the frequency with which federal civil servants appear among the central-circle memberships (only 5.7 percent in the American, but 18.4 percent in the Australian). This difference is undoubtedly a result of the significantly greater institutional power of top civil servants in Australia.

In both countries, business elites are also strongly represented in the central circle. However, much of this prevalence in relation to other sectors results from the larger numbers of business leaders interviewed in both studies (132 in the U.S., 90 in Australia). Respondents have the opportunity to designate large numbers of interaction partners, and thereby to achieve greater prominence themselves, while nonrespondents obviously do not have this ability. Thus, if a greater number of business leaders is interviewed, they are likely to comprise a larger proportion of the central circle. In fact, Table 4 indicates that, in comparison to their proportions of the sample, business elites are somewhat overrepresented in the Australian and underrepresented in the U.S. circle. By this measure, most other private sector groups are slightly underrepresented in both countries' central circles. In sum, all sectors are represented in the central circles, but the political-governmental elites are most prevalent.

Also relevant to the issue of sectoral representation in the central circles is the question of which persons and groups are *most central* within them. Are government officials at the center of each? What is the position of business elites and those of other sectors? In order to find the more and less central persons, we computed an index of centrality for each individual in the network and then ranked persons by their score on this index. The index is based on the number of others in the network a given person can reach directly or through one intermediary.[3] The sector membership of the 100 most central persons on this index is shown in Table 4 as "Top 100." While the centrality index is computed for the entire network, rather than for the central circles alone, virtually all of the top 100 persons in the network are central-circle members: 97 of 100 in the U.S., and all 100 in Australia.

If we designate these 100 most central persons as the core of the central circle, it is clear that the sector composition of the core is similar, though not identical, to that of each central circle as a

Table 4. Sector Composition of American and Australian Samples, Networks, Central Circles, and 'Top 100' Persons (Percent)

Sector	United States Sample	United States Network	United States Central Circle	United States Top 100	Australia Sample	Australia Network	Australia Central Circle	Australia Top 100
Politics	33.0	52.1	50.2	71.0	21.6	28.3	27.2	25.0
Civil Service	9.9	8.2	5.7	1.0	13.5	17.7	18.4	19.0
Business	24.2	13.5	16.3	9.0	24.3	17.3	30.8	37.0
Labor Unions	8.8	6.1	7.0	4.0	13.5	8.9	8.9	4.0
News Media	11.6	8.1	7.5	2.0	10.8	8.1	8.1	6.0
Voluntary Associations	9.5	6.5	4.4	6.0	10.8	6.9	4.8	5.0
Academic Professions	2.9	4.0	7.5	7.0	5.4	10.3	9.8	4.0
Other	–	1.5	1.3	0.0	–	2.5	1.9	0.0
Totals	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0

Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study and Australian Leadership Study.

---

[3] In the U.S. and Australian networks the most central individual, by this measure, can reach 389 and 462 other network members, respectively, either directly or through one intermediary. By contrast, the least central network members can reach less than half a dozen others as directly.

whole. In the U.S., elites in the political-governmental sectors make up over 70 percent of the core, a considerably higher proportion than of the central circle. All other sectors are sparsely represented, generally with less representation in the core than in the circle. The core of the Australian circle is more diverse. Members of the political-governmental sectors comprise a little under half of this group, as they do of the circle itself. But as in the U.S., most other sectors comprise a larger proportion of the circle than of the core. The one real exception is the Australian business elite whose members are overrepresented in the core, as compared with the circle, by some 6 percent. While this does not by itself indicate business elite ascendancy, it does suggest that the monopolistic or oligopolistic character of many industries in Australia's comparatively small economy makes those who head the dominant corporations more central as a group than are their American counterparts. Overall, however, the analysis confirms that the sector compositions of the American and Australian networks, central circles, and top 100 groups are very similar, with political and governmental elites being most prevalent in both countries.

The core of each circle consists of individuals who are especially well connected, in network terms. As Table 5 shows, persons in the core of the U.S. central circle are able to reach two-thirds of their fellows directly or through one other person, while those outside the central circle can reach only 3 percent of the others who are outside the circle this readily. The Australian core is even more densely connected, with its members able to reach 86 percent of the others in the core through no more than one intermediary, while those outside of the central circle are able to contact only 3 percent of their fellows this directly. All members of both central circles are able to contact one another through at most a few intermediaries, but the connections within the two core groups are especially dense. In both countries, then, the network and the circle within it resemble a wheel-like structure with the core consisting of a small number of highly central and densely interconnected individuals.

2. **Centrality of political-governmental elites.** The principal difference between the structure of American and Australian elites thus seems to be the more pronounced centrality of American politicians and government officials. To be certain that this is not an artifact of differences in the study designs, however, we redid the centrality analyses with network data limited to responses to the five identical sociometric questions in the two studies only. This excluded designations in response to questions which asked about contacts with persons in specific sectors other than the political-governmental sectors. In addition, to make the samples more comparable for this computation, we deleted from the U.S. sample 49 business leaders who were not in the top 250 (rather than 500) industrial corporations or in the top 25 (rather than 50) in the following categories of nonindustrial corporations: banks, insurance companies, utilities, transportation, retail chains and a miscellaneous category. Second, except for 20 persons who were members of the Republican or Democratic National Committees, all American party officials were also deleted on the ground that these mainly local politicians had no counterparts in the Australian sample. These changes, resulting in more precisely comparable samples and network data, increase our confidence that remaining differences in results between the two studies reflect actual differences in the elite structure of the two societies.

Once again, a network of all sample members plus all nonrespondents designated by at least two respondents was identified for each country, and the centrality index was calculated. The revised U.S. network includes 705 persons, while the revised Australian network consists of 553.[4] Despite these changes, however, the prevalence of political-governmental elites remains greater in the U.S. network than in the Australian network, and it does not therefore appear to be an artifact. To account for this difference, we speculate that the greater size and diversity of American society, plus the more centralized character of the American federal system, make Washington's politicians and government officials more central groups than their Canberra counterparts. Equally important may be the fact that in the absence of strong parties and party discipline, American political leaders, and especially senators and representatives are more frequently "policy activists" and "political entrepreneurs" who seize on new issues and mobilize elite support for them (Walker, 1977), thereby looming larger in the national elite network as a whole than do their Australian counterparts. In any event, it is clear that in both countries the political-governmental elites are key integrators, possessing a network centrality and numerical prevalence that are not seriously challenged by any other elite group.

This does not in itself render the three familiar

---

[4] To avoid confusion, we emphasize that all other results in this article are based on the original networks rather than the reduced ones. Our inspection of the reduced networks did not reveal patterns significantly different from those in the original networks. We therefore chose to operate with the latter in order to retain as much information from these unique data sets as possible.

Table 5. Proportion of Network Segments Connected by Paths of Two Links or Less for United States and Australia

	Network Segments (Percent)			
	Core of Central Circle ("Top 100")	Remainder of Central Circle	Outside of Central Circle	N
United States				
Core of central circle ("Top 100")	66	34	14	100
Remainder of central circle	34	14	6	127
Outside of central circle	14	5	3	649
Australia				
Core of central circle ("Top 100")	86	41	16	100
Remainder of central circle	41	14	5	318
Outside of central circle	16	5	3	320

Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study and Australian Leadership Study.

models of elite integration inapplicable to these two countries. For all three models focus primarily on the *connections* between political-governmental elites and other elite groups. The power elite and ruling class models posit a strong connection between business and government leaders, portraying labor union and various reform-oriented elites as relatively isolated and peripheral in the national power structure (Mills, 1956; Miliband, 1969). The plural elite model assumes that elite groups are autonomous, specialized and competing, with political-governmental elites playing a brokerage role among them (McConnell, 1966). How accurately do these models describe the connections between elite groups in the United States and Australia?

3. **Connections between elite groups.** To examine the connections between and within elite groups, we returned to the original samples and networks, dividing all the direct links between central circle members into categories according to the sectors of the persons they joined. To assess whether certain sectors "prefer" linkages to certain other sectors, we compared the actual distribution of links between sectors with what the expected distribution would be if each sector was equally linked to each other sector. Thus the first column in Table 6 shows the percentage of all links between central-circle members that involve each sector elite. Each of the other columns shows the corresponding distribution of links between all pairs of sector elites. If each circle member's links were distributed among other circle members independent of sectors, then all percentages in each row would be the same as those in the first column. We call this the expected distribution, and by comparing it with actual distributions (all columns but the first), we can infer each sector's "preference" for, or "avoidance" of, links with other sectors.

Three patterns emerge. First, contrary to the expectations of Mills, Miliband and others, virtually all sector elites are linked to all other sector elites within the central circle in each country. Thus, not only are the governmental and business sectors linked, but also nearly all other sector elites are connected to those sectors and to one another. Only the American civil service elite, which is weakly represented in the central circle to start with, is relatively isolated, having no links with union or voluntary association leaders in the circle, and only scanty links with the other sector elites. All sector elites are linked in the Australian circle. Indeed, contrary to pluralist expectations, the bulk of all links within the two national central circles occur between sector elites rather than within them: 64.5 percent in the U.S. and 74.5 percent in Australia. While this is not especially surprising given the inter-sector focus of some of the sociometric questions, it is noteworthy that the proportions of inter-sector links increase as one approaches the circles' core groups. Excluding links between the 71 politicians who dominate the American circle's core, for example, 96.2 percent of all remaining links between the 100 most central Americans go across sector lines. Even without excluding links between politicians, 84.3 percent of all links between the 100 most central Australians are inter-sector. In short, in both countries linkages between sectors are more evenly distributed than the power elite and ruling class models would lead us to expect, and they are more frequent, especially among the most central persons, than the plural elite model seems to imply.

Second, despite the predominance of inter-sector links, elites in all the Australian and in three of the five American nongovernmental sectors show somewhat more intra-sector links than is expected statistically. This is most pronounced in the cases of labor union elites in both central

Table 6. Expected and Actual Distribution of Links within American and Australian Central Circles According to Sector (Percent)

Sector	Expected Distribution	Actual Distribution						
		Business	Labor Unions	News Media	Voluntary Associations	Academic Professions	Politics	Civil Service
United States:								
Business	13	11	12	7	1	9	17	5
Labor Unions	6	5	15	6	2	3	7	0
News Media	4	2	4	7	1	2	5	2
Voluntary Associations	6	1	2	1	6	3	8	0
Academic Professions	6	5	3	4	4	8	8	8
Politics	62	76	63	65	87	71	52	83
Civil Service	3	1	0	1	0	4	4	3
Total	100	101	99	101	101	100	101	101
N	1990	265	118	85	109	128	1222	63
Australia:								
Business	24*	28	18	14	2	16	32	24
Labor Unions	8	6	17	7	7	8	9	6
News Media	8	5	8	26	5	6	9	6
Voluntary Associations	4	0**	3	2	12	2	6	5
Academic Professions	6	4	6	5	3	18	6	8
Politics	30	39	34	33	53	27	26	20
Civil Service	18	18	14	13	18	23	12	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	4484	1099	358	374	166	276	1352	827

Source: Computed from data collected in the American Leadership Study and Australian Leadership Study.

*Column excludes eight persons in other sectors who account for 62 links.

**Less than 1 percent.

circles, and of media, voluntary association, and academic elites in the Australian circle. There is thus some indication of elite isolation along power elite lines, or of autonomy and specialization along plural elite lines. Nevertheless, both union elites have about as many links with business leaders as they have among themselves, and both have substantially more links with their respective political elites. Many Australian media and academic elite respondents reported, moreover, that they deliberately avoid contacts with other elite sectors in order to protect their professional neutrality or because their advisory roles commit them to silence on policy issues. There is thus no strong evidence here for the theses that some elites are isolated and peripheral or that all elites are markedly autonomous and specialized in modern societies.

Finally, in both circles the largest proportions of links involving nongovernmental sector elites are with the political-governmental elites. This is most true of voluntary association leaders, whose extensive lobbying of government occurs in both circles almost to the exclusion of contacts with other sector elites. Links between non-governmental and political-governmental elites are greater in the United States than in Australia, probably in part because of the American study's stronger focus on these links. But even in the Australian data, where the sociometric focus is less concentrated on links with politicians and federal civil servants, there is no question but that these two groups are the preferred contacts of nongovernmental elites. In both circles, preference is generally for contacts with political-governmental leaders first and with fellow sector members second. The general pattern is one in which all nongovernmental elites have extensive connections to politicians and government officials who are therefore the linchpins of elite integration in the two central circles and elite networks.

Conclusions

In general, how do the several models of elite integration fare when applied to data on the inclusiveness and structure of American and Australian interaction networks? Of the three familiar models, the plural elite model seems to be most accurate, although none of the three is wholly inaccurate. As the plural elite model leads us to expect, elite networks in the two countries are inclusive of all major elite groups studied, location in these networks is not related to social class, education or other social background variables, and political-governmental elites are clearly central in terms of interaction linkages. In each of these respects, the power elite and ruling class models describe the data much less accurately. On the other hand, the plural elite model's depiction of autonomous, specialized elites is not convincingly supported. The existence of a large, densely interconnected central circle in each country fits uneasily with the pluralist image. In addition, there is extensive interaction between sectors, and inter-elite interaction is strongly centralized in core groups that are themselves so tightly integrated as to be incompatible with that model.

In these latter respects and in others, there is empirical support for at least the thrust of the power elite and ruling class models. Consistent with these two models, for example, is the centrality of business elites in both countries, especially in the Australian core group. As well, the relatively isolated, peripheral position of top civil servants which we find in the American network is consistent with Mills' thesis (1956, pp. 237-41). In Australia, where top civil servants hardly occupy isolated or peripheral network positions, one could argue that the triumvirate of political, business, and civil service elites, which virtually monopolize the core positions, comprise a power elite.[5] What emerges in both countries, in any event, is a picture of political-governmental and business elites as *primus inter pares* in networks that are inclusive of all major elite groups. Whether this should be taken as proof of a power elite or ruling class, whether it illustrates Lindblom's thesis (1977, pp. 170-213) that in "market systems" power is necessarily divided primarily between political-governmental and business elites, or whether it indicates that the modern interventionist state forces business elites into close, but essentially dependent relations with those who control the state apparatus are questions which our data raise but do not allow us to answer.

We end up, then, with findings that do not consistently support or entirely contradict any of the familiar models of elite integration. A more accurate description is provided by the consensually integrated elite model we have advanced. The descriptive and explanatory power of this model for the data presented here suggest that it ought to be considered and tested in further research. This model incorporates aspects of all three familiar models, but it portrays the structure of consensually integrated elites like the American and Australian as more comprehensively elitist, in the sense of a tighter integration of more elite groups, than has previously been recognized. In addition, it is a model which makes good theoretical sense in the context of the elitist paradigm. That is, it helps us to account for the existence of one of the major comparative and historical variations in elite behavior and structure, the consensually integrated national elite. As Kadushin has contended (1979, p. 127), "An integrated, legitimate national elite must and does exist only as a single national power establishment." The consensually integrated elite model and the research reported here take us a step closer to understanding how this is so.

Appendix

The following interaction questions were administered to all American and Australian respondents:

1. Have you talked with individual (legislators/Members of Parliament) about your policy position on this issue? With whom?
2. Have you talked with (federal officials/Commonwealth Public Servants) about your policy position on this issue? Which people?
3. Have you tried to get people that you know to support or oppose legislation on this issue? Who?
4. Have you worked with an interest group or organization trying to influence public policy on this issue? Which persons?
5. Of the various people you have talked with about this issue, who had the most useful and interesting things to say?

An additional six questions were asked of American *snowball* respondents:

6. Have you talked with people in business and finance about your policy position on this issue?
7. Have you talked with labor leaders about your policy position on this issue?
8. Have you talked with other interest group leaders about your policy position on this issue?

---

[5] We should perhaps add that while military leaders were not interviewed in either country, they received almost no designations as interaction partners on the hundred or so specific national issues, including foreign policy and defense issues, on which each set of respondents were most active.

9. Have you talked with mass media people about your policy position on this issue?
10. Have you talked with people at the political party organizations about your policy position on this issue?
11. Have you talked with people in the White House about your policy position on this issue?

An additional six questions were asked of *all* Australian respondents:

6. Have you talked with anyone in business or finance about your policy position on this issue?
7. Have you talked with anyone in the trade unions about your policy position on this issue?
8. Have you talked with anyone in newspapers or broadcasting about your policy position on this issue?
9. Have you talked with anyone in the state governments about your policy position on this issue?
10. Have you talked with anyone in the universities or research institutions about your policy position on this issue?
11. Is there any person active on this issue whom you feel we must interview? Who?

References

Alba, Richard D. (1972). "COMPLT—A Program for Analyzing Sociometric Data and Clustering Similarity Matrices." *Behavioral Science* 17: 566.

______ (1973). "A Graph-Theoretic Definition of a Sociometric Clique." *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 3: 113-26.

______, and Gwen Moore (1978). "Elite Social Circles." *Sociological Methods and Research* 7: 167-88.

Aron, Raymond (1950). "Social Structure and Ruling Class." *British Journal of Sociology* 1: 1-16, 126-43.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz (1963). "Decisions and Non-Decisions." *American Political Science Review* 57: 632-42.

Barton, Allen H., Bogdan Denitch, Charles Kadushin, Gwen Moore, Wayne Parsons, and Carol Weiss (1981). "Backgrounds, Attitudes and Activities of American Elites." In B. Denitch (ed.), *National Elites: What They Think, What They Do*. London: Sage (forthcoming).

Bottomore, T. B. (1964). *Elites and Society*. New York: Basic Books.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Samuel P. Huntington (1964). *Political Power USA/USSR*. New York: Viking Press.

Connell, R. W. (1977). *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1958). "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model." *American Political Science Review* 52: 463-69.

______ (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

______ (1967). *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Dahrendorf, Ralf (1967). *Society and Democracy in Germany*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Domhoff, G. William (1967). *Who Rules America?* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

______ (1970). *The Higher Circles: Governing Class in America*. New York: Vintage.

______ (1978). *The Powers That Be*. New York: Vintage.

Esping-Anderson, Gosta, Roger Friedland and Erik Olin Wright (1976). "Models of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State." *Kapitalistate* Nos. 4-5: 186-220.

Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley (1978). "Imperfectly Unified Elites: The Cases of Italy and France." In Richard Tomasson (ed.), *Comparative Studies in Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 295-317.

__________ (1980). *Elitism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Giddens, Anthony (1973). *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.

Higley, John, G. Lowell Field and Knut Gröholt (1976). *Elite Structure and Ideology: A Theory with Applications to Norway*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Higley, John, Desley Deacon and Don Smart (1979). *Elites in Australia*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hough, Jerry F., and Merle Fainsod (1979). *How the Soviet Union is Governed*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hunter, Floyd (1959). *Top Leadership, U.S.A.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Kadushin, Charles (1968). "Power, Influence, and Social Circles: A New Methodology for Studying Opinion Makers." *American Sociological Review* 33: 685-99.

______ (1979). "Power Circles and Legitimacy in Developed Societies." In B. Denitch (ed.), *Legitimation of Regimes*. London: Sage Studies in International Sociology 17, pp. 127-40.

Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1955). *Personal Influence*. New York: Free Press.

Keller, Suzanne (1963). *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society*. New York: Random House.

Lijphart, Arend (1968). *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

______ (1978). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). *Politics and Markets*. New York: Basic Books.

Lukes, Steven (1974). *Power: A Radical View*. London: Macmillan.

McConnell, Grant (1966). *Private Power and American Democracy*. New York: Knopf.

McRae, Kenneth D. (1974). *Consociational Democracy*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Miliband, Ralph (1969). *The State in Capitalist Society.* New York: Basic Books.

Mills, C. Wright (1956). *The Power Elite.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Moore, Gwen (1979). "The Structure of a National Elite Network." *American Sociological Review* 44: 673-92.

Parry, Geraint (1969). *Political Elites.* New York: Praeger.

Porter, John (1965). *The Vertical Mosaic.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Presthus, Robert (1973). *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prewitt, Kenneth, and Alan Stone (1973). *The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Purcell, Susan Kaufman, and John F. H. Purcell (1980). "State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?" *World Politics* 32: 194-227.

Putnam, Robert D. (1976). *The Comparative Study of Political Elites.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Rigby, T. H. (1968). *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Rose, Arnold M. (1967). *The Power Structure.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Therborn, Göran (1978). *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* London: New Left Books.

Walker, Jack L. (1977). "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection." *British Journal of Political Science* 7: 423-45.

Constitution-Making: Alignment and Realignment in the Federal Convention of 1787

CALVIN C. JILLSON
Louisiana State University

This study offers an empirical description of the voting alignments that dominated the American Constitutional Convention as the delegates struggled to produce the final report of that historic assembly. Its conceptual roots are firmly planted in the theoretical traditions of Schattschneider on conflict and cleavage, and of Key, Burnham and Sundquist on critical realignment of the American party system. I demonstrate that dynamic processes analogous to Key's conception of "critical elections" at the macro-level of national politics can also be identified and analyzed at the micro-level of the constituent assembly. Therefore, I argue that one of the "mainsprings of American politics," as Burnham calls the critical election phenomenon, permeates all levels of the American political system and not simply the national level of electoral mass politics. More specifically, this clear description of coalition alignment, operation and realignment in the Constitutional Convention, when informed and enlightened by the "critical realignment" model, greatly facilitates the more traditional discussion of debate, conflict and ultimate decision on the central issues before that body—representation, federalism, senatorial authority, and the nature of the executive in a republican government.

This study offers an empirical description of the voting alignments that dominated the American Constitutional Convention as the delegates struggled to produce the final report of that historic assembly. Although the analysis highlights changes and realignments in the voting coalitions as they occurred during the course of the convention, it is more than a simple descriptive exercise. Its conceptual roots are firmly planted in the theoretical traditions of Schattschneider (1960, pp. 62-77) on conflict and cleavage, and Key (1955, 1959), Burnham (1970, pp. 1-10) and Sundquist (1973, pp. 1-10) on critical realignment of the American party system. I demonstrate that dynamic processes analogous to Key's conception of "critical elections" at the macro-level of national politics can also be identified and analyzed at the micro-level of the constituent assembly. Therefore, I argue that one of the "mainsprings of American politics," as Burnham calls the critical election phenomenon, permeates all levels of the American political system and not simply the national level of electoral mass politics.

More specifically, a clear description of coalition alignment, operation and realignment in the convention, when informed and enlightened by the "critical realignment" model, greatly facilitates the more traditional discussion of debate, conflict and ultimate decision on the central issues before that body. This firm empirical base has been lacking in earlier analyses of the convention's work. Until the coalition patterns that characterized the convention's business are clearly defined, it must remain very difficult to present convincing explanations of how conflicting theoretical perspectives and practical programs became or failed to become reflected in constitutional provisions. Earlier efforts to analyze the convention's operations and decisions constitute a series of interesting, but generally ad hoc, hypotheses about the nature, number and effect of the divisions that separated the states at particular times and on particular issues. The direct result is that this work has failed to form a cumulative body of knowledge and understanding. Consequently, we find ourselves inundated by an embarrassing wealth of contradictory claims with no firm basis for choice among them.

Therefore, this study undertakes three general tasks. First, it supplies an empirical description of the voting coalitions that operated during the convention, with particular attention to their changes or realignments over time. Second, it advances an explanation of the underlying rationale for each division of the states. Questions such as the following are addressed: What were the major issues that precipitated each alignment? What were the alternative positions and arguments with their theoretical justifications and their practical power implications? Who finally prevailed and why? Third, the critical realignment phenomenon is

---

I am very grateful to the many friends and colleagues who helped to shape this paper. Particular appreciation goes to the dissertation committee that guided the early research: Thornton Anderson, Chair, Warren Phillips, Ric Uslaner, Ron Terchek, Don Devine and Whit Ridgway, all of the University of Maryland, College Park. Later versions of this paper benefited greatly from the comments and criticism of Ron Weber, Jim Bolner, Larry Falkowski and Bob Huckfeldt, all of Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

examined as it operates within the very restricted context of the constituent assembly—in this case, the American Constitutional Convention of 1787.

Early Views of the Conflict at the Convention

Interpretation of the constitution-making process has developed with a seeming inexorability from stark simplicity to great complexity. George Bancroft, a nineteenth-century eulogist of the Constitution and its authors, claimed that the American people rose as one against British tyranny and when free adopted a restrained but unbiased democratic constitution. But by the late 1950s interpretations had acquired such a degree of complexity in describing the disunity engendered by conflicting interests active in the convention that traditional modes of analysis were virtually overwhelmed. This study will first describe the growing complexity of these arguments and then suggest a model that will allow us to organize, interpret and understand the issues involved.

The "Whig Conception" of history and the men who made it dominated the early studies of the drafting of the Constitution (Bancroft, 1882; Fiske, 1888). The decade between the Revolution and the Constitution was described as one in which all right-thinking persons sought the immediate strengthening of the central government so that the nation might more adequately deal with the problems and strains of nationhood on a continental scale. In so doing, these patriots were defending one of the few strongholds of liberty and democracy in a world in which these values were in perhaps fatal and final decline (Greene, 1967; Bailyn, 1967; Wood, 1969).

The rise of the "Economic Approach" early in the twentieth century articulated an entirely different understanding of the place of the convention and the Constitution in the founding of the American political system (Smith, 1907; Beard, 1913). Instead of seeing the Constitution as a resounding victory for the general interest of liberty in the world, scholars portrayed interests within the convention as engaged in an essentially zero-sum contest for control of the levers of political and economic power (Smith, 1907, p. 299). Charles A. Beard, whose name is now synonymous with this perspective, interpreted the struggle over the Constitution as a victory for investment capital over capital employed in small-scale agricultural production, calling these two general categories of economic interest "personalty" and "realty." Although Beard quickly became an imposing presence in the field of constitutional studies, his thesis was attacked from the first (Warren, 1928, pp. 69-72). In fact, since Charles Warren, some 50 years ago, initiated a line of criticism assailing Beard for an "altogether too neat, too simple" picture of the interests that clashed in the convention, constitutional studies have produced an increasingly complex and sophisticated differentiation of the groups and interests seen as participants in that classic confrontation (Crowl, 1947; Pool, 1950; Thomas, 1953; Brown, 1956).

This trend toward increasing complexity culminated in 1958 with Forrest McDonald's attempt to respond to the criticism of economic reductionism by redesigning Beard's earlier study. McDonald's analysis reinforced the conclusions arrived at by Warren as early as 1928 and by several studies conducted during the late 1940s and early 1950s of the battles in the individual states over the Constitution's ratification. In McDonald's eyes, Beard's greatest shortcoming lay in his unnecessarily simplistic attempt to reduce the complexity of the interests and issues affecting the convention "to a single set of generalizations that would apply to all the states. Any such attempt [to reduce the convention's complexity to a single set of generalizations] is necessarily futile, for the various interest groups operated under different conditions in the several states, and their attitudes toward the Constitution varied with the internal conditions of the states" (1958, p. 357).

This recognition of the multiplicity of local and regional interests is critical to understanding the internal dynamics of the convention as a system and set of processes that operated to produce the American Constitution. Obviously, McDonald did not altogether discard Beard's basic thesis. He simply replaced Beard's dichotomous picture with a much more complex and realistic portrayal of the various interests that interacted, each cross-cutting and modifying the impact of the others, to produce the complex document that is the American Constitution. McDonald's basic point is that the interplay, the cooperation and opposition, among the various interests is likely to be complex in the extreme. Simple dichotomies, such as large states versus small, North versus South, commercial versus agrarian, landed versus landless, or personalty versus realty would be highly unlikely to capture this complexity. Yet these are precisely the explanations found in much of the traditional literature.

The Consensus View of the Convention

How is one to explain the existence of a Constitution at all if American society in the 1780s was teeming with selfish interest groups bent on directing politics, and particularly the fundamentally constitutive process of Constitution-making, to the service of their private ends? In recent years, the theme of class conflict and clashing interest groups has been greatly modified by a developing sense of the importance of intellectual, theoretical and ideological influences on the behavior of Americans in the 1780s. Lee Benson, Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood, among a host of others, have contended that a widely shared American mindset, constituting "a general pattern of beliefs about the social process—a set of common assumptions about history, society, and politics," permeated American society in the eighteenth century (Wood, 1968, p. viii). The application of this general sense of the homogeneity of American political thought to the convention itself allowed John P. Roche to argue convincingly in 1961 that these basic and widely shared political beliefs underlay, and in fact made possible, the success of that body. Roche does not marvel at the diversity of opinion upon which Beard and even McDonald concentrated. On the contrary, he argued that "what is striking to one who analyzes the Convention as a case study in democratic politics is the lack of clear cut ideological distinctions in the Convention." This is not to say that there were no serious conflicts or that groups pursuing various and divergent interests did not clash, but that "basic differences of opinion . . . were not ideological; they were structural" (Roche, 1961, p. 815). Although there was a general uniformity of opinion concerning ends, differences over means could be many and serious. A similar interpretation was widely held among the delegates themselves. George Mason wrote to his son just a week before the convention convened, saying,

> Upon the great principles of it, I have reason to hope that there will be greater unanimity and less opposition, except from the little States, than was at first apprehended. The most prevalent idea in the principal States seems to be a total alteration of the present federal system. . . . It is easy to foresee that there will be much difficulty in organizing a government upon this great scale; . . . yet with a proper degree of coolness, liberality and candor (very rare commodities by the bye), I doubt not but it may be effected.

And on the very day that the convention took its first roll-call vote, James Madison, in a letter to Edward Pendleton, expressed the impression that, "In general the members seem . . . averse to temporizing expedients. I wish they may as readily agree when particulars are brought forward" (Farrand, 1911, Vol. 3, pp. 23-33).

Therefore, our task requires an analytic approach that takes cognizance of a reading of the convention's basic structure identified by so prescient a pair as Madison and Mason and confirmed by the dominant trend of recent scholarship. That structure was determined by the convention's need to reach agreement, always within the general parameters provided by a government in the republican form, on a broad range of constitutional detail. Each provision was a matter of some discretion during debate. This discretion, in the face of the many competing and partial interests represented in the convention, provided in each case the opportunity, not to say the promise, for conflict and disagreement.

A Broader Theory of Critical Realignment

We can explore the implications for the convention of complex interaction among independent and self-interested agents by attempting to develop further E. E. Schattschneider's explanatory framework for the operation, impact and characteristic processes of conflict in a serial decision-making situation. Schattschneider argued that for a decision to be taken in any voting system composed of independent actors, the participants must join forces to create the requisite majority. In the act of joining forces the participants necessarily form a cooperation-opposition pattern on at least this individual event or decision. If the same cooperation-opposition patterns show up across a series of decisions, one can begin to speak of coherent decision groups and perhaps even voting coalitions.

Schattschneider used a diagram like the one given in Figure 1 to demonstrate the argument that active decision systems are characterized by both cooperation and unity on the one hand, and by conflict and cleavage on the other (1960, pp. 62-77). When a question is presented for discussion, debate, and final resolution, two related aspects of a dynamic process are set in motion. First, a division of the participants takes place between those who favor and those who oppose Issue A, those above the cleavage line versus those below it. But simultaneously, within each group, some measure of cooperation or agreement on Issue A is being displayed. The more cohesive groups become internally, the more effectively they can act in the between-group conflict that is the continuous battle over political issues in an open and ongoing decision system.

One such decision system is that discussed by V. O. Key (1955, 1959), Walter Dean Burnham (1970), James Sundquist (1973) and Gerald Pomper (1967): the national electoral system in which the presidential election is the common unit of analysis. This work began in 1955 with Key's classic study, "A Theory of Critical Elections." Since that time, Burnham, Pomper and Sundquist have elaborated Key's identification of "a category of election . . . in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the preexisting cleavage within the electorate," that "seems to persist for several succeeding elections" (1955, p. 4). In other words, Key argued that some decisions by the mass electorate are more important than others in terms of the bias or direction that they impart to the decision system.

Obviously, if some electoral decisions are noteworthy for their reorienting impact on the national party system, those that appear somehow normal must represent periods of stability between major reorientations, during which identifiable coalitions form and operate within stable cooperation-opposition patterns. Burnham's *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* convincingly displayed a "profile of long-term stability and short-term disruption . . . at the global national level." He concluded that this pattern is so evident "that one is led to suspect that the truly 'normal' structure of American national politics at the mass base is precisely this dynamic even dialectical polarization between long-term inertia and concentrated bursts of change in this open system of action" (1970, p. 27).

James L. Sundquist very explicitly built on Burnham's work by using the case study approach to analyze the three major examples of party realignment that have occurred since the Civil War. He concluded that realignments do not simply occur periodically but have followed when

> the existing rationale for the division of voters between the parties gave way to a new one. . . . The voting blocs that came together as coalitions . . . were rearranged. Thus the line of party cleavage sliced through the electorate in a new direction. . . . When things settled down, the changes had been so profound that in retrospect . . . a new party system can be said to have replaced the old (1973, p. 7).

Clearly, Sundquist's analysis of critical realignment in the American party system can profitably be viewed as a particular case of Schattschneider's more general argument that competing issues may divide a body of voters along a number of different lines. The voting body in question may be the American mass electorate as it participates in a presidential election or the average of 35 delegates from 11 states that gathered daily during the American Constitutional Convention. In each case, the single decision event, the election or the roll-call vote, provides the unit of analysis, and the serial consideration of these units provides a picture of the dynamic development of the decision system over time.

Therefore, in the analysis of an ongoing decision process, the interesting case concerns a system in which a number of salient issues are simultaneously present (see Figure 2). Since each major issue taps a more or less different set of questions



Source: Derived from E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 62-77.

Figure 1. The Decision Universe with Single Cleavage

or problems, the participants may find it convenient to join with different allies as the business moves forward. When this occurs, the power of effective decision is redistributed within the system, creating new cooperation-opposition patterns, new allies and opponents, and most importantly, new winners and losers on the substantive issues (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 63).

The fact that the Constitution has traditionally been characterized as a "bundle of compromises," strongly suggests that the convention fulfilled the minimal requirements of Schattschneider's model for an ongoing decision system facing multiple issues. Gerald Pomper even finds that behavior in the convention meets the more rigorous demands of coalition theory to the extent that "we are justified at least in an initial assumption that its behavior is of a coalitional quality" (1970, p. 210). The prevalence of compromise in the convention is of particular interest; the need for a compromise solution indicates that opposing voting groups have formed on opposite sides of an issue; that conflict over a period of time in the normal decision process has sharpened the differentiation between groups and the unity within groups; but that neither side has been able to overcome the other. The decision to accept a compromise solution very rapidly dissipates the energy behind the conflict and allows a new issue to rise to preeminence, perhaps activating a new cleavage line, and dividing the participants differently.

It is hoped that this dynamic model, applied to the roll-call voting record of the convention and interpreted in light of the intricate debates recorded by James Madison and others, will contribute to the development of a more sophisticated understanding of the accomplishments of that historic conclave.

The Convention and the Model

The circular models outlined in Figures 1 and 2 clearly display the logic inherent in the McDonald-Roche description of a highly fractious convention sustained by a widespread underlying ideological homogeneity. The circle itself represents bounded disagreement. In the convention this meant that fundamental agreement on two major points served to restrain disagreement on all other points. First, there was broad agreement on the desirability—indeed the political necessity, given the existing distribution of political opinion in



Source: Derived from E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 62-77.

Figure 2. The Decision Universe with Multiple, Cross-Cutting Cleavages

society—of offering a government in the republican form (D. Smith, 1965, p. 56; Banning, 1974, p. 170). This consensus on fundamental principles allowed the dialogue to begin, but widespread agreement on a second set of facts greatly facilitated successful completion of the convention's business. The dominant interpretation of the existing political situation was summarized in James Madison's impression that "in general the members seem to accord in viewing our situation as peculiarly critical" (quoted in Farrand, 1911, Vol. 3, p. 27). George Washington, writing to Thomas Jefferson in France, echoed Madison's assessment, saying,

> The business of this convention is as yet too much in embryo to form any opinion of the conclusion. . . . That something is necessary, none will deny, for the situation of the general government, if it may be called a government, is shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturned by every blast. In a word, it is at an end; and, unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy and confusion will inevitably ensue (quoted in Farrand, 1911, Vol. 3, p. 31).

This view of the immediacy of the danger not only held the convention together but positively pulled it through its most dangerous periods.

Largely due to this widely shared belief that the nation's health, perhaps even its very survival, depended upon producing a broadly acceptable Constitution, one conflict scenario became very familiar. Conflict or disagreement within the circle began with the rise of a critical and divisive issue or set of related issues. As initial debate clarified the available options, opposing coalitions quickly formed and engaged in extended debate, often characterized by impassioned pleas, demands, and threats of withdrawal until deadlock and stalemate threatened the Convention with dissolution. Whenever they were faced with a conflict that seemed to be insoluble under normal decision procedures, the convention delegates would deliberately select a compromise committee composed of moderates on the issue. After relatively brief deliberation, this committee would return to the floor with a proposal acceptable to neither extreme but supported by a majority. Such a compromise solution, when accepted by the convention, rapidly deflated the salience, centrality, and potential for further divisiveness of the issue. Further, the compromise created an emotional and substantive vacuum in the convention's business that was rapidly filled by a new cluster of critical issues with new and different coalitions to contend them. On several occasions, as the convention seemed to approach too violent an altercation, cooler heads drew it back from the abyss, the issue was compromised, the circle of shared consensus remained unbroken, and the convention proceeded on to new issues, new conflicts, new decisions.

The Model and the Methodology

To get at both the consensus and the conflict that characterized the convention, we have attempted to build several concerns into the adaptation of factor analysis employed in this study.[1] First, there must be an explicit time dimension so that the methodology can identify coalition realignments across time in the convention. Second, it must allow us to distinguish between levels of commitment and to observe changes in the levels of commitment demonstrated by particular states to general coalitions. Third, if it is true, as I have argued, that issues engender alignments and the substitution of one critical issue for another may engender a realignment, then it is of considerable importance to determine what the central issues under discussion at each stage in the convention's business were, when they changed and whether a coalition realignment ensued.

Factor analysis will allow us to address each of these concerns very directly. A two-factor solution to the patterned variation that underlies and organizes the surface complexity in the roll-call voting record of a particular phase of the convention's business will display the general voting coalitions that confronted one another over the issues contested during that period. The factor loading for each state on each factor will display the level of intensity or degree of commitment of each state to its coalition. Factor scores, on the other hand, indicate the extent to which the general coalition alignments pertain to or are reflected in each particular roll-call vote. High factor scores identify those questions confronting the delegates that most directly touch upon the dominant issues of the period, allowing us to address the following question: which individual roll-call votes, dealing with which substantive issues, contributed most to creating the coalition patterns that dominated a given period of the convention's work? In other words, what were the critical issues around which the coalitions formed and over which they did battle?

---

[1] A straightforward and readily accessible introduction to factor analysis is Rummel (1967). For a complete treatment, see either Rummel (1970) or Harry H. Harman (1976). See also Anderson et al. (1966).

The present study is a Q-factor analysis throughout as I am concerned to group states, or variables in the matrix columns, on the basis of similarity of voting response pattern, or cases (roll-call votes), found in the matrix rows. Twelve states attended the convention although never more than eleven were present at any one time. They will comprise the variables in this study: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. The range of cases is also very clearly limited. They are the 569 roll-call votes taken over the course of the convention. See Max Farrand, ed. (1911).

All factor analyses proceed from a matrix of correlation coefficients. Since voting in the convention was by state delegation, rather than by individual delegate, treating each state as a dichotomous variable, after the pairwise deletion of absences and divided votes, allows each cell of the matrix to show the degree of association between two states in yes and no voting. Votes were coded for analysis as follows: 1—yes, 2—no, 3—absent, 4—divided.

Coalition Formation and Realignment in the Convention

A necessary first step in attempting to be explicit about the operation of voting coalitions in the Constitutional Convention involves specifying those periods during the course of the debates at which coalition realignments occurred.[2] To do this, we must add a temporal dimension to factor analysis' clustering capabilities. To allow the factor methodology to demonstrate changes in the voting coalitions as issues and interests change over time in the convention, one need only limit the number of votes considered on each run. Rather than a single run covering all 569 roll-call votes, this study acknowledged the data's temporal dimension by performing 25 separate factor analysis runs of 100 votes each.[3]

Run number 1 covered votes 1 through 100. On the second run, the first 20 votes, 1 through 20, were dropped and the next 20, 101 through 120, were added. Thus, the second run covers the 100 votes between 21 and 120. The process proceeds by 20-vote increments until all 569 roll-call votes have been included in the analysis. It is important to note that by run number 6, no vote that was included in run number 1 is still in the 100-vote bloc under consideration. Since two completely different sets of votes are being subjected to analysis in runs 1 and 6, if the coalitions that opposed one another over the first 100 votes were not the same as those that controlled the second 100, that fact should be detected. Figure 3 displays the results of this dynamic approach. Three distinct coalition realignments occurred during the course of the convention's proceedings, meaning that there were, before, between and after these realignments, four periods of relative stability during which various coalitional patterns dominated the convention's affairs.

The most important aspects of Figure 3 are the following. Each vertical line represents an individual two-factor solution to 100 sequential roll-call votes. From left to right along the bottom of the graph, votes are explicitly labeled at intervals of 100 (50, 150, 250, 350, 450), but each vertical line represents an increment of 20; for instance, the lines between #50 and #150, represent 100-vote sets with 70, 90, 110, 130 as their middle or pivot votes. Factor analysis runs are labeled in increments of 5 (1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25). Each run unambiguously exhibits the dominant coalition pattern during the period in which the 100 votes under consideration were debated and recorded.

The horizontal lines are of equal importance as they indicate the extent to which individual states participate in the opposing coalitions defined by each two-factor solution. The middle horizontal line is labeled 0 and the loadings of each state on each two-factor solution are laid out above and below the 0 point. Factor 1 and the states that coalesce on it are found above the 0 point, and Factor 2 and those that group together on it in opposition to the Factor 1 states are found below. The loadings on both factors are labeled at intervals of .25 (0, .25, .50, .75, 1.0). The abbreviation for each state identifies a distinctive line symbol which can be traced across the entire graph from the convention's opening to its final adjournment.

Obviously, the most striking aspect of Figure 3 is the presence of three very clear periods of coalition realignment. The first began with run number 6, of which the middle or pivot vote is 150; the Connecticut Compromise was approved in the convention at vote number 156. The second realignment begins with run number 16, of which

---

[2] All previous attempts to employ quantitative methods to identify voting coalitions in the convention have serious problems in both conceptualization and research design (McDonald, 1958; Stodinger, 1968; Ulmer, 1968). Implicit in the study of all 569 roll-call votes as one undifferentiated group is the very strong assumption that the voting blocs so identified operated throughout the convention with equal authority, or at least that temporary variations in the alignments did not prove crucial and the disturbed coalitions somehow returned to their original alignment. On the other hand, if the voting alignments changed during the course of the convention, then the attempt to define a single general coalition structure would not result in a definitive pattern, but in the homogenization of a number of coalition structures that might have been valid on particular issues, but not universally so, or in a number of small voting blocs that would have had to vary their associations and constantly recombine to form, dissolve, and reform working majorities as issues changed. If this latter possibility pertains, the analyst must certainly have some responsibility for describing when and how these realignments took place.

[3] See similar method used by Burnham, *Critical Elections* (1970, pp. 13-14).



Source: Prepared for the author by chartographers of the Geology Department, University of Maryland, College Park. Derived from 25 separate factor analyses of recorded roll-call votes in the American Constitutional Convention of 1787.

Figure 3. Coalition Realignment in the American Constitutional Convention

the middle vote is 350; the Commerce and Slave Trade Compromise was passed in part by vote number 352. The final realignment begins with run number 21, of which the middle vote is 450; the executive branch compromise was passed with vote number 441. In no case is there a discrepancy of more than 9 roll-call votes between one of these three major realigning compromises and its reflection by this adaptation of the factor methodology.

Of equal interest are the long and well-defined periods of stability in the voting coalitions between realignments. These promise to help us to understand and interpret the realignments themselves. During periods of relative stability it is possible to define the major issues under debate and each state's position on each issue. Further, we can follow debate on the issue or issues that ultimately deadlock the convention and create the necessity for compromise and reevaluation. The result, at least in the three cases highlighted in Figure 3 above, was a decision by some to realign and cooperate with states that before the compromise they had vehemently opposed on other issues.

On the Issues: Who Won, What and When?

Virtually every author in the historical tradition of constitutional studies—including Bancroft (1882, p. 228), Fiske (1888, p. 289), McLaughlin (1905, p. 207), Farrand (1913, p. 82), Warren (1928, p. 293), Jensen (1964, p. 54), McDonald (1958, p. 102), and Pomper (1970, pp. 209-13), to mention only a few of the most prominent—has identified the same opposing coalitions contesting the representation issues during the convention's early weeks. A nationalist group centered around the three most populous states, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the three states of the Deep South, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, opposing a federalist coalition of New York, New Jersey and Delaware, with Maryland uncertain and Connecticut generally cooperative but undependable. These are precisely the coalitions displayed in Figure 3 on each of the first five runs during Phase I of the convention's debates. Such success in empirically verifying voting coalitions so well known to the traditional literature promises that much can be learned about groups that functioned later in the convention where the traditional literature tends to be much less specific.

The confrontation over representation occurred in two phases.[4] The first phase was the classic battle between the large states and the small which, though it threatened the very existence of the convention, culminated in the achievement by the small states of a compromise committee report on July 5th that included their equal representation in the Senate. But this partial solution only served to focus attention more clearly on a second aspect of the question: the distribution of suffrage in the House of Representatives where the states and the regions would still be distinctly, and perhaps dangerously, unequal. This second battle was primarily contested between the large populous states of the North and South. Thus, during the seven-week representation debate, two interrelated but variously motivated battles were fought, culminating in the pitched battles over the several committee reports of early July. In the first stage, the small states (see Factor 2 of Figure 3) achieved the equal representation in the Senate that allowed them to feel secure in the new governmental structure. Later, during mid-July, the southern states (see Factor 1), over the direct opposition of their former large-state colleagues, achieved a mandatory adjustment of representation in the House on the basis of population. It was widely assumed that this would give them majority control of that branch within a few short years if demographic trends continued in their favor. The two-stage unfolding of the conflict also explains why Pennsylvania abandoned the powerful large-state/Deep South coalition before Virginia did. When proportional representation in the Senate was lost in early July and the southern members of Factor 1 turned to consolidating the position of their region in the House of Representatives, Pennsylvania abandoned them without hesitation to side with its northern neighbors, while Virginia remained to assure the regional gains in which it would share. This accomplished, and therewith the second stage of the representation debate decided, Virginia promptly rejoined Pennsylvania in heading a new coalition of middle-state nationalists as the convention turned its attention to a new set of questions.

---

[4] The real pervasiveness of the representation question during the first seven weeks of the convention can only be fully appreciated when it is demonstrated that fully 24 of the 29 roll-call votes identified by highest factor scores (1.25 or higher on either factor or 1.0 or higher on both factors of a 2-factor Varimax Solution to the first 156 roll-call votes) as being concerned with those issues around which the opposing coalitions organized prior to the Connecticut Compromise, deal explicitly with the issue of representation. Equally striking is that the remaining 5 roll calls highlight the Nationalist attempt to institutionalize the supremacy of the nation to the separate states. The roll-call votes identified by high factor scores were numbers 7, 37, 40-45, 65, 67-71, 82, 85, 103, 105, 106, 110, 115, 120, 125, 127, 139, 143, 148, 149, 150.

Despite the tenacity with which the opposing positions had been held, acceptance of the Connecticut Compromise rapidly dissipated both the salience of the representation issue and its ability to divide the delegates and their states along the lines that had persisted through the convention's first seven weeks. Once compromised, the representation issue was no longer able to mobilize the coalition of large and southern states or to provide the "rationale for the division of voters" into active opposing coalitions.

Figure 3 indicates that the Phase I opposition pattern was quite rapidly replaced by an alignment of forces that pitted the wings of the new nation, the Northeast and Deep South, against its solid middle in a periphery-versus-center coalition pattern. During Phase II, the two northernmost states, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, joined the three southernmost states, the Carolinas and Georgia, in standing against a solid phalanx of six Middle Atlantic states ranging from Connecticut to Virginia. This new opposition alignment replaced the old soon after the Connecticut Compromise and controlled the convention's proceedings for fully the next five weeks. The several discrete issues that this coalition of forces addressed concerned not only the composition and powers of the executive branch, but also the nature of and possible restrictions on citizenship, citizen participation, office holding and the very divisive regional issues of slavery and commerce.[5] The new "rationale for the division of voters" that characterized this second major voting alignment centered on the stance that the new nation would take toward its current citizens, future immigrants, and its compound parts, particularly the new states then rising in the West.

The choices seemed to be relatively restricted. On the one hand, there was a cautious but optimistically positive view of the ordinary citizen's ability to participate in a properly balanced and structured government which could be broadly empowered to govern freely as changing times and an indeterminate future might dictate. On the other hand, we find a much less optimistic view of the quality of citizen participation and even of the feasibility of constructing adequate "checks and balances" in any government awarded broad powers. Therefore, in the latter view, it was thought both wise and expedient to depart as little as possible from the traditional conception of "separation of powers," as practiced and illustrated in the revered English Constitution. Aligned behind this more constricted view of a desirable national government were the major regional interests fearing the vague and uncertain impact of national policies on their foremost concerns, commerce in the North and slavery in the South.

The important battles on the broad empowerment versus restrictions front were decided in the week between August 9 and 15 with a moderate majority blocking the extremists from both camps and enacting a series of modest restrictions on citizenship, office holding and the conduct of government. There followed a relatively quiet week during which the implications of these decisions were worked out as they affected tangential questions and as the new and more volatile regional issues percolated to the surface. These explosive issues—commercial regulation, slavery, and taxation of exports, all understood as particular cases of the earlier general conflict between an expansive Americanism and a restricted regionalism—were destined to convulse the convention in the final week of August. Neither the coalition of the periphery nor that of the center would survive the contest.

The issues over which the Phase II coalitions stumbled and out of which the short-lived Phase III coalitions gathered their momentum were of two related types. First, those that directly and blatantly appealed to and again divided the states on the basis of their present or anticipated population. These were issues similar to those that dominated the convention's early weeks and activated a closely related cleavage structure. Obviously, the reemergence of a cleavage based on size promised to severely disrupt the coalition of Middle Atlantic states that had supported a broad empowerment during Phase II, as that coalition was an amalgam of the very large (Pennsylvania and Virginia) and the very small (Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland). In the face of this division, a second developed when certain of the small states became convinced that the large states were again seeking dominance and that small-state safety could only be secured if the states themselves remained as legitimate power centers within the new system. The "rationale" for this division, characteristic of Phase III, separated those who wished to circumvent the states as mere obstructions in a national system of government from those who wished to make federalism a meaningful reality.

This third stable opposition pattern shows Connecticut, New Jersey and Maryland to be isolated against the remaining eight states. These three are obviously the states, both small and vulnerable, that had been on their guard since the convention's opening day lest they be overwhelmed and rendered powerless in the new government.[6] Some measure of security had been achieved with equal representation in the Senate, but the small-state representatives were not satisfied to rest there. They were constantly alert to the possibility that the nationalism in which they had joined as full participants in mid-July as members of the middle-state coalition might once again be bent to the service of large-state pretensions. The temptation was always there for the large states, and the small states, knowing it, watched them closely.

---

[5] The 40 roll-call votes identified by highest factor scores as central to the debate between the coalitions of the center and the periphery between roll-call votes 157-375 were: 182, 185, 190, 203, 208, 215, 216, 219, 220, 232, 242, 243, 251, 257, 259-61, 265, 266, 281-86, 288, 294, 295, 300, 306, 328, 334, 350, 353, 359-61, 367, 368.

On the morning of August 24th, the coalitions that had dominated the convention's business since mid-July began to unravel as the worst fears of the small states concerning their putative large-state allies were confirmed on the critical and still-unresolved issue of executive selection. The specific question was: if selection of the chief executive is to be a legislative responsibility, should this selection be conducted by separate ballots in the House and Senate, or by "joint ballot" of both Houses voting together. The small states had been depending heavily upon a separate ballot in the Senate to give them some meaningful control over the executive branch. But if balloting were to occur jointly, the influence of the smaller states would be wiped out by the more numerous House delegations assigned to Virginia (10), Pennsylvania (8), and Massachusetts (8). It would require the votes of every member from Connecticut (5), New Jersey (4), and Delaware (1), just to offset the votes of Virginia, let alone the others. On the critical vote both Pennsylvania and Virginia abandoned their small-state allies of the previous five weeks to provide the determining votes in favor of selection by a "joint ballot" (Farrand, 1911, Vol. 2, p. 403).

The vulnerability of the smaller states was further demonstrated by an unbroken series of stunning defeats during the final week of August, leaving no doubt in the minds of confirmed federalists that additional defenses must be sought. They were profoundly radicalized by adverse decisions regarding control of western land reserves, the method for admission of new states, conditions under which federal troops might enter individual states, and ratification procedures. These questions having been decided in favor of a broad nationalism that seemed favorable to the larger states, several remaining issues, foremost among them the still-unresolved executive questions, were turned over to the Brearley Committee on Postponed Parts, to which one delegate from each state was appointed on August 31.

New bargains were struck and new working majorities were formed within this compromise committee, just as they had been following the Connecticut Compromise five weeks earlier and after the Commerce and Slave Trade Compromise only the week before. Out of the Brearley Committee came a new coalition structure, dominated by a powerful northern bloc of five small states from the Northeast and Middle Atlantic: New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. They were joined by the only large northern state, Massachusetts, and by the weakest and most vulnerable of the southern states, Georgia, to form a controlling seven-state majority. This coalition dominated Phase IV, the convention's last ten working days.

For most of the states making up the new seven-state majority, especially its small-state core, the convention had proven to be a rough passage. Through the first seven weeks it had taken repeated threats of physically withdrawing from the convention merely to establish the right to equality in one branch of the legislature. Through most of the debates since, the small states had been wary allies in support of the centralizing programs of the large-state nationalists: powerful, persuasive men like Madison, Wilson, Morris, and King. The willingness of these large-state delegates, late in the convention, to sacrifice the interests of their putative small-state partners once again by supporting "joint ballot" selection of the president and by attempting to retain exclusive control of the western lands deeply impressed the small states with their continued vulnerability.

The small states emerged from the Brearley Committee as a tightly cohesive and highly determined majority demanding final control of the process by which the president was to be chosen. Many delegates, from both large and small states, were convinced that electors isolated in their respective states would not coordinate their votes to elect a president on the first round and that, as a result, "nineteen times in twenty," this task would fall to the Senate, and so effectively to the small central and northern states. To make this selection system palatable to the large-state and southern oppositions (shown on Factor 2 during Phase IV) the convention searched for a means by which this control could be maintained while fulfilling the opposition demands that an ominously powerful Senate be somehow separated from the process. This was achieved by transferring responsibility for final selection from the Senate to the House of Representatives voting by states. With this solution both the northern majority and the large-state and southern minorities were satisfied. The majority thought that it had achieved effective control of presidential selection, and hence a power base in addition to the Senate from which to defend their interests, while the opposition minorities, resigned to the small-state victory, sought only to remove the Senate from the process, thus reducing their great fear that it would become an oppressive aristocracy.

---

[6] The 24 roll-call votes identified by highest factor scores as central to the debates surrounding the States' Rights issues between roll-call votes 352-441 were: 353, 355-57, 363, 369, 382, 392, 394, 398, 403, 407-09, 417, 423, 427, 428, 430, 432, 436, 437, 439, 440.

In addition, the Brearley Committee resolved a number of questions beyond the process of executive selection. Charles Warren notes that, "the Report of the Special Committee of September 4 had disposed of four of the great questions that divided the convention—the election of the President, the power of appointment, the treaty-making power, and the power of the trial of impeachment—and had settled each by compromises which in their final results were favorable to Senatorial authority" (1928, p. 664). The Phase IV coalitions fought the remaining battles of the convention over precisely these additions to senatorial authority.[7] Opposition both from large states (Pennsylvania and Virginia) and from southern states (North Carolina and South Carolina) consistently attempted to moderate provisions of the report by removing powers from the Senate, just as they had on the executive issues, while the new northern majority sought to defend and maintain the advantages that they had written into the Brearley Committee Report.

These issues were decided amid much clamorous debate but with little real change over the convention's final week as the northern majority held its ground. In a very real and fundamentally important sense the tables had been turned on the original proponents and beneficiaries of the Virginia Plan. Although the Virginia Plan set the early tone of the convention in favor of a powerful and truly national government, the small Middle Atlantic states clearly controlled the convention's latter days. During Phase IV, the Constitution was given its final gloss of moderate federalism. The small states had merely been the last major group in the convention to attain the security that all required before they could endorse the new Constitution. So on September 17, 1787, the convention sent the proposed Constitution on to the Congress, the states and an uncertain future.

Discussion and Conclusion

The American Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia between May 25 and September 17, 1787. For nearly all of that time the delegates struggled over control of the proposed government, over the proper relationship between the state and national governments, and over the nature of an effective and safe relationship between the departments of a government in the republican form. Proposals of every description were offered and considered. Previous analysts have concluded that, beyond the early polarization between the large states and the small on the representation question, the debates lacked objective structure, consisting primarily of great men wrestling with great principles.

This study has demonstrated that the activities of the convention were by no means as fluid and unstructured as past interpretations have indicated. The positions and arguments of individual delegates, when aggregated by the state delegation as the operative voting unit, show such a remarkable degree of stability that the contours of opposing arguments can be intricately traced. But that stability was decisively and irrevocably breached on three occasions during the course of the deliberations. In each case, as the convention resolved one set of critical issues, other issues, still unresolved and subject to intense dispute, came to the fore and the voting coalitions realigned to contest and do battle over them. This study has opened an explicit dialogue between the data left by the convention (in the form of both debates and roll-call votes) and the many conflicting interpretations of those data by offering an empirically verifiable description of the voting coalitions that dominated each phase of the convention's work (see Figure 3). Explanations that postulate active opposition patterns in the convention that are not consonant with those displayed here should be viewed with skepticism. For example, an interpretation of the convention's work that stresses state size (large versus small) or region (North versus South) as characteristic of the entire convention must be confounded by the actual alignments during the five-week Phase II period when the largest and the smallest states joined hands in a middle state coalition to oppose a coalition of the northern and southern periphery.

Fully as interesting as the identification of the coalition alignments themselves is the fact that voting behavior in the convention occurred along lines and according to dynamic processes that are directly analogous to Burnham's well-known description of the "normal structure of American national politics at the mass base" as a "dynamic . . . polarization between long-term inertia and concentrated bursts of change" (1970, p. 27). The presence of a similar pattern of change in the structure of voting in the Constitutional Convention suggests that the critical realignment phenomenon is a dynamic process that characterizes open systems of democratic decision even at the level of small groups. The primary benefit of studying the critical realignment phenomenon in a relatively restricted and manageable setting (restricted and manageable both as to the time it takes for the event to play itself out and the number of actors involved) is that the coalitions whose formation and performance one must strive to understand and explain are composed of independent and identifiable members who join together to pursue similar, though not always identical, goals. A realignment then consists of the explicit movement of one or more actors from one voting coalition to another, rather than a more or less ambiguous shift in the distribution of the two-party vote that persists over time. What is more, actors in such settings (legislatures, legislative committees, city and county councils, and the United Nations General Assembly are similar) do not move meekly or quietly. Generally their words as well as their ultimate roll-call decisions are recorded. For instance, the delegation that changed its coalitional allegiance during the American Constitutional Convention was made up of several articulate and vocal individuals who often went to great pains to explain exactly what they were doing, why, and what they hoped to achieve.

---

[7] The 25 roll-call votes identified by highest factor scores as central to the debates surrounding the issue of senatorial authority between roll-call votes 442-569 were: 484, 487, 488, 492, 498-500, 513, 518, 519, 528, 531, 533-36, 546-48, 555, 556, 558, 559, 562, 563.

Further, as the circular model with multiple cleavages suggested, and Figure 4 below demon-



	Rationale	Cleavage	Length of Struggle	Outcome
1.	Legislative control	Large vs. small becoming North vs. South	May 25-July 16	Legislature Divided Large–House Small–Senate
2.	Scope and empowerment of government	Cosmopolitan vs. localist and regionalist	July 17-August 28	Limited restrictions on government
3.	State integrity or federalism	Large vs. small	August 29-September 3	States threatened
4.	Distribution of authority within the government	Small and high-toned vs. large and southern	September 4-September 17	States secured in expanded Senate and executive authority

Source: Derived from E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 62-77.

*N.Y. leaves at vote No. 121.
**N.H. arrives at vote No. 202.

Figure 4. Cleavage Lines Active during the Convention

strates, Sundquist was quite correct to argue that "successive realignments can best be understood as new patterns drawn on transparent overlays" (1973, p. 10). The four stable voting alignments that occurred during the course of the convention can be represented using the circular model by visualizing the states as stationary within the voting universe and observing the way in which changes in the location of the cleavage lines generate each of the opposition patterns.

The first active cleavage to divide the convention posed the raw question of control: who will dominate this new government? Madison's Virginia Plan, serving as the convention's agenda through the first nine weeks, clearly envisioned the dominance of the most populous and wealthy states. Though eventually frustrated first by the small states and then by their southern colleagues, Pennsylvanians and Virginians achieved their most basic goal, a radical restructuring of the American political system issuing in a truly national government.

With the decisions concerning control of the legislative branch thus taken, the next division of the participants into allies and enemies (Phase II), organized to deal with questions regarding the scope and empowerment of the proposed government. The small states initially joined Pennsylvania and Virginia in advocating a broadly empowered and unencumbered national government equal to all the exigencies of domestic and international politics. But when Pennsylvania and Virginia abandoned them on the issue of executive selection and on a series of provisions that called into question the independence and integrity of the states in this new system (Phase III), the smaller states struck back as core members of a new northern coalition. This new coalition was organized within the Brearley Committee to reallocate the distribution of authority in the new government away from the House and toward the Senate and the president where it was assumed that the small states would be most influential (Phase IV). With the Constitution virtually complete, and the delegates smelling a final adjournment after nearly four months, the large-state and southern contingents opposed only half-heartedly.

The ultimate impact of shifting cleavages generating new patterns of allegiance among the participants was that no major group was radically dissatisfied with the product of the convention's long deliberations. In Charles Warren's words (1968, p. 733):

> One of the most fortunate features of the Constitution was that it was the result of compromises and adjustments and accommodation. . . . It did not represent the complete supremacy of the views of any particular man or set of men, or of any State or group of States. The Claims and interests of neither the North nor the South prevailed. . . . Moreover, it represented neither an extreme Nationalist point of view nor an extreme States' Rights doctrine. The adherents of each theory had been obliged to yield.

But the other and equally important side of this coin is that although "the adherents of each theory," were "obliged to yield" on their full program, at some point each state participated in the core of a winning coalition that secured their dearest aims. Thus, the delegates, almost to a man, departed the convention convinced that their constitutional glass was at least half full as opposed to half empty.

References

Anderson, Lee F., Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox (1966). *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Bailyn, Bernard (1967). *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bancroft, George (1882). *History of the United States: The Formation of the American Constitution,* Vol. 6. New York: Little, Brown.

Banning, Lance (1974). "Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution." *William and Mary Quarterly* 31: 167-88.

Beard, Charles A. (1913). *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.* New York: Macmillan.

Benson, Lee (1960). *Turner and Beard: American Historical Writing Reconsidered.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Brown, Robert E. (1956). *Charles Beard and the American Constitution.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Burnham, Walter Dean (1970). *Critical Elections: And the Mainsprings of American Politics.* New York: Norton.

Crowl, Philip A. (1947). "Anti-Federalism in Maryland 1787-1788." *William and Mary Quarterly* 4: 446-69.

Farrand, Max (1913). *The Framing of the Constitution of the United States.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

______ (1911). *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,* 4 vols. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Fiske, John (1888). *The Critical Period in American History.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Greene, Jack P. (1967). *The Reappraisal of the American Revolution in the Recent Historical Literature.* Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, No. 68.

Harman, Harry H. (1976). *Modern Factor Analysis,* 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jensen, Merrill (1964). *The Making of the Constitution.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Key, V. O. (1955). "A Theory of Critical Elections." *Journal of Politics* 17: 3-18.

______ (1959). "Secular Realignment and the Party

System." *Journal of Politics* 21: 198-210.

McDonald, Forrest (1958). *We The People.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McLaughlin, Andrew C. (1905). *The Confederation and the Constitution.* New York: Harper.

Pomper, Gerald (1967). "Classification of Presidential Elections." *Journal of Politics* 29: 535-66.

_____ (1970). "Conflict and Coalition at the American Constitutional Convention." In Kelley et al. (eds.), *The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 209-13.

Pool, William (1950). "An Economic Interpretation of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina." *North Carolina Historical Review* 27: 119-41, 284-313, 437-61.

Roche, John P. (1961). "The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action." *American Political Science Review* 55: 799-816.

Rummel, Rudolph J. (1967). "Understanding Factor Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11: 444-78.

_____ (1970). *Applied Factor Analysis.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Smith, David G. (1965). *The Convention and the Constitution: The Political Ideas of the Founding Fathers.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Smith, Allen J. (1965; first published 1907). *The Spirit of American Government.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Stodinger, Susan (1968). "An Analysis of Voting Behavior in the Constitutional Convention of 1787." M.A. thesis, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park.

Sundquist, James L. (1973). *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States.* Washington: Brookings Institution.

Thomas, Robert E. (1953). "The Virginia Convention of 1788: A Criticism of Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.*" *Journal of Southern History* 19: 63-72.

Ulmer, S. Sidney (1968). "Sub-Group Formation in the Constitutional Convention." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 10: 288-303.

Warren, Charles (1968; first published 1928). *The Making of the Constitution.* New York: Barnes and Noble.

Wood, Gordon S. (1969). *The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787.* New York: Norton.

Madison's Analysis of the Sources of Political Authority

ROBERT J. MORGAN
University of Virginia

James Madison believed that political institutions are not the effects of conflicts among private groups in society. He traced political authority to human nature. It is the ultimate source of both public opinion and the motives which impel some individuals to hold government offices. Prudently contrived governmental institutions can moderate the countervailing tendencies arising from these two sources of authority, although they are necessarily in a state of continuing tension. Strict accountability of representatives to the whole range of diverse opinion in society is in conflict with the tendency of government to become autonomous. The latter tendency follows from government's using its power to establish the fiscal and military institutions required to wage war. By doing so a government may create a new political equilibrium which is masked by apparent adherence to established constitutional balance and is then independent of the balance of private property.

My purpose is to present James Madison's analysis of the sources of governmental authority in order to challenge two dominant interpretations of his political theory. The more systematic of the two portrays him as the Founders' prophet who forecast that ruling majorities will be restrained because their power depends on the opinions and interests of diverse and numerous groups in the extended American republic. The other one pictures him as advocate of constitutional checks created and used by a ruling class bent on curbing democratic majorities. Both images are based almost exclusively on the tenth and fifty-first *Federalist* papers separately without any effort to perceive the significant linkages between them and anything else Madison wrote about politics. Scholars have ignored completely Madison's highly significant argument in these papers and elsewhere that governmental authority and the restraints upon it are both derived from the same ultimate and penultimate causes. The first cause is human nature and the proximate cause is opinion.

My thesis is that Madison's political theory follows from his perception of the fundamental dilemma involved in tracing both governmental power and restraints on it through opinion to original human nature. His consciousness of this problem led him to conclude that there is a natural, inescapable and enduring tension between accountability and autonomy in the American republic. That is why on various occasions he distinguished between a government which is self-controlled by the forms in which its power is distributed and a second type which is ruled by "a will independent of the community" (*Federalist* 51, pp. 339, 341; *Papers,* Vol. 9, p. 299; *Writings,* Vol. 9, pp. 231-33, 520-28). Consequently, he was moved to explain why the forms of the American republic resting on opinion and human nature offer a reasonable prospect, even if not an absolute certainty, of securing accountability.

My thesis is developed in three main sections. Each part elaborates successively Madison's ideas concerning: (1) the implications of basing the power and limits of republican government on public opinion; (2) the reasons why republican government tends to become autonomous in the performance of its protective functions; and (3) the process which is likely to enable the government to transform itself radically without appearing to do so. First, however, it is necessary to comment on the two prevailing interpretations of Madison's political theory.

Both portrayals dismiss Madison's prescription of governmental forms and his reasons for doing so because political institutions are now regarded as reflections of underlying groups or a dominant class seeking to curb majority rule. J. Allen Smith popularized the class image by claiming that Madison's tenth *Federalist* was proof of the undemocratic characteristics of the Constitution. It promised to break and control the violence of faction. This essay revealed Madison's determination to curb the "supremacy of public opinion" effectuated through elected, responsible political parties unimpeded by any limits on majority rule. The tenth paper was proof that Madison advocated constitutional checks to curb "the people, but not the government," in the interest of a propertied class (1965, pp. 40-42, 205). This image based on scanty evidence and tendentious proof has been very durable. It has been used to perpetuate the belief that Madison opposed majority rule and political parties, especially as they function in the British model.[1] James M. Burns' claim is typical: "Madison railed against the spirit of party" (1967, p. 27).

---

[1] It was spread widely by Parrington (1931, Vol. 1, pp. 286-89) and has been repeated in the influential works

Charles A. Beard created the other durable image of Madison: the founder and prophet of an American science of politics. Beard did so by applying Bentley's group theory of politics to the framing of the Constitution and by claiming that Madison's tenth *Federalist* was the first American statement of such a theory (Beard, 1913, p. 6; Bentley, 1967, pp. 200-22). Beard used the tenth *Federalist* to impute to Madison the theory that economic group interest was the "impelling motive" of the Framers of the Constitution. This theory was proved by connecting provisions of the document, like any law, with the interests of the economic groups which advanced or opposed them. Beard claimed, also, that the scientific character of Madison's analysis in the tenth paper was certified by the power of his predictions, among which two are notable: (1) in the future the overbearing majority most to be dreaded, Madison "prophesied," will be the landless, urban proletariat; and (2) it will be difficult to form governing majorities because "the very size of the union will enable the inclusion of more interests" within them. It was Madison who provided us with proof that (1) the Constitution was not deduced from general "principles" applied to particular cases; (2) the motives of those who framed it were not a love of justice, the desire to advance the general welfare, or to protect the nation from foreign enemies; and (3) that the "superstructure" of government is simply an "incidental" reflex of underlying group conflicts (Beard, 1913, pp. 6-9, 14-18, 154-58). By claiming that the Constitution reflects the activities of groups moved by *economic motives,* Beard departed significantly from Bentley's paradigm (1967, pp. 212, 258-97, 453-60, 473, 477). Otherwise, Beard remained faithful to it and identified Madison with it.

Beard's transmogrification of Madison into a neo-Bentleyan group theorist reinforced Smith's thesis that Madison advocated constitutional checks to protect a propertied class from party government unimpeded by any limits on the will of popular majorities composed of leveling democrats. But Beard's Madisonian image has been used to support the contrary claim that (1) he prophesied the moderating effects of a large and socially diverse nation on political parties; or (2) he was the first American to state a pluralist theory of politics. Neither of the latter two, it is confidently believed, was developed "in connection with governmental structure" (Wright, 1949, p. 17). Several scholars have applied a superficial gloss to Beard's image despite the obvious contradictions involved.[2] Hartz tried to demolish Beard's neo-Marxist class theory, but left the Bentleyan paradigm untouched (1956, pp. 29-34).

Neither Hartz nor others paid any attention to Beard's extremely revealing recantation of his economic theory of politics. This theory omitted considerations of any "human motivation" except economic interest and treated that one as the *sole* and *independent cause* of all "political actions and institutions." Therefore, the theory omitted any consideration of the pursuit of unlimited power "as an end in itself, or as a means to class, national and imperialistic ends." So it ignored the degree to which this phenomenon makes *economic man dependent* on political and military man. His great error, Beard admitted, was to universalize a theory of politics which was relevant only between 1815 and 1914, but he consoled himself with the thought that Marxists and Liberals had made the same mistake. They had not paid enough attention to war, so they failed to realize that the effort to isolate economic activities as the cause of politics was doomed at a very early state of social development. The influences of these two kinds of activities on one another are reciprocal (1945, pp. 71-75, 90-91, 101-14).

Beard did not venture to say how his great error affects our understanding of Madison's political theory or the founding of the republic. I venture to do so in the course of challenging the prevailing Smith-Beard image of Madison.

Opinion, Majority Rule and Accountable Government

Madison's analysis of the dilemma facing the Founders started with his identification of the republican cause with self-government and his

---

of Schattschneider (1942, pp. 1-3), and Ranney (1975, pp. 22-24).

[2] Holcombe combined the first and second of these propositions and retained Beard's economic interpretation (1950, pp. 23-27, 78-80). Dahl first played Mark Antony to Madison by *restating* the extended sphere proposition in his Madisonian model which was not an analysis of the historical Madison (1956, pp. 5-7, 15-17); but later praised the tenth paper for being the first statement of the new concept of political pluralism in keeping with Bentley's paradigm (1967, pp. 40-42). See also Bourke (1975, pp. 271-95) for other pluralist readings of Madison. Authors who have combined the class and extended sphere arguments without embracing Beard's economic determinism include Riemer (1967, p. 132), Burns (1967, pp. 13-14, 18-23), Burns (1968, pp. 38, 94-98), and Wood (1969, pp. 501-06). The extended sphere proposition was restated by Wright (1949, pp. 17-25), Ketcham (1957, pp. 20-25) and Adair (1957, p. 348).

premise that it is founded on "opinion" like every other government, despotic or free (*Federalist* 51, p. 341; 49, p. 329). Yet wherever liberty is accepted as the *precondition* essential to political life, nothing is more evident from experience than its "natural diversity" (*Papers,* Vol. 5, p. 467; Vol. 10, p. 208) and the "zeal" with which different opinions about the theory and practice of religion, government and other subjects are expressed (*Federalist* 10, p. 55). Because opinion is the source of both the power and stability of governments as well as the security for individual rights (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 70, 85), some political theorists friendly to democracy have prescribed social homogeneity as the condition essential for democratic self-government. They have claimed that if all persons were to be reduced to perfect political equality, then all would be "perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions . . . opinions, and passions" (*Federalist* 10, pp. 58-59). In fact, however, no society has ever been a homogeneous mass, not even a primitive one (*Papers,* Vol. 10, p. 212). This social condition can only be a postulate of utopian fantasies (*Writings,* Vol. 9, p. 527). It is no guide to the founder of a republic.

Diversity of opinion exists and makes all societies necessarily heterogeneous because it is rooted in human nature. Mankind's self-love, fallible reason, and diverse faculties combine to create differences of opinion. The rights of property originate in these differences of opinion. Although it is the first object of government to protect the diverse faculties and opinions out of which the rights of property originate, its efforts to do so divide society into different interests and parties (*Federalist* 10, p. 55). It is clear that he who would extinguish parties would extinguish liberty first (*Federalist* 50, p. 335). Thus, as long as human beings enjoy liberty, they will naturally hold and express diverse opinions and form parties which arise out of the actions of government. This truth is well illustrated by recent American history. The first parties divided after 1776 over the cause of independence; after 1783 parties were "in abundance," but they were local; the proposed constitution gave rise to a second and interesting division between its opponents and supporters among whom some may have entertained other secret objectives (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 106-12). In free societies, "parties arise out of the nature of things, and the great art of politicians lies in making them checks and balances to each other" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 86).

Opinion, Madison observed, is malleable as well as naturally diverse. He warned that, because the American people occupy an extended territory, they are likely to be influenced for some time to come by the "misrepresentations" of "interested men" (*Federalist* 63, p. 410). Three years later he repeated this warning, saying, the "larger a country is, the less easy for its real opinion to be ascertained, and the less difficult for it to be counterfeited" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 70). His own legislative experience convinced Madison that political opinion, especially about policy issues, was commonly manipulated behind political masks and disguises. He had seen legislators enact "base and selfish measures masked by pretexts of the public good." Clever persons had made dupes of both the public and other honest but gullible legislators by "veiling . . . and varnishing sophistical arguments" in order to disguise their real objectives (*Papers,* Vol. 9, p. 354). It was scarcely worth the effort to reform Congress, if the people chose their own representatives only to find eventually that a clever, enterprising and "moneyed few" profited personally from every new regulation of commerce and finance at a cost paid by the "industrious and uninformed mass" (*Federalist* 62, p. 406). In subsequent private correspondence Madison lamented more than once the difficulty of informing people spread over a large area. The "towns . . . for a time . . . always set public opinion," so that the country is too much uninformed to match cities in this regard (*Letters,* Vol. 1, pp. 515, 596). The people cannot be informed properly much of the time because the aims of parties are often a "game behind the curtain." A party often wears a "mask" (*Letters,* Vol. 2, pp. 7, 114; see also pp. 121-22, 126). Madison even found himself blinded on one occasion, when the projects of our own "foreign Department are under a veil, not a corner of which I have been able to lift" (*Letters,* Vol. 2, p. 109). On the other hand, he conceded freely the need to deceive foreign governments; one occasion called for a diplomat "wearing a mercantile mask" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 134; see also *Papers,* Vol. 9, p. 277).

The manipulation and counterfeiting of opinion with masks and gamesmanship are unavoidable, but censorship or legislation curbing the flow of free opinion is not. In 1794, Madison feared that a proposed tax on newspapers would obstruct the free flow of information *to* the public. Every government tends to want censorship to hide its own abuses. In ours, where members are so far removed from the "eye of their constituents," it is essential to have a prompt and easy circulation of newspapers throughout the whole of society and representatives traveling between their constituents and the government. Together they are the "equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits" in making true public opinion known (*Letters,* Vol. 1, p. 572; *Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 70). In addition: "Opinions are not the [proper] objects of legislation." The opinions expressed by associations formed freely and voluntarily to express their positions on public issues are not properly the subject of any notice whatsoever from the government of the United States. The democratic societies' beliefs will stand or fall by "public opinion. . . . In a Republic, light will prevail over darkness, truth over error" and Madison was confident of this principle (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 222, 223). Subsequently, he applied the same reasoning to the Sedition Act of 1798, which made publication of political opinions a punishable offense if they held elected officials' conduct in contempt, disrepute or hatred. By making the truth of the utterance a defense, the law subjects opinions and conjectures to the same test as facts in court. When vigorously enforced, it effectively destroys the right of electing the members of the government. The exercise of this right includes the opportunity to express opinions which castigate elected public officers who discharge their responsibilities unfaithfully or defectively. The Constitution presupposes this right, which is the "very essence of a free and responsible government" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 386-89; 394-98).

Despite its natural diversity, opinion is, and must be, more or less fixed as the mind or sense of the community which has "full agency" in a republic (*Papers,* Vol. 12, p. 373). A republican consensus must support the Constitution with enlightened conviction, affection and that degree of veneration which only time can bestow. The fixed opinions to which Madison was committed as analyst and ardent advocate were the heritage of the American Revolution. It was made, he said in 1783, in the name of the rights of mankind with the promise that the "unadulterated forms" of republican government would more than merely "fulfill the ends of government." They would "ennoble national character," give exemplary and unprecedented support to liberty as well as other rights and prove that such goods are the consequences of our political establishments (*Papers,* Vol. 6, p. 494). The federal republic established by the Constitution of 1787, also, promised to meet the test of utility by serving the common good. It would preserve self-government by protecting the nation from foreign enemies, advance its commerce, relieve it of the Old World's burden of standing military establishments, restrain factions (the bane of the ancient republics), and promote domestic freedom, tranquility, happiness and the pursuit of justice. When government does so, it is supported by a degree of popular veneration which is essential to its stability (*Federalist* 14, p. 79; 20, p. 124; 51, p. 341; 62, pp. 404, 407).

The stability of the republic cannot rest upon enlightened opinion alone; it requires a sentimental attachment as well. Affection must be developed over time and must be so widely shared as to be rooted in sentiment rather than pure reason alone. The latter's fallibility is great enough to require the support of the "prejudices" of the community. The strength of every individual's *opinions,* and "*its practical influence on his conduct,*" depends on both the number of persons one believes to have shared them and the long duration of time over which they have been held (*Federalist* 49, p. 329, emphasis added; see also *Papers,* Vol. 13, p. 22). As he explained in "Public Opinion," the sheer extent of the country also magnifies this problem: "the more extensive a country the more insignificant is each individual in his own eyes" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 70). The Bill of Rights, Madison hoped, would provide precisely the kind of reinforcement of popular opinion by embodying certain maxims of free government in "national sentiment." An official declaration of rights embodied in the Constitution should have a tendency over time to establish public opinion in their favor and rouse the whole community against attempted violations of rights by a ruling majority. In the short run, such a declaration conforms with the prevailing opinion in the United States that there should be limits to all the "forms" of government. It ought, also, to base the Constitution on more than the mere acquiescence of a dissenting minority by assuring them that the Constitution's supporters are truly devoted to liberty and the republican cause (*Papers,* Vol. 12, pp. 198, 203, 204-05).

Madison's general conclusion was that a stable political system is one in which government acquires the "moral and political authority emanating from the actual possession of power, and a just and beneficial exercise of it" in conformity with political values deeply rooted and widely shared as the sense of the community (*Writings,* Vol. 9, p. 359). This perception of the effects of popular affection on political authority undoubtedly explains Madison's unease over any congruence between party cleavages and basic constitutional doctrines. When he expressed this concern in *Federalist* 49, he had good reason to be anxious about the durability of the young republic (*Writings,* Vol. 9, p. 318). This disquietude prompted him to publish his essays in the *National Gazette* in 1791-1792 and later to urge Washington privately to run for a second term. Under Washington's continued leadership, public opinion favoring republican government and its administration would be better decided as long as the parties were divided over these issues (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 108-09). He conceded many years later, however, that such divisions are unavoidable whether a constitution is written or prescriptive (*Letters,* Vol. 3, pp. 442, 601).

Madison labored for a constitutional consensus which takes the form of "plain and general truths" instead of a collection of provisions desired or opposed by particular interests. Every attempt at the latter is "fallacious," when the object of action is to establish a "general system" of government for people who are divided by a "contrariety of opinions" and local attachments. No such system can be established, if people are inflexibly tenacious in defending individual opinions even to the point of opposing particular constitutional provisions out of secret motives plausibly inferred. The same difficulty is created when some interests demand provisions which they foolishly think will serve to protect them. For example, many southerners wanted a provision prohibiting Congress from enacting commercial regulations or maintaining a standing army without a favorable vote by two-thirds of the states. Why, Madison asked, should the "northern states most competent to their own safety bind themselves" with such provisions to the southern states which lack competent means of their own self-defense? In contrast, the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the constitutional prefix which Madison proposed unsuccessfully were truths so plain and general that they ought to serve all Americans for generations to come as the maxims of free government. Among these none is more important in establishing a general system of government than the idea of the sovereignty of the people. It means that the people of the United States established the Constitution by "compact" and can change it by the same means, if they please. While it is in force, however, all have an obligation to observe its terms despite the variety of opinions which the residents of some areas hold in contradiction to the sense of the community (*Papers*, Vol. 11, pp. 166, 173, 176; Vol. 12, pp. 200-03; *Writings*, Vol. 9, pp. 527-28).

One of the obligations incurred by compact is tacit obedience by all to the majority authorized to rule in a republic created to serve the public good and the private rights of all. In such governments the legislature commands the moral and physical force of the community so there is no appeal to any other sovereign than public opinion to sustain the maxims of free government on behalf of an injured minority. Experience gives no assurance that legislative majorities will be *self-controlled* by the restraints of religious convictions, by the desire to be respected for their integrity, or by conscience which is flawed by "unconscious bias." In short, a legislative majority, no matter how numerous, is in practice the author of its own standards of conduct so long as it is the voice of the majority in the body of the people (*Papers*, Vol. 9, pp. 354-56; Vol. 10, pp. 33-34, 213-14; Vol. 11, pp. 298-300; Vol. 12, p. 204; Vol. 13, pp. 22-24; *Writings*, Vol. 9, p. 361). In short, whenever a legislative majority, regardless of its size, mirrors and becomes the agent of a dominant interest in society, the majority principle fails to protect minor interests among the population. The state legislatures perfectly exemplified this truth, Madison pointed out. In most of them the landed and mercantile interests, sometimes mixed with creditors and debtors, as well as friends and foes of paper currency, alternated in power frequently enough to change the laws according to their respective interests to the detriment of stable policy. This truth, he reminded the Convention of 1787, was apparent in both large and small states. His congressional experience had convinced him, however, that, when a legislature is composed of members from all states, the number and variety of interests to which they are accountable and must respond collectively is greatly increased (*Papers*, Vol. 5, p. 467; Vol. 6, p. 495; Vol. 10, pp. 32-33). To this degree, American experience confirmed Hume's theory that extension of the territory of a political system embraces a greater variety and number of opinions than a small one. It thereby hinders political association based on shared interests (Ketcham, 1957, pp. 20-25; Adair, 1957, pp. 348-50). Madison insisted, however, that this theory is subject to one extremely important qualification. The natural diversity of opinion in free societies does not, ipso facto, restrain *legislative majorities*. The ease with which opinions are communicated and associations are formed to act on them *"result[s] from the structure of government itself"* and it is this premise which leads to a prudential remedy in the form of a federal republic (*Federalist* 10, pp. 55, 58, emphasis added; 51, p. 340; 63, p. 410; *Papers*, Vol. 10, pp. 208, 212-13).

Three generations of neo-Bentleyan scholars have turned a blind eye to Madison's definition of the most important problems facing the Framers and his remedies for them. The major question was whether republican government which is necessarily dominated by a legislature responsive to prevailing public opinion can be made so self-controlled as to serve all interests in a diverse society, or whether it must be controlled by the latter's dominant natural majority. Madison believed that self-control could be achieved only through constructive use of the *forms of governmental institutions*. His prescription to the Convention of 1787 was "enlarge the sphere" (from state to nation) by framing a "republican system on such a scale & in such a form as will control all the evils [which] have been experienced" in the states (*Papers*, Vol. 10, pp. 33-34).

These forms should include large districts from which to elect representatives chosen for three-year terms. These two choices are possible because an "extensive country" is suited to the creation of a federal republic which retains representative bodies in the states and creates a new one concerned with aggregate national interests. The two forms are necessary to secure election of representatives who have knowledge of interests in all the states as well as those of their own. The result should be that every representative will have a "*diffusive sympathy with the whole society.*" In time this attitude will be reinforced by a growing complexity in the social and economic structures of all states—an "assimilating" trend (*Federalist* 10, pp. 59-60; 56, p. 358; 58, p. 382; 63, p. 413; *Papers,* Vol. 9, p. 357; Vol. 10, p. 214; Vol. 12, p. 142; *Writings,* Vol. 9, pp. 520-28).

It is notable that Hamilton agreed with Madison's diagnosis of the issue, but not with his prognosis. Circumstances may dispose some members of the House to have some regard for the diversity of interests and differences of ranks within society, but competition for control of the new government will occur between "landed men and merchants." Large landowners will represent small farmers and merchants will represent manufacturers and mechanics. The crucial question will be whether those who control the new government will be partial to the "landed . . . moneyed . . . mercantile . . . or manufacturing interest" (*Federalist* 35, pp. 213-16; 60, pp. 390-92).

Madison believed that prevailing public opinion favored not only popular sovereignty and majority rule moderated by representation, but also responsible, accountable government. "I believe no principle is more clearly laid down in the Constitution than responsibility" (*Papers,* Vol. 12, p. 227). It must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible functionary and it must be made "effectually answerable" to the public. Periodic elections provide that means, no matter how imperfectly they may function. At least, regular reviews of performance with the prospect of returning offenders to private status prompt persons of talent and distinction who have a "great regard for public opinion" to perform any task for which they have pledged their reputations (*Federalist* 49, p. 330; 57, p. 371; 63, pp. 408-09; *Papers,* Vol. 10, p. 211; Vol. 12, p. 262).

One final word is helpful in judging Madison's commitment to the sovereignty of public opinion. Undoubtedly, his assertion that every kind of government is founded on opinion was derived from Hume. It is equally certain that Madison had read and reflected upon Hume's essays as Henry May has concluded (1976, pp. 3-65). Nevertheless, Madison did not simply mimic Hume with whom he often disagreed either explicitly or implicitly. Madison went far beyond Hume in perceiving the complex dimensions of public opinion in the American republic and he disagreed positively with the Scot in regard to other conclusions. The first of these is the doctrine that all legitimate political authority is founded ultimately on compact, an idea which Hume was most explicit in denying. The second difference is Madison's belief that legitimizing principles are of the essence of a constitutional consensus which ought to be largely beyond party strife and observed as an essential condition of free political union. Hume said that opinions of "right," consisting of the kind of "speculative principles" which Whigs and Tories had espoused in Britain, were needed to sustain authority, but they were really masks obscuring practical or party objectives. With regard to two ideas Madison followed Hume closely. First, Madison agreed that political institutions acquire a degree of autonomous moral and political authority over a long period of time, if power is used to serve the public interest as it is commonly understood. Second, stable institutions require veneration, affection and the prejudices of the community on their side. Consequently, party divisions over the legitimizing principles of the regime are deadly threats to political stability. Madison's qualified agreements with Hume regarding these matters show how he used the unique conservatism of Hume which Sheldon Wolin has delineated (1954, pp. 1001-14). Madison did so, paradoxically, to support the radical doctrine of popular sovereignty and accountable republican government which Hume abhorred. Like Hume, but under different circumstances, Madison wished to convert the heresy of revolutionary principles into the orthodoxy of constitutional consensus.

Power, Property and Governmental Autonomy

One of the most important elements missing from the prevailing interpretations of Madison is any explanation of his observation that operation of the majority principle in Congress ought to prevent rule by a minority which "masks" its actions behind the "forms of the Constitution" (*Federalist* 10, p. 57). His meaning requires elaboration of two general propositions which explain why governments tend to become autonomous even to the point of transforming themselves without appearing to do so. From experience Madison concluded that there is always some danger that "artful and ambitious rulers" will gradually erect an "independent Government" on the foundation of a self-governing one. This prospect is real because every government, once it has attained "a certain degree of energy," has a "tendency" to increase its power. Furthermore, a "*self-directed course* . . . is the natural propensity of every government" (*Papers,* Vol. 11, p. 299; *Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 67). Therefore, founders who establish a self-controlled republic and wish it to endure must understand how the energy of government increases its power at a certain point and why its tendency toward autonomy is natural.

The explanation of these two tendencies starts with knowledge of human nature and, particularly, the motives which impel individuals to seek governmental offices. Madison perceived three: "1. ambition 2. personal interest 3. public good. Unhappily the first two are proved by experience to be the most prevalent." The major object of constitutional reform, therefore, is to "meliorate" the form of republican government so as to attract from society individuals who "feel most strongly the proper motives" to hold public offices. The only combination consistent with human nature is one composed of ambition and a desire to serve the public good. If personal interest, by which Madison meant avarice, is accepted as a motive for holding office in the American republic, it will not be self-controlled. It will be ruled by a will independent of the desires of any social majority which ought "ultimately to give the law" (*Papers,* Vol. 9, pp. 354-55, 357; *Federalist* 51, p. 337).

Undoubtedly, Madison drew these inferences from personal observations, but they served only to confirm *some* of the conclusions reached by Hume in his new science of politics (Wolin, 1954, pp. 1004-06; Adair, 1957, pp. 343-44, 353-55). Significantly, Madison rejected Hume's conclusion that political authority is (and, therefore, ought to be) founded not only on opinion, but also, on the personal interest of rulers seeking to gratify their avarice as well as their ambition. Moreover, Hume argued, in a society where opinion favors the right to private property and accepts personal interest as the motive for holding office, rulers can establish a new and controlling equilibrium of power independent of: (1) the distribution of private wealth in society, and (2) the "forms" by which power is distributed in the constitution. This change can be effected because the self-interest of rulers can "determine, limit or alter" the operation of the elements of opinion which are the primary foundations of power. In Britain the shift from an original constitutional equilibrium to a new balance of power was effected by maintaining a semblance of old form, in accordance with Machiavelli's advice to keep up the appearance of unchanged institutions (1965, Vol. 1, p. 252). The interest relied upon to make rulers cooperate for the common good, despite their insatiable ambition and avarice, is property created by government—offices and, notably, shares in a growing public debt incurred to defer the costs of wars of imperial rivalry.

English experience since 1690 convinced Hume that Harrington was wrong in saying "the balance of power depends upon that of [private] property" (1770, Vol. 1, pp. 42-44). It is evident that a government can endure for a long period despite an imbalance between governmental power and private property. Locke (1946, pars. 157-59) was equally in error in supposing that the establishment of parliamentary supremacy necessarily entailed the redistribution of representation from underpopulated rural areas to the new and growing cities. When Hume published his essays, there was still a great disparity between the weight of property owned by commoners and their share of power under the constitution. The latter endured, nevertheless, Hume explained, because the government created and distributed a critical mass of property out of the public treasury. The latter took the traditional forms of honorable and often lucrative offices and a strikingly novel one, shares in the permanent national debt. By making it the private, or personal, interest of members of Parliament to acquire these forms of property, the government avoided the necessity of overtly redistributing representation and resolving the crisis which it would effect. The skillful distribution of the Crown's offices, Hume declared, "creates a much greater dependency than the same property dispersed" among many private owners. This public property creates an even greater "influence" than forms privately created, Hume concluded, because the persons who distribute it are "antecedently . . . invested with a public character." He approved of Parliament's "*corruption and dependency*" on the Crown, its consequent loss of direct accountability to particular constituencies and the mutation of the mixed and balanced constitution into a fiction—all on utilitarian grounds. The establishment of cabinet government maintained the prescriptive authority of the ancient constitution and, therefore, served the public interest in the highest sense. Furthermore, the appeal to the private interest of rulers is in the public interest. No nation such as Hume's contemporary Britain can exceed the Romans in greatness, if it limits the behavior of its rulers by the moral standards applied to private individuals (1770, Vol. 1, pp. 26, 40-49).

On the other hand, Hume was emphatically opposed to the new practice of permitting "the highest officers of the state to be commonly the public creditors." This policy threatened to become the characteristic cause of the "degeneracy" of free governments. It was a particular manifestation of the one universal truth of political science which he thought was beyond challenge: in free governments legislators enact measures of trade and revenue from which they expect to gain personally. A significant example is the distinctly modern policy of creating a national debt in order to defer payments of the cost of war by entailing it on posterity. This artificial policy is a "poison" for two major reasons. This "precarious" form of property tends to be located in cities, particularly the capital, thereby "making the head too large for the body." It concentrates the government's influence there to the neglect of the countryside and spells the doom of the "middle power." The "landowners will be utterly unable" to resist the growing power of the owners of this new property which is derived *exclusively* "from the commission of the sovereign" (1770, Vol. 1, pp. 107-08; Vol. 2, pp. 43-44, 121-22, 133-54). Shortly before his death in 1776, Hume bitterly denounced the "century of licentiousness" which had transformed Englishmen into "vile beasts" with the rise to power of "financiers" (Marshall, 1954, pp. 247-57; Forbes, 1975, Ch. 6). The equally dreadful consequence of linking wars of imperial rivalry with the expansion of this new form of governmental influence would surely be the destruction of free government due to excessive military conquests, as the ultimate fate of the Roman Republic proved. Unfortunately, the debt was popular with merchants and manufacturers who expanded their enterprises with this new form of capital. Obviously, Hume predated Marx, to say the least, in understanding this phenomenon (1770, Vol. 2, p. 350; Marx, 1930, Vol. 2, pp. 833, 836-39). Montesquieu shrewdly observed that this "fictitious" property is metamorphosed into a "real" form only by making those who acquire it the *dependent* supporters of a government which must endure in order for their property and liberty to be secure (1949, Vol. 1, Bk. 19, Ch. 27; Bk. 22, Chs. 17-18).

The American Founders were deeply divided over Hume's paradoxical and ironic analysis of political authority in the British model. Sophisticated owners of land found his prophecy foreboding. Hume presented the paradox of political authority prescriptively derived from ancient institutions and ironically maintained in appearance rather than reality by a radically new conception of civic virtue which transforms the avarice of rulers into a proper motive for public service. On the one hand, Hume insisted that in a modern commercial society avarice must be praised and encouraged no less than it was condemned by the ancient moral philosophers. Avarice must energize the aggrandizement of private property on which the wealth and power of the state depends (1770, Vol. 2, pp. 2-23, 30-31, 80-111, 127). The rulers of such a society cannot be expected to forego the fruits of avarice and to be held to higher standards of behavior than those prevailing in society. Hume was unwilling, however, to apply this rule without exception. He approved of the acquisition of lucrative offices under the Crown because it maintained the fiction of a fixed constitution. He denounced the acquisition of shares in the public debt by such officers because the dependence of the owners of this artificial property on the sovereign state would destroy the countervailing power of the owners of other forms of property. A civic morality based on avarice cuts two ways. "Social" indoctrination (Dahl, 1956, p. 18) of rulers would not be enough to save the ancient constitution in the long run.

As heirs to this British legacy of ideas and institutions, many of the Framers believed that the new American republic must derive its authority from the acquisitive drives of its rulers. They could not be held to self-denying standards of behavior contrary to those prevailing in a commercial society. Mercer was the purest disciple of Hume in espousing this position at the convention in 1787. "It is a first principle of political science . . . [that] public measures are calculated for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people." No change of government can alter this universal constant of political behavior. The executive must be armed with "influence," therefore, in order to counterbalance the "speculating legislatures" which had been plundering the American people (Farrand, ed., Vol. 2, pp. 284-85, 289). To this extent Mercer agreed with Hamilton who invoked "Hume's opinion" against republican purists who "reprobate the danger of influence in the British government" because they do not understand its necessity. Government must be established and maintained by appealing to "avarice, ambition, interest [the passions] which govern most individuals and all public bodies." Hamilton insisted, however, that interest must include that which Hume denounced as the certain cause of degeneracy in free governments: an "active and continuing interest" in public "debts and particular plans of finance." Together with force, these were the sources of the authority of the British constitution, the only good model available for imitation (Farrand, ed., Vol. 1, pp. 284-86, 288-89, 373, 376, 378-79, 381). Mason, who strongly objected to making the interest of rulers the foundation of authority in a republic, conceded nevertheless that in "the present state of American morals and manners" any plan of government which paid "premiums to a mercenary and depraved ambition" was not likely to lose many friends (Farrand, ed., Vol. 2, p. 284).

Madison was a leader among delegates who believed that the authority of republican government ought not to be derived from its rulers' personal interest in acquiring property in the form of public office. He worked, therefore, to make the narrowest possible application of Hume's doctrine of interest. He believed that republican government cannot be maintained by persons indoctrinated to act merely according to the mores of an acquisitive society. He labored, therefore, to find constitutional language which would prevent

American imitation of influence copied from the British model as it operated both at home and in the former American colonies. Exponents of the British model insisted that interest in holding *executive* office is essential to the energy of government and the accomplishment of great purposes. They were utterly contemptuous of the idea that any person of talent can ever be satisfied with a legislative career. Consequently, they opposed all explicit constitutional barriers to the appointment of ambitious legislators to offices which they vote to create or to compensate with increased emoluments or accept as rewards for supporting the government (Farrand, ed., Vol. 1, pp. 373-74, 386, 388, 390; Vol. 2, p. 405; see also pp. 484-92, 613-14). Madison supported such restrictions because they are essential to republican government. They encourage persons of talent to seek a legislative career, provided they are amply compensated by law and subject to scrutiny by the electorate. They do not bar them from eventual appointment to executive office but they imply that the conception of office as a form of property in which its holder has a personal interest is to be replaced with the idea that office is a public trust in which its holder can have no more than a psychological interest. This change can be effected even though it is necessary to rely on pride, vanity and ambition to move representatives to seek election and reelection to office. They will be tied to their constituents through sympathy and dependency, except for a few who seek other ends through "innovations" which subvert electoral authority (*Federalist* 57, pp. 372-73). For the same reason, Madison argued that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from sharing the president's power to remove executive officers. If Congress did so, it would soon create offices to serve as sinecures for favorites and pensioners (*Papers,* Vol. 12, pp. 255-56).

These restrictions on legislative power were not intended to curb democracy. They were designed to reinforce accountability to the electorate. So long as it is commonly believed that self-government (liberty) requires functional differentiation among governing institutions, it is necessary to show that this goal is consistent with the prevailing theory of political motivation. The members of institutions must have the motives to support their independence and functional integrity, but in the course of doing so their own behavior is so modified from its raw, natural state as to serve the public good. Private and public interest are made perfectly congruent.

The Convention's action to bar imitations of the British model of traditional governmental influence contrasts with its refusal to adopt language barring members of the government from having a personal interest in treasury operations. It was not the result of a plot, but of the opposition of members to provisions excluding particular categories of the population from serving in Congress. Even before the patronage issue was finally settled, Mason proposed to require the ownership of land as a qualification for membership in Congress and to disqualify all persons having unsettled accounts with, or debts to, the United States. The proposal to restrict membership to landowners brought on an immediate charge that it was "a scheme of the landed against the monied interest." Several members reminded all concerned that "the monied interest" is essential "in particular emergencies to the public safety," when a government is dependent on the willingness of the citizens to become its creditors. All apparently agreed that merchants were the most likely creditors during war. This assumption was unjustified because many farmers and planters, Madison noted in a later debate, had property "taken at the point of the bayonet, and a certificate presented in the same manner." It was clear that interest in what critics called "stock-jobbing" can be created only by government which does so only in consequence of waging war. Therefore, it is only a temporary interest, existing until war debt is liquidated. The monied interest was defined in this very narrow sense; it did not refer to other kinds of capital nor to wealth in general as has been supposed. Mason's other proposal was viewed by some delegates as hostile to "the commercial and manufacturing" interests and likely, as well, to cause more mischief than it would cure. Madison opposed Mason on the ground that, despite the solid evidence of abuses in state legislatures, every interest and part of the American community ought to be effectively and sympathetically represented in Congress. When he was challenged in 1788 to defend Congress' power to incur a public debt, Madison responded that war provides the sole occasion for its creation according to European experience. Consequently, we must provide for such "extraordinary emergencies" unless we assume that all wars are avoidable (Farrand, ed., Vol. 2, pp. 121-26, 290, 489-92; *Papers,* Vol. 11, p. 86; Vol. 13, pp. 48-49).

Madison was fully aware of the far-reaching implications of the decision to erect no constitutional barriers to legislative service by public creditors and officers of the armed forces. Conflict among the exponents and opponents of governmental power derived from the personal interest of rulers would undoubtedly continue after the establishment of the new government because the delegates authorized it to assume the obligation of the congressional war debt. The struggle would continue because the supporters of governmental energy derived from the personal interest of rulers regarded republican government as an impediment to the use of public debt for this purpose. The opponents of personal interest as a source of power considered republicanism to be the bulwark of liberty. In this conflict the public debt was like a political coin having obverse and reverse sides. Its exponents insisted that it must constitute one source of a permanent personal interest in order for the government to hold the balance of power in accordance with Hume's analysis of the British model. Opponents of interest such as Madison and Jefferson wanted to liquidate the war debt as soon as possible in order to deny the government its use to create interests which it can employ as the critical mass needed to control the balance of power constitutionally and politically. Both agreed that, if Hume were correct, any government which creates and manipulates the monied interest and its identical twin, the military interest, in order to make them its chosen instruments of power, forces the landed interest into conflict with both of these and the commercial interest as well.

This conflict had existed since 1780, when Madison served his first term in Congress. Madison had not been in Congress long before he became aware that certain members opposed the republican Confederation because it lacked financial powers needed to wage war independent of the wills of the several states. He wished, therefore, for the states to make an explicit grant of such authority to serve this end. It would "reconcile the army and everybody else to our republican forms of government; the principle inconveniences which are imputed to these being really the fruit of defective revenues" (*Papers*, Vol. 2, p. 166). In 1783 he justified his advocacy of an appeal to the states to support a plan for restoring the credit of the United States in order to disprove the charge that unadulterated republican governments will not meet the financial obligations incurred to fight a war of liberation. Americans should do so in particular because their revolutionary struggle had not been a war of "ambition and vain glory" of the sort which had entailed the burdens of public debt on other nations. This distinction between the kinds of wars which generate public debt did not mollify landowners like Mercer who charged that it would "establish and perpetuate a monied interest" which would gain "ascendancy" over the "landed interest" and by its "influence become dangerous to our republican institutions." Madison agreed that if the debt were not liquidated "within the shortest possible time," it would, indeed, "administer poison" to our republican institutions (*Papers*, Vol. 6, pp. 278, 492). Jefferson, also, expressed his concern in January 1787 that the war debt would be chained on our "necks in perpetuum." He outlined for Madison a plan for retiring it. In September 1789 he offered a philosophical doctrine to serve as a restraint on the government in the absence of an explicit constitutional bar to permanent debt and the anti-republican consequences of this omission. No law ought to be contrary to the principle of nature which forbids each generation to entail obligations on posterity. Applied to the war debt, this axiom would place "natural limits" on the borrowing power and thereby "bridle the spirit of War" to which "money-lenders" had excessively free recourse. The incorporation of this axiom into the principles of republican government would perfectly complement the constitutional provision which had transferred the power of making war from the executive to the legislative branch (*Papers*, Vol. 9, p. 284; Vol. 11, pp. 34-35; Vol. 12, pp. 382-87).

Madison agreed that the rule ought to be of particular value, when applied to the debt, but it was unacceptable to Congress as then constituted. He tried, but failed, to secure a "speedy and effectual" provision for the liquidation of the war debt (*Papers*, Vol. 13, p. 65). When this legislative effort proved barren, he used Rousseau's plan for international peace as a text for expounding Jefferson's axiom in order to state the republican doctrine that creation of a permanent war debt clearly distinguishes a government "independent of the will of the people" from governments depending upon the "will of the community." Not even the latter can prevent all wars, but republics offer the best hope of doing so provided they adopt "permanent and constitutional maxims" which forbid a government to entail the "accumulated interest of its perpetual debts" on posterity. Government instigates war, spends for it and "reaps its benefits" unless "avarice" is compelled to "calculate the expenses of ambition" and to make the latter publicly known. This argument was fully consistent with the conviction which Madison expressed before the Constitutional Convention of 1787, during it (*Papers*, Vol. 9, p. 350; Farrand, ed., Vol. 1, p. 318) and afterwards. No republic can endure for long if ruled by an elite consisting of persons combining "the skill and habits of military life and such as possess the great pecuniary resources" of society. The republican theory which vests both "right and power . . . in the majority" cannot hold this circumstance (*Federalist* 43, p. 284).

The bill to establish the Bank of the United States also provoked Madison to believe that its purpose was to extend a permanent monied interest to include working majorities in Congress so as to substitute the personal interest of members of the government in treasury operations for a proper sense of public duty. The covert objective of these operations was, in Madison's judgment, to undercut the constitutional balance so as to render the advantage of different independent branches useless. The bank's supporters assumed that

> the energetic administration of this government is . . . connected with this institution. Mr. M. here stated the principles on which he conceived this government ought to be administered; and added, other gentlemen have had other ideas on the subject, and may have consented to the ratification of the Constitution on different principles or expectations; but he considered the enlightened opinion and affections of the people the only solid basis of support for this government (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 27, 37, 41; *Letters,* Vol. 4, pp. 485-86, 492, 494).

Defeated in Congress, Madison appealed to public opinion in a series of essays which portrayed significant differences between certain models of government and the American republic. The latter was designed to: (1) secure the right to "natural" property in opinions and goods of every variety instead of redistributing it through the artifice of monopolies created by law; (2) derive its "energy" from the "will," enlightened opinions and interests of every "occupation" in every state; it does not substitute private interest for public duty, reward supporters and bribe opponents through the treasury, nor hire persons to use their tongues and pens to sustain the "terror of the sword" so as to enable the few to rule the many despite the latter's "apparent liberty"; and (3) it relies on natural parties to become political checks on each other instead of using the "insinuating" monied interest, emoluments and the "tenor" of military force to "maintain the equilibrium of power." In order to make it clear that he had reference to real events, he asserted that the famous equilibrium of the British constitution, if it ever really existed, does not now depend upon "the form in which its powers are distributed" according to the theory that it is mixed and balanced (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 86-87, 93-94, 101-04, 113-19).

By August 1791 Madison was thoroughly dismayed that his efforts to deny personal interest as a source of the new government's authority had failed. The legislative maneuvers and votes on the funding and bank bills had proved Mason to have been correct at the convention. They were evidence of

> the daring depravity of the times. The stock-jobbers will become the pretorian [*sic*] band of the Government, at once its tool and its tyrant; bribed by its largess, and overwhelming it by its clamours and combinations (*Letters,* Vol. 1, p. 541).

The natural tendency of government to increase its power by basing its energy on personal interest and performing its protective function had been set by artful design upon a self-directed course.

The Metamorphosis of Republican Government

There was a second general reason why Madison believed that the Constitution might become a mask for minority rule. "Measures mold governments" was the rule learned from British experience and confirmed by Hume. The tendency toward autonomy ends in the government's self-transformation even as it maintains the shadows of established forms. Madison based his analysis of constitutional change, one which originated with Machiavelli, on three premises: (1) Like causes produce like effects; war is the cause of all "vigorous and high toned" governments. (2) The "genius" of a government depends on its "system of policy"; hence there should be no introduction of "heterogeneous" (foreign) laws, and certainly not the English common law, unless agreed to expressly because the latter includes numerous "antirepublican doctrines." (3) The relationship between principles and facts can be perceived, just as Hume claimed, through "the eye of the Philosophical Legislator," long before it is "visible to the naked eye of the ordinary politician." The natural principle that one generation cannot bind another is a proposition of this sort. Philosophical insight enables some observers to determine when political actors are disguising their true objectives by manipulating appearances as substitutes for reality. Consequently, the correct "principles ought to govern" both political analysis and decisions because they are "so connected with facts" (Farrand, ed., Vol. 1, pp. 464-65; *Papers,* Vol. 10, p. 197; Vol. 12, p. 373; Vol. 13, p. 25).

Madison's belief that the genius of a government can be affected by its system of policy had a meaning now largely lost to us. He used it in a classical sense to mean that there are known first principles on which the institutions of every kind of regime are founded and they are guides for their proper functioning. They are tutelary. He used "genius" in a second sense derived from the new psychology of politics. It was synonymous with "spirit" in Montesquieu's sense: the springs, the characteristic motivating, energizing forces supporting each type of government. No system can be reduced to only one, however (*Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 93), because the American system properly rests on both ambition and the desire to serve the public good.

Madison repeatedly applied the two categories, system of policy and heterogeneous laws contrary to the genius of republicanism, to the actions of his political opponents in the 1790s. They all tended either to assimilate our institutions to the

British model covertly, or to "warp" public opinion openly in favor of it (*Letters,* Vol. 2, p. 156). Hamilton's financial statutes were a "system of measures more accommodated to" hereditary forms of government than to the "true genius" of ours (*Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 104). The pursuit of "national splendor and glory" by means of wars of ambition ought never to be our primary objective because war appeals to, and generously rewards, the strongest passions, avarice and ambition, as well as the most dangerous weaknesses of human nature, and links them in the use of force (*Papers,* Vol. 11, p. 97; *Writings,* Vol. 6, p. 174). No people were ever given a greater opportunity to understand the danger of intrigues between "political and military leaders," but whether they would profit from the instructive history of less fortunate people Madison was unsure (*Letters,* Vol. 2, p. 156).

Madison was quite explicit about the metamorphosing effects of introducing certain anti-republican principles of the English common law. First, the Constitution created a republican government and every effort to read into that document the common-law prerogative of war and assign it to the president is contrary to its "first principles" and inconsistent with its "forms." If it were to be accepted, then no citizen could any longer even guess the "character of the government under which he lives," nor could even the most learned jurist predict the extent of the "constructive prerogative" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 149, 151). Second, constructive incorporation of the common law of sedition would strike with equal force at the first principles of our republican government. Punishment for the utterance of political opinion not only destroys the very essence of a free government, but also converts it into a system of rule independent of the will of the majority of the community. When both of these anti-republican doctrines are constructively incorporated and combined, the design is clear. In 1798 Madison was convinced by Adams' war measures and support of the Sedition Act that it was his intention to transform the United States into "the makeweight of the European Balances of Power" in accordance with his theory of constitutional equilibrium and his love of the "maxims" of the British constitution. We have now long forgotten that the Virginia Assembly justified its resolutions of December, 1798, and Madison's exposition of its meaning and intended effect with another resolution. It declared that "the policy of the United States forbids a war of aggression" and the standing military forces needed to wage it. This warning was based on the proposition that "measures can mold governments," especially when they are "pretexts for power afforded by war." Once such transforming measures are added to "constructive perversions of the Constitution," Madison added, "our code of laws" will determine the "form as well as the powers of Government" (*Writings,* Vol. 6, pp. 310, 321, 327-28, 333, 338, 340, 407).

Conclusions

Madison was neither an opponent of majority rule and political parties responsive to public opinion nor a pluralist. The objective of his political theory was to show that limited government can be founded on human nature which interacts with stable institutions to serve the common good. This prospect is realistic so long as political authority rests on enlightened public opinion and the limited personal interest of rulers in the gratification derived from public service. Authority based on these two sources tends, however, to create a tension between strict accountability to a diverse society and governmental autonomy once an initial degree of support has been established. Thereafter, the balance of political authority is not based solely on the constitutional text nor on the balance of private property. War, in particular, enables government to alter this balance and it is likely to do so, given human nature and the gratification provided it by wars calculated to extend hegemony over others. The only countervailing force opposing such a change is appeal to public opinion to sustain the first principles and forms of accountable, representative government. Over time the moral and political authority of such a government is derived in great measure from the common belief that it has used power for beneficial purposes.

References

Adair, Douglas (1957). " 'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison and the Tenth Federalist." *Huntington Library Quarterly* 20: 343-59.

Beard, Charles A. (1913). *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.* New York: Macmillan.

______ (1945). *The Economic Basis of Politics.* New York: Knopf.

Bentley, Arthur F. (1967; first published in 1908). *The Process of Government.* Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press.

Bourke, Paul T. (1975). "The Pluralist Reading of James Madison's Tenth *Federalist." Perspectives in American History,* Vol. 9. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 271-95.

Burns, Edward M. (1968). *James Madison Philosopher of the Constitution.* New York: Octagon Books.

Burns, James M. (1967). *Deadlock of Democracy.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Dahl, Robert A. (1956). *A Preface to Democratic Theory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

______ (1967). *Pluralist Democracy in the United States.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Farrand, Max, ed. (1913). *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,* 4 vols. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Forbes, Duncan (1975). *Hume's Philosophical Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison (1937). *The Federalist.* Introduction by Edward M. Earle. New York: Modern Library.

Hartz, Louis (1955). *The Liberal Tradition in America.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Hofstadter, Richard (1972). *The Idea of a Party System.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Holcombe, Arthur M. (1950). *Our More Perfect Union.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hume, David (1770). *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects,* New Edition, 6 vols. London: T. Cadell.

Ketcham, Ralph L. (1957). "Notes on James Madison's Sources for the Tenth Federalist Paper." *Midwest Journal of Politics* 1: 20-25.

Locke, John (1946). *The Second Treatise of Civil Government.* Edited with an introduction by J. W. Gough. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Machiavelli, Niccolò (1965). *The Chief Works,* 3 vols. Translated by Allan Gilbert. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Madison, James (1884). *Letters and other Writings of James Madison,* 4 vols. New York: Worthington.

______ (1900-1910). *The Writings of James Madison,* 9 vols. Edited by Gaillard Hunt. New York: Putnam.

______ (1962 to date). *The Papers of James Madison,* 13 vols. to date. Edited by William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, Robert A. Rutland and others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Marshall, G. (1954). "David Hume and Political Scepticism." *The Philosophical Quarterly* 4: 247-57.

Marx, Karl (1930). *Capital,* 2 vols. Introduction by G. D. H. Cole. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. London: J. P. Dent.

May, Henry F. (1976). *The Enlightenment in America.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de (1949). *The Spirit of the Laws,* 2 vols. New York: Hafner.

Parrington, Vernon L. (1930). *Main Currents in American Thought,* 3 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Ranney, Austin (1975). *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Riemer, Neal (1967). *The Democratic Experience.* New York: Van Nostrand.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). *Party Government.* New York: Farrar and Rinehart.

Smith, J. Allen (1965: first published 1907). *The Spirit of American Government.* Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press.

White, Morton (1956). *Social Thought in America.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Wolin, Sheldon (1954). "Hume and Conservatism." *American Political Science Review* 47: 999-1016.

Wood, Gordon (1969). *The Creation of the American Republic.* New York: Norton.

Wright, Benjamin F. (1949). "The Federalist and the Nature of Political Man." *Ethics* 59, Pt. 2: 1-31.

The Language of Equality in a Constitutional Order

TIMOTHY J. O'NEILL
Tulane University

Like all languages, the language of American law can liberate or confine thinking. Its confining power is illustrated by the absence of the radical "group rights" claim in the Bakke *litigation despite the prominence of that argument in the popular debate over affirmative discrimination. This absence establishes the limitations of the metaphor developed to give meaning to the concept "persons" in the equal protection context. While capable of investing the corporation with many of the attributes of "personhood" as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, the metaphor makes absurd the claim of a racial group to exercise rights or privileges distinct from those of its members. This analysis illuminates the metaphorical structure of law language and concludes that the restricted range of metaphorical thinking in law weakens the law's capacity to mediate struggles over social goals.*

Most discussions of *The Regents of the University of California* v. *Bakke* have been dominated by the social and moral dilemmas posed by the case. Some analyses have sought guidance in resolving these dilemmas in the legal arguments and litigational strategies employed by the parties and the amici curiae. Such an approach seems reasonable to a nation which seizes upon legal concepts to solve so many of its pressing political and social problems. And it is characteristic of the premises of a constitutional political order which invests so heavily in its judicial institutions as policy makers.

But the constitutional language on equality has made only certain types of equality arguments possible (meaningful and sensible). The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees are posed in restrained terms, forbidding the states from denying to their residents the "equal protection of the laws." Protection against one type of inequality, not the affirmative duty to promote equality, lies at the heart of the constitutional text. More important, the language of the law which has been developed to provide meaning to the spartan provisions of the Constitution has placed restraints on the range and nature of claims which are possible under the clause. If the briefs presented in *Bakke* offered choices to the Court, those choices were limited by what has become sensible in the language and rhetoric of American law and politics.

The power of a language to restrain thinking explains the absence of an important argument in the legal debate over *Bakke*. No organization, either in its brief or in the oral arguments made before the California or United States Supreme Court, defended the radical case for "group rights"—the right of a corporate whole to exercise a power or privilege independent of the rights of its individual members. Despite its respectability in other contexts, the group rights argument was not seen as sensible when applied to the question of minority access to medical school education. The guarantee of equal protection to "persons" could not be extended to groups except as proxies for the individual rights of their members.

It is my thesis that the absence of the radical group right position in the *Bakke* litigation establishes the limitations of the legal concept "persons" which has been developed to give meaning to the equal protection clause. These limitations not only are the product of historical circumstance and ideological belief, but also can be traced to the nature and role of legal concepts employed in American law. The meaning of "persons" has developed in such a way as to make group rights absurd in American law.

A linguistic approach is used here because it permits an examination of the impoverishment of public debates on key questions as a result of the reliance on legal grammar and logic. Conventional approaches do not satisfactorily settle this issue. The controversy over "affirmative discrimination" (Glazer, 1975)—granting preferential treatment to members of groups traditionally victims of unjust discrimination—is not the type of rule-bounded question susceptible to traditional, jurisprudential understandings. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause condones extraordinary exceptions to its individualistic, anti-racist theme implicates a number of conflicting constitutional values. Since the grand principles of individual merit and of the humanitarian concern for the victims of racial slurs were themselves challenged in *Bakke*, a solution to the case could not be deduced from these major premises. *Bakke* presented a situation in which

---

I thank the Pericles Foundation and the staff of the Governmental Studies Program of the Brookings Institution for their financial and intellectual assistance. I also thank Professors Warren Roberts and Jean Danielson for their helpful comments.

the nation must develop new principles or radically recast old ones if the public's expectations of justice and fairness were to be satisfied. Citing the relevant rule was inapposite; the rules must be created, not simply interpreted.

The Antinomies of Equality

The Regents of the University of California v. *Bakke* resulted from the efforts of a white, 32-year-old male, Allan Bakke, to win admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was not admitted, Bakke charged, because of the institution's policy of reserving 16 admission slots for qualified but academically unimpressive blacks, American Indians, Chicanos, and Asian-Americans. The heart of Bakke's argument was simple: equal protection means nondiscrimination. According to his attorneys and supporters, the Fourteenth Amendment's language is unequivocal when it insists that "no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Individual, not group-based, attributes are the only permissible factors to be counted.

The university's response took the form of an appeal to a mixture of policy and legal considerations. The policy arguments emphasized the wisdom and utility of using race as a basis for apportioning public goods: preferential programs provided successful role-models for upwardly mobile minority youths, preserved social peace by establishing the state's sensitivity to the needs of its minority citizens, and improved the delivery of medical services to the traditionally underserved minority community. The university and its supporters also evoked a series of constitutional arguments favoring the Davis admissions process. Some shared Bakke's emphasis on the meritocratic character of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections (standardized tests misjudge the true capabilities of minority applicants, the minority's meritorious contribution to a diversified education and to social pluralism), while others explored the possibility of an extraordinary exception to the individualistic merit principle granted to ex-slaves and their descendants (Calabresi, 1979, pp. 433-34).

Despite the real difference in their views, both Bakke's and the university's supporters focused on the importance of the individual. No participant or amicus curiae organization endorsed or gave serious attention to the concept of proportional representation of racial groups in the medical profession. Defending the university's program in the oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Archibald Cox explicitly rejected proportional representation. If the program were to

> give rise to some notion of group entitlement to numbers, regardless either of the ability of the individual or of . . . their [sic] potential contribution to society, . . . I would first, as a faculty member, criticize and oppose it; as a constitutional lawyer, the further it went the more doubts I would have ("Oral Arguments," 1977, p. 17).

Even the representatives of groups likely to be injured if Bakke's challenge were upheld declined to argue a group right position. The Black Students Union of Yale Law School charged (1978, pp. 375, 377) that Bakke, and not the supporters of the university, was asserting a "group right"; Bakke was the party insisting that "by using [a racially-oriented] classification, the school is denying a group [the white applicants] its rights."

Of course, relying on the literal meaning of statements such as these is dangerous. Some university supporters may have underplayed their preference for a group rights position. The notion of group rights is radically redistributive; it demands a major restructuring of the ways in which resources and opportunities are apportioned in society. It promises both a group of new winners and losers and a new set of rules for the competition. The individualistic argument is distributive. Although new winners and losers may emerge, the competition continues on the basis of the traditional values of individual merit and accomplishment. If courts are perceived as susceptible to distributive arguments but resistant to redistributive ones, it is tactically sensible not to champion group rights. Other university supporters may have failed to recognize the group entitlement basis of their arguments for affirmative discrimination. A claim for group rights may be implicit in an argument for minority representation. However, of the more than 350 participants in the writing or approval of amici briefs I interviewed, only one was willing to support proportional representation on a radical group right basis.[1] All the others supporting the university saw racial membership as a convenient proxy for the individual's constitutional right to be free of racial discrimination. Organizations as forthright in their endorsement of statistical parity among the races as the National Conference of Black Lawyers did so not on the premise that such groups have a distinct right to a fair share of the medical profession but rather that in a race-blind society individual choices would naturally distribute physicians among racial groups in a random manner. The current unequal distribution of benefits and burdens among the races served in their view as evidence of invidious discrimination against individuals. For them, minority representation meant equalizing opportunities among groups as a short-term expedient for insuring fair treatment of all individuals. Minority representation also seemed to promise a broadening of intellectual resources to the advantage of the whole society.

---

[1] Interview with William Wells, Assistant General Counsel, NAACP, September 14, 1977. My data are derived from interviews with 363 participants in the advocacy politics of *Bakke*. I interviewed leaders and members from every organization active in the case, except for two small Jewish organizations. Access to the private files, notes, and correspondence of many informants provided checks on statements made during the interviews.

The litigants' and amici's interpretation of equality was shared by all the courts. The trial court judge quoted with approval a federal district court's judgment enjoining an affirmative action employment program. "There is no place for race or ethnic groupings in America. Only in individual accomplishment can equality be achieved" (*Anderson* v. *San Francisco Unified School District,* quoted in "Notice of Intended Decision," 1978, p. 189). The California Supreme Court majority opinion fastened onto the language in *Shelley* v. *Kramer* insisting that "the rights created by . . . the Fourteenth Amendment are . . . guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights" (*Bakke* v. *Regents of the University of California,* 553 P. 2d., 1153, 1163, n. 17 [1976]).

The federal court seemed as blind to the radical group right position as the lower courts had been. Four justices declined to address the constitutional arguments at all. The five who did reach the constitutional issue split over whether the Fourteenth Amendment countenanced racially exclusionary admissions processes. Although divided over the issue of means, they were united on the vision of the goal to be achieved: fairness to the individual. According to Brennan, Davis' special admissions program "is consistent with the goal of putting minority applicants in the position they would have been in if not for the evil of racial discrimination" (*Regents of the University of California* v. *Bakke,* 438 U.S. 265, 374 n. 58 [1978]). Marshall invoked the vision of "a fully integrated society, one in which the color of a person's skin will not determine the opportunities available for him or her" (p. 401). Blackmun wrote of his

> earnest hope that the time will come when an "affirmative action" program is unnecessary. . . . Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive but that is behind us (p. 403).

Finally, Powell expressed his commitment to "fairness in individual competition for opportunities":

> The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal (pp. 319, n. 53, 289-90).

All five justices relied on the notion of equal opportunity, the principal American response to the perplexing issue of equality. The principles of fair competition ("to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life") and of careers open to talent ("to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all," Lincoln, 1967, p. 188) suggest that individual performance, not a system of statuses, should determine an individual's position in society. However, coexisting with the traditional equal opportunity formula has been a concern about the distribution of economic and social burdens and awards after the competition. If all individuals are created equal, then "equality of opportunity ought to lead to approximate equality of condition" (Kristol, 1968, pp. 108, 110). Efforts to reconcile the centrifugal pressures of these ideals of equal opportunities and equal accomplishments have largely defined the debate on equality in the American tradition.

Until recently, the attractions of equal opportunity have overshadowed the concerns about equal results. Universal suffrage, public education, and a hostility to blatant elite domination of the economic and political sectors promised that individual achievement would receive its due. However, in an era of high unemployment and narrow economic opportunities, like the late sixties and much of the seventies, the promise of advancement through personal achievement seemed to lose its magic. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the proportion of families with incomes below the poverty line was almost four times higher among black than among white families in 1969. The median school years completed by whites was 12.1 years in 1969; the median for blacks was 9.8 and for Latinos 9.6 years. In 1974, the unemployment rate among nonwhite minorities was double that of whites (1971; 1975, p. 64). A study released by the Congressional Budget Office in 1977 reported that nonwhites suffered a 70 percent higher infant mortality rate and had six years' shorter life expectancy than whites (San Francisco *Chronicle,* 1977). In such a world, the "openness" of the social system was seen as oppressive. Activist organizations were formed which gave voice to a demand for group reparations such as the "Black Manifesto" of 1969 (Bedau, 1972). The betterment of the individual was sought in uplifting the status of the group in which he or she was an involuntary member.

The demand for rights for groups is not unique to American race relations. Programs of quotas in education and employment are found in Malaysia and India (Means, 1972; Katzenstein, 1977). Long-established democracies such as Belgium and Canada's Quebec provide special rights to linguistic groups (Heisler, 1977, pp. 28-31, 40-42). In fact, the right of a linguistic group to require the education of its children in a particular language is the clearest statement of a group right. No individual can claim a right to speak a language since language presumes at least two individuals who share a common grammar and vocabulary. The claim to linguistic independence is plausible only in terms of a group claim to exist as a group, as a collectivity not reducible to its parts.

If the idea of group rights finds support in the policies of other civilized nations, why has the radical character of group rights failed to be translated into concepts sensible to legal discourse? Why is American law "blind" to the appeals of group rights?

The Limitations of Equal Protection

Contemporary equal protection doctrine possesses little ability to entertain what I have called the strong or radical case for group rights. Only a weak case for group rights has received serious attention in the legal literature. Owen Fiss, for example, has proposed a "group-disadvantaging principle" to support preference programs. If a group forms a "natural class," possessing a unique identity in the public eye not reducible to the characteristics of any one member, and if its members are treated on the basis of the group identity and not on individual attributes, then the group may be the legitimate recipient of preferences. But Fiss makes it clear that the "natural class" is only a short-term expedient for identifying individuals who are deserving of "special solicitude." One of the justifications for the preferences is to "permit the fullest development of the individual members of the subordinate group." The new principle is thus more concerned with the group as a collectivity of disadvantaged members than with the rights of a group as a group. It is the aggregate claim of unjustly injured individuals which is vital in defining the group's claim to special treatment (Fiss, 1976, pp. 123, 147-58).

In other areas of constitutional law, the courts have been willing to extend due process and equal protection guarantees to business firms, labor organizations, corporations, and trusteeships (*Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad* v. *Beckwith*, 129 U.S. 26 [1888]; *First National Bank* v. *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765 [1978]). Moreover, the acceptance of the independent status of an economic association as an artificial "person" is not unique to American law, for every society knows of associations which it regards as legal entities.

If the protection of the corporate "person" from arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law and from infringements of its First Amendment rights is a basic doctrine of American law, why can't the legal concept of "persons" encompass the claim of groups such as blacks to a share of the public largesse as a group? The answer can not lie in the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only "persons" or the assertion that "persons" can only mean "natural" entities. Corporations are legal personalities created by government fiat and granted an artificial existence and legal standing distinct from those of its members. By contrast, groups such as blacks are "natural" associations, produced by physical and social factors largely independent of legislative and judicial actions. The explanation for the law's resistance to the radical group right claim lies in a configuration of historical and ideological factors and, equally important, in the nature and limitations of the language of law.

The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment promised full citizenship to the newly freed slaves. The common emphasis in the court cases that were to follow was on the individualistic character of the rights conferred by equal protection. The majority in the *Civil Rights Cases* held that "state action" invading "individual rights . . . is the subject matter of the Fourteenth Amendment" (109 U.S.3,11[1883]). *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* rested on the premise that nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment referred to races; it referred to citizens and persons (163 U.S. 537 [1896]).

The limited successes for black civil rights reiterated the particularistic focus of constitutional guarantees. "The rights created by . . . the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual" (*Shelley* v. *Kramer*, 334 U.S. 1, 22 [1948]). Even *Brown* v. *Board of Education* characterized the right at stake as an individual one. Racial assignment to public schools was wrong not because race is not an indicator of social status—unfortunately it is—but because it is irrelevant to the question of an individual's educational needs ("age and qualifications," 347 U.S. 483, 494 [1954]). Poverty or superior potential are legitimate criteria by which to apportion educational opportunities; racial affiliation is not. Former Justice Douglas aptly summarized *Brown*'s individualistic theme in his dissent to *Bakke*'s precursor, *DeFunis* v. *Odegaard:* "There is no superior person by constitutional standards. A DeFunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter his race or color" (416 U.S. 312, 337 [1974]).

Paradoxically, during the same era in which the courts routinely ignored a "natural" group right claim when interpreting "person" within the Fourteenth Amendment, they were enthusiastically extending both due process and equal protection guarantees to the "artificial" economic "person"—the corporation. The post-Civil War Court assumed without argument that a corporation was a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment (*Santa Clara County* v. *Southern Pacific Railroad Company,* 118 U.S. 394 [1886]):

> This important point was settled by Chief Justice Waite telling counsel in oral argument that the Court would not hear arguments on it since all the Justices were of the opinion that corporations were persons within the purview of the amendment (Miller, 1968, p. 54).

However, the radical group rights claim was never raised by either litigants or the courts in any of the major civil rights cases. The historical oddity of one group receiving authoritative acceptance as a "person" while the other was never raised suggests that ideological or linguistic, not historical, circumstances are at work.

Scheingold has observed that "legal symbols in political discourse divert attention from fundamental conflicts by focusing on established procedures. . . . The law, in other words, calls upon a prior procedural concensus to resolve or perhaps to sublimate a current conflict of substance" (1974, p. 52). Given the law's special role in a culture characterized by the vigorous assertion of rights, ideological considerations may be the key to understanding the law's resistance to the appeals of the radical group right claim.

The classical liberal democratic tradition is founded on a belief in the radical individualism of basic equal needs and rights. The idea of a "group right" which is more than the aggregate of individual privileges is thus precluded. The group is justified only as a shelter for individual aspirations and needs. The Declaration of Independence forthrightly establishes the premise of radical individualism in American thought: ". . . all men are created equal . . . endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights." And groups like "Governments," "are instituted among Men" in order "to secure these [individual] rights." The sole reference to groups other than political or administrative divisions in the Constitution reaffirms the dependent status of group life—"the right of the people peacefully to assemble" in the First Amendment. Thus, the American tradition deals with political organizations as if they were assemblies and therefore transitory expressions of individual energies or sentiments.

These features of individualistic-oriented rights and duties and the derivative status of the group as a mechanism for realizing individual rights have molded judicial understandings of equal protection. The antidiscrimination principle is the traditional vehicle of these understandings. The principle is reducible to one proposition: the same standards of "color-blindness" (rejecting as generally irrelevant the ascription-based attributes of race, religion, and ethnicity), and universality (the precept that rules should be applied in an evenhanded manner) which dominate the courtroom are applicable to the legislature.

The courts enjoy a special status in a complex system of constitutionally divided and limited power. As the guardian of constitutional symbols and of the popular faith in the rule of law, the courts are the forum for social struggles over moral and political principles. But the courts are also an anomaly in a political culture where the Jacksonian ideal of the citizen-politician is still powerful; they are the repository of the prestige accorded expert legal decision makers. The special prestige and status of courts in the American system means that judicial confinement of the equal protection clause to the concept of equal treatment not only mirrors elements of the popular understanding of equality but also independently supports the legitimacy of individual-oriented attitudes. The antidiscrimination principle is both a product of and a contributor to the myopia of American ideology on the role and purpose of groups.

While an ideological explanation for the neglect of the radical group right claim in American legal thought seems apt, it fails to deal adequately with certain realities. Despite the ideological attachment to the nineteenth-century liberal doctrine of the atomistic individual, all Western democracies reward ascription-based associations. The state finds it politically and administratively convenient to channel public goods and services through such groups, and individuals join these associations because it is beneficial to be a member. Moreover, the conservative theme of the mediating group has coexisted with and occasionally contradicted the liberal premise of individualism in American thought. This theme sees intermediating associations as a positive good which provide a salutary buffer between the relatively impotent individual and the centralized might of government. The liberty fostered by private groups counters the leveling thrust of the democratic ethos (Tocqueville, 1969, pp. 520-24). The emotional appeal of "neighborhood" and "family" in Ronald Reagan's acceptance speech at the 1980 Republican National Convention demonstrates the theme's continued vitality in American politics. Even the Constitution contains an explicit exception to the individualistic character of the American political scheme. Article I, Section 8 confers a special status on Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign associations (cf. Svensson, 1979, pp. 432-39). But perhaps the most persuasive reason to resist a purely ideological answer to the question of "why not group rights?" is the existence of the "American corporate system" of complex, economic associations (Miller, 1968, p. 6).

The corporation's status as an artificial "person" is in part the consequence of legislative will and in part the result of judicial creativity. It is the product of "legal make-believe," of an "elaborate web of 'as-ifs' which the courts have woven" (Miller, 1968, p. 9, quoting Walter H. Hamilton). The corporation is granted an artificial personality, existence, and legal standing precisely *because* it is intended to be distinct from its constituent members. This leads Arthur Miller and others to conclude that the corporation "is a constitutional anomaly," an aberration in Western thought (Miller, 1968, p. 60; Van Dyke, 1977, pp. 343-69). But to dismiss the corporation as an "anomaly" is to dismiss a persistent and universal feature of Western culture. What if it is not an anomaly?

If one begins from the premise that the corporation is not a curiosity but the logical extension of the legal fictions developed to provide meaning to the constitutional word "persons," then the possibility arises that nonindividualistic notions of "persons" are sensible within American law. The corporation is a permanent "group" whose rights and powers extend beyond those attributable to any member, employee, or stockholder. The failure to ascribe importance to comparable, non-economically based groups as repositories of rights therefore becomes both more puzzling and more significant. It suggests the linguistic limitations of the metaphor upon which the legal theory of "persons" has been built.

Law as Metaphor

The practice of law is a linguistic skill: it deals with and works through words. Yet clubs are trumps in law and, therefore, law differs from most languages in at least one regard—there is a fist behind the legal word. "Fist" implies "action"; law language acts upon the listener both as a sound and as a symbol. Law language is a form of political force, not only in the sense of speech as a physical activity but also in the more important sense of speech as a political act, as an attempt to affect community action. As a subspecies of political language, law language is therefore "conventional" in the most radical sense—it is not only an human artifact but a maker of men and women. The language in which we conceive of legal "things" is decisive in molding our attitudes and behaviors toward those "things." Answers to "what is freedom of speech?" are derived from the legal concepts and usages we have developed to distinguish protected speech from similar but unprotected activities such as obscenity (see *Roth* v. *United States,* 354 U.S. 476 [1957]).

While legal words describe nothing perfectly, they are useful in simplifying and clarifying a complex and fluid world. They are necessary abstractions from the bewildering mosaic of reality, attempting to explain complex and seemingly unrelated phenomena by simple and hence, from a realistic standpoint, necessarily incomplete concepts and principles. But the dangers of law language are obvious: the map is offered as a substitute for the territory, the chemical formula for the taste, the diagram for the dance. These dangers are tolerable only so long as the basic nature of law language is remembered by its users.

The abstracting and simplifying character of law language affects its role as a specialized form of political action. Political demands, beliefs, and interests expressed through litigation will be mediated and transformed by the conventions established in law language governing what is sensible. The ways in which particular social problems will be handled in the courtroom will depend not only on the pool of existing ideas and doctrine available to legal actors but also on the ability of the language to apply these existing understandings to new or recurring issues.

Law in the Anglo-American approach has fastened on two devices to provide the flexibility and innovative capacity necessary for change: legal fictions and the process of analogical reasoning. Both are used as means to apply concepts and approaches which have worked satisfactorily in one area to another area. Both are expressions of the curious form of conservatism which permeates the legal system: a prudent recognition of the pitfalls of wholesale innovation harnessed to a cautious realization of the need to adapt to changing circumstances. And both are facets of the metaphorical nature of law language itself.

A legal fiction is a form of "legal pretending." It is a legal contrivance which transforms something known to be false or unreal into an assumed fact. A fiction may be used to broaden or narrow judicial jurisdictions or to modify a substantive rule of law. No matter its goal, however, the fiction is phrased "so as to *look* as if the court merely follows old and legitimate ways. The fiction assimilates the unusual to the usual, the new to the old." Its appeal rests on its ability to disguise change and therefore to allow "for a gentler transition" between the old and the new by treating a new controversy "as if" it fell within a settled aspect of the law (Friedman, 1975, pp. 250-52, emphasis in the original).

The second device of metaphorical law language is analogical reasoning—the comparison and contrast of similar and dissimilar things. Analogical reasoning in law presumes that when cases are similar in relevant ways, the judge is warranted in treating them "as if" they were the same. The need for the qualifier "as if" is a recognition of how the interplay between ambiguous words and shifting social circumstances both constrains and liberates legal thinking. Law is not a system of preexisting rules applied by legal experts. Rather, since government would be impossible if a rule had to be clear before it could be imposed, law is a process receptive to differing viewpoints and to ambiguities. Analogical reasoning "provides for the participation of the community in resolving the ambiguity [of rules] by providing a forum" where different policies can be offered by asserting competing analogies. Moreover, since the public participates indirectly in the definition, refinement, and modification of legal rules through analogical reasoning, its loyalty is tied to its legal institutions (Levi, 1948, pp. 1, 104)—one possible explanation for the role and power of courts in American life. But analogical reasoning is not unbounded. It is limited by a taught tradition establishing what procedures and methods are appropriate for drawing analogies—such as the adversarial process of fact-finding in American law—and by specific legal doctrines which constrain the legal actor's freedom to uncover plausible similarities—for example, the axiom that criminal statutes should be construed more strictly than civil statutes. Equally important, but often overlooked, is the influence exerted by the limitations of reasoning based on metaphors.

If analogical reasoning is justified by the ambiguity and shifting contexts of rules and words, it does not follow that a word or rule can mean everything. There is a core of meaning which cannot simply be abandoned without powerful justification. And that "core of meaning" is determined by the inescapable, metaphorical structure of law language.

Both legal fictions and analogical reasoning are metaphorical in form; their power lies in their ability to transfer meanings from a settled portion of the law to an unsettled one. But transference will not work unless there exists a significant likeness between different classes of phenomena (Miller, 1979, p. 156), which in turn means that the asserted likeness between classes must be accepted as plausible by the existing conventions of what constitutes significant similarities. An example from common law reasoning illustrates this point: a rancher dammed a stream running through his property in order to provide a watering hole for his cattle. An unexpected thunderstorm caused the watering hole to overflow its banks and to flood the croplands of an adjacent farmer. The farmer sued the rancher, holding the rancher responsible for the damage inflicted by the flood waters just as he would be if his cattle had trampled the farmer's crops. The rancher raised in his defense the settled rule that a landowner is not responsible for acts of nature involving his property. The flood was like an act of a wild lion which crossed the rancher's land in order to strike at the farmer's chickens. The court is asked to select from among these competing analogies. His damming the stream transformed a thing of nature into a thing of man—is a flood more like a wild lion or a domesticated cow? It is of course absurd to speak of a flood as if it were a lion or a cow, but it is the appeal of metaphorical thought that it allows us to transfer through fiction the knowledge and experience accumulated in one area to another area. This willing suspension of disbelief allows us to explain problems in a logical manner by recourse to absurd comparisons. Absurdity serves the vital function of defining the plausibility of an extreme logical argument in law and thereby sets limits to the range of legal logic.

The issue of the comparative constitutional status of ethnic groups and corporations is illuminated by stressing the limits of the metaphor developed to enrich the meaning of "persons" in the Fourteenth Amendment. At one time, the courts were required to settle the issue whether a corporation was more like an artifact or a human being (the conventional understanding of "person"). By choosing to treat the corporation as if it were a human being, the courts demonstrated their acceptance of the similarities between corporations and human beings as significant and their dismissal of the similarities between corporations and artifacts as irrelevant. The capacity of a corporation to draw upon its human resources in order to plan, to expend its energies prudently, and to adapt to changing circumstances make it plausible to treat it as if it were a living being. Unlike an inanimate object, a corporation is not totally dependent on human action; the body of organizational mores and customs and the structure of decision making mold its human participants into carriers of organizational values. A corporation can be a creator of as well as an instrument for the realization of human values.

But the metaphorical transference of human qualities to the corporation is not without its costs. By investing human abilities and therefore human rights in corporations, law language established limits which make group right claims in a civil rights context appear absurd. The fiction of an autonomous "group" in American law grants the artificial person of the corporation many of the prerogatives of political action and speech but denies it the rights to vote or to campaign for public office. To suggest that General Motors is being deprived of equal protection because it cannot cast a ballot in an election is seen as absurd. Thus, the closer the fiction of the artificial person comes to the core of political practice, the fiercer is the law's attachment to individualism and the less its willingness to entertain the metaphor of the corporate group as "person."

So too, American law is able to accept the idea of a group as a convenient vehicle for protecting the individual against past and continuing discrimination, but it flounders when pushed to require statistical parity as a right. It finds plausible a group's claim to affect the political process but rejects as absurd the claim to a share of any benefit as a right. According to much of American political teaching, politics is a process of group action and accommodation. Groups affected by a public program have a right to play a role in shaping and administering that program. But membership in such groups is seen as voluntary, overlapping, and changing. When the claim to rights and privileges as an identifiable group is voiced, American law lacks the capacity to accept the argument as a sensible extension of the metaphor of "person." Thus, even as fervent a defender of affirmative discrimination as the jurist Ronald Dworkin finds himself bounded by the metaphor and forced to conclude: "Prejudice in official decisions is wrong, not because some group is worse off as a whole, but because it treats an individual with contempt" (1978, p. 44).

It is clear that the metaphorical connotations of "person" dominating law language are richer in their capacity to ensure that groups receive protection against unfriendly legislation (the presence of "contempt"), than in their ability to lay a foundation for claims of a more positive nature. If corporations are not an anomaly but are the logical extensions of the core meaning of "persons," then it is significant that the metaphor of the corporate "person" originally developed in terms of the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision historically sought to protect individuals against unfair or arbitrary deprivations of personal liberties or property. The due process clause ensures that government will abide by agreed-upon procedures when legislating on matters affecting personal interests and guarantees the opportunity of affected parties to participate in the deliberations.

Where claims of due process presuppose an existing standard and constitute an appeal to consensual "rules of the game," equal protection analysis does not rest on a comparable basis. The types of cases which arise under the equal protection clause tend to be ambiguous or undefined in their claims. Equal protection may guarantee some kind of equality, but equal shares of what and equal to whom? Where due process assures protection against, equal protection seems to promise the equal right, privilege, or capacity to *do* or to *have* something. The metaphor of the corporation as "person" seems fitting in the former setting, but becomes problematic in the latter.

The factors which make the corporate "person" a satisfying and enlightening metaphor in the due process context make it less plausible in the equal protection context. The corporation is a well-defined body; its functions and the scope of its rights are closely confined by the legislative fiat giving it legal life. The severely limited status of its claims as a "person" provides a relatively objective measure of its legitimate needs and interests. And the law's willingness to err on the side of individual liberty supplies the breathing space for the corporation's special status. But the courts are not so lenient when corporations claim more positive privileges. While the courts have applied the most stringent standards of scrutiny to state laws prohibiting aliens from practicing the professions of law (*In Re Griffiths,* 413 U.S. 717 [1973]) and engineering (*Examining Board* v. *DeOtero,* 426 U.S. 572 [1975]), the courts have only required a rational relation to a legitimate state interest to uphold limits on corporate entry into the ready-to-wear eye glass business (*Williamson* v. *Lee Optical of Oklahoma,* 348 U.S. 483 [1955]), debt adjusting (*Ferguson* v. *Skrupta,* 472 U.S. 726 [1963]), and street peddling in New Orleans' Vieux Carré (*New Orleans* v. *Dukes,* 427 U.S. 297 [1976]). Although corporations and aliens are "persons" within the meaning of equal protection, what is a sensible demand by one type of "person" is not sensible when presented by another.

Insofar as the radical group right claims in situations like *Bakke* are more similar to the "positive" exhortations of equal protection than the "protective" character of due process, the metaphorical capacity of the notion of a group "person" in the law founders on the limits of the metaphor's definition of what is absurd. Extracting themes found in philosophical and popular discussions about affirmative discrimination (see Conrad, 1976, pp. 142-44), one can construct a radical group right position on *Bakke* and demonstrate why the dominant metaphor resists it.

> Society is not an aggregate of discrete individuals but a collection of social groups.
>
> Individual attributes are the products of group identities and influences and not of individual efforts or talents.
>
> Therefore, ethnic or racial group membership is a primary feature of the individual's life.

From this argument two conclusions can be derived—one rooted in considerations of corrective justice, the other in concerns of distributive justice.

> Historically, racial injustices have been inflicted on the basis of group, not individual, identities. Since the injuries were group-focused, the group is the legitimate recipient of compensation. The group has a claim in its own right to compensation rather than as an administratively convenient and efficient means to compensate individuals. (Corrective justice.)
>
> Unless good cause is shown to proceed otherwise, public goods and services ought to be distributed among primary groups in proportion to their share of the total population. (Distributive justice.)

In terms of *Bakke*, the radical group right position would justify not only transitory preference programs (appealing to the dictates of corrective justice) but would uphold quotas as permanent features of public university admissions (appealing to the demands of distributive justice).

These arguments are incomprehensible within the metaphorical understanding of "person" dominating current law language. The radical group right position fails to exhibit the two elements which invest the corporate "person" with a satisfying plausibility in other contexts. First, unlike a corporation, an ethnic or racial group lacks the type of definiteness which a corporation receives as part of its establishing charter. Who is a member and what are the proper functions of the group can not be assumed but must be demonstrated. Absent these specific boundaries, the group offers little assurance of its independent ability to mold its members, the quality which gives the corporation that significant likeness to a human being which justifies the metaphorical transference from "person" to "corporation." Second, the ethnic or racial group's claims are potentially unlimited and hence unlimitable. While the specific personal status of the corporation confines the types of claims it can plausibly make, the racial group claims the prerogatives of the full political actor. Its claims are typically posed in terms of demands for equality. The same problems which frustrate efforts to define what equality legitimately demands bedevil the exhortative features of the radical group right position. The group right claim is apparently unlike both natural and corporate metaphors of "person"—it seems like neither the "wild lion" nor the "domesticated cow," addressing questions which are beyond the limited capacity of current metaphors to answer. Little wonder the litigants and amici declined to raise and the courts ignored the relevance of a radical group right position.

Conclusion

This discussion of the metaphor underlying judicial treatments of "persons" in equal protection analysis is intended to suggest the confining effects of dominant metaphors. This is hardly surprising since metaphors are not neutral instruments, but rather they filter, modify, and distort perceptions of politics (Edelman, 1971, pp. 65-71). The "as if" quality of the metaphor permits us to understand the unknown or novel in terms of the known or familiar, but some of the original meaning may follow the metaphor into its new context. Metaphorical thinking is essential to political study, but it is useful only so long as it is the servant and not the master of thinking.

To understand fully the debate over *Bakke* and its implications, one would have to explore the other metaphors which dominate equal protection analysis such as "color-blindness" where the Constitution is likened to a color-blind person who sees the world in differing shades of grey. This article's analysis is more limited. It seeks to illuminate the law's capacity to teach us about the difficult choices of public policy by explaining the absence of a significant strand of thought in the *Bakke* litigation.

The value of constitutional discourse and decision in political dialogue is often justified by the moral influence exerted by the law on American life. But debates among lawyers are not the same as those among philosophers or economists or members of Congress. Law language narrows the debate and helps to simplify complexities, but it may also impoverish public understanding of serious controversies. The contrast between the richness, depth, and variety of ideas and arguments found in an organization's non-legal statements on *Bakke* with the narrowness of its legal brief demonstrates the costs extracted by too heavy a reliance on the law to settle broad social issues. The judicial process has failed to provide the kind of instruction the nation has looked to it to provide.

This is not an indictment of the law's inadequacies. Legal reasoning promises plausibility, not certainty, for its conclusions. Nor is this a simple affirmation of the no longer novel insight that judicial decisions are poor mechanisms for resolving difficult problems. The intent is far more modest: to remind the reader that analyses of theories of equality are in large part evaluations and explanations of the power of political words. To look to the courts for guidance on affirmative discrimination means to rely on the power of legal words to console or activate us. The reliance on legal words forces a reliance on the conventions and contexts which the law uses to define what is sensible. But sensibility has many meanings. What is legally sensible need not be synonymous with what is politically sensible. If affirmative discrimination is a constitutional issue, it must be understood in the fullest sense of the word "constitutional": as that kind of problem which requires an examination of the fundamental principles giving order and meaning to the American political experiment. After examination, the radical group right position may prove to be a poor response to the problem in the context of American principles, but its claims ought to be tested, not ignored because of the lingering connotations of a useful metaphor.

References

Bedau, Hugo Adams (1972). "Compensatory Justice and the Black Manifesto." *The Monist* 56: 20-42.

Black Law Students Union of Yale University Law School (1978). "Brief of the Black Law Students Union of Yale University Law School, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petitioner." In Alfred A. Slocum (ed.), *Allan Bakke versus Regents of the University of California,* Vol. 3. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, pp. 353-78.

Calabresi, Guido (1979). "Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy." *Catholic University Law Review* 28: 427-44.

Conrad, Thomas (1976). "The Debate About Quota Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 20: 135-49.

Dworkin, Ronald (1978). "The Bakke Case: An Exchange." *New York Review of Books,* 26 January 1978, pp. 42-45.

Edelman, Murray (1971). *Politics as Symbolic Action.* Chicago: Markham.

Fiss, Owen M. (1976). "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 5: 107-77.

Friedman, Lawrence M. (1975). *The Legal System.* New York: Russell Sage.

Glazer, Nathan (1975). *Affirmative Discrimination.* New York: Basic Books.

Heisler, Martin O. (1977). *Ethnic Conflict in the World Today.* Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No. 433.

Katzenstein, Mary Fainsod (1977). "Preferential Treatment and Ethnic Conflict in Bombay." *Public Policy* 25: 313-32.

Kristol, Irving (1968). "Equality as an Ideal." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 5. New York: Macmillan, pp. 108-11.

Levi, Edward H. (1948). *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lincoln, Abraham (1967). "Message to Special Session of Congress, July 4, 1861." In Richard N. Current (ed.), *The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Means, Gordon P. (1972). " 'Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development." *Comparative Politics* 5: 29-61.

Miller, Arthur Selwyn (1968). *The Supreme Court and American Capitalism.* New York: Free Press.

Miller, Eugene F. (1979). "Metaphor and Political Knowledge." *American Political Science Review* 73: 155-70.

"Notice of Intended Decision, F. Leslie Mankor, Judge of the Superior Court of Yolo County, California, November 22, 1974." In Alfred A. Slocum (ed.), *Allan Bakke versus Regents of the University of California,* Vol. 1. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, pp. 165-91.

"Oral Arguments in the Supreme Court of the United States." (1977). *Regents of the University of California* v. *Bakke.* Mimeographed.

San Francisco *Chronicle* (1977), 11 October 1977, p. 8.

Scheingold, Stuart (1974). *The Politics of Rights.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Svensson, Frances (1979). "Liberal Democracy and Group Rights." *Political Studies* 27: 421-39.

Tocqueville, Alexis de (1969). *Democracy in America.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1971). *Characteristics of the Population, United States Summary,* Vol. 5. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 1-100.

______ (1975). *Current Population Reports, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Van Dyke, Vernon (1977). "The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory." *World Politics* 29: 343-69.

Citizenship and the Right to Leave

FREDERICK G. WHELAN
University of Pittsburgh

The right to leave one's country, in conjunction with the right to change one's nationality, both of which are proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), are examined in historical and philosophical perspective and with special reference to their implications for a theory of citizenship. These rights are novel elements in enumerations of fundamental rights, at variance with traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and with the practice of many states, past and present. They are also rights which have not frequently been defended, and have often been denied, by political and legal philosophers, many of whom have defended stronger ties of allegiance and obligations between the citizen and the state than is evidently implied by the human rights doctrine. These rights are clearly grounded in basic liberal values of individual liberty and voluntarism; however, they represent extensions of these values beyond what was usually acknowledged in the classical liberal tradition.

The period since the close of the Second World War has been marked by a revival of fundamental rights as a matter both of philosophical concern and of public commitment. Achieving respect for "human rights and fundamental freedoms" was one of the founding purposes of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) together with the two subsequent Covenants on Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and 1966, respectively, provide the nearest thing we have today to an "official" enumeration of such rights in the world community. In the analysis of rights, these documents offer a good starting point. If the rights which they seek to guarantee are not plausible and defensible, the entire issue of "human rights" is thrown into some disrepute; and if they are, we must consider what their implementation would entail. In this article I wish to discuss two related human rights from the UDHR: the provision from Art. 13(2) that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own," and that from Art. 15(2) to the effect that "no one shall be arbitrarily . . . denied the right to change his nationality."[1]

The right freely to leave one's country, whether simply to travel abroad, or perhaps with the intention of settling elsewhere and assuming a new nationality, is no doubt not the most important of possible human rights, as measured either by the number of people who intensely desire to exercise it or by the suffering that accompanies its infringement. It does not, on the other hand, seem to be a trivial matter, since it pertains in an obvious fashion to individual liberty, which is historically associated with the most important rights; and the case of Soviet Jews has recently led to its being the occasion for well-publicized accusations of human rights violations. I have chosen to examine this particular right, however, not so much because of its currency but rather because it appears to be an interesting claim to consider in light of its implications for some traditional concerns of political philosophy. The assertion of a right to leave (especially in conjunction with a right to change one's nationality) appears to conceive nationality as comprising a weaker bond on the individual than is usually the case in practice; this in turn seems to be logically connected with a particular conception of citizenship and thus of the nature of political association. Indeed the attempt to gain recognition for this right in international law may even appear to comprise part of a project for a new world order, one in which national boundaries and the identity, entitlements, and obligations which an individual acquires through birth would be less important than they have been in the past and typically are still today.[2]

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the theory panel of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association meeting at Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pa., in March, 1980. Further research was made possible by a Faculty Research Grant from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of the University of Pittsburgh.

[1] The UDHR enumerates human rights as a "common standard of achievement" and is not legally binding, although some argue that it defines the human rights that the UN Charter binds all members of the UN to observe and respect. The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights reaffirm many of these rights and establish mechanisms for their protection. The Covenants, however, bind only those states that ratify them (of which the U.S. is so far not one).

[2] Any international bill of rights having binding, legal force would point to a new world order, insofar as this would involve a narrowing of the realm of the sovereign

In the following sections I shall (1) offer some analytical comments on the nature of the right to leave as stated in the UDHR; (2) emphasize its novelty; (3) outline some traditional arguments against such a right, which have served to justify the authority that states have frequently claimed over the departure of their citizens; (4) outline some of the arguments of theorists who have supported such a right; and (5) speculate about the implications of this right for a world order. My principal aim is analytical—to assess this right in light of Western history and the tradition of legal and political theory, and to uncover the implications that emerge from arguments both for and against it. I shall not argue extensively for any particular position. I shall suggest, however, that the contemporary liberal view, which supports both the right to leave and the sovereign state's authority over immigration, represents a defensible compromise between extreme, though theoretically plausible, positions.

The Right to Leave One's Country

Human rights are rights of fundamental importance which everyone in the world is supposed to have, regardless of differing political systems and cultures, and wherever he or she may happen to be. Their fundamental importance is usually explicated by reference to an ideal of human dignity that should be inviolable—by anyone, but especially by governments, which because of their power have traditionally been regarded as posing the gravest threats. The purpose of the UDHR is thus in part analogous to that of bills of rights in the past: it is supposed to impose at least moral obligations (both positive and negative) on governments and thus protect individuals by safeguarding certain inviolable areas of liberty and security against governmental actions.[3] This intention is clear in the case of the rights to leave and to change one's nationality, since governments are the only agencies that might undertake to close borders and prevent emigration, and which have the exclusive authority to confer citizenship and to release a person from this status.

The claim that "everyone" should have these rights is of course subject to the usual implicit qualification that rights can be forfeited through misconduct, especially conduct which infringes on the rights of others. No one doubts that criminals or those involved in compulsory judicial proceedings may be (at least temporarily) deprived of the right to leave their country of current residence. Nor can one leave in order to evade legitimate and reasonable civic obligations, although this is a qualification that is evidently subject to abuse. Rights may also be limited in their exercise by the rights of others, but on first sight it does not seem that the right to leave would in general be likely to encounter this barrier. In the international instruments human rights are expressly subject to certain general limitations or exceptions. All the rights of the UDHR are subject to limitations, under law, for the purpose of securing "morality, public order, and the general welfare" (Art. 29[2]), while the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that considerations of "national security, public order (*ordre public*), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others" may derogate from the right to leave one's country specifically (Art. 12[3]). It is clear that any of these principles, broadly interpreted, could vitiate the rights they qualify and thus violate the spirit of the effort to protect human rights. In practice these "escape clauses" (especially that referring to national security), along with the general principle of sovereignty, have been invoked by states that deny or restrict the right to leave.

With respect to the classification of persons, the important point is that the right to leave is held by *citizens* against the government of their own country, in the face of possible excessive demands for allegiance. It should be noted that Art. 13(2) says that *anyone* (i.e., citizen or alien) may leave any country—at any time, for any reason; but that one has a right to return, that is, to enter, or re-enter, only one's own country. The UDHR does not stipulate a general right of entry, or immigration (for aliens), a matter which remains under state sovereignty and which of course imposes a practical limitation on the right to emi-

---

power of states. The right of emigration may entail a new world order in a special, substantive way, especially if it were to be combined with, or held to imply, a right of immigration.

[3] Though ambiguous, the UDHR may be read as extending the traditional scope of bills of rights in two ways (in addition to its inclusion of social and economic rights). It may seek to guarantee the rights enumerated not only against governmental action, but also against infringement by individuals and groups acting in a private capacity, imposing an obligation on governments to take steps to prevent violations of this kind. And it may be read as imposing obligations on the "world community," or on the United Nations, to step in and respond to violations that occur in a particular country (cf. Lauterpacht, 1950, pp. 155-56). Either of these interpretations would have drastic consequences if the UDHR were to attain the status of a legally binding instrument; as it is, however, the UDHR lacks the legally obligatory force of constitutional bills of rights and thus does not require precise construction.

grate and change one's nationality, an issue to which I shall return.[4]

The right to leave one's country may be analyzed into several more specific rights. One of these is the right to travel abroad with the intention of returning and without any implied withdrawal of loyalty. A personal right to travel may perhaps be thought of as a right of "free movement" around the world, analogous to the "freedom of movement . . . within the borders of each state" which is proclaimed in Art. 13(1) of the UDHR;[5] it certainly entails the freedom to go out of one's own country for private purposes, without fear of reprisal. A human right to travel would impose a fairly minor obligation on governments to provide passports for their citizens, insofar as passports are a practical necessity for travel abroad,[6] and while there is no right to enter any particular country, the wording of 13(1) suggests that an alien traveler, once admitted into a country, may not be restricted in his movement within it. Travel abroad may have many purposes, some of which may appear suspect to the authorities of one's country, but if this is a human right it is of course an entitlement for which the individual ought not to have to answer (cf. Flathman, 1976, pp. 127-36).

The general right to leave also includes the more specific right of emigration, defined as leaving the country of which one is a citizen with the intention of settling or residing elsewhere on a permanent basis. Thus as an emigrant, one withdraws oneself from the jurisdiction of (if not allegiance to) one's country and exempts oneself, in general, from making any future contributions to its welfare. A right of voluntary expatriation[7] adds to emigration the right to renounce one's former citizenship and thus voluntarily and unilaterally absolve oneself of allegiance and of any further obligations to one's former state. In principle, perhaps, expatriation need not be accompanied by the acquisition of a new nationality, but in a world of sovereign states it seems unlikely that anyone would willingly incur the condition of statelessness; thus it is the "right to change one's nationality" (i.e., obtain a new one), in conjunction with the right to leave one's country, that amounts to a right of expatriation. The exercise of this right (as with most but not all human rights) is of course optional,[8] and therefore it is important that procedures for denationalization ensure that this be done voluntarily, as by explicit renunciation rather than by statutory presumption.[9] The right of a person to change his nationality creates an obligation on the part of the person's previous state to release him from allegiance, but it no more creates an obligation (under the UDHR) for any other state to admit that person to citizenship than does the right of emigration imply a right to enter any other country. Naturalization as well as immigration remain, so far as current human rights doctrine is concerned, within the policymaking discretion of sovereign states.

A right of emigration-and-expatriation (the right to leave in the strongest sense) as a human right rather than as a concession on the part of states is immediately interesting from the point of view of political philosophy, insofar as citizenship or the basis of political membership is one of its central concerns. Such a right seems to go at least part way towards making citizenship and its obligations entirely voluntaristic, as seems to be envisaged in classical liberal political theory, which legitimizes authority by reference to the consent of those subject to it, sometimes conceived as resting on a fairly formal, contractual basis. The liberal idea of "government by consent" as invoked, for example, in the Declaration of Independence meant much the same thing as the modern right of peoples to "self-determination": it referred to the people's right collectively to constitute themselves as an independent state and to determine (and perhaps later to "alter or abolish") their form of government.[10] Such self-determination is something that the people were conceived by the American Framers as doing in constitutional convention, and by philosophers more abstractly at the moment of the original social contract. Philosophers of this school agreed that this original foundation should be the product of unanimous agreement, in accordance with their premises regarding the free and equal condition of individuals outside civil society, and thus they all seem to have acknowledged, at least implicitly, the right of non-consenting individuals to withdraw from the territory of the newly established state.[11] Thus a right to leave seems to follow from the basic mode of conceptualizing a political society within this tradition of thought, at least at the moment(s) of constitutional establishment. The idea of government by consent is of course usually held to be compatible with the practice of majority rule with respect to the ordinary business of legislation and policy making (if indeed it requires even that); in some versions of this kind of theory everyone is conceived to have been bound by the original agreement to accept the decision of the majority, even to acquiesce in it as expressing the general will. Thus contract theory, though it always begins with individuals, is capable of generating strong demands for allegiance and common dedication. Acknowledgement of an ongoing right of emigration, however, would enhance the individual-consent basis of liberal theory, relieving individuals of the requirement (in principle) to be bound by the majority as well as helping to ensure that accidents of birth need not be determinative in practice of allegiance. As Socrates suggests in the *Crito,* a presumption of consent to obey the laws is more plausible when the laws permit emigration, even granting the objection that the hardships that emigration would actually involve in most cases should lead us not to regard this permission as a sufficient criterion of consent.[12]

---

[4] Even the strongest defenders of international human rights shrink from proposing a human right of immigration, as too much at odds with universal state practice. Cf. Lauterpacht (1945, p. 130).

[5] The Belgian delegate at the UN Third Committee's debate on Art. 13 of the UDHR said that "the ideal . . . would be a return to the time when a man could travel round the world armed only with a visiting card" *United Nations Bulletin* (1948), p. 968.

[6] Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have established that American citizens in effect have a right to a passport as an adjunct to a constitutional right of travel abroad (part of the "liberty" of which a person cannot be deprived without due process in the Fifth Amendment). For the state of affairs as of 1970, see Boudin, 1970.

[7] I shall not discuss the related and important topic of "involuntary expatriation," or the right *not* to be deprived of citizenship, which is declared in Art. 15 of the UDHR.

[8] Voting, though a human right (UDHR, Art. 21), for example, is compulsory in some countries—a duty as well as a right. The right to leave is clearly not of this sort; like the right to practice a religion it is a "liberty," or a (Hohfeldian) "privilege," and therefore optional in its exercise.

[9] Statutory loss of citizenship has been reduced by judicial review almost to nothing in the U.S. (Roche, 1974).

[10] But cf. Mansfield, 1976. The right of self-determination has frequently been invoked to refer more nar-

It is helpful to think of the human rights in the UDHR as falling into three categories: (1) civil rights, which confer on individuals liberties or immunities from state action (e.g., freedom of worship or speech) or stipulate certain protective norms for governmental process (e.g., nondiscrimination, fair trial); (2) political rights, associated with democratic government; and (3) the social and economic rights in Arts. 22-28 of the UDHR, by which the individual is entitled to the provision of certain material goods or opportunities by the state. Of these the last category appears to be a novel development in rights doctrines and has been the most controversial aspect of the UDHR, at least in the West. While there are some comparatively newly asserted civil rights (e.g., to marry and found a family, privacy), this *type* of right along with political rights is of long standing, comprising most of the articles of the older classic rights documents. The civil rights also for the most part exemplify a clear and nonproblematic type of claim, in that they are negative rights, prescribing only noninterference or abstention from certain actions on the part of others (especially the government), or imposing upon the state only minimal administrative and procedural obligations. Thus they stand in contrast to the new positive rights to be provided with tangible goods; and they do not suffer from the commonly alleged difficulties of the latter, such as that they may in some cases be beyond the means of some societies. Insofar as the traditional civil rights impose only negative obligations on states, they are never liable to infringement on the ground that their recognition is physically impossible or unreasonably expensive. Because they do not impose significant burdens on government or society, they are not so open as the social and economic rights may be to the intuitively attractive argument that rights imply duties, and that the beneficiary of certain rights has an obligation to contribute to the collective welfare of the society out of whose resources his or her rights have hitherto been granted.

The right to leave one's country—whether for travel, emigration, or expatriation—falls clearly in the category of the traditional type of civil rights, although its assertion is evidently new. Thus it faces none of the conceptual and practical problems associated with some of the other novelties in the UDHR. Its meaning and requirements are comparatively clear, and it is a right which in principle could be granted to every individual seeking to exercise it, immediately, and without any direct costs to the public beyond those of administrative formalities (of the sort usually covered by modest fees). In this perspective the right to leave is a fairly clear-cut matter.

Although in contemporary parlance the right of

---

rowly to the right of the inhabitants of dependencies to choose independence, although as stated (for example, in the Covenants on Human Rights) it seems to refer more broadly to popular self-government and freedom from outside intervention on a continuing basis as well.

[11] For example, Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Ch. 17 ("Covenant of every man with every man"); Rousseau, 1978, I.5 ("The law of majority rule is itself an established convention, and presupposes unanimity at least once"); and Kant, 1970, p. 79 ("Thus the actual principle of being content with majority decisions must be accepted unanimously").

[12] As Hume suggests in "Of the Original Contract" (1963, pp. 462-63). Hume here accepts the "common ideas of mankind," which he says oppose an absolute right of emigration.

emigration is put forward as a *human* right, of a sort that can be thought of as a *civil* right, it is also a right which can be conceived as an aspect of that liberty to which individuals have been held to have a *natural* right. I take natural rights to be rights of fundamental importance which individuals may be supposed to have had in a conceivable state of nature. A thought experiment of this sort is useful in thinking about the functions and form of the state and in reflection on the proper relationship between the individual and the state: individuals who have rights prior to the establishment of the state may be conceived as accepting membership in civil society on certain conditions, among which is that some portion of natural liberty, or some of the most important natural rights, are not surrendered. Some but not all of the important civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech, equal treatment, the right not to be arbitrarily detained) are derivatives of natural rights; other civil rights (e.g., those pertaining to a fair trial) and political rights are clearly not natural rights, since they are inconceivable except within the context of the state—although they may perhaps all be traceable in a very general way back to the idea of natural liberty and equality.

In this framework a division emerges within the cluster of rights under discussion. The right to a nationality (UDHR Art. 15[1]), and thus the right to change one's nationality, or expatriation, clearly cannot be claimed as natural rights, since they presuppose the existence of states and perhaps even of a world order of sovereign states roughly of the modern type (Lauterpacht, 1950, p. 347). Expatriation, then, falls into the category of (merely) civil rights, but those deemed important enough to be elevated to the status of human rights. Travel abroad and emigration (or free choice of residence, irrespective of political boundaries), on the other hand, would seem to be near-derivatives from a conceivable natural right—the right of free movement over the face of the earth, as an aspect of natural liberty in general, together perhaps with the often-alleged natural right to occupy and reside on unoccupied land. A "natural right to liberty" figures predominantly in the classical natural rights doctrines; the liberty in question turns out, on analysis, to be a bundle of specific liberties, of which free movement was probably always one of the most fundamental (Cranston, 1973, Ch. 5). A legal capacity for free movement and choice of residence was one of the features which distinguished a free person from a slave in antiquity (Westermann, 1945), and the portion of natural liberty which classical liberal theorists assumed would be retained in civil society always included free movement, at least within the boundaries of the nation. An extension of this right to include movement across those boundaries, or out of the country, thus appears simply to be an enlargement of a right that has always been acknowledged and held to be of the first importance in liberal thought. The closeness of the right to leave one's country to a basic natural right strengthens the case for it, at least for those to whom this way of thinking is morally plausible, and with respect to the practice of those states which are committed to principles resembling those of classical liberalism. I shall later look at this tradition more closely, noting certain contrary elements in it.

The Novelty of the Right

Although the right of emigration is the sort of right contained in the classic rights documents of the liberal tradition, and although it is otherwise evidently consistent with this venerable political theory, it is enshrined as one of the specifically enumerated "fundamental rights" for the first time in the UDHR. This fact provokes two questions which may illuminate the right's significance: why did it not figure among the principles of free government in the past? and why did representatives of the United Nations, supported by many liberal scholars and private groups, see fit to include it in 1948?

Of the famous documents that set forth the rights of persons against governments, it is only the first—Magna Carta—which contains anything resembling the rights being considered here, and thus it might be useful to examine this precedent in some detail. Chapter 42 of the original (1215) Magna Carta states:

> It is allowed henceforth to any one to go out from our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land and by water, saving their fidelity to us, except in time of war for some short time, for the common good of the kingdom. . . .

Historians believe that clerical motives were responsible for the presence of this article, which virtually repealed earlier efforts by the crown to prevent or restrict the travel of English ecclesiastics to the papal court. Unlike some of the articles of Magna Carta, however, which specify the rights or "liberties" of definite social groups, this provision is put in general terms, and thus it appears similar to the basic civil rights enunciated in the later constitutional milestones—rights possessed by all subjects or residents.

Of obvious significance in this text is the qualifying clause, *salva fide nostra,* which is common in feudal documents. This meant first that the direct vassals of the king (the chief barons), who had sworn homage to him, while they were free to go abroad, were not by that act released from their feudal obligations and loyalty to him. The feudal contract between vassal and lord, out of which later evolved the bond of allegiance between the subject and the state, was indeed a mutual *contract* or explicit agreement between two parties, and as such it could not be dissolved unilaterally. Only a claim that the king had previously failed to fulfill his part of the contract could justify diffidation, or a renunciation of loyalty on the part of the baron; otherwise the terms bound for the lives of the parties. Moreover, by this stage in the development of English feudalism the king was successfully claiming the personal loyalty not only of his immediate vassals but of all persons born in his realm, all of whom were coming to occupy a common status as subjects of the king in addition to their particular status and duties within the feudal hierarchy. The king began by demanding "liege homage" from the vassals of his vassals, to ensure that their personal loyalty to their lords would never drag them into rebellion against himself; and liege homage was gradually extended into a general claim of "liegeance" or allegiance, sometimes made explicit in the form of an oath administered by the king's officials to all adult (male) subjects. Thus, by 1215 (or not long afterwards) every Englishman was considered to be bound by the qualifying clause in chapter 42: while anyone was at liberty to go abroad, no one could abandon at will the tie of allegiance which bound him to the king (Pollack and Maitland, 1923, pp. 299-300). We can see here the early stages of the doctrine of "perpetual allegiance" which remained the law of England until the nineteenth century (of which more below), a doctrine which diverges from true feudal contractualism in that it traces the beginning of the subject's allegiance and political obligations to birth and thus removes the crucial element of voluntarism. Chapter 42 of Magna Carta thus grants a right to travel out of the realm, but decidedly not a right of expatriation. Emigration in the usual sense is also denied inasmuch as the emigrant is always liable to be recalled to the duties of allegiance at the king's discretion.

In these respects Magna Carta was close to prevailing conceptions and practices in all European countries, despite its liberal character and importance as precedent in England. With respect to the right to leave the kingdom, however, any liberal tendencies of the document were soon snuffed out. Chapter 42 was omitted from all subsequent reissues of Magna Carta, as later English kings successfully reasserted their authority to regulate travel abroad as part of the royal prerogative. John's successor Henry III required any subject leaving the country to obtain a license, and other monarchs down to James I regularly issued prohibitions on the exit of important classes of subjects (e.g., clerics, noblemen, soldiers, skilled artisans). Otherwise the restrictions were relaxed in practice, and it came to be understood that anyone could leave unless specifically forbidden, so that travel and emigration were *permitted* to English subjects as a matter of policy. But the legal authority of the government to forbid this was not doubted, nor did the exercise of this privilege obliterate the allegiance which the emigrant continued to owe to the king.[13]

Thus what looks like the first attempt to establish a right to leave proved unpromising, and no sign of any such right appears in any of the well-known bills of rights of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus Arts. 13 and 15 of the UDHR appear to introduce new items into the developing consensus (if such exists) of those rights regarded as fundamental, or worthy of the denomination "human" rights. How is this to be explained? Much in the UDHR as well as in the United Nations' concern with human rights in general stems of course from the immediately preceding experiences of fascism and the Second World War, and it is in the events of this period that we probably should seek the roots of these new concerns.

The contemporary importance of a "right to a nationality" is perhaps clearest. Statelessness has become an increasingly intolerable position for an individual in the twentieth century, where the apparatus of modern states provides the means of closing borders and ideological differences and economic pressures provide the motives for doing so. Those who drafted the UDHR moreover recognized the injustice and the danger of the involuntary expatriation or denationalization imposed by Germany on its Jewish citizens as a prelude to further persecutions (although this episode was by no means the last case of punitive or politically motivated denationalization; see McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen (1974), pp. 941-59). It is less clear why a right to change one's nationality was included, unless to provide a kind of last resort for other minorities that might in the future suffer persecution within existing nation-states. It is not at all clear why a general "right to leave" one's country was included, unless as a way of countering new threats to individual liberty that were perceived to be implicit in the various contemporaneous totalitarian ideologies, with their strong claims on behalf of the state (or the society, or the nation) over the individual.

In the UN debates on this article, the Soviet delegate offered an amendment that would have permitted free movement (both within and out of the country) only in accordance with the laws of the state. This motion was defeated on the obviously valid ground that it would have rendered this right an empty formalism. When Art. 13 of the UDHR was eventually adopted, the USSR protested that it was in contradiction with Art. 2(7) of the UN Charter, the well-known provision forbidding "intervention" in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the sovereign states-members. Some commentators have regarded this provision as indeed contradictory not only with the right under discussion but also with the whole enterprise of trying to establish some kind of international protection of human rights for individuals.[14] The USSR's position on this issue not only reflects its own practices of restricting the free movement and exit of its citizens; it also reflects traditional notions of sovereignty, in which a state's unlimited authority to control its frontiers has always been seen as a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction. In these debates the Saudi Arabian and South African delegates also expressed reservations in favor of laws and practices current in their countries. These, together with the Soviet bloc countries, eventually abstained in the General Assembly vote on the UDHR, evidently in part out of objections to this article.[15]

---

[13] For the text of Magna Carta and commentary, see McKechnie, 1958.

The right to leave one's country (in conjunction with the right to marry) became in 1949 the basis of one of the very first acrimonious disputes over human rights at the UN. The General Assembly debated and eventually condemned a recent Soviet decree forbidding the marriage of Soviet citizens to foreigners, and its refusal to permit the exit of a large number of Russian women to join their husbands abroad (Sohn, 1968, p. 72). The right to leave was not so prominent again until the restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel became a matter of wide concern and publicity in the 1970s, leading to efforts by the U.S., under the Trade Act of 1974, to bring pressure to bear on the USSR to recognize this right. It is significant that both of these episodes involved the USSR, since the Soviet bloc countries (the German Democratic Republic perhaps most notoriously) have continued to insist that the exit of citizens falls under the sovereign authority of the state, and to impose burdensome and vague conditions for permission to leave other than for travel by members of official delegations (Knisbacher, 1973; McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, 1974, p. 933). While in communist theory appeal could presumably be made to the special exigencies of building socialism under conditions of hostile encirclement, and to the citizen's obligation to repay the state for social benefits received, it is interesting that Soviet justifications of its restrictive policies tend to invoke more often the traditional notions of sovereignty and national security.

The right to leave one's country is reaffirmed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the USSR in 1973) and in other international human rights conventions, and thus it seems to be a firmly established article of contemporary human rights doctrine (Turdack, 1979). Nevertheless, the UN's Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, voting in 1963 to reaffirm this right, heard a report which concluded that the right to leave seems "by no means to be generally recognized," and that more people are "effectively confined" behind national boundaries now than ever before in history (*United Nations Review* 10 [1963]: 30-32). The rights to a nationality and to change one's nationality, on the other hand, have not been reaffirmed in subsequent documents, for reasons that are not clear, although they remain enshrined in the UDHR.[16] A right to acquire a new nationality, however, may possibly be inferred from the well-established right to emigrate, given in addition the clear international consensus on the desirability of eliminating statelessness.

Mention may be made, finally, of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which culminated in the Helsinki Accord of 1975. In connection with the third section of the Accord, on Humanitarian Cooperation, the Western countries were concerned (among other things) to assert the right of free movement of people, to which the communist states responded with proposals for cultural exchanges and other controlled contacts. The result was a compromise which appears to embody a retreat from the more sweeping "right to leave" of the UDHR and Covenant. Facilitation of emigration is called for only in the special cases of family reunification and marriage between persons of different nationalities, and the stipulation that applications for exit permits should be examined "favorably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations" seems almost to conceive emigration as a permission rather than as a human right (Leary, 1977, p. 132). The Helsinki Accord therefore represents at best a very restricted multilateral effort to implement the larger human right of free movement, although one that has no doubt had some positive effect.

---

[14] Infringements of human rights by governments normally occur within their boundaries and in this sense are a "domestic" matter, with which outsiders (it is claimed) are not entitled to interfere. On the other hand it can be argued that, to the extent to which human rights become a matter of international law, they are removed from the category of "domestic jurisdiction" and hence from the "nonintervention" requirement (Henkin, 1977, p. 22; cf. Schwelb, 1964, pp. 26-27; and Lauterpacht, 1950, p. 176).

[15] See Robinson, 1958, pp. 118-19; and del Russo, 1968, pp. 759-60. Concerns about sovereignty also figure in the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Covenants and other international human rights instruments. The key debates on the draft declarations are summarized in the *United Nations Bulletin* 5 (1948) 848 f., 932 f., 966 f., 966 f., and 1003 f.

[16] Art. 24 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which deals with the rights of children, asserts that every child has the "right to acquire a nationality." McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen (1974, pp. 928, 935) observe that the later documents "unfortunately" fail to reaffirm the right to change one's nationality, but they offer no explanation.

Misgivings such as those expressed by the abstaining states in 1948, and which are apparent in the Helsinki compromise, should not seem surprising or sinister. A right of emigration as a human right is something new in world politics, a claim to which the laws and practice of many states, past and present, have been opposed. It is not only new; it is a radical claim in the fundamental challenge which it at least implicitly poses to the prevailing conception of the authority of the sovereign state and to the world order based on sovereign states, which is legitimized in traditional international law. It is generally agreed that any effective international bill of rights would represent a momentous break with prevailing conceptions, insofar as it would necessitate a partial reduction of sovereign power by states in favor of binding international procedures for adjudication and enforcement (Lauterpacht, 1950, pp. 53, 69-70, 305; Schwelb, 1964, pp. 11 f.). This right in particular, however, by its content, seems to pose a more specific challenge, in that it entirely releases individuals from binding ties of allegiance to their countries, conferring on them full liberty to abandon their nationality at will and assume a new civic identity on a voluntaristic basis. This claim, now put forward as a human right, raises important and basic questions about the nature of a political society and the individual's place within it.

Some Opposing Views

In this section I shall review three types of political doctrines which at various times in the past have been explicitly hostile to the free departure of citizens from the state. Each of these doctrines is associated with, or at least implies, a comprehensive theory containing principles regarding the proper basis and functions of the state and the place of the individual in it. All of them are, as we should expect, in one way or another at odds with liberal beliefs, although each is sufficiently plausible to merit consideration.

1. In surveying the views of the political philosophers on this matter we come first to Plato, who in a well-known passage in his *Laws* imposes severe restrictions on citizens' travel abroad: the right to travel is a privilege accorded only to older citizens of assured loyalty, only with the permission and supervision of the government, and only as members of semi-official delegations who are obliged to report, upon their return, on what they have learned abroad. The caution that Plato's Athenian lawgiver manifests on this issue is clearly connected with his desire to shield his well-designed polity from the potentially corrosive influence of foreign ideas and practices. These are assumed to be either inferior and thus corrupting, or at least unpredictably disruptive simply because of their novelty, and thus their introduction must be controlled by appropriate authorities—who do, however, scan the reports of returning travellers for possible improvements on the laws (Plato, *Laws* 950d f.). This feature of Plato's city recalls the laws of Sparta attributed to Lycurgus, who "forbade [Spartan citizens] to travel abroad, and go about acquainting themselves with foreign rules of morality, the habits of ill-educated people, and different views of government," all in an effort to "save his city from the infection of foreign bad habits" (Plutarch, "Lycurgus," p. 70).

Illiberal attitudes and rules such as these are connected with a distinctive theory of politics and of the ends of a political community that was characteristic of the classical Greek philosophers. The end of the state is the virtue of its citizens, the promotion through life-long training of a distinct ideal of perfection of character. To this end it is desirable to have, and the effect of good institutions will be to produce, what a modern observer would call cultural and ideological uniformity, on the normative assumption that the laws in force embody wisdom and thus tend in fact to the promotion of true virtue. The individual, on the other hand, possesses whatever excellence and worth he does possess as a result of his citizenship and upbringing in the state where he has been reared. "Could you deny that you are our offspring and servant, both you and your forefathers?" the personified laws of Athens demand of Socrates; "We have given you birth, nurtured you, educated you, we have given you and all other citizens a share of all the good things we could" (Plato, *Crito* 50e, 51c). These are claims which Socrates does not attempt to refute. A citizen of a state so conceived is all that he is (or nearly so) in virtue of his political membership, and as such he owes a profound debt of gratitude, similar but superior to that owed his natural parents, to the state—a debt originating with birth and discharged only with his death as a citizen (cf. *Crito* and *Laws* 717b, 804d, 949e). Such a citizen presumably would not be inclined to leave (as Socrates was not), nor would he be entitled to do so without permission. The question of a *right* of this sort would not be likely to arise.

Such a view of the purposes and requirements of a political community was not characteristic of all ancient states. Socrates *had* been free to emigrate from Athens (taking his property), as the laws point out, despite the arguments just mentioned, which would appear to lay the groundwork for the opposite conclusion. An oration of Cicero's makes it clear that Roman law, and that of other cities in the period of the later republic, recognized a right freely to acquire a new citizenship:

> How admirable [the Roman] legal system . . . that no one should be removed from his citizen-roll (*civitate*) against his will, nor be forced to remain on it against his will. For the unshakable foundations of our liberty are that each one of us has the absolute power of retaining or of renouncing his right of citizenship (Cicero, 1958, p. 665; see Phillipson, 1911, pp. 210-12).

The era of the Roman empire was to offer unprecedented opportunities for mobility, encourage cosmopolitan idealism, and eventually wash out differences of genuine civic identity in a common but attenuated Roman citizenship.[17] It is probably to this period that one should look for the closest parallels to contemporary cosmopolitanism of the sort reflected in documents such as the UDHR.

The classical conception of the high and demanding purposes of the *polis,* however, is likewise not entirely without its modern equivalents, and now as then it may be theoretically consistent for such states to impose requirements and demand a degree of loyalty from their citizens incompatible with the international mobility and individualism of the human rights doctrine. Under the inspiration of certain modern ideologies (socialist or nationalist, mainly) states are again envisaged as undertaking the molding of their citizens according to a distinct pattern of virtue; and this project now as in the days of Lycurgus frequently leads to a defensive policy against moral and political corruption from without. Such a conception of politics can also easily lead to a strong view of the obligations which the individual acquires simply through having been reared in such a state, which is conceived as an all-encompassing common project of citizens, and not as a limited contract among individuals. Representatives of the Soviet Union have frequently insisted, in connection with international human rights documents, that a person's rights are accompanied by duties "to one's country, people and State."[18] In dwelling on this point they apparently refer to a distinctive conception of virtue that is expected of a socialist citizen, as well as to obligations arising from receipt of state-provided welfare benefits.

It should be noted, however, that such ideologies (like the laws of Lycurgus and Plato) should logically be averse mainly to the unsupervised travel abroad of citizens, in accordance with the paramount consideration of avoiding moral and political corruption. Permanent emigration and expatriation do not seem to pose any such threat to the virtuous but vulnerable institutions of these societies (and Plato's city even requires emigration to stabilize the population); these practices can be prohibited therefore only through the more problematic claim of lasting allegiance which every citizen is supposed to owe in exchange for his upbringing.

2. I turn, second, to Sir William Blackstone, who expounds the "official" legal and constitutional theory of England in the heart of the modern classical-liberal era. Blackstone, though not a philosopher, offers reasons and justifications for the provisions of the common law of England, and thus his "commentary" amounts in effect to the presentation of a political theory. What we find in it—somewhat perhaps to our surprise—is that the rights under discussion were not acknowledged and did not comprise part of the "liberty of the subject" in the country which (no doubt rightly) prided itself on its free institutions.

Blackstone offers an eloquent defense of a natural right to liberty, and the civil liberty that English subjects enjoy under the law is said to represent a large portion of this—that part which either was not surrendered upon the establishment of civil society or is merely "regulated" in a formal manner. Occupying first place within this civil liberty is the "power of locomotion," free of arbitrary restraint—a right that includes free movement and choice of residence within the realm as well as procedural guarantees of the sort epitomized by the law of *habeas corpus*. The common law understanding of personal liberty also includes, interestingly, the Englishman's right not to be forced against his will to leave the country (and presumably immunity from involuntary expatriation, although Blackstone does not emphasize this): exile and deportation are penalties unknown to the common law, and the king cannot even require a subject to serve abroad in an official capacity. Only an act of Parliament, which Blackstone holds to be sovereign, can supersede common law and expel a subject from the country.

---

[17] See Jones, 1940, pp. 172-73. Multiple citizenship was common under the principate; Roman citizenship was compatible with local. In A.D. 212 Roman citizenship was granted to all free inhabitants of the empire.

[18] See e.g. Sohn, 1968, p. 65. Art. 29 of the UDHR and the Preambles to both of the International Covenants on Human Rights affirm that the individual has "duties . . . to the community to which he belongs"—a clause that may be read as qualifying the rights protected by these instruments.

On the subject of exit, however, Blackstone's doctrine represents a continuation of the position discussed above in connection with Magna Carta.

> By the common law, every man may go out of the realm for whatever cause he pleaseth, without obtaining the king's leave; provided he is under no injunction of staying at home: . . . but because that every man ought of right to defend the king and his realm, therefore, the king, at his pleasure, may command him by his writ that he go not beyond the seas, or out of the realm, without license (*Commentaries* I. 265, 134, 137).

There is thus in general a legal right, which may be restricted or rescinded by an act of the royal prerogative, to leave; but this is evidently not part of that natural liberty which is retained in civil society, nor does Blackstone appear to consider it a very important kind of liberty.

The right to leave, moreover, is assuredly not a right of expatriation. Blackstone offers a clear exposition and defense of the legal doctrine of perpetual allegiance that was in force in Great Britain until 1870—and of which the most familiar consequence (for Americans) was the War of 1812, in response to the British policy of impressing or drafting British-born but American-naturalized seamen. Blackstone traces this doctrine to its feudal origins, explaining how the feudal oath of allegiance was extended to all subjects on the ground that all lands, in English feudalism, were ultimately held in tenure from the king; he notes, however, that "the term of allegiance was soon brought to signify all other engagements which are due from subjects to their prince, as well as those duties which were simply and merely territorial." This allegiance continued to be signified by an oath to the king which is regularly required of office holders and may be demanded of any subject. This oath binds for life, or, put another way, it establishes a contractual tie which one party is not entitled to abrogate on his own.

The oath of allegiance, Blackstone goes on to argue, merely signifies a tie of allegiance between subject and sovereign whose basis is deeper and which is binding on any natural-born subject whether or not he has actually taken the oath.

> But besides these express agreements, the law also holds that there is an implied, original, and virtual allegiance, owing from every subject to his sovereign, antecedently to any express promise . . . which [was] only instituted to remind the subject of this his previous duty, and for the better securing its performance (*Commentaries* I. 369; cf. James I, 1918, esp. pp. 81-82).

Blackstone's justification for this doctrine of allegiance from birth (an "implied" but nonvoluntaristic contract) consists in an argument that assimilates political obligation to the duty of gratitude for benefits received from a benefactor —regardless of whether or not the recipient had a choice in accepting the alleged benefits.[19] "Natural allegiance [i.e. the allegiance of a natural-born subject] is therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place or circumstance. . . ." Gratitude is due, in Blackstone's essentially liberal scheme, not for something so profound as an education in virtue, but merely for the benefits of civil society—liberty, personal security, protection against aggression, and so forth. These benefits are enjoyed from birth, and so a debt is conceived to accumulate which is never quite paid off—or rather, perhaps, the gratitude and loyalty which the subject should feel are permanent qualities, and not really a (quantifiable) debt at all.

The notion of "benefits received" stands beside the notion of consent or contract as a frequently enunciated general type of justification for political obligation. Both are plausible in that they derive the larger and more abstract political obligation from a simpler and intuitively more clear kind of moral duty—the one from gratitude, the other from promise-keeping. While liberal political philosophers of this era (e.g., Locke) inclined toward the latter type of theory, which seems to make a larger place for individual volition with respect to political membership, the paramount liberal state of the time rested on the other foundation as a matter of law.

The theory of "natural allegiance" which Blackstone expounds has other connotations as well, which cannot be explored here. The idea that "naturally" (i.e., by birth) a person belongs to a particular political community and a *historical* and *national* community at that (both notions are present in the idea of the common law), is a doctrine that is perhaps not entirely at home in liberal theory. New political theories of historicism and nationalism that were advanced in the nineteenth century had their own distinctive understandings of political membership, which, it may be speculated, were not characteristically receptive to the citizen's right to leave.

---

[19] Rawls' doctrine of justice as fairness invokes a similar argument for political obligation (1971, sec. 18). Nozick (1974) singles this principle out for criticism; see also p. 173 on emigration.

3. I shall only briefly note various policy considerations that have in the practice of modern states led to severe restrictions on or even prohibition of emigration. I have mentioned that the royal authority to prohibit exit from England was exercised in early modern times with reference to certain classes of subjects. During the eighteenth century and down to the 1820s English statutes attempted to prevent not only the exportation of machinery and new industrial processes, but also the emigration of skilled workers or anyone in possession of economically valuable knowledge.[20] This was in accordance with the doctrine of mercantilism, which guided the policy of European states in this period. The aim of mercantilism was to enhance the power of the state, a goal which it pursued in accordance with prevailing economic theories that to a large degree traced power to wealth and wealth to the size of the state's population (especially the skilled and productive groups). Mercantilist policy, then, while it sought to attract immigrants, dictated the prevention of emigration—except to colonies that would strengthen the state's overall position in the world, and with an occasional exception made for dissident religious groups (such as the Puritan emigrants from England, or the Huguenots expelled from France) who might prove a source of internal disunity and weakness. Even in the nineteenth century, when mercantilist economics had largely given way to laissez-faire doctrines or to more specialized forms of protectionism, the policy imperative of maximizing the state's population remained—now for military reasons (in the age of universal conscription) and for nationalistic goals. Fulfillment of the obligations of military service was often in this era made a prior condition of emigration, when this was permitted at all, and posed in practice one of the main obstacles to the enjoyment of any "right" that people had in this matter.

Policy considerations of this sort seem to (and no doubt often did) reflect mere *raison d'état*, an attitude on the part of rulers that regards people as resources to be deployed for the state's purposes (see Heckscher, 1955, p. 286). To the extent that a plausible ethical basis for such policies may be found, however, it is no doubt to utilitarianism that we should look; and while I do not know of a writer who explicitly defends such policies in utilitarian terms, we may sketch the outline of the argument. As is well known, any rights that individuals may have under utilitarian principles are circumscribed by, or, more strongly, derived from whatever is necessary to maximize the welfare of the collectivity affected by their actions, and the thrust of most utilitarian theory is to emphasize not rights but the duty which the individual has to contribute to the good of the whole. If the statist policies of the sort mentioned are intended to, or do in fact redound to the overall benefit or welfare of all (or the "greatest number") of the people affected by them, then it might appear that they are justifiable. Such in fact was the usual assumption of mercantilist writers, and to an extent also of nationalist writers, although the latter would probably emphasize other kinds of claims that the nation is held to have on its members as well.

The main difficulty with this reasoning is the question of the theory's scope, a difficulty which arises in many applications of utilitarianism: to *whose* happiness is one obligated to contribute? Statist theory takes the current members of the state as the morally relevant unit, just as Bentham usually restricted his utilitarianism to a particular "community" rather than all mankind (Lyons, 1973, pp. 24-28). But this restriction seems arbitrary from an ethical perspective; why should individuals not be free (or obliged!) to go wherever they can best advance the welfare of humanity as a whole? The problem of scope is indeterminate in many versions of utilitarianism, however, and thus it does not comprise a particular objection to this application of the doctrine.

The logic of utilitarian ethics is clear, although what the theory prescribes in particular circumstances may be debatable; and justifications of a roughly utilitarian character are often offered for state actions contrary to a strict adherence to human rights. The right to leave a country and settle where one wishes, like other individual rights, may well be overridden when considerations of collective welfare are made decisive in the formation of public policy. The spirit of the old mercantilist laws thus survives to an extent in the efforts of modern states to discourage the emigration of skilled personnel—efforts which engage our sympathy most, perhaps, in the case of the "brain drain" from the developing to the richer countries (cf. Higgins, 1973, p. 353).

---

[20] Blackstone, *Commentaries*, IV. 160; and Holdsworth (1923, XI. 432-33, XIII. 227). Adam Smith remarks that these regulations are contrary to the "boasted liberty of the subject" (1937, p. 625).

Some Justifications of the Right to Leave

In this section, I shall briefly call attention to three places in the history of political philosophy where rights similar to those in the UDHR have been explicitly (though not often so unambiguously) defended. The object in doing this is less to find precedents or to trace the genealogy of the contemporary doctrine of human rights than it is to seek reasoned arguments, grounded in systematic views of the state and citizenship, for a right to leave one's country and change one's nationality.

All of the figures to be discussed are (not surprisingly) from the classical liberal period of modern political thought. All of them develop their theories from similar basic premises common to that school: the original moral status of individuals is as free and equal beings, in possession of certain natural rights, unattached and without ties or obligations to any political society; political ties are conceived as being established (legitimately) only on the basis of consent, real or supposed, and the members of the states thus formed always retain some degree of independence from and even claims against the state. Within this general framework differences emerge: states have different forms and different degrees of authority, while individuals are more or less permanently and tightly bound by the act of consent by which they become citizens. In only one of the three theories is an apparently unqualified right of emigration defended: despite the individualistic premises and natural rights background, most writers even in this tradition conclude by ascribing more authority to states than is permitted by the human rights doctrine of the present.

1. The outlines of Locke's political theory are sufficiently clear. Men are by nature "free, equal, and independent," and "no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent." From this premise the original founding of a civil society by the unanimous agreement of a group of individuals in the state of nature proceeds in a straightforward manner. The society or body politic once established, Locke says that the majority may bind the whole, as in establishing a government, and thereafter in making laws; but each individual must by a free personal choice agree to membership in the political society.

Beyond this, Locke is one of the few theorists in the contractarian tradition who explicitly raise the question of how individuals born in future generations come to be members and have obligations in the society their ancestors founded (thus anticipating one of the objections to this kind of theory raised by Hume). Locke insists that fathers cannot bind their children and that each individual must himself consent to any political ties he is to be under. He denies, moreover, that his insistence on this point has the effect of discrediting all existing governments. In the first place, he says (remarkably),

> there are no examples so frequent in History . . . as those of Men withdrawing themselves, and their Obedience, from the Jurisdiction they were born under, and the Family or Community they were bred up in, and *setting up new Governments* in other places.

Not only is this a historical fact, but emigration out of the country of birth is a natural right which each person can choose to exercise upon reaching adulthood:

> 'Tis plain then, . . . by the Law of right Reason, that a *Child is born a Subject of no Country, or Government.* He is under his Fathers Tuition and Authority, till he come to the Age of Discretion; and then he is a Free-man, at liberty what Government he will put himself under; what Body Politick he will unite himself to.

This doctrine follows logically from Locke's premises, although as we have seen it is a radical one, at variance with English law after as well as prior to 1688. It comprises a very clear argument for a right of emigration set within a general and coherent theory of political society, a right moreover which is fundamental because of its relationship to what is asserted to be the very basis of such society.[21]

What is more interesting, however, in light of the simple assertins of the UDHR, is Locke's subsequent argument concerning the manner in which this right is, in effect, ceded when one becomes a citizen. Locke distinguishes between the tacit consent which can be imputed to anyone (including an alien) who travels or resides in a country, or acquires property there, and which creates an obligation to obey the law only so long as the person continues to enjoy its protection; and *express consent,* which he requires of those (whether natives upon reaching age twenty-one, or aliens being naturalized) who become full members or citizens of the civil society. The moral and legal consequence of the latter undertaking is a permanent obligation:

> Whereas he, that has once, by actual Agreement, and any *express* Declaration, given his *Consent* to be of any Commonweal, is perpetually and in-

---

[21] Rousseau's Emile, in important respects a Lockean individual, is not only free to travel, but moreover his purpose is to discover where it suits him to live and contract civil ties, and whether he should exercise his "right of renouncing his fatherland" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 455).

> dispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a Subject to it, and can never again be in the liberty of the state of Nature; unless by any Calamity, the Government, he was under, comes to be dissolved (*Second Treatise,* secs. 95, 115, 118, 121; see Dunn, 1969, p. 133).

Locke's position here appears to be a perfectly natural conclusion from the premises of individual consent theory: there is no obligation without consent—but the terms of an agreement to become a citizen are such that allegiance is permanently binding; citizenship is a contract for life. The right to leave is a natural right, but it is not a reserved right against government; it is one of those natural rights which the individual deliberately surrenders upon entering society, although he may live and travel where he wishes prior to making such a commitment. This doctrine brings Locke partly into agreement with the contemporaneous English law of perpetual obedience, although he would presumably insist that the oath of allegiance be administered explicitly and that it be more than a formality. But it means that his theory is far from supporting the modern *human right* to leave any country and to change one's nationality—rights which *citizens* (perhaps especially citizens) are intended to possess as well as aliens or stateless or immature persons. The Lockean citizen does not have these rights (except under local law, or with permission); the tie of citizenship which Locke envisages is apparently a good deal more solid than that implied in the theory behind the UDHR.

2. The great international legal theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—from Grotius to Vattel—attempted systematically to set forth the proper form and authority of the modern state, and the relations among states, based on the "law of nations," a synthesis of normative principles derived from natural law, custom, and the emerging consensus among state officials and scholars in that period. All of the writers to be considered construct a normative account of the state along basically Hobbesian lines. Individuals prior to the state are independent and equal and possess natural rights, or more usually a general basic inclination towards and right to self-preservation. This premise is frequently tempered by assertions of natural sociability, or at least by reference to a natural law (over and above natural rights) which enjoins people to seek society and undertake whatever obligations are necessary to allow society to function in a peaceful and stable fashion.

These theorists also follow Hobbes in conceiving of the social contract as issuing in the creation of a sovereign who is a person or assembly distinct from the body of citizens, or in the establishment of a state with a single sovereign will that is normally vested in a ruler (or "prince") who, while he is taken to represent the whole, is not necessarily elected by or responsible to the members in any direct or "democratic" manner. Such a ruler embodied the authority of the sovereign state, which was defined and consolidated in this period.

Thus these writers offer a comprehensive theory that combines several different, and perhaps in some ways clashing, elements: individualism and the idea of natural liberty whose loss or restriction is a matter of jealous concern; obligation only through actual or implicit consent; a sovereign ruler with typically large authority over his subjects; and a strong notion of a state that must have the means to maintain its independence in a world system comprised of such states, which confront each other in a Hobbesian competitive struggle, barely restrained by acknowledged but unenforced rules of international conduct. It is clear that the main concern of these jurists is not so much (as with Locke) to emphasize the rights of subjects and the necessity of consent as it is to establish the legal personality and agency of the state as a prelude to their ostensible topic—the law of nations (or international law). They were, furthermore, realists who, while they might on occasion make recommendations where current law was not clear, were to a large degree offering a generalized and systematic description of the practice of actual European states in this period. Thus, as we might guess, the right of subjects to emigrate is a delicate topic, one which they treat with ambiguity and numerous qualifications.

Hugo Grotius, for example, the earliest and most influential of the writers of this school, notes the "rule of natural justice . . . that a thing should not be permitted if it is contrary to the interests of society"; and with respect to the emigration of nationals he dwells on two negative points: that the departure of citizens in large bodies is not permissible, as tending to destroy civil society, and that emigration in times of duress for the state is likewise contrary to natural justice (Grotius, 1925, II.v.xxiv, pp. 253-54). He avoids confronting the simple question of whether or not individuals under normal circumstances have a right to leave.

Pufendorf argues, more liberally, that individuals do retain a right (implied to be natural) to migrate at will, the better to look after their private interests, which was the purpose of their joining the state in the first place. But he seriously weakens this doctrine with the qualification that this right may be waived by the terms of the original contract establishing the state of which the individual is a citizen. These terms are assumed to be reflected in the basic law or custom of the land, and thus Pufendorf (like Grotius before him) notes the case of Russia—always notorious for its adamant denial of a right in its subjects to leave (cf. Montesquieu, *Persian Letters* No. 51)—without criticism. Pufendorf does take issue with Grotius on the matter of group-emigration in terms which express vividly the classical liberal notion of the priority of individualistic civil society to the claims (not to mention the sanctity) of *states:*

> For even if this or that state may be seriously weakened, or even entirely drained of its population by the emigration of its citizens in large numbers, that does not mean the entire destruction of civil society among men. The destruction of one is the creation of another, and the decrease of one works to the increase of another. After mankind had multiplied nature desired that it be gathered into civil societies, but she never commanded that this or that state endure and flourish forever (Pufendorf, 1934, VII.xi. 2-4, pp. 1348-52).

Christian Wolff dwells more than others of this school on love of country and gratitude towards one's native state as elements in natural law; the effect of this teaching is to make the desire to leave seem *prima facie* to be dereliction of duty. He argues that a right to emigrate must be a positive-legal and not a natural right, since it presupposes the existence of states—although this seems to overlook the possibility that natural liberty included the right of "migration" in general, under which "emigration" may be subsumed. He thus defines the right of emigration as "permission to go into voluntary exile," that is, a right one may have only under local law, treaty law, or at the ruler's discretion (Wolff, 1934, secs. 135-36, 142-43, 153-54, pp. 74-83).

J. J. Burlamaqui begins his treatment of the subject with an apparently strong statement:

> It is a right inherent in all free people, that every man should have the liberty of removing out of the commonwealth, if he thinks proper. In a word, when a person becomes member of a state, he does not thereby renounce the care of himself and his own private affairs. . . . Thus the subjects of a state cannot be denied the liberty of settling elsewhere, in order to procure those advantages which they do not enjoy in their native country.

This again, however, is severely qualified by the following maxim that "in general" the emigrant should secure the permission of his sovereign, and by the doctrine that the laws of the country in this matter (to which the subject is presumed to have consented) are finally determinative (Burlamaqui, 1823, II.v.xiii; p. 38).

Emmerich de Vattel, second only to Grotius in influence, has the most to say on this issue, and he on balance offers the strongest case for a right to leave. He begins, however, with a strong statement of the opposite position:

> The children are bound by natural ties to the society in which they were born; they are under an obligation to show themselves grateful for the protection it has afforded to their fathers, and are in a great measure indebted to it for their birth and education. They ought, therefore . . . to express a just gratitude to it, and requite its services as far as possible, by serving it in turn.

He nonetheless proceeds to a straightforwardly Lockean argument that, since "every man is born free," the son of a citizen is at liberty upon reaching the age of discretion to quit his country if he does not find it "convenient" or "advantageous" to stay. He then goes on to say that even a citizen (in spite of the genuine debt of gratitude) may "quit the state of which he is a member, provided it be not in such a conjuncture when he cannot abandon it without doing it a visible injury." Most importantly, Vattel gives three cases in which a person is said to have an "absolute right to renounce his country, and abandon it entirely." These are: (1) if it becomes impossible for him to gain a subsistence there, since then the natural right of self-preservation supersedes; (2) if society fails to discharge its (unspecified) obligations towards him, since then he is released from his contractual obligations to it; and (3) if the majority of the nation change the terms of the original contract without his consent, as for example in introducing a fundamental constitutional change, or abridging the natural liberty of conscience by imposing an obligatory state religion. In all of these cases a *natural* right to emigrate arises, since the ties between the individual and the civil society are conceived to have been dissolved, leaving the individual in a condition of natural liberty with respect to it (Vattel, 1883, I.xix.220-25, pp. 103-05).

All of these writers—the founders of modern international law—thus discuss and make some provision for a right of emigration (they do not go into expatriation as a separate issue). With the exception of Vattel's last cases, however, none of them upholds a *natural* or *fundamental* right of emigration, that is, a right which individuals possess unambiguously against the states of which they are members. Even Vattel conceives such a right to arise only in specific circumstances, having to do with the putative terms of the founding of the state. None of them defends such general and unqualified rights as those found in the UDHR, for the reason that among their other achievements these writers were among the classic theorists of state sovereignty.

3. Thomas Jefferson, of all the major political

thinkers, offers the most blunt and unqualified defense of a natural right of both emigration and expatriation prior to the twentieth-century writings in support of the contemporary human rights doctrine. While Jefferson's philosophical affinities are a matter of some dispute, he appears in this respect to argue from clearly Lockean premises, although his conclusion is more radically individualistic than Locke's own.

Jefferson's views on the subject appear first in a pamphlet containing proposals for instructions to the Virginia delegates to the Continental Congress in 1774, among which is the following:

> To remind him [the king] that our ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the free inhabitants of the British dominions in Europe and possessed a right which nature has given to all men of departing from the country in which chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies under such laws and regulations as, to them, shall seem most likely to promote public happiness.[22]

This doctrine is repeated nearly verbatim in several other places—in Jefferson's proposed preamble to a Virginia statute on citizenship and naturalization, in his autobiography, and in several letters (Jefferson, 1779, p. 477; 1903, p. 12)—a fact which suggests that this right was one about which Jefferson felt strongly, and not one which he chose to emphasize for ephemeral revolutionary purposes. It did, however, have a practical meaning in colonial America, and it formed one of the philosophical bases for Jefferson's understanding of the moral-legal position of the colonists, and thus for his justification of independence; hence the reference in the Declaration of Independence to the "circumstances of our emigration." The assertion that the colonists (or their ancestors) had a natural right of emigration meant that they had not needed the permission of the king to leave England, which as we have seen was indeed the state of the matter as far as English law was concerned. Moreover, extended to include a right of expatriation, it denied the English doctrine of perpetual allegiance: settling in America meant in effect a return to the state of nature, and the formation of new civil societies by consent among the colonists. Jefferson's account of the structure of the British Empire held that the colonists had in fact chosen the British king to be their king (on certain terms), just as they had freely chosen to retain much of English common law and other customs as binding on themselves. They had *not*, however, chosen to put themselves under the British Parliament, and so the revolution meant only a severing of ties with the king, an action which the colonists were entitled to take (on Lockean grounds) when the king, through his support of parliamentary usurpations over the colonies, violated the terms of his trust.

The special circumstances of America, settled by emigrants, thus forced Jefferson to rethink and elaborate this aspect of the Lockean account of the rightful origins of civil society. He does this in a way which adds a new element (indeed, a specific new natural right), though one which seems perfectly consistent with the basic themes of liberty and consent in Locke's own theory. As far as Jefferson's reasoning is concerned, beyond the simple deduction of this right from the natural right to liberty, there is a letter (1817, pp. 124-25) in which Jefferson briefly relates the right of free movement to his own concept of the pursuit of happiness: "If he [God] has made it a law in the nature of man to pursue his own happiness, he has left him free in the choice of place as well as mode." Jefferson's desire to replace "chance" with "choice" also implies an idea of political community founded entirely on voluntarism or the free choice of its members—choice on an ongoing basis, not just at the beginning, since everyone is free at any time to break his ties and leave. There are, finally, signs that Jefferson was interested in some of the possible implications of this right as a practical matter. Part of his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts under Adams stemmed from his belief that they constituted an unjust infringement of aliens' rights to reside where they wished (free from arbitrary deportation) (1798, p. 284), and in his First Annual Message he proposed a revision in the U.S. naturalization law, reducing the residence requirement (1801, pp. 340-41). In these positions he perhaps acknowledges that openness of borders to aliens and ease of immigration and naturalization are the logical corollaries of a fundamental right to leave one's country and settle elsewhere.

Conclusion

A human right to leave one's country and to change one's nationality is more important than might at first be imagined because of two large implications which it contains. These implications are adverse to traditional claims of states over citizens and at odds with usual state practice in the past, and the reluctance of most legal and political theorists to advocate such a right is perhaps a measure of the degree to which their theories were designed to accommodate the modern state as it developed—or indeed even to defend some vision of a state with even stronger claims and tighter bonds on its subjects. Even the classical liberal state, in its major philosophical presentations, appears to have demanded more in the way of lasting allegiance from its members that might be expected from its premises, and more than is apparently allowed for by modern human rights.

---

[22] Jefferson, 1974, p. 4. Jefferson's view was not shared by the other American revolutionaries (see Wills, 1978, Ch. 6).

The first implication of an unqualified right to leave pertains to the nature of the state and the place of the citizen within it. Not only is political obligation conceived as a matter of consent; this consent is also conceived as being given continuously, with the option of leaving always open as a means of registering one's decision to cease to be a member of a particular political community. A state which as a matter of right may be abandoned at will presumably cannot be a state to which its members in general have strong or deep ties of any sort; it is not a state which provides goods for which deep and lasting gratitude is due, nor one which embraces common projects requiring a common sense of civic identity so strong as to take precedence over other identity. The decision to emigrate (as evidently befits a human right) is a private decision, a decision which the individual conceived as a private person makes to advance personal interests or to enhance the development of his individual personality according to a self-selected pattern. "Choice of nationality" in this perspective appears to be little more than a choice of residence, as Jefferson suggests, where personal happiness can be pursued, along with the acquisition of those civil and political rights usually thought important in the liberal tradition to provide desirable safeguards and opportunities for optimal individual development.

The second implication pertains to the nature of the international system as a whole. This cluster of rights, if they were actually to be made effective, would point to a world of increased individual mobility and genuine voluntarism, a world where the claims and authority of sovereign states would be significantly reduced from their present status, and where national borders would be far more open than they are at present. The most important question in this respect is whether a basic right to leave creates a corresponding obligation on the part of other states to permit entry (that is, whether it implies a basic right of *immigration*) as well as the obvious obligation on one's own government to permit exit and release one from allegiance. A positive answer to this question does not seem to be logically necessitated by the notion of a right to leave, which is most reasonably understood as analogous to traditional civil liberties (like the right to free speech). Such liberties, in contrast to "claim-rights," impose negative duties of abstinence from interference on other parties, and do not normally establish for the right-holder a claim on resources (such as a printing press or air time) that may be necessary for the exercise of the right. Still, conceivably universal closed-border policies of sovereign states could of course completely preclude exercise of the rights to leave any country and to change nationality, rendering the liberty to do so rather meaningless. On the other hand, a right to enter any country would mark a drastic reduction of the scope of traditional sovereignty—so drastic, in fact, that such a right was quite deliberately omitted from the UDHR and is thus not an official "human right." Some supporters of the UDHR and of the rights discussed in this article, however, have made it clear that they envisage for the future a new, cosmopolitan world order—a very different context for political life than the world of states we usually take for granted (see for example, McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, 1974, esp. pp. 928, 996-98; and Nett, 1971, pp. 218-27).

The state of affairs prevailing at present in Western countries may be seen as a middle position between two theoretically more consistent extremes. We acknowledge and actually grant a largely unqualified right to leave, in accordance with basic liberal values centering on individual autonomy and initiative. The right to leave is combined, however, with acceptance of substantial state sovereignty, epitomized so far as this issue is concerned in the state's authority to regulate and even prohibit immigration. Recognition of state authority in this area is not in itself illiberal, since liberal political philosophy has generally taken for granted the context of the sovereign nation state as the appropriate and justifiable framework both for the flourishing of a liberal society and for the exercise of rights of self-government. (As noted above, the UN-sanctioned right of peoples to "self-determination" fits badly with suggestions that a state may not control the admission of new members.)

This middle course is somewhat tenuous, however, insofar as opposing positions on either flank have at least the appearance of superior consistency. One of these would extend sovereign powers to include control over the movement of individuals across frontiers in either direction—a position that could be justified by various theories of state and citizenship similar to those considered above. The other position would extend the ideal of individual choice and mobility, or seek to give it greater effect, by adding a right to enter to the right to leave any country. The current practice of Western countries, however, seems to represent a reasonable compromise between competing, extreme conceptions; indeed perhaps the sort of logical weakness it appears to involve is a normal feature of reasonable compromises. The historically recent acknowledgement of a fundamental right to leave in any case represents a tangible advance in liberal principles and, as I have sought to show, a substantial departure from practices almost universally defended by political theorists in the past.

References

Blackstone, Sir William. *Commentaries on the Laws of England,* Vol. 1.

Boudin, Leonard B. (1970). "The Right to Travel." In Norman Dorsen (ed.), *The Rights of Americans.* New York: Vintage, pp. 381-98.

Burlamaqui, J. J. (1823). *The Principles of Moral and Politic Law,* 6th ed. Translated by Nugent. Philadelphia: Carey and Lea.

Cicero (1958). *Pro Balbo.* In *The Speeches.* Translated by R. Gardner. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Cranston, Maurice (1973). *What Are Human Rights?* New York: Taplinger.

del Russo, A. L. (1968). "International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic Appraisal." *William and Mary Law Review* 9: 749-69.

Dunn, John (1969). *The Political Thought of John Locke.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Flathman, Richard E. (1976). *The Practice of Rights.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grotius, Hugo (1925). *The Law of War and Peace.* Translated by F. W. Kelsey. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill.

Heckscher, Eli F. (1955). *Mercantilism,* Rev. ed., Vol. 2. Translated by M. Shapiro. London: George Allen.

Henkin, Louis (1977). "Human Rights and 'Domestic Jurisdiction,' " In Thomas Buergenthal, with Judith R. Hall (eds.), *Human Rights, International Law, and the Helsinki Accord.* Montclair, N.J.: Allenheld, Osmun.

Higgins, Rosalyn (1973). "The Right in International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay in, and Leave a Country." *International Affairs* 49: 341-57.

Hobbes, Thomas (1960). *Leviathan.* Edited by Michael Oakeshott. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Holdsworth, W. S. (1923). *A History of English Law,* 3rd ed. London: Methuen.

Hume, David (1963). "Of the Original Contract." In *Essays Moral, Political and Literary.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

James I (1918). "An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance." In Charles Howard McIlwain (ed.), *The Political Works of James I.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Jefferson, Thomas (1774). *A Summary View of the Rights of British America.* In Merrill D. Peterson (ed.), *The Portable Jefferson.* Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975. Pp. 3-21.

______ (1779). "A Bill Declaring Who Shall Be Deemed Citizens of This Commonwealth." In J. P. Boyd (ed.), *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* Vol. 2. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950.

______ (1798). "The Kentucky Resolutions." In Merrill D. Peterson (ed.), *The Portable Jefferson.* Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975, pp. 281-89.

______ (1801). "First Annual Message." In P. L. Ford (ed.), *The Works of Thomas Jefferson,* Vol. 9. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.

______ (1817). Letter to John Manners, June 12, 1817. In A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (eds.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* Vol. 15. Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903.

______ (1903). "Autobiography." In A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (eds.), *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* Vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association.

Jones, A. H. M. (1940). *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kant, Immanuel (1970). "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice.' " In Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings.* Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 61-92.

Knisbacher, Mitchell (1973). "*Aliyah* of Soviet Jews: Protection of the Right of Emigration under International Law." *Harvard International Law Journal* 14: 89-110.

Lauterpacht, H. (1945). *An International Bill of the Rights of Man.* New York: Columbia University Press.

______ (1950). *International Law and Human Rights.* London: Stevens.

Leary, Virginia (1977). "The Implementation of the Human Rights Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act: A Preliminary Assessment: 1975-1977." In Thomas Buergenthal, with Judith R. Hall (eds.), *Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord.* Montclair, N.J.: Allenheld, Osmun.

Locke, John (1965). *Second Treatise.* In *Two Treatises of Government.* Edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Mentor.

Lyons, David (1973). *In the Interests of the Governed.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr. (1976). "The Right of Revolution." *Daedalus* 105: 151-62.

McDougal, Myres S., Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-shu Chen (1974). "Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Areas." *Yale Law Journal* 83: 900-98.

McKechnie, William Sharp (1958). *Magna Carta,* 2nd ed. New York: Burt Franklin.

Montesquieu (1961). *The Persian Letters.* Edited and translated by J. Robert Loy. New York: Meridian.

Nett, Roger (1971). "The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth." *Ethics* 81: 212-27.

Nozick, Robert (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.* New York: Basic Books.

Phillipson, Coleman (1911). *The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome,* Vol. 1. London: Macmillan.

Plato (1975). *Crito.* In *The Trial and Death of Socrates.* Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett.

______ (1980). *The Laws of Plato.* Translated by Thomas L. Pangle. New York: Basic Books.

Plutarch, "Life of Lycurgus." In *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans.* Translated by John

Dryden. New York: Modern Library, n.d., pp. 49-74.

Pollack, Sir Frederick, and Frederic William Maitland (1923). *The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pufendorf, Samuel (1934). *De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo*, Vol. 2. Translated by C. H. and W. A. Oldfather. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rawls, John (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Robinson, Nehemiah (1958). *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, World Jewish Congress.

Roche, John P. (1974). "The Expatriation Decisions: A Study in Constitutional Improvisation and the Uses of History." In *Sentenced to Life*. New York: Macmillan.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1979). *Emile, or On Education*. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books.

______ (1978). *On the Social Contract*. Translated by Judith R. Masters. New York: St. Martin's.

Schwelb, Egon (1964). *Human Rights and the International Community*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Smith, Adam (1937). *The Wealth of Nations*. Edited by Edwin Cannan. New York: Modern Library.

Sohn, Louis B. (1968). "A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights." In *The United Nations and Human Rights*, Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana.

Turdack, Daniel C. (1979). " A Brief Review of the Provisions in Recent Agreements Concerning Freedom of Movement Issues in the Modern World." *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 11: 95-115.

United Nations Bulletin 5 (1948).

United Nations Review 10 (1963).

Vattel, E. de (1883). *The Law of Nations; or, the Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns*. Philadelphia: Johnson.

Westermann, W. L. (1945). "Between Slavery and Freedom." *American Historical Review* 50: 213-27.

Wills, Garry (1978). *Inventing America*. New York: Vintage.

Wolff, Christian (1934). *Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum*, Vol. 2. Translated by J. H. Drake. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dewey and Marx: On Partisanship and the Reconstruction of Society

ALFONSO J. DAMICO
University of Florida

There are many similarities between Dewey and Marx, particularly the claim by each to have united theory and practice. But this article argues that the distance between the two remains great. Dewey denies what Marx affirms; namely, that partisanship performs a variety of positive functions in the movement towards a more morally adequate society and in the moral transformation of man. Against Marx, Dewey argues that the "rivalry of parties" must come under the control of the norms of critical inquiry which, Dewey believes, can also serve as the site of a more comprehensive and nonpartisan social interest. The article concludes that both Dewey and Marx are correct in what they have to say about partisanship, but in a more limited way than either would acknowledge. If partisanship is functional in the reconstruction of society, as Marx holds, and dysfunctional to the moral growth of the individual, as Dewey holds, then the controversy between liberal amelioration and radical politics is likely to persist.

> Social life is essentially *practical.* All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. . . . The materialist doctrine . . . forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. . . . The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.
>
> Karl Marx

> It is through what we do in and with the world that we read its meaning and measure its value. . . . The problematic in experience is part of a unified existential situation. Qualities such as pain and uncertainty are parts of experience; they are felt but they are not mere feelings. Inquiry must, therefore, aim to actually modify existing conditions; the problem cannot be resolved by merely mental processes.
>
> John Dewey

I

In juxtaposing John Dewey and Karl Marx, my first purpose is to narrow the controversy between liberal amelioration and radical politics to a particular subject: the nature and role of partisanship in the reconstruction of society. The intent is not to rank Dewey and Marx; the contributions of each are sufficiently secure to discourage that type of intramural competition. Rather, the objective is to understand Dewey's denial of what Marx affirms: namely, that partisanship is functional in the effort to improve society. Partisanship is not defined at the outset. Partly, this is to avoid defining the term in ways in which one or possibly both of the theorists being discussed would reject. Indeed, in the case of Marx what is most immediately noticeable is how comfortably the concept of partisanship sits within his political theory, whereas, in Dewey's case, the reverse comes nearer to being true.

The quarrel between Dewey and Marx is in some ways a family quarrel; and, like all domestic quarrels, it is especially bitter—family members are expected to know better. Both have an epistemology that claims to unite theory and practice; each locates the meaning of social reality in human activity as people are shaped by and, in turn, shape society; both understand the "problematic" (Dewey) or "contradictions" (Marx) in experience as part of an existential situation; and both believe that the requirements attending the effort to reconstruct society not only account for the moral advance of society but also account for the moral maturation of the individual. However, these similarities can be beguiling.[1] Important differences are hidden in such general characterizations of Dewey's and Marx's thought. Dewey, for example, clearly believes that the struggle to reconstruct experience is a task for men as such. While he supported some groups and attacked others, he never identified the task of "problem solving" with any particular party, group, or movement. Marx, in contrast, treats the moral progress of man and society as coterminous with the status of the working-class movement. Dewey's tone is more often than not conciliatory, just as Marx's is more commonly polemical. The question of which tone to strike still divides liberals and Marxists today.

---

[1] Sidney Hook's study of Dewey (1939) and George Novack's book on pragmatism and Marxism (1975) represent, respectively, an overestimation and an underestimation of the similarities between Dewey and Marx. Hook believes that if Marxists were more pragmatic in their methods and Dewey more programmatic in his theory, their positions would converge "on a set of common hypotheses leading to common activities" (p. 174). In contrast, Novack somewhat breathlessly attacks Dewey's pragmatism as the "theoretical expression of the outlook of the educated bourgeois in the epoch climb of American capitalism to world domination and the transformation of bourgeois democracy

II

To understand the relative prominence of partisanship in Marx's thought compared, for example, to the notion of compromise, it is helpful to contrast Marx's approach to political problems with what Isaiah Berlin describes as the "moral" approach to political questions. This "moral" approach, Berlin writes, views political philosophy as a "branch of moral philosophy, which starts from the discovery or application of moral notions in the sphere of political relations" (1958, p. 58). This approach is nicely illustrated by most of the contributions to the most recent *Nomos* publication on the subject of compromise.[2] The book opens with various authors reminding us, in a variety of interesting ways, that compromise is a protean concept in that it includes both the notions of tolerance and a sellout of one's virtue. Attention next shifts to the issue of the morality of compromise in which distinctions are drawn between compromises involving conflicts of interests and those involving conflicts of principles. The discussion then concludes with contributions on the role of compromise in politics, democracy, and law. While the authors disagree among themselves, they by and large illustrate Berlin's "moral" approach to a political issue.

So far as I know, there is little, if any, literature on the topic of partisanship to be found among those working within the tradition described by Isaiah Berlin. Partisanship, understood in its most general connotation as a commitment to a *particular* party, interest, or cause, is out of place within this approach. Partisanship would undermine two of its characteristic concerns, substituting the universal and impersonal for the particular and subjective, and modifying self-interest by an interest in the morality of principles. Hume's impartial spectator, Rawls' veil of ignorance, the Golden Rule—all picture the just man as deciding or choosing from a standpoint in which he exchanges positions with all possible others affected by his choice.

Marx is clearly not an ethical thinker within this tradition. While his theory does provide a measure for distinguishing a more morally adequate society from a less adequate one, the theory also alters dramatically the context within which ethical questions come up for consideration. As will be shown, one effect of that alteration is that partisanship becomes a positive force in the moral advance of man and society. Perhaps the most satisfactory label to use for describing Marx's approach to political questions is "socio-historical." It points, first, to Marx's rejection of the methodological individualism often characteristic of the moral approach. Marx attacks both the notions of the undifferentiated individual and the "standpoint of society." In an observation that Dewey was to echo in a more American idiom, Marx writes:

> Society does not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves. It is as though one were to say, from the standpoint of society there are neither slaves nor citizens: both are men. Rather, they are so *outside* society. To be a slave or to be a citizen are social determinations, the relationships of Man A and Man B. Man A is not a slave as such. He is a slave within society and because of it (1972, p. 77; see also 1963, p. 158).

In a variety of ways, Marx ridicules the notion that man can be understood in the abstract apart from the specific or concrete context that makes

---

into imperialist reaction" (p. 41). Much more helpful are the comparisons of Dewey and Marx in Richard Bernstein (1971).

[2] (Pennock and Chapman, 1979). The two contributions to the NOMOS volume that do not reflect the moral approach are George Kelly (pp. 87-103), and Paul Thomas (pp. 104-20). Kelly's essay provides a useful background for understanding why the concept of compromise is largely absent not only in Hegel's thought but in Marx's as well. Thomas' essay attempts to locate the debate in Italy over "historical compromise" in an analysis of Marx's discussion of political emancipation and human emancipation. Thomas' essay, while admirable, tends to iron out the paradoxical wrinkles in Marx's theory. Marx's thesis, I argue, is that extending political emancipation so that it becomes human emancipation can only be accomplished by refusing to treat the rights and liberties associated with political emancipation as a matter of principle prior to the reconstruction of society. Political alliances and activities that are consonant with such norms as compromise are, for Marx, a matter of strategy. To consider them in any other way would run contrary to Marx's warning that "the clearer and more vigorous political thought is, the *less* it is able to grasp the nature of social evils" (1956, p. 217).

him the sort of person he is. Nor, he insists, can society be understood just as a collection of individuals (no more, Dewey would have added, than the sense of a table is satisfactorily understood by describing it as a collection of atoms in motion).

If Marx were merely insisting on the social nature of man, his break with the moral approach to political questions would not be very great. But when Marx describes consciousness itself as a function of man's practice and what is known as a concrete embodiment of that practice, the shift to new philosophical territory is rather total. Philosophy, Marx argues, can only make sense of the world once it gives up that dualism which assigns knowing and what is known to two separate ontological categories. It is just this type of error that Marx accuses Feuerbach of having made:

> The chief defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses is understood only in the form of the *object* or *contemplation;* but not as *sensuous human activity,* as *practice,* not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the *active* side was developed abstractly by idealism—which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinguished from the objects of thought; but he does not understand human activity itself as *objective* activity (1947, p. 197).

Marx's materialism, as is true for Dewey's pragmatism, is fundamentally an activist epistemology. People come to know the world by how they exist or act in it, but that knowing, in turn, becomes a part of the social reality within which their actions are located. Within the current inquiry, what is most important about this complex doctrine is that it helps explain Marx's break with the moral approach and why partisanship becomes a major feature of his alternative approach. If men shape circumstances and circumstances shape men, then both are part of an order of development which can only be grasped historically. For Marx, human nature is an historical nature: "As individuals express their life so they are." In contrast to the moral approach which relies upon such distinctions as the distinction between reason and desire in its analysis of human nature, Marx relies primarily on distinctions between periods in the history of human development. And while the former approach attaches considerable importance to the morality of principles as a way of improving man and society, Marx (1977, p. 569) denounces such principles or, more exactly, the appeal to them as "obsolete verbal rubbish."

Another major consequence of Marx's method is the argument that man's immersion in self-interest, rather than the attempt to rise above it, is the key to the moral as well as political reconstruction of society. The moral approach ties the moral advance of society and the moral growth of the individual to experiences that encourage a willingness to consider all possible viewpoints. In contrast, Marx's approach counsels the individual to more fully understand his nature within a particular social formation. As part of that counseling activity, philosophy itself must be partisan:

> The weapon of criticism obviously cannot replace the criticism of weapons. Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses when it demonstrates *ad hominen,* and it demonstrates *ad hominen* when it becomes radical (Marx, 1963, p. 52).

Not the evasion of a point of view but a diagnosis of the consequences of competing points of view is the first step in the reconstruction of society. All ideas being reflections of partisan interests, the task is to discover some partisan interest that can serve as the agency for human emancipation. Partisanship sits easily within both Marx's theory and the style of politics generated by that theory.

The greater conspicuousness of the notion of compromise in various versions of liberal and pluralist political theory can be traced to an underlying epistemology that is suspicious of any sort of claim to Absolute Truth and also interprets men's interests as the expression of subjective desires. By equating a man's interest with whatever he *wants,* the liberal can nicely argue that each individual is generally the best judge of his own interest. But, more importantly, since conflicts of interest are the expression of competing desires, men should be willing to compromise. That is, the democratic case for agreements reached through mutual concessions is intimately bound up with the belief that there are no objective or knowable criteria that can assign one set of interests greater value than another.

Marx's case for partisan politics rests upon an epistemological base so different from that underlying the liberal case for compromise that any evaluation of Marx's argument for partisanship from the standpoint of the liberal theoretical perspective would not be very meaningful. We have already seen that Marx treats the individual and society as dual aspects or dimensions of man's social practice. The effect of this sociology is to assign an objective meaning to men's interests (Balbus, 1978, pp. 294-95). Whether a person is aware of it or not, what determines his life chances is how he is affected by the social structures within which he exists. Partisans are not partisans merely because of a difference of opinion, but because people's activities and the subsequent series of social relationships differentially affect their ability to satisfy their interests and adversely affect, under conditions of private property, their capacity to live the life of social beings. Politics, as pictured by Marx, is not a clash of desires but a confrontation between man's interest in human emancipation and those social structures that drive a wedge between man's life as a public or social being and his life in civil society.

Marx links partisanship to the moral advance of society and man through the account of man's alienation. That theory has received abundant attention and no extensive review is required here. But it is worth noting that Marx's theory of alienation provides functional equivalents for most of the standard concerns of more formal ethical theories. Universalism and mutual reciprocity, for example, are no longer standards defining the form of a moral judgment; rather, they are potentialities uncovered within man's experience. They are the defining features of a de-alienated existence. For example, within Marx's comparison of political emancipation and human emancipation in the early writings, a contrast is being drawn, as Carol Gould describes it (1978, pp. 132-78) between instrumental reciprocity and mutual reciprocity. The instrumental character of reciprocity within capitalism points to the fact that each person enters into a relationship on the basis of self-interest alone. Political emancipation, i.e., the rights guaranteed by the liberal state, makes a virtue out of a necessity by elevating this exchange relationship to the realm of universal principle. In contrast, mutual reciprocity would characterize a society in which people are willing to regulate their particular desires in light of the values attached to their life in association. Gould's distinction between instrumental reciprocity and mutual reciprocity in Marx's thought suggests a companion distinction between a partisan interest and a universal interest. A partisan interest is a destructive particular interest in the sense that one individual realizing his interest precludes another from realizing his interest. A universal interest, in contrast, operates when conditions permit individual differences but not in ways that make one person's project destructive of another's project. Even when conditions do not permit mutual reciprocity and all interests are partisan interests, Marx was well aware that most group or class interests make their appearance in the guise of universalism. One of the reasons for partisan philosophy is to expose the underlying partisan interests hidden by the "morality of principles." But what makes partisanship such a conspicuous feature of Marx's thought is the thesis that the partisan interest of the working class is also a reconstructive universal interest in that the realization of the interest of the working class simultaneously abolishes the conditions that make all interests destructive interests.

In Marx's theory of the moral progress of society—i.e., the realization of human emancipation—partisanship is a critical factor in three distinguishable moments of that progress. In discussing the role of philosophy or theory, I have already anticipated Marx's claim that a correct theoretical understanding of the world requires philosophy to become part of the world. And philosophy only becomes part of the world by adopting a point of view that reveals to people what their real interests are. "Theory is actualized in a people only insofar as it actualizes their needs" (Marx, 1967, p. 259; see also Bernstein, 1971, p. 53). In saying that Marx views philosophy itself as a partisan activity, I do not mean that there are no intellectual norms or criteria regulating that philosophical activity. Rather, philosophy is partisan in that insofar as its analysis or theoretical understanding is correct its statements become a form of advocacy. The partisan nature of philosophy is, in turn, linked to two other aspects of the moral reconstruction of society: partisanship *between* classes and the partisan activity *of* the proletariat class.

Marx's program of reconstruction is clear. What is required, he argues, is the emergence of "a class with radical chains," a class that can "only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity." But the formation of this class requires, among other things, an opposing class:

> For a *popular revolution* and the *emancipation of a particular class* of civil society to coincide, for *one* class to represent the whole of society, another class must concentrate in itself all the evils of society, a particular class must embody and represent a general obstacle and limitation. A particular social sphere must be regarded as the *notorious crime* of the whole society, so that emancipation from this sphere appears as a general emancipation. For *one* class to be the liberating class *par excellence,* it is necessary that another class should be openly the oppressing class (Marx, 1963, p. 56).

Where the liberal might describe the militancy of partisans as a problem to be solved or justice as a "pact of reconciliation," such cleavages, viewed from within Marx's theory, serve to expose the class bias within the liberal consensus. As people become increasingly partisans of their particular interest, their needs and their subjective awareness of those needs emerge in the formation of the working class. The liberal emphasis on the "rights of man" as a common value that binds even partisans together obscures the persistence of the "separation of man from man." The movement from political emancipation to human emancipation is tied to the dynamic of the class conflict. "Individuals form a class only insofar as they are engaged in a common struggle with another class" (Marx, 1947, pp. 41, 76-78). The positive functions assigned to the conflict between classes are complemented by Marx's analysis of partisan political activity within the working class.

What gives Marx's theory its paradoxical edge is the thesis that the proletariat must become more, not less, self-interested if it is to represent the interests of man as such. Marx was not unaware of the criticism that the proletariat might never become partisans of anything more than its own particular interests. In *The German Ideology,* Marx, discussing Max Stirner's assertions that society cannot be renewed so long as the people who compose it remain unchanged, writes:

> Stirner believes that the communist proletarians, who are revolutionizing society, putting the relations of production and the form of intercourse on a new basis—i.e., on the new men, on their new mode of life—remain "the same as ever." The untiring propaganda which these proletarians are making, the discussions which they carry on daily among themselves, prove sufficiently how little they want to remain "the same as ever." They would only remain "the same as ever" if, with Saint Sancho they were "to seek the guilt in themselves"; but they know too well that only under changed circumstances will they cease to be "the same as ever," and therefore they are determined to change their circumstances at the first opportunity. In revolutionary activity, change of self coincides with the change of circumstances (1947, p. 204, n. 46).

This "coincidence of the changing of circumstances" and "self-changing," set down again in the third thesis on Feuerbach, points to a second critical function of partisanship in Marx's thought: through partisan activity, the proletariat purifies itself of the old sentiment of particular interests and acquires the new sentiment of universalism. In other words, partisanship, whatever the irony, is the key to that isomorphism said to exist between the moral advance of society and the moral maturation of man.

Since the partisan struggle between classes is critical to the reconstruction of society, Marx's theory requires him to show that the partisan activity of the working class will lead them beyond their own more particular interests. What makes the issue particularly acute is Marx's unremitting insistence that the working class must acquire a combative, noncompromising temperament. Whether Marx is describing revolutionary situations, trade union activity, or the significance of universal suffrage, he is careful to locate them within the class struggle, a struggle sometimes covert but, nevertheless, continuous. As late as 1871 Marx was interpreting trade union activity in terms of its contribution to the formation of the proletariat as a class and to its acquisition of a partisan mood or temperament (Tucker, 1978, p. 520; Gilbert, 1979, pp. 531-36). Similarly, when Marx discusses universal suffrage, the emphasis is on the strategic contribution that it makes to the formation of a partisan working-class movement and the "dissolution of civil society." Universal suffrage plays a very different role in Marx's theory from the role assigned it in, say, liberal thought. Where the liberal sees in universal suffrage a norm of fair or just decision making that mutes the militancy of partisans, encourages reliance on public argument, and exposes the individual to wider interests, Marx sees an opportunity for accentuating the partisanship of the proletariat and a chance to calculate their strength in the struggle to abolish private property. It is a difference between valuing universal suffrage according to the ends being achieved and valuing it as a means best suited to a world characterized by a plurality of ends.[3]

On political alliances, Marx allows that it may be wise to "form a bloc" with liberal elements "according to circumstances"; but such elements should only be tolerated and the movement should "remain aware that a break with them is only a matter of time." Alliances are strategic arrangements; Marx always warns against that type of compromise in which the "other side" is accorded some form of moral legitimacy. Alliances are dangerous whenever they encourage a disposition to listen to and acknowledge the interests and claims of other groups or, more exactly, the opposing class. This danger occasioned Marx's "Circular Letter" addressed to the Social Democrats in 1879. If, Marx warned, the party became, as Bernstein and others proposed, an "all-sided party of 'all men imbued with a true love of humanity,' " nothing would remain as a basis for socialism "but the 'true love of humanity' and empty phraseology about 'justice' " (Tucker, ed., pp. 549-55).

Marx ends, as he started, with a rejection of the moral approach. Partisanship means no compromise; and when society becomes just, its reconstruction will have been the work of partisan political actors.

---

[3] Alan Gilbert (1976) and Shlomo Avineri (1976) have recently quarreled over the significance to be attributed to Marx's comments on universal suffrage. Gilbert complains that Avineri's humanist interpretation of Marx, especially Avineri's thesis that Marx believes that universal suffrage made possible the peaceful and gradual abolition of classes, mistakenly mutes Marx's emphasis on revolutionary and partisan political activity as the means necessary to win the fight for universalism. Clearly, I believe that Gilbert comes out ahead in this quarrel.

III

Despite Marx's replies to his critics, doubts continue to be raised about his thesis that the changing of conditions coincides with the changing of man. Bertell Ollman, for example, in a largely appreciative interpretation of Marx's thought (1971, p. 238) argues that Marx leaves the question of the relationship between human behavior and surrounding conditions underdeveloped. While granting Marx's contention that the individual is largely shaped by society, Ollman criticizes him for assuming that changes in character are always rational, "that is, in keeping with the new interests which are created" by changing conditions. Nor, he adds, does Marx ask how long it will take for new conditions to bring about new persons. In effect, Ollman's complaint is that Marx was handicapped in his ability to explain why proletarian class consciousness failed to develop because he lacked the idea of character structure. His criticism of Marx is simply that character structure stands between changing conditions and changes in the individual, between activity and consciousness. Thus people are not only "prisoners of their conditions," but also "prisoners of themselves, of their own character structures which are the product of previous conditions" (Ollman, p. 243). Thus Ollman concludes that Marx underestimated the time lag between the emergence of changed conditions and the likelihood that human beings would respond in ways that fit their rational interests.

Marx considered the reconstruction of society, i.e., the stages that society must go through for its morality to advance, and the transformation or moral maturation of man as neatly isomorphic. But this claimed isomorphism is thrown into doubt, if the claim for the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and alterations in human character is insecure. While Ollman worries that Marx was wrong about the likelihood that the working class would become sufficiently partisan to carry out the needed changes in society, a more characteristically liberal concern is that once people become partisans they will no longer be open or attentive to the interests of others. The liberal mistrust of Marx is stated as follows by Nathan Rotenstreich (1965, pp. 62-63):

> Marx tried to discover the necessary connection between the proletariat and the idea of freedom: the particular interest of the proletariat is *ipso facto* the trend toward the realization of human freedom and sovereignty. . . . The particularity of interest and the universality of ideas are here interrelated. Thus, the norm is embodied in the actuality of an historical interest while the actuality of an interest is elevated to a normative level. . . . The harmony between the interest and the idea is the guarantee of the infallibility of the interest, on the one hand, and of the materialization of the norm, on the other. One of the main difficulties of Marx's philosophy is obviously encountered here, precisely because he so closely tied up the norm with a given historical factor qua class . . . with all the consequences following from this, including the possible and eventual consequence that the proletariat is always right, because it embodies *the* Right.

IV

Marx's rejection of the methodological individualism of classical liberalism, his insistence that only social ends are truly reasonable and emancipatory, the belief that practice shapes both man and society: all have their parallels in Dewey's thought. But, again, while Dewey's commitment to the unity of theory and practice positions him closer to Marx than many, the distance between them remains great. Marx's analysis focuses on the conflicts *between* men generated by structural antagonisms; Dewey's pragmatism shifts attention to the experienced difficulties in some interaction between "organism and environment." For Marx's radical criticism, Dewey substitutes "standard deliberate inquiry," for radical practice, "socially cooperative intelligence." With these substitutions in place, it is not very far to Dewey's suspicion of a "rivalry of parties" and his rejection of a "class point of view."

By examining Dewey's nonpartisanship in the context of his larger philosophy, however briefly, I hope to show that something more is at stake in the dispute between liberal amelioration and radical politics than just a proposal by American progressives to take the politics out of politics. Much of the distance between Dewey and Marx can be explained in terms of their competing theoretical perspectives. Dewey's understanding of the nature of critical inquiry reduces the level of generalizations available to him and, thus, narrows the range within which rational action can occur. Both the reduction and the narrowing are important factors in Dewey's call for an "alliance," rather than a competition, of social forces. This methodological difference also shows up in the way Dewey understands the interaction between man's moral growth and the moral progress of society. Marx begins with man understood as the "ensemble of social relations" and locates the development of the individual, i.e., the move from alienation to de-alienation, within the formative processes that reconstruct societies. Dewey begins at the other end of the interaction process. Where Marx asks what must happen to society in order for the individual to change, Dewey inquires more closely into how the individual must change if society is to be changed. The two positions are not mutually exclusive. Dewey believes as strongly as Marx that real changes in social conditions must take place before men can realize their interest in a form of association that supports mutual reciprocity, just as Marx recognizes that the "educator must himself be educated." But their different theoretical perspectives encourage different preoccupations and varying sensitivity to the obstacles confronting those who seek to reconstruct society.

In many of his early writings, Dewey uses the analysis of experience as a wedge to position pragmatism between idealism and what he termed "sensational [atomistic] empiricism." While differing over whether the object of cognition is some a priori system or a series of previous sensations, both idealism and empiricism, he contends, embrace a dualism between knowing and what is known. Neither, he argues, understands the role of reason *in* experience. Briefly, Dewey's effort to unite theory and practice, ideas and experience, follows Charles Sanders Peirce in interpreting the meaning of an idea or concept in terms of the possible experiences suggested by the idea or concept. Peirce's pragmatic prescription for determining meaning translates such statements as "This is hard" into the form "If you attempt to scratch the object, you will not succeed" (Peirce, 1958, p. 212). What distinguishes Dewey's instrumentalism is his greater concern with the nature of the experience that gives rise to thinking and the type of activity that links ideas and experiences. Most simply, Dewey argues that problematic experiences set the stage for inquiry and that ideas are mainly tools or instruments for reconstructing experience or solving the problem. What sets the stage for thought is some disturbance or conflict in man's interaction with his environment. An idea is essentially a "plan of action" for working our way out of "some hole." Dewey's instrumentalism treats knowing as a type of activity intermediate in the development of an experience. Inquiry begins because something has gone wrong; it terminates when the problematic experience has been reconstructed. Since ideas must be tested by being tried out, theory and practice work together to transform an indeterminate situation into a determinate one. That which is known is the conclusion of reflective inquiry as it reorganizes experience. It is this side of Dewey's theory of inquiry which entails an activist and reform-oriented style of politics.

As part of his theory of knowing as a problem-solving activity, Dewey insists on the qualitative immediacy of experience. That is, the problematic is a real property of some experience in man's interaction with his environment. This objectivism of values can be seen in Dewey's statement that

> it is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful. The problematic in experience is part of a unified existential situation. Qualities such as pain and uncertainty are parts of experience; they are felt but they are not mere feelings. Inquiry must, therefore, aim to actually modify existing conditions; the problem cannot be resolved by merely mental processes (1960a, p. 117; cf. 1960b, pp. 232-36; see also Somjee, pp. 12-15).

Dewey's thesis that ethical and esthetical valuations are "real" properties of an experience yields several important features of his pragmatist philosophy. First it circumscribes what he means by the practical nature of ideas. To say that an idea "works" or "succeeds" means that it meets the "needs" of the problem. Also, it indicates how Dewey attempts to overcome the fact-value dichotomy; instrumentalism translated into ethics becomes naturalism.[4] Finally, it points to what distinguishes Dewey's political theory from other versions of liberalism, especially pluralist theory. Dewey holds that there are objective criteria for determining how a conflict of interests should be resolved. But, in contrast to Marx, those criteria are bound up in a *method*. In other words, Marx has a teleological value theory in the sense that practice is the realization of the fully universal and social man uncovered or understood by philosophy. Where Marx speaks of practice as the realization of philosophy, Dewey distinguishes between intelligent and unintelligent action (cf. Rotenstreich, 1965, pp. 52-53).

Dewey's lifelong preoccupation with education issues is a direct result of his conception of problems and values as characteristics of some interaction between "organism and environment."

---

[4] Both Dewey and Marx have been accused of making a virtue out of whatever works. Dewey's emphasis on the practical nature of ideas has even been ridiculed as a peculiarly American version of might makes right. Similarly, one version of the historicist charge directed against Marx is that his theory destroys all moral distinctions except the distinction between success and failure within a pattern of historical inevitability. What Dewey's casual critics have never carefully considered is how Dewey's conception of the problematic in experience as part of an existential situation circumscribes that he means by the practical. While Dewey's more appreciative critics are divided about his claims for the qualitative immediacy of experience, they, at least, do not ignore what he intends on this point. See Reichenbach (1939). A defense of Marx from the crude charge of historicism can be found in Avineri (1970, pp. 144-79).

We can witness this location of the problematic in the following:

> Experience is primarily a process of undergoing a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection, in the literal sense of these words. The organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequences of its own actions. . . . The human being has upon his hands the problem of responding to what is going on around him so that these changes will take one turn rather than another, namely, that required by its own further functioning. . . . In this sense, life goes on by means of controlling the environment (Dewey, 1960a, pp. 24-25).

Also, Dewey's concept of experience narrows considerably the level of verifiable generalizations available to him. On the one hand, experiences have sufficient "reach, scope or content" to provide us with an orientation to practice; but, at the same time, the "processes of experienc*ing*" are always open-ended, requiring constant adjustments of both means and ends. This pluralistic interpretation of experience, "a *via media* between extreme atomistic pluralism and block universe monism" (Dewey, 1939, p. 544) dovetails nicely with the main features of Dewey's theory of inquiry. Given the understanding of the problematic, what is needed is some method for guiding the reconstruction of experience; but that method must be capable of guiding action in "specific situations." Thus, for Dewey, rational conduct is a form of trial-and-error rationalism. The analysis of experience, Dewey writes, teaches us that "every reflective problem and operation arises with reference to some *specific* situation, and has to subserve a *specific* purpose dependent upon its own occasion." What men must learn is how "to inquire definitely and with particularity, to seek solutions in the terms of concrete problems as they arise . . . for doing always means the doing of something in particular" (Dewey, 1962, p. 165; see also 1966, pp. 104-06, 148-51). In short, the rationality of pragmatism is not the rationalism of some teleological process; but that of trial-and-error experimentalism (Somjee, pp. 60-61).

Much of Dewey's political theory can be understood in terms of what fits this model of trial-and-error rationalism. He defends democracy on the ground that it makes possible pragmatic problem solving. His attack on the "old" liberalism is framed in terms of the failure to recognize that the practical significance of means and ends varies with historical circumstances. His polemic against Marxism in *Freedom and Culture* (1963, p. 100) complains, in part, that its holistic categories dictate a "kind of all-or-none practical activity."[5] But there is more to Dewey's criticism of Marx. Dewey's strongest objection is to the role assigned class conflict in the reconstruction of society. What moves the controversy between Dewey's version of liberal amelioration and Marx's radical practice beyond the debate over piecemeal social engineering versus revolutionary transformation is Dewey's contention that through resort to a "method" men themselves are changed.

Earlier I noted that Marx treats the changing of circumstances and the transformation of man as isomorphic. Dewey's brand of the unity of theory and practice also yields an understanding of social reconstruction and individual moral growth as isomorphic. The differences between talking about growth or transformation interest me less in this context than the fact that both theories encourage the view that alterations at either end of the man-society interaction is accompanied by corresponding changes at the other end. Marx treats the various elements of that interaction process as related parts in a single structure. This contributes to the view that the status of the working class movement is the measure of the current state of society's morality. Partisanship is important both to mobilize a particular class and because the submission-emancipation of that class embodies the norms for measuring the moral advance of society. But once Dewey locates conflict or problems in the "man-environment" interaction, reduces the level of generalizations that can be applied to that interaction, and limits the range of rational action, he denies what Marx affirms. The first denial is that philosophy should adopt a "class point of view"; the norms of critical inquiry are tied to no particular interest but to a "social interest."

During the thirties in America, various writers, most notably Sidney Hook, wondered whether or not Marxian class analysis could be incorporated into their largely pragmatic and liberal philosophies. Much of this intellectual tug-of-war took place in *Social Frontier,* a journal of social criticism devoted largely to issues in educational philosophy. In articles with titles such as "The American Mind and the 'Class' Problem," and "Shall We Use the Class Dynamic?" (1934) Hook and others argued that a progressive orientation to practice and education required recognition of the class-divided nature of American society. Arguing that the "conservative owning class" could not be expected to support a philosophy that would challenge their privileged position, Hook held that philosophy must base its analyses on a working-class "point of view." In a regular column, "John Dewey's Page," Dewey commented on this debate, arguing for a more comprehensive point of view. He quickly noticed that the argument for using the interests of the working class as the foundations for doing theory is itself based on the suppressed premise that those interests are in some way in the interests of the society at large. Nor, he argued, is it clear just what is being said by those who advocate the adoption of a class point of view. While clearly stating his own support for the working class, Dewey (1936, p. 242) insisted on a distinction between an "orientation *toward* a class" and an "orientation *by* a class interest." In other words, Dewey was willing to indicate his support and sympathy for the workers but insisted that "one's frame of values" or "one's controlling framework of ideas" should be derived from a more "comprehensive social interest."

---

[5] So far as I can tell, Dewey's writings evidence little direct knowledge of Marx's thought. Most of his criticisms are directed at what he calls communism "after the pattern set in the U.S.S.R." (1934, p. 86).

Insisting that social pluralism, not class, is the chief characteristic of society, Dewey adds that even if class division were a more prominent feature, knowing that does not settle the question of what to do about it. And, in an indirect challenge to the isomorphism between the changing of conditions and the changing of man argued by Marx, Dewey (1937, p. 237) insists that no new system can reach maturity without some widespread "change of habits of belief, desire, and purpose." And in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1957), his most important work on social psychology, Dewey uses the concept of habits not only to examine the formation of human character but to again criticize the notion of a "class dynamic." Arguing that institutions are embodied habits, Dewey warns against proposing or prophesying rapid and far-reaching social changes. "Ways of belief, of expectation, of judgment and attendant emotional dispositions of like and dislike, are not easily modified after they have once taken shape" (1957a, pp. 102-03). This social psychology reenforces the conclusions of Dewey's epistemology and philosophy of experience in holding that the major task of social reconstruction is the development of the art of education or the "habit of learning."

The particular form that a belief in a social interest takes in Dewey's philosophy gives his more political and programmatic comments and positions their nonpartisan character. Typical is Dewey's advice to teachers that they not lose sight of the larger value to be pursued when organizing for the sake of winning increased school funding. That larger value is the cause of intelligence itself. Thus, teacher organizations should form alliances with other groups, artists, ministers, writers, etc., that also have a special stake in the spread of intelligence. Dewey's advice to teachers is repeated over the years in his comments on an alliance of middle-class groups or in his support for the League for Independent Political Action. That Dewey believed such disparate and frequently amorphous groups could form an "aggressive alliance" for social reconstruction is sufficient measure of his confidence in the possibilities for resolving conflicts through the spread of intelligence.

What emerges from these comments are two additional senses in which Dewey denies Marx's claim for the positive value of partisanship. While Marx's philosophy locates the structural bias towards human emancipation in the conflict between two classes whose interests are intractable, Dewey's pragmatism makes the norms of critical inquiry or intelligence the controlling factor and thus the "rivalry of parties" or the interests of partisans must also come under the influence of that controlling factor. What completes Dewey's break with Marx is Dewey's denial that partisan political activity can supply human beings with the character structure needed for the moral advance of society. That is, Dewey's defense of critical inquiry is more than a defense of a "method"; it is an account of the way in which individuals experience the world and their place in it.

To describe this link between the logic of inquiry and individual character formation, Dewey relies upon the concept of "growth":

> No amount of pains taken in forming a purpose in a definite case is final; the consequences of its adoption must be carefully noted, and a purpose held only as a working hypothesis until results confirm its rightness. Mistakes . . . are lessons in wrong methods of using intelligence and instructions as to a better course in the future. They are indications of the need of revision, development, readjustment. . . . The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the existent situation. . . . Growth itself is the only moral "end" (1957b, pp. 175, 177; cf. 1966, pp. 49-53).

The logical norms of trial-and-error rationalism are here translated into social norms for measuring the quality of life. How men link theory and practice, knowing and doing, becomes the sign of what kind of men they are as a result of the doing.

Whatever subject Dewey subsequently considered, the norms of critical inquiry became the decisive standard guiding his discussion. His pragmatist epistemology serves as a vehicle for a reconstructed theory of education in which having experiences that promote the habits and dispositions of a "pragmatic" mind are crucial. This reconstructed educational philosophy, in turn, informs his account of democracy as a way of life in which the art of inquiry, communication, and community are blended together. What is important about this series of links is that each one points to the conclusion that the improvement of society and the moral maturation of the individual are bound up with key values associated with the liberal consensus. The linkages are presented here with little, if any, exposition.

As part of his theory of democracy, Dewey's first step is to link the "rational" and the "social." He argues that

> knowledge is a function of association and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties of effectual observation, reflection and desire are habits acquired under the influence of the culture and institutions of society, not ready-made inherent powers. . . . Without freedom of expression, not even methods of social inquiry can be developed. For tools can be evolved and perfected only in operation; in application to observing, reporting and organizing actual subject-matter; and this application can not occur save through free expression and systematic communication (1927, pp. 158, 167).

Next, communication and freedom of inquiry are linked to community and democracy as a way of life:

> Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. . . . Consensus demands communication. . . . A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living of conjoint communicated experience (1966, pp. 4-5, 87).

Each of these linkages points to Dewey's conclusion that the changing of men is the key to the changing of conditions. Through such communication and a developing commitment to the norms of critical inquiry, the self-interested behavior of egoistic man is supplanted by a greater sense of sociality:

> To be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience. One shares in what another has thought and felt and insofar, meagerly or amply, has his own attitude modified. Nor is the one who communicates left unaffected. . . . The experience has to be formulated in order to be communicated. To formulate requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see it, considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be got into such form that he can appreciate its meaning (1966, pp. 5-6).

Dewey's comments suggest a new link between the liberal norms of tolerance, freedom of inquiry, and community. The norms of critical inquiry are not mere formal criteria for measuring the veracity of an opinion; rather, they are a kind of relationship whereby men come to value relationships marked by a "concern on the part of each in the joint action and in the contribution of each of its members to it" (Dewey, 1927, pp. 188). If it is not too great a strain on the language, one could say that universalism, for Dewey, means engaging all points of view in a discussion, a discussion or public discourse controlled by the norms of critical inquiry.

Dewey's lasting faith was his belief that, if only men would submit their beliefs and ideas to critical examination and the test of experience, the resulting moral and social consensus would overwhelm the current divisions and conflicts within society. Much of Dewey's confidence in a problem-solving orientation as the solution to social ills is grounded in his pragmatist epistemology. That is, unlike that form of liberal politics in which no standard apart from the interests or desires of the conflicting parties themselves is appealed to, Dewey's characterization of the problematic as part of an "objective" situation makes the appeal to critical inquiry itself the seat of value. The needs of the situation as uncovered by open inquiry and trial-and-error rationalism, not some agreement reached by compromise or mutual concessions, is the standard embedded in Dewey's confidence that education—understood in its broadest sense as the self-critical, reflective alteration of human character—could further the reconstruction of society. Partisanship, whether it appears in the form of a theory or the claims of a particular group, is miseducative in that it postpones rather than furthers the necessary and desirable development of man and society.

V

I doubt that there is any aspect of Dewey's pragmatism that has not been subjected to severe criticism. But, in the current context, perhaps, the single most important charge is that his program for the reconstruction of society is, quite simply, not political enough. Among the many ways that this point could be made, an early critique of pragmatism by C. Wright Mills (1966) illustrates how vulnerable Dewey is to this criticism. More than most critics, Mills appreciates just how much Dewey's epistemology, "his biological model of action," informs and shapes Dewey's theory of politics. This model, Mills argues, minimizes the power divisions within society by locating all problems "between *man and nature,* instead of between *men and men.*" The most important political effect of where conflicts and disturbances come up for treatment in Dewey's philosophy is that education, the spread of intelligence, becomes the solution to social problems. "The biological, environment-organism adjustment schematum underlies the cogency of this type of 'problematization' and its answer." Additionally, this type of instrumentalism pictures the organism-enviromment interactive process as one of constant adaptation, strengthening the "drive toward specificity of problems" or piecemeal social engineering. Dewey's naturalism complements this model of conflict resolution by using "problems" as a surrogate for "values." By insisting on the qualitative immediacy of experience, Dewey is able to shift the "value problem" away from inter-human conflicts about action to a conception of "problem solving." Mills (1966, pp. 382, 400) properly complains that such shifts enable Dewey to avoid "the social, economic, and political trials which certainly beset the moralist, and especially a social pluralist!" In effect, Dewey loses sight of the coercive element in most conflicts and their resolution by failing to make a problem of the determination of goods and the requirement to comply with that determination. In a different work, Mills argued that "liberal practicality" inclines either to be "a-political" or to diagnose political conflict in pathological terms that make "anti-social" attitudes or the "corruption" of intelligence *the* problem (1961, p. 88). Consequently, whenever competing groups confront each other because of the structural antagonisms of society, Mills argues that what we get from Dewey is not a reason for supporting one or the other but an appeal to a "method." In short, Dewey's "problematization" postpones a fuller realization of the politics of conflict.

I do not think that any of Dewey's defenders have managed a satisfactory response to the type of criticisms of pragmatism registered by Mills. What I do suspect, however, is that such criticisms make the choice between the competing theoretical perspectives and political postures of Dewey and Marx seem easier than it really is. Another way of stating Mills' critique is to argue that Dewey, like Marx, was overly confident in his belief that changes in man and changes in society are elements in an isomorphic process such that the diagnosis of what needs to be done to one element suffices to solve the obstacles or problems more clearly belonging to the other sphere or element. This way of putting the matter better captures, I think, the reasons for the very different attitudes towards partisanship generated by Dewey's pragmatism and Marx's theory and, at the same time, makes the task of evaluating those competing attitudes more difficult. In what might best be described as an inconclusion, I want to suggest that Dewey and Marx are both right in what they have to say about partisanship, but in a more limited way than either would acknowledge.

In a recent work that attempts to explain what must happen before men revolt against injustices, Barrington Moore (1978, pp. 458)62) summarizes his thesis by arguing that changes must occur at three levels: individual personality, social organization, and cultural norms or shared perspectives. The type of change required at each level is one that heightens a group's sense of moral outrage and weakens the bonds of authority that tie individuals to a dominance-submission authority relationship. At the level of shared perceptions, Moore argues that it is "necessary to overcome the illusion that the present state of affairs is just, permanent, and inevitable." At the level of social organization, networks of cooperation and solidarity are necessary if individuals are to become politically mobilized for effective resistance. Moore is less precise on how individual personality changes; the needed changes—disciplined behavior, a strengthening of the ego—seem to be dependent on new forms of cooperation and changes in the repressed group's shared perceptions. Although stated at a very high level of generality, these comments can serve to state in one final way the positive functions that Marx assigns to partisanship. Partisan philosophy—radical criticism that argues *ad hominen*—exposes the subjective and particular interests hidden within the ideological language of a given society. Partisan political activity—the conflict between classes —exposes the pattern of domination and submission within the social system. Such activity also furthers a sense of class solidarity, contributing to the formation of a new method of cooperation. Partisan political activity—viewed from the inside, so to speak, as activity by a class as a class for itself—is part of the change in personality that is important if those oppressed by the current system are to avoid ineffective outbursts and, instead, become an effective resistance movement with all this implies about calculating what can and cannot be done at a given time. Partisanship, Marx reasonably argues, is important in diagnosing what is wrong within a particular social formation, as a signal that men accept the need to reconstruct the situation, and as a process of political mobilization.

If one asks what signifies within Marx's theory that the reconstruction of society has been successful, the obvious answer is to say that private property and the social relationships supported by the private property system have been abolished. But an answer in terms of changes in man would have to be stated in terms of the new norm of mutual reciprocity that animates the reconstructed society. In other words, *after* the reconstruction, partisanship is dysfunctional. Arguing that men become nonpartisan, i.e., abandon particular interests destructive of the interests of others, by becoming partisans, Marx insufficiently appreciated how demanding an education was required of the educators. Believing that changed conditions produce changed men, Marx imagined that partisanship, in all three senses, would not only change men but also undo the changing.

The "organism-environment" interaction model of Dewey that Mills so sharply criticizes, nevertheless, makes Dewey more sensitive than Marx to the problems confronting someone who sets out to alter men's dispositions, attitudes, and modes of response. The complaint that Dewey sought to institutionalize a mood, while it loses none of its sting, also points to his most characteristic contribution to the analysis of political problems. The end or what is to be done, Dewey fairly, if incessantly, reminds us, must always be considered from the angle of how individuals are to do it and what kind of people they are becoming as a result of the doing. If the end is community and a commitment to the norms of mutuality and reciprocity that signify the realization of a more morally adequate society, then Marxian partisanship, Dewey warns, must be considered a dangerous means. When Dewey identifies the substance of community with communication, his critics are wide of the mark when they charge him with substituting a method for a vision. The individual is a social being, shaped in large measure by the pressures of society. Changing conditions alone, Dewey argues, will not alter this natural causality operating in the social order. Overcoming this dependence requires new forms of experience guided by an intelligence cultivated to enable the individual to better judge how what he is doing affects him and his association with others. Dewey's experimentalism, no less than Marx's radical practice, is an autogenetic category. Through open inquiry, communication, trial-and-error action, the individual can better shape conditions, thereby exercising control over his own shaping. Independence means escape from dependence but is also a way of recognizing interdependence. The individual must still act as a social being, as part of a social network. Communication, open inquiry are equally needed if individuals are to be open to those experiences and actions that will enable them to solve problems from a more general perspective, one that does not just calculate private advantage but considers the consequences for maintaining relationships of mutual reciprocity. Not partisan interests, but the social interest must be controlling; not radical politics, but the politics of trial-and-error rationalism is the school that teaches men how to reconstruct society in their mutual interest.

Marx is most persuasive in arguing that partisanship plays a crucial role in the changing of conditions. Dewey, on the other hand, is most persuasive when defending the role of the norms of critical inquiry in the changing of man. The strengths and weaknesses of each theory are complementary. Or, to put it somewhat differently, the quarrel between liberal amelioration and radical politics is not just an historical episode in political thought but a fundamental quality of the individual's political experience as a conscious actor.

References

Avineri, Shlomo (1976). "How to Save Marx from the Alchemists of Revolution." *Political Theory* 4: 35-44.

______ (1970). *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Balbus, Isaac (1974). "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis." In Ira Katznelson (ed.), *The Politics and Society Reader.* New York: David McKay, pp. 278-304.

Berlin, Isaiah (1958). *Two Concepts of Liberty.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bernstein, Richard (1971). *Praxis and Action.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Dewey, John (1936). "Class Struggle and the Democratic Way." *Social Frontier* II, 2: 241-42.

______ (1966). *Democracy and Education.* New York: Free Press.

______ (1936). "Education and Social Change." *Social Frontier* 3, No. 26: 237.

______ (1939). "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder." In Paul Schilpp (ed.), *Philosophy of John Dewey.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, pp. 515-608.

______ (1963). *Freedom and Culture.* New York: Capricorn Books.

______ (1957a). *Human Nature and Conduct.* New York: Modern Library.

______ (1962). *Individualism: Old and New.* New York: Capricorn Books.

______ (1960a). *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom.* Edited by Richard Bernstein. Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press.

______ (1927). *The Public and Its Problems.* Chicago: Sage Books.

______ (1960b). *The Quest for Certainty.* New York: Capricorn Books.

______ (1957b). *Reconstruction in Philosophy.* Boston: Beacon Press.

______ (1934). "Why I Am Not a Communist." *Modern Monthly* 8: 135-37.

Gilbert, Alan (1976). "Salvaging Marx from Avineri." *Political Theory* 4: 9-34.

______ (1979). "Social Theory and Revolutionary Activity in Marx." *American Political Science Review* 73: 521-38.

Gould, Carol (1978). *Marx's Social Ontology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Hook, Sidney (1934). "The Importance of a Class Point of View." *Social Frontier* I, No. 1, pp. 19-22, No. 2, pp. 17-19.

______ (1939). *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait*. New York: John Day.

Kelly, George (1979). "Mediation versus Compromise in Hegel." In J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics: Nomos XXI*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 87-103.

Marx, Karl (1963). *Early Writings*. Edited by T. B. Bottomore. New York: McGraw-Hill.

______ (1947). *The German Ideology*. Edited by R. Pascal. New York: International Publishers.

______ (1972). *The Grundrisse*. Edited by David McLellan. New York: Harper and Row.

______ (1977). *Selected Writings*. Edited by David McLellan. New York: Oxford University Press.

______ (1956). *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*. Edited by T. B. Bottomore and Maximillian Rubel. New York: McGraw-Hill.

______ (1967). *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*. Edited by Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Mills, C. Wright (1961). *The Sociological Imagination*. New York: Grove Press.

______ (1966). *Sociology and Pragmatism*. New York: Oxford University.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. (1978). *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*. New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Novack, George (1975). *Pragmatism vs. Marxism*. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Ollman, Bertell (1971). *Alienation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (1958). *Collected Papers*, Vol. 5. Edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Pennock, J. Roland, and John Chapman, ed. (1979). *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics*. New York: New York University Press.

Reichenbach, Hans (1939). "Dewey's Theory of Science." In Paul Schilpp (ed.), *Philosophy of John Dewey*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, pp. 157-92.

Rotenstreich, Nathan (1965). *Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy*. Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press.

Somjee, A. H. (1968). *The Political Theory of John Dewey*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Thomas, Paul (1979). "Marxism and Compromise: A Speculation." In J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), *Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 104-20.

Tucker, C. Robert (1978). *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed. New York: Norton.

Political Finance and Political Reform: The Experience with State Income Tax Checkoffs

JACK L. NORAGON
Ohio Legislative Service Commission

This article is a comparative analysis of state income tax checkoff programs adopted between 1973 and 1979 that grew out of the Watergate era and were intended to reform methods of political finance in state elections. The descriptive characteristics of these programs are examined, their economic performance, factors contributing to economic success and program type, and the political behavior of taxpayers choosing whether to exercise the checkoff option and, if so, which suboptions they choose. Finally, a reform model based on recent works is offered as a basis for judging the performance of tax checkoffs. It is suggested that the performance of most checkoff programs falls considerably short of the expectations of the model.

Since 1973, 17 states have passed laws that enable taxpayers to make annual political contributions, in most cases without increasing their tax liability, merely by checking a box, or at most by writing the name of a political party on a state income tax return. While the similarity of state checkoffs to the federal checkoff is too great to be coincidental, the states have displayed a considerable variety in the substance of their programs and in the uses of funds secured from the checkoff. This article examines some of the characteristics of those plans, their financial effects, and their political consequences. And finally, these plans are balanced against a reform model built upon principles advocated by some of the contemporary writers on campaign finance.

A Taxonomy of State Income Tax Checkoffs[1]

Some of the more salient characteristics of the 17 state income tax checkoff plans can be seen in Table 1. All but four states employ checkoffs that do not add to the taxpayer's liability. These four states (Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Montana) have an add-on feature that increases the taxpayer's liability. A one-dollar checkoff (or add-on) is the rule, but in three states the amount is two dollars. Eight states' programs are similar to the federal checkoff in that taxpayers are presented with a single general campaign fund option on their tax returns. Six other states provide a choice among qualified political parties, and in three states the choice is between political parties and a campaign fund. Generally, states that permit only a campaign fund option provide public financing directly to candidates; most of the other states provide public stipends for political parties. Parties eligible are, for the most part, those that polled a specified percentage of the vote at a previous election (usually for governor or president), or that have gained access to the ballot through petition.

State programs that permit taxpayer choice between a campaign fund and political parties, but then turn over all public proceeds to political parties, employ in effect a buffer mechanism that prevents the majority party from reaping a public windfall, thus providing a relative benefit to the minority. This mechanism for disbursing nondesignated public funds to parties varies from state to state, but an imposed per-party maximum is common. Its mild redistributive effect would appear to be of greatest value in decidedly one-party states (e.g., North Carolina).

Of the ten states that fund candidates directly, two subsidize gubernatorial candidates exclusively, while all ten subsidize candidates for governor or additional state executive offices; four subsidize legislative candidates, three subsidize supreme court or appeals court candidates, one subsidizes candidates for county municipal offices, and one subsidizes congressional candidates. Five of these states also impose campaign

---

I wish to express my appreciation to Martin Giesbrecht, John Gallagher, Roger Warren, and Patricia Handwerk-Noragon, as well as several anonymous referees, for their critical comments and helpful suggestions, and to David Johnston, who made the whole project possible. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1978 annual meeting of the Ohio Association of Economists and Political Scientists in Cleveland.

[1] Sources used, in addition to those noted in the bibliography, include individual state statutes and communications with state tax authorities, election officers, and party officials; the Federal Election Commission's *Federal and State Election Law Survey, Federal and State Campaign Finance Law Summaries,* and *Quick-Reference Charts;* and the Commerce Clearing House's *State Tax Guide.*

expenditure ceilings on offices publicly subsidized (as well as some that are not).

Seven of these ten candidate-recipient states have eligibility requirements pertaining to private contributions. Four impose a threshold, or a minimum aggregate amount of private contributions that must be collected, to qualify a candidate for public funding. Six states, including all of those with thresholds, specify the maximum contribution that may be counted by a candidate to meet threshold or public matching requirements. Such contributions constitute "seed money" designed to require a candidate to demonstrate a certain minimum level of popular support.

How are public funds distributed? Seven of the candidate-recipient states either route funds to particular offices by formula, or direct all public monies to candidates for a single office (i.e., that of the governor); and five of these states employ a matching-funds concept, in which eligible private contributions are matched at a given ratio with public funds. Party-recipient states, on the other hand, generally distribute public funds annually, according to taxpayer desires, to the state central committees of the parties for use as they see fit.

The Economics of the Checkoff

The economic performance of a checkoff system is largely a function of (1) the amount of the checkoff permitted by law, and (2) the rate at which taxpayers participate in the checkoff. Given that little variation exists in the amount of the checkoff among the states, the more significant factor in most instances is the rate at which the taxpayers avail themselves of the opportunity to contribute to the party of their choice or to the more abstract promise of a healthier political system. Judging from past scholarship, one might hypothesize that participation rates would be fairly low. Previous studies of political participation indicate that about 10 percent of the electorate is actually willing to contribute hard cash to a political campaign (Milbrath, 1965, p. 19; Alexander, 1976b, p. 81). In 1968, for example, 7.6 percent of eligible voters reported making a contribution to some campaign for office; and in 1972, 12.4 percent so reported (Adamany and Agree, 1975, p. 28). However, given the post-Watergate environment, the fact that the solicitation is direct and near-universal, the process is extremely simple, and in most cases the contribution does not materially come out of the taxpayer's pocket, higher rates of participation in the checkoff might well be expected. In 1972, the first year of the federal checkoff, almost 12.9 million taxpayers (or approximately 10.4 percent) exercised the checkoff option. Some felt that figure was artificially depressed, owing to the fact that the checkoff did not appear on the 1040 tax forms, but on a supplemental form. Even though in the following year the position of the checkoff was moved to the basic tax form, it was not until the third year of the program, 1974, that participation achieved a new plateau (just under 24 percent), suggesting that the initial lower participation rates may have been due more to a lack of familiarity with, or understanding of, the program's concept than to taxpayer oversight. From the inception of each state's checkoff program it should be noted that no state has failed to display prominently the checkoff option on the face of its tax return.

Methodological Comment. One of the problems in comparing the incidence of tax checkoffs among the various states is that the same base statistics are not always collected by state tax authorities. Ideally, a state's participation rate would be computed as the percentage of the number of eligible taxpayers filing returns who designate a checkoff. Failing that, the next-best method would be figured as the percentage of the number of eligible tax returns filed on which a designation appears. This method is not as accurate as the former, since there is no way of knowing whether a checkoff on a joint return represents one person or two. Nevertheless, some empirical experimentation based on data from states that provided sufficient data to compare the two methods demonstrates that the computational differences between the two methods are slight in most cases, suggesting that the rule is for only one spouse to check off on a joint return. The most problematic situation occurs when the only statistics a state tax commissioner can provide are the number of returns filed and the number of persons designating contributions. Empirical tests based on fuller data supplied by other states indicate that a ratio based on these two figures is not very reliable, because it is extremely sensitive to the number of joint returns filed. Compared with results obtained through either of the two formulas mentioned above, rates determined through the third method deviated from .3 percent to more than 14 percent. Fortunately, it was possible to employ the first method to determine participation rates for 13 states for at least one year. I did not have to rely on the third method for any state over the duration of a checkoff program.

Rates of Taxpayer Participation. Table 2 provides a comparison of participation rates in the tax checkoff programs of 15 states (including the federal checkoff) over the first five years of each program. Two states, Oklahoma and Hawaii, are not

Table 1. State Income Tax Checkoff Plans: Salient Characteristics

State	Year Enacted	Checkoff or Add-on	Amount (Per Person)	Taxpayer Options	Recipients of Funds	Eligible Offices	Campaign Expenditure Ceilings
Hawaii	1979	Checkoff	\$2[a]	GCF	Candidates	State executive offices, state legislature, county and municipal offices	Yes
Idaho	1975	Checkoff	\$1	PP or GCF	Parties	NA	NA
Iowa	1973	Checkoff	\$1	PP[b]	Parties	NA	NA
Kentucky	1976	Checkoff	\$1	PP	Parties	NA	NA
Maine	1973	Add-on	\$1	PP	Parties	NA	NA
Maryland	1975	Add-on	\$2	GCF	Candidates	State executive offices, state legislature	Yes
Massachusetts	1975	Add-on	\$1	GCF	Candidates	State executive offices	Yes
Michigan	1976	Checkoff	\$2[c]	GCF	Candidates	Governor	Yes
Minnesota	1974	Checkoff	\$1	PP or GCF	Candidates[d]	State executive offices, state legislature	No
Montana	1974	Checkoff (through 1978) Add-on (1979-)	\$1	GCF	Parties (through 1976) Candidates (1977-)	Governor-lieutenant governor, supreme court	No
New Jersey	1976	Checkoff	\$1[e]	GCF	Candidates	Governor	No
North Carolina	1975	Checkoff	\$1	PP	Parties and (since 1978) candidates	State executive offices (some), U.S. House and Senate, court of appeals and supreme court	No
Oklahoma	1979	Checkoff	\$1	GCF	Parties and candidates	State executive offices	No
Oregon	1977	Checkoff	\$1	PP	Parties	NA	NA
Rhode Island	1973	Checkoff	\$1	PP or GCF	Parties	NA	NA
Utah	1974	Checkoff	\$1	PP	Parties	NA	NA
Wisconsin	1977	Checkoff	\$1	GCF	Candidates	State executive offices, state legislature, supreme court	Yes

(Continued on next page)

Table 1. (continued)

State	Private Contribution Eligibility Requirements	Distribution of Public Funds
Hawaii	Contributions $\leq \$2,000$ count toward meeting public funding requirements (applies both to primary and general election).	Eligible contributions matched by public funds in election years (cutoff provision limits maximum amount receivable).
Idaho	NA	Public funds distributed biennially in election years.[f]
Iowa	NA	Public funds distributed annually according to taxpayer preferences.
Kentucky	NA	Public funds distributed annually according to taxpayer preferences.
Maine	NA	Public funds distributed annually according to taxpayer preferences.
Maryland	Contributions $\leq \$50$ count toward meeting public funding requirements (applies both to primary and general elections).	Available public funds allotted to eligible offices through formula in election years, and candidate contributions matched by public funds at a 2:1 or 3:1 ratio, depending upon the office.
Massachusetts	Threshold requirement; contributions $\leq \$250$ count toward meeting requirement (applies both to primary and general elections).	Eligible contributions matched by public funds, up to a maximum per office, in election years.
Michigan	Threshold requirement (primary election only); contributions $\leq \$100$ count toward meeting requirement.[g]	Primary election winners share equally in public funds in election years.
Minnesota	None	Primary election winners share equally in public funds allotted to eligible offices through formula in election years.
Montana	None	Through 1976, public funds were distributed biennially in election years. Since then, candidates share equally in public funds allotted to eligible offices by formula in election years.
New Jersey	Threshold requirement (\$40,000); contributions $\leq \$600$ count toward meeting requirement (general election only).	Candidate contributions matched with public funds at 2:1 ratio in election years.
North Carolina	None	Through 1977, all public funds available for party use in election years. Since 1978, half of funds received by each party in election years distributed to eligible candidates at the discretion of a party committee.[h]
Oklahoma	All contributions to candidates count toward meeting public funding requirements (general election only).	Half of public funds distributed for candidate use, half for political parties, biennially in election years. Candidate funds distributed per office according to formula, and per candidate according to private contributions received.[i]

(continued on next page)

Table 1. (continued)

State	Private Contribution Eligibility Requirements	Distribution of Public Funds
Oregon	NA	Public funds distributed each calendar quarter according to taxpayer preferences.[j]
Rhode Island	NA	Public funds distributed annually according to taxpayer preferences.
Utah	NA	Public funds distributed annually according to taxpayer preferences.[j]
Wisconsin	Threshold requirement; contributions $\leqslant$ \$100 count toward meeting requirement (general election only).[k]	Candidates share equally in public funds allotted to eligible offices by formula in election years.

Source: Classification by author based on state statutes. More detailed information provided upon request.

Key: GCF = General campaign fund
PP = Political party
NA = Not applicable

[a] State law also permits the legislature to appropriate general revenues to bolster the state campaign fund, as needed.

[b] Since 1979, taxpayers also have the option of dividing contributions between political parties.

[c] State law requires that annual taxpayer contributions be matched by state appropriations from the general fund.

[d] Technically, public funds are disbursed to political parties, but party leaders are bound by law to distribute the funds to candidates according to formula. Thus, the parties serve merely a ministerial function.

[e] State law permits the legislature to appropriate additional funds from general funds if public funds are inadequate to finance an election.

[f] Partisan taxpayer designations are distributed in accordance with taxpayer preferences. Ninety percent of general campaign fund designations are distributed to qualified parties in proportion to the share of the vote received by each at the previous general election, except that no party may receive more than half of such funds. Whatever surplus exists is distributed equally among parties qualified for the ballot.

[g] The threshold requirement is that each candidate, to be eligible for public funding, must raise 5 percent of the state's maximum expenditure ceiling.

[h] Partisan taxpayer designations are distributed in accordance with taxpayer preference. Unspecified designations are distributed to parties in proportion to their numbers of registered voters. No party, however, may receive more than \$300,000 of such funds.

[i] Each eligible political party must, by law, receive at least 10 percent of the public funds available for parties. Also, since each candidate must apply for a specific amount of public funds at an early date, his or her public grant may not equal the total of private contributions received.

[j] State law requires public funds to be divided between the state and county central committees of eligible parties.

[k] The threshold for each candidate is 5 or 10 percent (depending on the office) of the state's maximum expenditure ceiling.

included, since they had not undergone a tax collection of checkoff revenues at this writing. Nine of the states fared better in the first year of their programs than did the federal checkoff, and six fared worse. New Jersey, whose plan has been in effect since 1976, enjoyed the greatest initial success, as more than 31 percent of its taxpayers contributed. Michigan's checkoff rate exceeded 26 percent in the first year. Next came Utah (24 percent), followed by Montana (22 percent), and Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island (18 percent). At the other extreme was Maine, where fewer than 1.5 percent of the taxpayers contributed, and Maryland and Massachusetts, where the checkoff rate was only about 4 percent.

Unlike the federal program, not all states experienced increased participation in the second year of their programs. Seven states showed slightly higher participation rates, six lower, and two were essentially unchanged. Rhode Island showed the greatest percentage increase (five points), while Iowa and New Jersey both experienced 3 percent increases. Of those states suffering a decline in taxpayer designations, Utah's was by far the greatest (from 24 percent to 8 percent). Apparently, this did not reflect a change in taxpayer sentiments so much as a change in Utah's law. In the second and third years of that state's program, the law required not only that taxpayers designate the party to which their contributions were to go, but also that they sign their name on a line adjacent to the designation. Failure to do so negated the contribution. The signature requirement was either ignored or managed to frighten off a sizeable number of potential contributors, many of whom possibly believed that their political beliefs were being scrutinized. Whatever the explanation, the Utah legislature repealed the signature requirement, effective in the tax year 1977. As a result, Utah's checkoff rate in 1978 soared to just under 25 percent, slightly greater than what it was in the first year of the program.

The rates of the three states with the poorest first-year performance—Maine, Massachusetts, and Maryland—declined in the second year of their programs. Maine dropped to about 1 percent, and Massachusetts and Maryland to under 3 percent. The continued low participation in these states suggests that state programs that require taxpayers to increase their tax liability when exercising the checkoff are destined to low participation at the outset, and may suffer further decline in subsequent years sufficient to threaten their viability. This is evidenced by the fact that Maryland's program, though several years old, still is not fully implemented. Also, unhappiness with Massachusetts' experiment in election financing has prompted legislation to be considered that would alter the feature that is the apparent stumbling block to success—the increase in the taxpayer's liability.[2]

Of the state programs that have run three or more years, New Jersey's, Michigan's, and Rhode Island's are the cream of the crop. Each has experienced either strong initial taxpayer support, growth in the second and third years, or a rate of acceptance comparable or superior to that of the federal checkoff, or all three. No other state has been as consistent in taxpayer support and has approached the national level of support given the presidential election campaign fund. Support for the federal checkoff has climbed steadily to its peak of 28.5 percent in the sixth year, and only in its seventh year (tax year 1978) did it fail to increase. In that year the federal checkoff rate fell to under 26 percent. Even so, the probability of very many states achieving the level of support of the federal program does not appear to be great. At this writing it appears that only New Jersey will surpass the nation's performance figure, with Michigan a distinct possibility.

The success of the New Jersey experiment is all the more impressive when one considers the somewhat conservative method used to calculate checkoff rates. This analysis has taken into consideration only those taxpayers who checked off who were eligible to do so (i.e., who had taxable returns). Counting all taxpayers who exercised the checkoff option, regardless of their tax liability, would increase the checkoff rate of a number of the states (e.g., Rhode Island's checkoff rate would be 10 points higher in the sixth year). According to this method, the checkoff rate of New Jersey taxpayers is nearly phenomenal: in tax year 1978, 2,780,806 New Jerseyites marked the checkoff box, which is 67 percent of the 4,147,901 persons who filed returns!

Aside from a checkoff system that does not affect taxpayer liability, what factors contribute to a successful program? The answer is far from clear. In one sense, of course, the question of "success" cannot be answered, for it hinges on the motives and expectations of those who proposed and enacted such laws in the first place. Another reason "success" is difficult to measure is the variety of goals, judging from the statutes, that are apparent in the various state laws. Some seek to fund only a few candidates, others a great number; some provide only small candidate subsidies, others attempt near-total election financing. Let us speak for the moment only of *relative* or *comparative* success and postpone the larger question of overall performance.

---

[2] Early tax returns in Montana after that state changed its checkoff from one in which the taxpayer incurred no additional liability to an add-on checkoff showed a dramatic dropoff in participation. Based on the number of returns filed as of March 1, 1980, the checkoff rate was about 2.6 percent as compared with a rate of 20.2 percent at the same time a year earlier.

Undoubtedly a public understanding of the checkoff concept is a prerequisite to a successful program. The task for states recently enacting checkoff legislation should be somewhat easier, given several years' experience with the federal plan. Ruth Jones suggests that perhaps taxpayer options are related to funding levels—that is, that states which collect public funds through a general campaign fund have slightly higher levels of taxpayer checkoffs than states that employ partisan designations (1980b, p. 6). The data, based on average checkoff rates derived from Table 2, support this contention, but only if add-on states are excluded from the analysis. States that permit only a campaign fund option on their tax forms collectively have averaged 17.5 percent over the life of their programs (exclusive of add-on states, 24.5 percent), while states that permit only party designations have averaged an 11 percent checkoff rate (exclusive of add-on states, 13 percent). States that permit either have averaged 18.1 percent.

Common sense suggests that the checkoff rate is likely to be related to economic factors. Perhaps it is the wealth of a state's citizenry that accounts for a high or low checkoff rate. The following hypotheses may be proposed: (1) states whose taxpayers have higher per capita personal incomes are more willing to exercise the checkoff option than states whose taxpayers are less well-off economically; and (2) taxpayers of those states that make a greater "tax effort" (i.e., that have higher rates of taxation) are more likely to be amenable to the checkoff than taxpayers in states with a low-tax mentality. These two hypotheses are tested in Table 3, which ranks the states in terms of their per-year checkoff averages, per capita personal income, and per capita taxes derived

Table 2. Incidence of Taxpayer Checkoffs during the First Five Years

State	Initial Tax Year	Proportion of Taxpayers Exercising Checkoff Year of Program 1	2	3	4	5
Idaho	1975	14.7[a]	13.5[a]	12.7[b]	14.2[b]	c
Iowa	1973	9.0[b]	12.8[b]	12.5[b]	12.3[b]	11.7[b]
Kentucky	1976	9.6[d]	16.7[b]	15.0[b]	c	c
Maine	1973	1.3[d]	1.0[d]	0.8[d]	0.7[d]	0.6[d]
Maryland	1975	4.0[b]	2.9[b]	3.2[b]	2.8[b]	c
Massachusetts	1976	3.5[d]	2.9[d]	4.6[b]	c	c
Michigan	1976	26.1[b]	28.3[b]	27.0[b]	c	c
Minnesota	1974	18.4[b]	18.3[b]	18.2[b]	20.6[b]	16.0[b]
Montana	1974	21.7[a]	22.1[a]	21.4[a]	19.1[a]	16.4[b]
New Jersey	1976	31.1[b]	34.3[b]	34.4[b]	c	c
North Carolina	1975	4.9[b]	5.5[b]	9.4[b]	7.2[b]	c
Oregon	1977	17.0[b]	15.8[b]	c	c	c
Rhode Island	1973	17.7[b]	22.3[b]	23.2[b]	22.8[b]	23.5[b]
Utah	1974	24.2[a]	8.3[a]	8.2[a]	24.6[a]	18.1[b]
Wisconsin	1977	17.8[b]	19.3[b]	c	c	c
United States: Presidential Election Campaign Fund	1972	10.4[d]	13.6[d]	23.9[d]	25.8[d]	27.5[d]

Source: Based on data compiled from state tax authorities and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. More detailed information provided upon request.

Key:
CR = Checkoff rate.
TC = Number of eligible taxpayers exercising the checkoff option.
IR = Number of income tax returns filed.
TF = Number of taxpayers filing returns.
RC = Number of eligible returns filed on which the checkoff option was exercised.

[a] Derived from this formula: $CR = \frac{TC}{IR} \times 100$.

[b] Derived from this formula: $CR = \frac{TC}{TF} \times 100$.

[c] Plan not in effect.

[d] Derived from this formula: $CR = \frac{RC}{IR} \times 100$.

from non-federal sources. While the relationship between the income tax checkoff rate and state tax effort is quite weak (Spearman's Rho = .25), the relationship between the checkoff rate and state personal income is a bit stronger (Rho = .37). Neither figure is very impressive, but a different picture emerges when Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts, the three states whose checkoffs have added to the liability of their taxpayers, are removed from the analysis. Then the association between checkoff rank and per capita personal income rank increases to .62, and the association between checkoff rank and the ranking based on per capita taxes from a state's own sources increases to .80. Thus, if we have correctly interpreted the principal reason for the low participation levels in the three states, the strength of these relationships suggests that both hypotheses have merit: citizens from relatively wealthy states are more likely to contribute public dollars to finance political campaigns than citizens from less well-to-do states; and citizens from states that are more willing to tax themselves are more likely to contribute public dollars to finance elections than citizens from low tax-effort states.

Is the rate of success related to a political variable, such as the degree of competitiveness between the two major parties? Presumably the politics of a politically competitive state should stir the passions of the party faithful more than the politics of a state in which one party is dominant. This should be especially true in states with partisan plans. However, a competitiveness index (not reproduced here) based on party control of the three principal decision-making institutions of state government—the governorship and two houses of the state legislature—during the two bienniums preceding adoption and the biennium in which each state adopted its checkoff program, shows that the hypothesis apparently has little explanatory value. Of the most competitive states, Michigan and New Jersey are well above average in program performance, but Maine and Idaho are below average, and Utah is about average. In the semicompetitive category are Massachusetts and North Carolina, both with subpar performances; Kentucky, of less than average success; and Montana and Wisconsin, among the more successful. Among the least competitive states is Maryland, with one of the least successful programs, and Iowa, which is also below average; Oregon, average in participation; and Rhode Island, which has one of the more successful programs.

Financial Success. Financial success and a high checkoff rate are not one and the same, though they are certainly related. The amount of money realized from a checkoff program is also related to the population of a state and the amount of its checkoff. In one sense, states with larger popula-

Table 3. Relationship between the Incidence of State Income Taxpayer Checkoffs and State per Capita Income and State per Capita Taxes

State	Per Year Checkoff Average	Rank	Per Capita Personal Income (1977)	Rank	Per Capita Taxes from Own Sources (1976)	Rank
New Jersey	33.27	1	$7,994	1	$793	4
Michigan	27.13	2	7,619	2	749	6
Rhode Island	22.15	3	6,775	9	711	7
Montana	19.14	4	6,125	10	709	8
Wisconsin	18.55	5	6,890	7	791	5
Minnesota	18.30	6	7,129	5	823	2
Utah	16.68	7	5,923	14	593	12
Oregon	16.40	8	7,007	6	703	9
Idaho	13.80	9	5,980	11	590	13
Kentucky	13.77	10	5,945	12	549	14
Iowa	11.72	11	6,878	8	701	10
North Carolina	6.75	12	5,935	13	527	15
Massachusetts	3.67	13	7,258	4	903	1
Maryland	3.23	14	7,572	3	814	3
Maine	.85	15	5,734	15	671	11

Association between checkoff rank and per capita personal income rank: Rs = +.37
Association between checkoff rank and per capita taxes from own sources: Rs = +.25

Source: Income and tax data were obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

tions enjoy an advantage, for even with a modest checkoff rate they may realize more from the checkoff than less populous states with higher participation rates. The offsetting factor in states more sparsely populated is, of course, that because there are fewer voters, elections *ought* to cost less, all else being equal. Table 4 provides dollar statistics for the first five years of each state program. Michigan, the largest state of the group with the second highest checkoff rate and a two-dollar checkoff, more than doubled its nearest rival in realizing almost $8.4 million in its first two years. That sum becomes even more formidable when matched by state appropriations, as required by Michigan law, and added to subsequent years' contributions. Michigan's nearest competitor is New Jersey, which has collected almost $4 million in three years.

None of the remaining states has accumulated over several years as much as Michigan collected in its first year. Minnesota comes closest, accumulating slightly more than $2 million over five years. Iowa and Wisconsin have realized something more than half of Minnesota's revenues, although Wisconsin's program is only two years old. Based on per-year average statistics, Wisconsin has the third most productive program ($512,600 annually) behind Michigan and New Jersey, although Wisconsin's annual collections have averaged, for example, less than 40 percent of the revenues realized by New Jersey. Minnesota has averaged $400,000 annually over the first five years of its program. Oregon ($266,400), Iowa ($207,500), and Kentucky ($214,000) have averaged more than $200,000 annually. The least successful program in monetary terms, by far, has been Maine's, averaging only $5,200 per year over five years.

As I have noted, the success of a checkoff program cannot be measured simply in monetary terms. Any evaluation is problematical, even at the level of legislative intent. This is so not only because of the different objectives inherent in various state statutes, but also because it is often difficult to discern the actual objectives of a given program, aside from the obvious goal of making public money available for use in elections. This is probably due to the nature of the state legislative process itself, in which the level of discourse may not reach the basic motivations behind legislation, in which bills rarely contain purpose clauses or findings of fact, and in which the positions of contending forces are sometimes compromised to the lowest common denominator of agreement. Evaluation is further clouded by the fact that election costs are not uniform everywhere. The style, degree, and, consequently, costs of electioneering in large urban, industrialized states vary considerably from those of less populous rural states. Thus an evaluation of the economic success of a program is somewhat fraught with hazards. Let us again defer the question of success until we have considered some of the political implications of state public funding via the tax checkoff.

Table 4. Public Funds Realized from State Income Tax Checkoffs: The First Five Years

	Year of Program						
State	1	2	3	4	5	Totals	Average
			(all figures in thousands)				
Idaho	$ 47.4	$ 45.0	$ 59.9	$ 69.1	[b]	$ 221.4	$ 55.4
Iowa	153.2	225.3	220.2	223.1	$215.9	1,037.7	207.5
Kentucky	174.0	244.7	223.2	[b]	[b]	641.9	214.0
Maine	7.5	5.8	5.0	4.5	3.4	26.2	5.2
Maryland	152.9	142.2	128.0	114.4	[b]	537.5	134.4
Massachusetts	95.4	99.2[a]	171.0[a]	[b]	[b]	365.6	121.9
Michigan	2,608.0	2,920.0	2,854.0	[b]	[b]	8,382.0	2,794.0
Minnesota	372.3	376.2	391.8	447.7	416.7	2,004.7	400.9
Montana	63.2	70.8	79.8	74.0	66.2	354.0	70.8
New Jersey	1,164.5	1,401.9	1,426.8	[b]	[b]	3,993.2	1,331.1
North Carolina	128.5	144.6	259.5	219.5	[b]	752.1	188.0
Oregon	268.7	264.0	[b]	[b]	[b]	532.7	266.4
Rhode Island	89.1	112.9	108.7	110.8	112.0	533.5	106.7
Utah	101.5	35.0	34.8	117.6	142.0	430.9	86.2
Wisconsin	499.4	525.7	[b]	[b]	[b]	1,025.1	512.6

Source: Data compiled from state tax authorities. More detailed information provided upon request.

[a] Unofficial.

[b] Plan not in effect.

Patterns of Political Behavior

In the virgin territory we are exploring, the possibilities for the political scientist may, at first glance, appear limitless. Unfortunately, some of the more intriguing questions may, at least at this time, not be answerable, primarily because of our short time perspective. We still do not have enough years of experience with the checkoff to provide more than tentative answers to some questions. Given this reality, I would like to address only three additional questions of political import: (1) what is the nature of the relationship between the political competitiveness of a state and the type of checkoff system adopted? (2) in those states that permit taxpayers to designate either the party of their choice or a general campaign fund, what are their tendencies of choice? and (3) what is the pattern of political distribution of the economic rewards of the partisan checkoff?

Political Competitiveness and the Checkoff. Regarding the first question, has the political competitiveness of a state affected the decision of legislative leaders to adopt a plan that is candidate- or party-oriented? It is reasonable to hypothesize that majority-party political leaders in noncompetitive states would favor a financing system most compatible with the continued dominance of that party. That is, if a state were heavily Democratic in its voting preference, the presumption is that taxpayer checkoffs would also be heavily Democratic. Thus, the plan selected would be a party-choice one. Conversely, in a competitive state the plan adopted would probably bear the imprint of both parties and it would more likely offer either a campaign fund-choice or a hybrid plan that permitted a campaign fund or party option.

First, we would expect to find that the least competitive states adopted both party-choice and party-recipient plans, those which function to maximize the opportunity for taxpayers to direct contributions to their party, and for parties to receive all taxpayer-directed funds. Four states' politics were judged noncompetitive, but only one of the group (Iowa) adopted a strictly partisan plan. Maryland and Hawaii have candidate-oriented programs and Rhode Island has a hybrid-choice program. Furthermore, if partisan motivations guided the Republican-dominated Iowa legislature, then indeed the "best-laid plans do oft go astray," for as we shall see, the Democratic party has been the chief beneficiary of the checkoff in that state.

At the other end of the competitiveness spectrum, the second hypothesis suggests that the most competitive states would tend to adopt both general campaign fund-choice and candidate-recipient plans, which function to minimize the opportunities for partisan-motivated taxpayers and to promote candidate-oriented rather than party-oriented elections. The rationale behind this notion is that due to the very competitive nature of a state's politics, whatever emerges from the legislative process will bear the imprint of both parties (i.e., compromise politics); and given the strong desire of one party, or both, for equality of results in the operation of a tax checkoff, the system that best insures that end is one that funds candidates for specified offices, and does so more or less equallv. Five states fall into the competitive category. Three of the five (Idaho, Michigan, and New Jersey) perform as expected, but the other two (Maine and Utah) do not. The evidence in support of the hypothesis is not very strong. The semicompetitive states demonstrate a pattern much the same as the competitive and noncompetitive states. Three of the five states in this group (Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and North Carolina) have candidate-oriented or hybrid-choice programs, while the other two (Oregon and Kentucky) have strictly partisan programs. On the whole, then, it appears that our original hypotheses have to be rejected. The incidence of plan selection by the various categories of competitive states suggests a nearly random pattern, but with a slight loading on the general campaign fund option in each category. One is forced to conclude that the competitive status of political parties probably has not been an operating factor in state decisions to adopt partisan or candidate-oriented plans.

Party or General Fund Option. The second and third questions posed concern the effects of structuring taxpayer choice. How does framing the taxpayer's choice in terms of either a partisan or nonpartisan designation, or, if partisan, between Republicans and Democrats, affect taxpayers' behavior when completing their income tax? In three states in this survey, taxpayers may check off either a political party or a general campaign fund option on their tax returns. Table 5 displays the number and proportion of taxpayers (1) choosing the general campaign fund or (2) making a specific party designation over the first five years of these states' programs. More than 61 percent of all taxpayers exercising the checkoff option during this period chose to make a partisan contribution in preference to a general campaign fund contribution. This figure, however, hides as much as it reveals. Taxpayer behavior in the largest state stands in stark contrast to that in the two smaller states. Minnesota taxpayers preferred the partisan option in the first two years by a two-to-one margin, and in the next three years increased the margin to nearly three to one. In contrast, seven of ten Rhode Islanders have shown a steady preference for the general fund option during all five years. The taxpayers of the third state in the group, Idaho, have exhibited more erratic behavior. Initially expressing a preference for partisan designations by almost two to one, Idaho taxpayers two years later preferred the general campaign fund by three to two. In the following year (which was not an election year) almost 63 percent of Idahoans checked a party box again.

About all that can be concluded is that taxpayer preferences are likely to vary from state to state, and the taxpayers of any one state may not be consistent in their preferences over time. One might expect that in this era of candidate politics, with the weakening of party ties, taxpayer preferences would run in the direction of campaign fund designations rather than party designations. But such apparently is not the case, as only Rhode Island exhibits the expected behavior with any consistency.

Partisan Checkoff Preferences. The third issue posed inquiries into the partisan preferences of taxpayers who have made a contribution through the checkoff. Table 6 indicates the political sympathies of taxpayers in nine states permitting partisan designations over the first five years of each state's program. The statistical means of taxpayer preferences during this period reflect, at the very least, the majority status of the Democratic party. Total dollar contributions through the checkoff in the first two years of these nine state programs show a preference of Democratic over Republican checkoffs by more than two to one, and that preference held at almost two to one in the third year. In the fourth year the Democratic advantage declined somewhat to about three to two, partly because strongly Democratic Kentucky was not included in the fourth-year calculations. Yet, upon examining individual state performances, one finds it difficult not to conclude that Republican performance is improving, suggesting that Republicans in the early years of such programs were suffering a post-Watergate depression. Only in Maine and North Carolina is there little evidence of improving Republican fortunes. In six other states, Republican checkoffs have either inched up slightly, as in Iowa, Rhode Island, and Kentucky, or more dramatically (from 9 to 13 percent) as in Idaho, Utah, and Minnesota. In Minnesota, Republican checkoffs have increased from less than 28 percent of the partisan total in the first year to more than 40 percent at the conclusion of the fifth year. However, in only one state, Utah, have Republicans benefited more than Democrats from the checkoff. Republican checkoffs outnumbered Democrat checkoffs in tax year 1978, accumulating almost half of all proceeds, compared to the Democrats' 44 percent. In only one other state, Idaho, has there been any semblance of parity between the parties in terms of

Table 5. Incidence of Taxpayer Choice: The General Campaign Fund versus Partisan Designations

State (First five years of program)	General Fund Designations N[a]	General Fund Designations %	Partisan Designations N[a]	Partisan Designations %
Idaho				
1975	16.5	34.8	30.9	65.2
1976	24.6	54.7	20.4	45.3
1977	36.3	60.5	23.7	39.5
1978	25.7	37.2	43.4	62.8
1979	b	b	b	b
Minnesota				
1974	125.2	33.6	247.1	66.4
1975	126.0	33.5	250.2	66.5
1976	106.4	27.2	285.4	72.8
1977	117.8	26.3	329.8	73.7
1978	106.6	25.6	310.1	74.4
Rhode Island				
1973	62.7	70.3	26.4	29.7
1974	82.8	73.3	30.1	26.7
1975	78.8	72.5	29.9	27.5
1976	80.1	72.3	30.7	27.7
1977	81.8	73.0	30.2	27.0

Source: Data compiled from state tax authorities. More detailed information provided upon request.

[a] Numbers of taxpayers expressed in thousands.

[b] Plan not in effect five years.

public funds generated. Idaho Republicans over four years have gradually increased their share of partisan checkoff proceeds from 37 to 46 percent, while at the same time Democratic checkoffs have declined from approximately 61 to less than 49 percent. Republicans in this state have also been aided by the tendency of taxpayers to change their preferences for partisan designation to that of general fund designation, discussed above. Moreover, the abrupt reversal of that trend in 1978 came at the expense of Democrats rather than Republicans, as 5 percent of Idaho taxpayers checked off the American or Libertarian parties.

Third parties have not been notably successful in garnering partisan checkoff funds, managing to secure contributions in only five states. Their best efforts have been in Utah, where they (primarily the American Independent party) have annually secured 6 to 10 percent of checkoff funds. However, the largest annual dollar amount ($12,400) was contributed to third parties by Oregon taxpayers in tax year 1977.

An Evaluation of State Checkoff Programs

This survey of state income tax checkoff programs would not be complete without an attempt to come to terms with their strengths and weaknesses, without an analysis of the consequences of these programs and the values which they serve. Earlier we discussed the question of the success of state checkoffs in terms of legislative intent and the taxpayers' reception to the checkoff innovation. However, additional standards of measurement exist by which to render judgments. The literature of campaign finance is replete with prescription and concern with democratic values. For example, a common theme running through recent works suggests that political finance should be restructured to overcome the unequal distribution of economic resources in society. Most of what is advocated by the reform-minded are egalitarian proposals designed to lessen the economic influence of or dependency of political candidates

Table 6. Preferences of Taxpayers Designating the Partisan Checkoff

State (First five years of program)	Republican		Democrat		Other	
	N^a	%	N^a	%	N^a	%
Idaho						
1975	11.5	37.2	18.8	60.8	0.6	2.0
1976	8.6	42.2	11.5	56.0	0.4	1.8
1977	10.5	44.3	12.7	53.8	0.4	1.9
1978	20.0	46.0	21.0	48.6	2.4	5.0
1979	b	b	b	b	b	b
Iowa						
1973	60.8	39.7	92.4	60.3	c	c
1974	89.2	39.6	136.1	60.4	c	c
1975	91.1	41.4	129.2	58.6	c	c
1976	93.5	41.9	129.7	58.1	c	c
1977	94.4	43.7	121.5	56.3	c	c
Kentucky						
1976	46.0	26.4	128.0	73.6	c	c
1977	64.7	26.4	180.0	73.6	c	c
1978	63.1	28.3	160.0	71.7	c	c
1979	b	b	b	b	b	b
1980	b	b	b	b	b	b
Maine						
1973	2.7	35.4	4.9	64.6	c	c
1974	2.0	34.8	3.8	65.2	c	c
1975	1.9	37.7	3.1	62.3	c	c
1976	1.6	35.3	2.9	64.7	c	c
1977	1.3	37.2	2.1	62.8	c	c
Minnesota						
1974	68.4	27.7	175.3	70.9	3.5	1.4
1975	83.2	33.3	164.0	65.6	3.0	1.2
1976	89.2	31.3	186.9	65.5	9.3	3.2
1977	131.5	39.9	186.4	56.5	11.9	3.6
1978	125.9	40.6	173.4	55.9	10.9	3.5

(continued on next page)

Table 6. (continued)

State (First five years of program)	Republican		Democrat		Other	
	N[a]	%	N[a]	%	N[a]	%
North Carolina						
1975	36.7	29.5	87.5	70.4	0.2	0.1
1976	35.7	25.2	105.6	74.8	c	c
1977	50.5	25.6	146.8	74.4	c	c
1978	47.8	26.8	128.3	71.8	2.6	1.4
1979	b	b	b	b	b	b
Oregon						
1977	89.4	33.3	166.9	62.1	12.4	4.6
1978	90.7	34.4	163.7	62.0	9.6	3.6
1979	b	b	b	b	b	b
1980	b	b	b	b	b	b
1981	b	b	b	b	b	b
Rhode Island						
1973	5.2	19.6	21.2	80.4	c	c
1974	6.6	21.8	23.5	78.2	c	c
1975	7.3	24.3	22.6	75.7	c	c
1976	7.4	24.2	23.3	75.8	c	c
1977	7.5	24.8	22.7	75.2	c	c
Utah						
1974	39.8	39.2	51.9	51.1	9.8	9.7
1975	14.1	40.3	17.9	51.2	3.0	8.5
1976	16.6	47.7	15.7	45.2	2.5	7.2
1977	53.8	45.8	54.0	45.9	7.8	8.3
1978	70.6	49.7	62.4	43.9	9.0	6.4

Source: Data compiled from state tax authorities. More detailed information provided upon request.

[a] Numbers of taxpayers expressed in thousands.

[b] Plan not in effect five years.

[c] None qualified.

on wealthy contributors, but at the same time provide funds enabling serious, well-qualified candidates to carry on vigorous competitive campaigns.

What follows is a model by which state checkoff programs may be evaluated, following the arguments of those who have recently advocated change in the structure of political finance. I have relied principally upon the works of Alexander (1972, 1976a, 1976b), Adamany and Agree (1975), Broder (1976), and Wertheimer (1978). Judging from these and other writings, I conclude that a model checkoff program would have to:

1. Enable candidates to achieve independence from large contributors (Wertheimer, 1978, p. 3; Alexander, 1972, p. 280; Adamany and Agree, 1975, p. 11).
2. Provide citizens with a more equal opportunity in financing elections (Alexander, 1972, p. 296; Adamany and Agree, 1975, p. 8).
3. Provide adequate campaign funds (Adamany and Agree, 1975, pp. 8-17; Alexander, 1976a, p. 8).
4. Distribute financial resources to all candidates fairly (Alexander, 1976a, p. 8; Adamany and Agree, 1975, pp. 8-11, 180-81).
5. Provide adequate financing for legitimate functions of political parties (Broder, 1976, p. 318; Alexander, 1972, p. 294; 1976a, p. 10; 1976b, pp. 186-87; 1980, p. 31; Adamany and Agree, 1975, pp. 177-78, 182).
6. Be easily administered (Adamany and Agree, 1975, p. 17).
7. Be compatible with American political practices and constitutional balances (Alexander, 1976b, pp. 266-67; Adamany and Agree, 1975, pp. 176, 179-80, 187; Broder, 1976, pp. 315-16).

These seven principles are made operational and applied to the 17 state checkoff programs in Table 7. While principles 1, 2, and 6 appear as originally stated, the following restatements of the remaining principles have been made. Principle 3 applies only to those states that purport to provide near-total public financing for candidates in either primary or general elections (i.e., those whose laws permit candidates to receive at least two-thirds of their campaign contributions in public money), and not to those that offer a small candidate subsidy or indirect support through political parties. Principle 4 has been subdivided into two indices: (1) whether or not public funds are available only to candidates who have demonstrated some measure of popular support (e.g., through a matching-grant system or the winning of a primary election), and (2) whether or not public funds are available to minority party and independent candidates who have demonstrated *current* popular support. Principle 5 is broken down as follows: (1) do political parties play a discretionary role in disbursing public funds to candidates? and (2) may parties use public funds for internal administrative or "housekeeping" uses? And principle 7, potentially the most complex of all, is subdivided into these two questions: (1) is public financing provided for both executive and legislative branches? and (2) is public financing provided for primary as well as general elections?

All 17 states have checkoff plans that promote equal citizen opportunity in campaign finance (principle 2). Since the checkoff is pegged to the state income tax, which in each state is near-universal in its application, it can be said that this principle is almost inherent in the checkoff concept itself. However, it is the only principle met by all the states in this survey. Only four states have sought to finance elections of both branches of state government (principle 7), although the law is discretionary (silent) in eight states. Generally, these latter are states in which political parties receive public funds. And only four states provide for public funds to finance primaries (principle 7), although in three other states the law appears permissive.

Is demonstrated candidate support a prerequisite to receiving public funds (principle 4)? In nine states that fund general elections, checkoff funds are available to assist party nominees (i.e., those selected in primary elections). In three of these states, public financing of primary campaigns is discretionary, and none of them requires any demonstrated measure of candidate support. Given the outcome of recent litigation in Rhode Island, this may remain a moot question unless parties are willing to provide services to all primary contenders in a nondiscriminatory manner.[3] In eight states, general election funding is predicated on candidate demonstrations of private financial support, or "seed money," and four of these states finance primaries on the same basis. In one state (Minnesota), partisan checkoff funds are distributed to nominees immediately after the primaries, but funds from the nondesignated account are distributed after the general election, and only to candidates who achieve a minimum specified percentage of the vote.

Eleven states base the funding of non-major party candidates (principle 4) on some measure of current support (generally they achieve a place on the ballot through petition); however, two of these states, Idaho and North Carolina, also base minor-party funding on past electoral performance. Idaho, for example, distributes 90 percent of its public money to qualified parties that competed in the *previous* gubernatorial election based on their proportion of the vote in that election. Three states provide checkoff funds only to parties or party candidates, and not to independent candidates. Six states either do not base funding on a measure of current support or do not permit minor parties and independents to share in public funds.

Most of the states have provided some role for political parties to play in the administration of checkoff funds (principle 5). Eight states currently allow parties to dispense checkoff monies, and until the recent law change in Montana, nine states so permitted. The laws of seven states are flexible enough that political parties may use public funds for internal administrative or organizational purposes such as office expenses, staff salaries, and mail solicitations (principle 5). It is these states—Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and (probably) Oklahoma—that are experimenting with one of the more intriguing aspects of the checkoff potential, and that is the direct public subsidy to political parties. While parties have grown up with, and at present are an integral part of the electoral process (and consequently the recipients of a variety of public benefits), one can find few examples of state parties, or, as in the case of Oregon and Utah, county central committees, receiving direct taxpayer grants in this country. Despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that in most of these states taxpayer attraction to the checkoff has not been notable, state party organizations have been able to increase their organizational capacities and offer substantial services to party candidates. For example, Kentucky Democrats have a sizeable campaign headquarters capable of housing the campaign efforts of congressional and statewide executive candidates, and the party provides campaign staff for most of them. And in North Carolina, Democrats have increased their voter identification and targeting capabilities through investing public funds in computer facilities. One wonders whether, if taxpayer response had been more generous in some of these states, candidate pressures for splitting up the public windfall might not have left the party

---

[3] See *McKenna* v. *Reilly,* 419 F. Supp. 1187 (1976).

Table 7. How Well State Checkoffs Realize Reform Expectations

	Principles of Campaign Finance Reform Applied to Checkoff Programs					
State	(1) Reduces Reliance on Large Contributions	(2) Promotes Equality	(3) Adequate Campaign Funds Provided[a]	(4a) Demonstrated Candidate Support a Prerequisite to Receive Public Funds[b]	(4b) Current Support Measure for Independent and Minority Party Candidates[b]	(5a) Party Given Role in Dispensing Public Funds[c]
Hawaii	Yes	Yes	NA	Yes[d]	Yes	No
Idaho	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive direct subsidy	10% of public funds disbursed to all parties on ballot	Yes
Iowa	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive direct subsidy	No	Yes
Kentucky	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive indirect subsidy[e]	No	Yes
Maine	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive indirect subsidy[e]	No	Yes
Maryland	f	Yes	No	Yes[d]	Yes	No
Massachusetts	No	Yes	NA	Yes[d]	Yes	No
Michigan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes[d]	Yes (but funds received after election)	No
Minnesota	No	Yes	NA	Yes[d]	Yes (but funds received after election)	No
Montana	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive direct subsidy	No	No
New Jersey	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes[d]	Yes	No
North Carolina	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive direct subsidy	Yes (party candidates only)	Yes
Oklahoma	f	Yes	NA	Yes[d]	Yes	No
Oregon	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive direct subsidy	No	Yes
Rhode Island	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive indirect subsidy[e]	No	Yes
Utah	No	Yes	NA	Party nominees receive indirect subsidy[e]	Yes (party candidates only)	Yes
Wisconsin	No	Yes	No	Yes[d]	Yes	No

(Continued on next page)

Table 7. (Continued)

	Principles of Campaign Finance Reform Applied to Checkoff Programs			
State	(5b) Party May Use Public Funds[c]	(6) Program Easily Administered[g]	(7a) Finances Both Executive and *Legislative* Candidates[h]	(7b) Primaries Financed[h]
Hawaii	No		Yes	Yes
Idaho	No		Law permits: Both currently funded	No
Iowa	No		Law permits: Both currently funded directly or indirectly[e]	No
Kentucky	Law permits: Currently used for administrative expenses		Law permits: Current *funding indirect*[e]	No
Maine	Law permits: Currently used for administrative expenses		Law permits: current funding indirect[e]	Law permits: Current funding indirect[e]
Maryland	No		Yes	Yes
Massachusetts	No		No	Yes
Michigan	No		No	Yes
Minnesota	No		Yes	No
Montana	No		No	No
New Jersey	No		No	No
North Carolina	Law permits: Half of funds currently used for voter-related expenses		No	No
Oklahoma	Yes: Proper expenditures to be determined		Direct funding for executive candidates; legislative candidates funding permitted	No
Oregon	Law permits: Some currently used for administrative expenses		Law permits: Both currently funded directly or indirectly[e]	No

(continued on next page)

Table 7. (Continued)

	Principles of Campaign Finance Reform Applied to Checkoff Programs			
State	(5b) Party May Use Public Funds[c]	(6) Program Easily Administered[g]	(7a) Finances Both Executive and Legislative Candidates[h]	(7b) Primaries Financed[h]
Rhode Island	Law permits: Currently used for administrative expenses		Law permits: Current funding indirect[e]	Law permits: Current funding indirect[e]
Utah	Law permits: Currently used for administrative expenses		Law permits: Current funding indirect[e]	Law permits: Current funding indirect[e]
Wisconsin	No		Yes	No

Source: Category responses based on state statutes and communications with state tax authorities, program administrators, and party central committee staffs. More detailed information provided upon request.

Key: NA = Not applicable.

[a] Applies only to states whose programs by law permit near-total public financing.

[b] One index of the principle of distributing financial resources to all candidates fairly.

[c] One index of the principle of providing adequate financing for the legitimate functions of political parties.

[d] May be read concurrently with Table 1 for more detail.

[e] Public funds are used by one or more major parties to support a general party effort, but funds are not given over to candidates directly.

[f] Checkoff program not yet fully implemented due to inadequate funds or program infancy.

[g] See text for general discussion.

[h] One index of the principle that a program should be compatible with American political practices and constitutional balances.

organizations with little for their own use.

To many observers, the key issue is whether the checkoff has reduced candidate dependence on "fat cats" (principle 1). Given the variety of campaign practices and the broad range of attendant expenses present in the various states, answering this question might appear next to impossible. However, a number of factors reduce the proportions of the problem rather dramatically. The previously mentioned practice of parties using funds for in-house expenses, however laudable and helpful to candidates that may be, in no way compensates for the hundreds of thousands or, in some cases, even millions of dollars required to run a statewide campaign. Moreover, given the uncertainties of campaign success, coupled with the realization that the world of elections is indeed one of scarce economic resources, candidates are not likely to shed the belief that "no amount of money is too much." Generally, then, the search for large increments with which to fund campaigns is not likely to abate. A few features in a number of checkoff programs, however, either have reduced, or apparently will reduce, the reliance on large contributors. One is the limit on the size of private contributions, the other the overall expenditure limitation. The former requires a candidate to concentrate on raising a specified minimum of campaign receipts in relatively small sums in order to receive matching public grants or to be eligible to participate in the public funding program. Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Wisconsin have such contribution limitations. However, probably more effective in reducing dependence on large contributors will be Hawaii's statute that imposes a flat ban on all nonparty contributions to a candidate of more than $2,000.

The second feature, the overall expenditure limitation, controls the more rapacious propensities of some candidates by imposing a maximum dollar amount on campaign expenditures (and thus reduces the need for a large campaign chest). The expenditure maximum is usually imposed as a condition for participation in a state's public funding program. States imposing maximum limits include Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. Thus far, the problem with expenditure ceilings, aside from questions of constitutionality, is that, in the eyes of some observers, they have initially been set arbitrarily low by state legislatures, or have not been adequately adjusted for rapidly increasing campaign costs in subsequent elections. In 1978 Minnesota's successful Republican gubernatorial aspirant, Albert Quie, refused public financing, suggesting he could not have won had he accepted it because of the $600 000 spending limit imposed, and because his campaign would have been eligible for only $100,000 in state funds (*Congressional Quarterly,* 1979). Also in 1978 the Wisconsin campaign fund ended the election year with a surplus when the candidates for governor and lieutenant governor and about 45 percent of the qualified legislative assembly candidates did not participate in the public funding program.

The Minnesota example points up what is perhaps the major reason that candidate dependence on large contributors has not lessened appreciably, though, and that is simply that in most cases checkoff programs provide insufficient funds. This, coupled with the fact that six of the nine states that fund candidate campaigns directly have very ambitious programs, results in a "shotgun" effect in which small amounts of money are directed to candidates for many offices. This deconcentration of public funding may have resulted from overly optimistic assumptions of the amounts of public funds that would be available, but it appears that in perhaps too many instances a "let's share the wealth" attitude prevailed in preference to the value of reducing candidate reliance on large contributors. One of the more obvious examples of this mentality is contained in Hawaii's checkoff program, which, as noted earlier, attempts to fund candidates for all principal state, county, and municipal offices. Faced with a potential multitude of candidate applications for public subsidization, the legislature's answer has been to limit the amount of public funds available to candidates in certain classes of offices. Consequently, the maximum amount a candidate for the state legislature or for county or municipal office can hope to receive from the state is $50 per election.

Only four states have laws that permit sizeable public increments that more than match private contributions, and thus theoretically qualify for judgment under the adequacy criterion (principle 3). Maryland and Michigan permit candidates to receive between two-thirds and three-fourths of their primary or general election contributions in public funds; New Jersey permits candidates to receive up to two-thirds of their general election contributions in public money; and Wisconsin's law permits public financing up to the maximum spending limitations imposed for general elections.

Of these four, only in Michigan and New Jersey is it apparent that checkoff funds are, or will be, adequate to provide near-total public financing. Both of these states, as mentioned above, operate their programs under expenditure ceilings. In 1977, New Jersey's legislature appropriated more than $2 million to initiate its public funding program, which accounted for 63 percent of all funds spent by the Democratic and Republican gubernatorial contestants. In 1978, public funds accounted for about two-thirds of the more than $2.2 million spent in Michigan's gubernatorial contest (*Comparative State Politics Newsletter,* 1980). Four years after these elections there is every reason to believe the public campaign funds of both states will be more than adequate to meet candidate demand. Based on per-state averages to date, the potential for the New Jersey checkoff fund over four years is between $5 million and $6 million, whereas the cumulative potential for the Michigan fund is $11 million-$12 million (exclusive of interest accumulation). If Michigan continues to match taxpayer checkoffs with general revenue appropriations, it is quite possible that more than $22 million will be available in the campaign fund to subsidize gubernatorial elections in 1982, a prospect that may force that state's legislature eventually to decide what to do with an expanding surplus of election funds. Maryland and Wisconsin, on the other hand, may never be capable of providing the degree of funding their laws permit. Both states suffer from the "shotgun" effect and Maryland has been unable to muster enough funds from its add-on checkoff to finance even a single election as yet.

How easily and effectively administered are checkoff programs (principle 6)? The rhetoric of political reform in the 1970s has certainly been in the direction of further public accountability in campaign finance, but just how much increased accountability has actually resulted is open to question. Undoubtedly some has, for the primary vehicle of accountability has been the campaign expenditure statement, required of every state candidate in all states in this survey. In principle, these statements enable public officers charged with enforcing such programs to reconstruct the financial realities of a campaign, and thereby to determine each candidate's sources and amounts of income and the objects and amounts of expenditure. If irregularities are found, further auditing and investigation may result in prosecution to uphold the integrity of the election process. Beyond this, the analysis and summary publication of at least pre-election campaign statements are designed to enable the voting public to evaluate particular candidates based on the nature of their pre-election campaign activities and the sources of their contributions. To what degree these principles are being fulfilled is not easy to determine.

There is little question that the campaign reporting laws have generated mountains of paperwork and reports recounting in detail the financial histories of candidates competing, in most cases, not only in publicly financed elections, but also in all state elections. It also appears that legislatures have generally not provided adequate funding for enforcement agencies to hire necessary auditors and investigators to sort through and analyze these reports (Hellebust, 1978, p. 225). Consequently, enforcement agencies determine the accuracy of statements filed almost exclusively on the basis of internal consistency checks, and are fortunate if they are able to keep up with the mass of paperwork confronting them. None of the states in this survey authorizes random audits by enforcement officials; instead they rely in most instances on an adversary complaint system whereby an individual (usually an opposition candidate) files a written complaint with the enforcement agency, which then initiates a full investigation, which often includes hearings and the subpoenaing of witnesses. After a hearing, the agency may issue findings of fact and may recommend prosecution.

If there is reason to question both the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement commissions, and there seems to be, one can also question whether the present system of campaign finance disclosure has served an information function. Fling (1979, pp. 252-53) concludes that the detailed reporting and documentation requirements of some states are burdensome to candidates, and that pre-election reports filed are not always accuate or complete. Also, Fling, Hellebust (1978, p. 226), and Broder (1976, p. 311) all seem to agree that pre-election campaign disclosure has not served as an adequate guide to the voter, and that the sheer mass of data generated by campaign reporting laws simply has exceeded the news media's capacity carefully to examine, analyze, and disseminate meaningful information to the public.

Would enforcement of campaign disclosure laws be more effective or efficient if administrative staffs were larger and had greater resources to conduct more thorough statement evaluations; if enforcement commissions possessed additional authority to conduct random audits; and if laws and regulations were less vague in defining what constitutes a legitimate or illegitimate use of public funds, as they now are? The answer is far from clear.

To date, almost all of the unlawful activity turned up by enforcement commissions concerns either minor discrepancies in, or the failure to file, timely campaign disclosure statements. Undoubtedly, beefing up enforcement commissions would have some advantageous results, but whether the benefits would be commensurate with the costs is unknown. I am struck, for example, by the fact that of 471 cases initiated by the Federal Election Commission in 1978 as a result of audits of federal candidates and political action committees, only 37, or less than 8 percent, resulted in civil suits, and not one resulted in criminal action (*Congressional Quarterly,* 1980).

What can explain the relatively low levels of disclosure of illegal campaign activities and the lack of criminal prosecution at the state level? Is the task confronting enforcement commissions impossible? Are the requirements of campaign finance disclosure and the very existence of an enforcement agency sufficient to alter candidate behavior?[4] Or is it just possible that our expectations of unlawful behavior of politicians seeking election in the state arena have been inflated? The last word on this subject has yet to be written.

Comment

From the standpoint of those interested in campaign finance reform, the states' experiments with income tax checkoffs must be, with a few exceptions, disappointing. Generally, taxpayer response has not reached the levels that could be expected by the citizenry of a "mature democracy," to use the words of Herbert Alexander. While Alexander (1976b, pp. 266-67) argues that the challenge confronting us is to educate voters to view making political contributions in the same light as voting (i.e., as an act of good citizenship), there is much grist for the skeptics' mill when, on the average, only two of every ten taxpayers will volunteer a dollar of their tax liability to the promise of better politics, and when, moreover, only two or three out of every *100* taxpayers will oblige a one- or two-dollar contribution via the checkoff out of their own pockets. Perhaps too much skepticism is unwarranted, for several states' programs are yet in their infancy, and if the federal experience is at all a reliable guide, participation in many of the states can be expected to increase.[5] But disappointing too must be the failure of the states to realize particular goals, such as a substantial reduction of candidate dependence on large contributors and a general oversight of primary election financing. Yet, with all their shortcomings, these diverse state experiments contain a few encouraging signs. The concept that the machinery of government can legitimately be used to facilitate direct dollar support by the citizenry for the election system has gained more than a foothold. Moreover, a few states are well on their way toward near-complete funding of gubernatorial elections via a mixture of private seed money and public funds. Also, about a half-dozen states are revitalizing their state or local party apparatuses, which holds out hope that the election role of political parties may be enhanced, thus balancing the "cult of personality" that has become so apparent in today's election contests.

Whatever credit reform elements may take for the successes of these experiments, they must also share in their shortcomings. Lack of a consensus on the proper function of political parties has resulted in some states giving parties a substantial role to play in the distribution and expenditure of public funds. In other states, parties are almost totally excluded from public financing operations, as candidates deal directly with public officials responsible for disbursing checkoff funds. Thus, one tendency is to increase the public responsibilities of parties (with certain attendant risks, to be sure), while another tendency is to by-pass them, contributing even more to their atrophy. Furthermore, given the realities off the checkoff, it would appear that the reform penchant for financing both executive and legislative campaigns is unlikely to be realized in the near future if the goal of either near-total public financing or a reduction of candidate reliance on large private contributions is to be realized. Funds at present available from state checkoffs are simply inadequate to the task.

---

[4] Discussions with the chairman of the state Elections Commission in Ohio, a state that does not have an income tax checkoff program, revealed his belief that the adversary system of prompting investigation in use in Ohio and most of the states in this survey was far superior to a large bureaucracy with independent audit authority in ferreting out campaign irregularities. His view was that no one has a greater motivation to scrutinize the election behavior or filed disclosure statements of a candidate than a political opponent. Experience has shown that most complaints filed with the Ohio Elections Commission have come from opposing candidates.

[5] Minnesota has also begun to experiment with a second checkoff. Beginning with tax year 1978, each renter or homeowner who files a property tax refund return may designate that one dollar be paid from the state's general fund into the state elections campaign fund. In the first year, fewer than 11 percent of the returns bore a taxpayer checkoff, but $98,313 accrued to the campaign fund from this source.

References

Adamany, David W. (1977). "Money, Politics, and Democracy: A Review Essay." *American Political Science Review* 71: 289-304.

______, and George E. Agree (1975). *Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign Financing in America.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Alexander, Herbert E. (1972). *Money in Politics.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.

______ (1976a). "Introduction: Rethinking Reform." In Herbert E. Alexander (ed.), *Campaign Money: Reform and Reality in the States.* New York: Free Press.

______ (1976b). *Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform.* Washington, D.C.: *Congressional Quarterly.*

______ (1980). "Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns." *Regulation* 4 (No. 1): 27-32.

Broder, David S. (1976). "Epilogue: Assessing Campaign Reform: Lessons for the Future." In Herbert

E. Alexander (ed.), *Campaign Money: Reform and Reality in the States.* New York: Free Press.

Comparative State Politics Newsletter (1980). "Survey onn State Campaign Finance." 1 (No. 2): 16-23.

Congressional Quarterly (1979). "Prospects for Public Financing Look Dimmer." 37: 647-48.

_____ (1980). "Reform-spawned Agency Stirs Discontent." 38: 1019-26.

Fling, Karen, ed. (1977). *Campaign Practices Reports: A Summary of Campaign Practices Laws of the 50 States.* Washington, D.C.: Plus Publications.

_____ (1979). "The States as Laboratories of Reform." In Herbert E. Alexander (ed.), *Political Finance.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Hellebust, Lynn (1978). "The Limitations of Campaign Finance Disclosure." *National Civil Review* 67: 223-27.

Jones, Ruth S. (1980a). "State Public Financing and the State Parties." In Michael J. Malbin (ed.), *Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

_____ (1980b). "The Partisan Impact of State Public Campaign Financing Laws: Collection and Allocation." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Milbrath, Lester W. (1965). *Political Participation.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Wertheimer, Fred (1978). "Breaking the Money Link." *In Common: The Common Cause Report from Washington* 9, No. 2: 3-4.

Wilson, James Q. (1966). "Corruption: The Shame of the States." *The Public Interest,* No. 2: 28-38.

Party and Bureaucracy: The Influence of Intermediary Groups on Urban Public Service Delivery

BRYAN D. JONES
Wayne State University

Geographically based intermediary groups in cities, primarily the political party structure and community groups, can potentially affect the distribution of public services to neighborhoods in three ways. First, they can stimulate citizen demands for services, which urban bureaucracies transform into outputs; more demands yield more services. Second, urban service agencies may grant special consideration to demands mediated by the intermediary structures, producing more output per demand for mediated demands. Finally, parties and groups may intervene in neighborhoods to co-produce services, gaining more impact from agency efforts than in neighborhoods not represented by strong intermediary structures.

Using data on citizen complaints, agency outputs and service impacts in neighborhoods, this study of building code enforcement in Chicago finds that the party structure is efficacious at all three stages of the service provision process, but that groups are not effective at any stage.

Recent urban policy research has documented the connection between procedurally neutral bureaucratic decision rules and the distribution of urban public services. These rules, adopted primarily to deal with the repetitive tasks which urban public service bureaucracies must perform in making services available to citizens, have the unintended consequence of determining what groups and neighborhoods receive what levels of service (Levy et al., 1974; Jones et al., 1978; Lineberry, 1977; Mladenka, 1978). This research has discredited what Lineberry terms the "underclass hypothesis" (1977, p. 61): because of lack of political power or because of ingrained discrimination, neighborhoods inhabited by the poor and minority groups get less service, or poorer quality service of what they do receive. The wealthy do not seem to be able to gain service benefits consistently, and there is no evidence to indicate that electoral coalitions account for variations in public services. The primary explanations for service distribution is bureaucratic rather than political.

Yet politics, particularly politics played out in a bureaucratic milieu, concerns perhaps more than anything else using and manipulating rules for group or individual gain. Some groups are doubtless better than others in making use of bureaucratic procedures to gain their ends. To the degree that these groups are linked to urban neighborhoods, and to the degree that they are successful in using bureaucratic procedures to obtain services, then their neighborhoods will receive more or better services than would be the case if the bureaucratic decision rules operated without interference.

Intermediary groups link citizens to government. As government becomes more and more bureaucratic, these intermediary groups increasingly must deal with complex organizational structures to obtain desired benefits. Yet it is an open question whether such groups are able to deal successfully with the intricacies of the modern social service state. Probably in most cases citizens are on their own in dealing with public bureaucracies, interacting with agency officials directly rather than going through an intermediary process. In that case, the citizen is likely to be treated most bureaucratically, and will receive service according to service delivery rules, unhindered by the influence of intermediary organizations. On the other hand, intermediary organizations—parties, interest groups, and even independently acting elected officials—may be able to take advantage of bureaucratic procedures to secure benefits, or even change the rules or alter their impact.

This article analyzes the role of intermediary groups in the urban service delivery process by focusing on the City of Chicago's Department of Buildings, which is responsible for enforcing the city's building and housing codes. The primary issue is whether citizens are linked in any meaningful way to the service bureaucracy through mediating structures, and whether these linkages, if they exist, affect the distribution of services

---

This research was supported, in part, by the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University. I gratefully acknowledge that support. The project could not have been completed without the cooperation of personnel in the Department of Buildings of the City of Chicago; in particular, I want to acknowledge the cooperation of Richard Moran, head of the department's systems division. Charles Elder and Mike Maxfield made helpful comments on earlier drafts.

to the neighborhoods represented by these organizations.

Citizens' demands for services come through a limited number of channels. These include the party organizations, community groups, and elected officials; citizens may also contact the service bureaucracy directly. The efficacy of these mediating structures will, of course, vary with a city's political and governmental characteristics. Party officials are not likely to be effective where party structures are weak, and elected officials chosen from wards may be more important channels of citizen demand than those chosen at-large. The major advantage of studying these linkage processes in Chicago is that each of the major intermediary groups is alive and well; hence we may estimate their relative efficacy in at least one city. Generalization may be hazardous because of Chicago's extraordinarily strong political party structure; however, only by studying this "deviant case" can one understand how political forces affect urban bureaucracies when political forces are as strong as modern society permits.[1]

Municipal Regulatory Agencies

Municipal regulatory agencies engage in activities aimed at changing the behavior of the individuals who are the targets of the regulatory action. Government uses coercion to induce compliance, and can threaten the loss of property or liberty. These regulatory activities include enforcing the building code, the housing codes, and the environmental code, as well as fire prevention (Kemp, 1978).

All municipal regulatory agencies possess the following: (1) a method of acquiring information defining the universe of potential targets, (2) a process for determining targets requiring action, (3) a process for determining the intensity of agency effort to be used in attempting to achieve compliance, and (4) a standard which indicates when compliance has been achieved. In the language of policy analysis, the process of local regulation involves inputs (1), efforts or outputs (2) and (3), and outcomes or impacts (4).

Levers of Action. Urban intermediary groups are primarily interested in impact, in solutions to neighborhood problems. The difficulty lies in finding and using the processes likely to have maximum impact.

Intermediary groups may intervene in three ways to raise the level of services delivered to their neighborhoods. First, they may stimulate demands on government, and thus stimulate action. If a service agency is attuned to responding to citizen demands for service, a group can improve service to its constituents by increasing demand.

In the second place, intermediary groups may be able to take advantage of special attention rules, either explicit or implicit, that result in better service for some neighborhoods (Crecine, 1969, p. 189). If agencies are more sensitive to demands from neighborhoods represented by strong party organizations or community groups, then the linkage between citizens and municipal outputs will be enhanced. This violates bureaucratic procedural neutrality or what is often termed *the norm of neutral competence* (Kaufman, 1956).

Finally, intermediary groups can facilitate government regulatory programs by intervening in the compliance process. It may be possible to convince the targets of government action to comply with agency directives. Rather than intervene in the bureaucratic process, the group tries to influence the target. This situation has been termed *coproduction* (Rich, 1979; see also Crenson, 1978).

Hypotheses

Intermediary Groups. If intermediary organizations are stronger in some neighborhoods than in others, and if they are effective in securing services, then those neighborhoods will be disproportionately benefited. Hence our first interest is in relating the organizational strength of intermediary groups to neighborhood social conditions.

Using the existing literature on urban parties, we may hypothesize that party organizations will be stronger in neighborhoods comprised of citizens of southern or eastern European stock, where citizens are relatively poor, but where there are relatively large proportions of home owners (see, for example, Wald, 1980, who thoroughly reviews the literature on the electoral support of urban political machines).

The literature on neighborhood support for community organizations is less precise, partly because of the variety of urban community organizations. There are organizations for home owners, for middle-class renters, as well as for the poor. It seems sensible to assume that community organizations will be strong where party organizations are strong. This would be the case if the neighborhood political culture tends generally to support organizations. In addition, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that community groups are particularly active in housing code enforcement where there are numerous renters. These hypotheses may be stated briefly as follows:

---

[1] On Chicago government and politics, see Rakove (1975); Gosnell (1968); and Guterbock (1980).

HYPOTHESIS 1. *Party organizations will be stronger where there are concentrations of European ethnic home owners of low-to-moderate incomes.*

HYPOTHESIS 2. *Community organizations will be strong (a) where the party is strong, and (b) where there are numerous renters.*

Citizen Demands. By initiating demands for service, or by stimulating citizens to do so, urban intermediary groups can affect the service delivery process. One key question concerns whether intermediary organizations have a *stimulative* or *substitutive* effect on the demand process. Are there more demands where such organizations are strong than in demographically similar neighborhoods where they are weak, or are the demands which would normally be forwarded to service agencies anyway simply channeled through linkage organizations? Of course, a final possibility is that organizations have no effect whatsoever on the demand process.

To a substantial degree, the demands from urban neighborhoods directed at municipal service bureaucracies are based on need. There are generally fewer demands from neighborhoods that have little use for, say, housing code enforcement activities than from those neighborhoods plagued by deteriorating housing. This is true even though those neighborhoods with proportionally fewer demands are characterized by higher income and levels of education, both of which are associated with high social and political participation (see Jones et al., 1977; Brody, 1978). What effects do intermediary organizations have on a process that would doubtless occur regardless of what community groups, party organizations, and other urban linkage organizations do? The hypotheses concerning citizen demands may be stated briefly as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 3. *Citizen demands for government action will be more numerous where intermediary organizations are strong, all other things being equal.* (This is the stimulation effect.)

HYPOTHESIS 4. *A higher proportion of citizen demands will be mediated by party organizations and community groups where these groups are strong.* (This is the substitution effect.)

Agency Outputs. Municipal agencies distribute services according to certain internal decision-making processes. The literature suggests three types of decision making in these agencies: the *decision-rule* hypothesis, the *attention-rule* hypothesis, and the *street-level discretion* hypothesis.

The decision-rule hypothesis holds that municipal service agencies employ standard bureaucratic decision rules in deciding where to direct effort. These decision rules are procedurally neutral, and do not openly benefit or harm any particular person or class of persons. However, these decision rules can be biased toward some citizens in their operation.

Two decision rules seem particularly likely to be adopted by code-enforcement agencies (and probably by most municipal regulatory agencies). The agency may respond to citizen demand, or it may respond to (agency-defined) need for service. Response to citizen demands is likely because such demands are an inexpensive method of acquiring information for the agency. They indicate where potential code violations (or other service problems) exist. All other things being equal, using this decision rule implies that more service effort will be directed at high-demand neighborhoods.

Response to agency-defined need means that neighborhoods with decaying housing stock will receive more government service. In Chicago, responses are often determined by the wording and the administration of the municipal housing code. While agency personnel are required to exercise considerable *judgment* regarding code violations, inspectors and supervisors are not supposed to exercise much *discretion.* If a violation is identified, personnel are supposed to follow standard procedures for all areas of the city.

If bureaucratic decision rules are the sole basis for agency action, then the only way that intermediary groups can influence service delivery is to stimulate citizen demands. The decision rule hypothesis can be stated as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 5. *More government effort will be directed at neighborhoods (a) with more demands for service; and (b) with deteriorating housing stock.*

It is also possible that some municipal bureaucracies openly employ certain rules that are *not* procedurally neutral. Agencies may be more sensitive to contacts from some sources than others and thus follow *attention rules* (Crecine, 1969, p. 189).

Some research on Chicago has suggested that consistent machine support is linked to the provision of public services (Kasperson, 1965), but, as Dornan has pointed out (1977, p. 516), the empirical research clarifying the linkages between process and distribution has not been undertaken. If there are such linkages, they must exist in the form of either explicit or implicit attention rules within service agencies. Only through such attention rules can the repetitive tasks involved in delivering services accumulate to benefit politically active neighborhoods.

The fact that intra-agency attention rules link political support to receiving service means that different agencies within the same city can be programmed with different attention rules. Mladenka (1980) found no evidence of linkages between neighborhood political support and levels of service provided by four Chicago service agencies, but there are three reasons to suspect that these agencies were not as susceptible to political influence as the Building Department. First, three of the agencies Mladenka studied deliver services from fixed facilities (parks, schools, and fire stations), facilities that cannot be moved around in response to changes in the successes of political coalitions. Second, two of the four agencies (the Fire Department and the Board of Education) adopted strong civil service provisions long ago and enforced them. These agencies had few patronage positions. Presumably, attention rules based on political support are more common in agencies containing numerous patronage positions. Third, none of the agencies he studied dealt with individualized citizen contacts; demand-driven agencies seem more likely to be open to political influence, all other things being equal. Finally, Mladenka performed no multivariate analysis, so that there is some question whether his analysis was sensitive enough to discern political effects.

Managers of Chicago's Building Department are of two minds on the issues of attention rules. On the one hand, it is fashionable to claim that complaints receive equal treatment. On the other hand, the department maintains special desks for handling the complaints forwarded by community groups and by aldermen. Moreover, quite a few officials in the Building Department are also active in ward organizations, so they may be especially sensitive to demands from party officials. As one line official said:

> I got all these cases from Senator Daley [State Senator Richard M. Daley, 11th Ward Committeeman and son of the former mayor]. He has 50 cases that he wants inspected right away. I've got the clerks going through my card files, seeing where they are, what I can do. He's my boss on the political side, and of course I'd like to do what he wants, but I don't know when I can [because of a shortage of personnel the district was handling only crisis cases and court reinspections at the time].

Attention rules may also exist for the characteristics of citizens. White, middle-class neighborhoods may get better service than do poor black neighborhoods. While this thesis has been generally discredited by research, it is worth testing once more in an agency in a heavily political environment.

In order to distinguish the attention-rule hypothesis from the decision-rule hypothesis one must control for the effects of the latter when studying the former. Hence I control for citizen demands and the condition of the housing stock in this analysis. The attention-rule hypothesis may be stated in this manner:

HYPOTHESIS 6. *More agency effort will be directed at neighborhoods with (a) strong party organizations; (b) strong community organizations; and (c) concentrations of economically well-off white citizens, all other things being equal.*

It is possible that a service organization will use neither standard decision rules nor attention rules. In his study of street-level bureaucrats, Lipsky (1980) suggests that agency personnel will develop routines that run counter to agency policies. They may, however, also develop routines that actually enhance agency policies. If street-level bureaucrats do develop routines that subvert decision rules established by agency executives, then the service received by neighborhoods may not be reliably related to citizen demands, or the condition of the housing stock, or political support. Indeed, this is exactly the interpretation that Nivola (1979, p. 33) puts on his finding that in Boston code enforcement does not vary systematically with socioeconomic differences among neighborhoods. Thus we may suggest a counter-hypothesis to the attention-rule and decision-rule hypotheses, the street-level discretion hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 7. *All relationships between agency outputs and (a) condition of the housing stock, (b) demographic characteristics of citizens, (c) the number of citizen demands, and (d) the strength of intermediary organizations will be statistically insignificant and all correlations will be low.*

Impact. What is the impact of code enforcement? The most straightforward hypothesis is that compliance to agency efforts to improve housing conditions are directly related to the intensity of the agency effort. But certain neighborhood conditions may also be more conducive to agency efforts because owners there will comply more readily than elsewhere. Home owners, for example, may be more likely to comply than absentee owners of large apartment buildings. Hence we must control for such neighborhood conditions.

HYPOTHESIS 8. *Compliance to agency directives will be more extensive where agency effort to obtain compliance is greater, all other things being equal.*

Finally, intermediary groups could intervene at this stage by trying to get recalcitrant owners to comply to the directives of the building department and housing court. This activity has been termed *co-production* because citizens are able to get more service despite a constant level of government outputs. Where intermediary groups are strong, they are more likely to be able to intervene successfully with owners.

In Chicago, concerned citizen groups and ward organizations may intervene in two ways. First, they may intervene formally by testifying in housing court; judges report that aggressive testimony from citizens is likely to bring decisive action. The representatives of citizen organizations report that it is very difficult to get judges to act decisively against violators, but they agree that their activities often do make the difference. Second, intermediary groups can intervene by informal means. Citizen groups have been known to keep the pressure on known "slumlords." So have certain ward organizations. While slumlords have influence in some ward organizations, there are more voters who are offended by bad buildings than voters who own them. The co-production hypothesis may be stated as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 9. *Compliance with agency directives will be more extensive where intermediary organizations are strong.*

The Basic Model

These hypotheses may be translated into a single recursive causal model, capable of being tested empirically. Figure 1 presents the model. All of the hypotheses may be directly tested by estimating the links in this model using ordinary least squares regression analysis, with the single exception of the demand-substitution hypothesis. This hypothesis implies a test on proportions, while all other hypotheses imply tests on levels or quantities of variables, so that a separate regression analysis must be conducted.

The key endogenous variables in the model are the quantity of citizen complaints concerning alleged targets of the regulatory process, the severity of government action taken, and the impact of the government action, or the degree to which the situation was resolved. Exogenous variables include, first, the characteristics of the targets of regulatory activity: for code enforcement, these are the objective conditions of buildings. A second set of exogenous variables includes characteristics of residents of city neighborhoods. These characteristics should *not* influence service delivery independently of the concentration of service targets, unless special attention rules make service bureaucrats more attentive to demands from, say, higher-income neighborhoods. Intermediary organizations provide a potential link between neighborhood characteristics and government services. Each set of variables potentially affect service delivery at each stage—citizen demand, government action (outputs) and impact.

The Data

To provide an empirical test of this model, I have analyzed computerized records collected by



Source: Compiled by the author.
Note: Definitions of terms appear in the appendix.

Figure 1. Basic Model of Code Enforcement Processes

the Chicago Building Department between 1975 and 1979. These records have been supplemented with measures of the strength of intermediary organizations and housing and population characteristics of city neighborhoods. The variables used in this study and their sources are listed in the appendix.

Records from the Building Department served as the data base for estimating citizen complaints, agency outputs, and service impacts. I geo-coded the records to Chicago's 50 wards by first aggregating addresses of the buildings which were targets of departmental action to census tracts, and then aggregating tracts to wards. Because the department maintains separate computer files for each of its functions, each file had to be geocoded to wards separately. I used four files: the complaint file, which tabulates incoming contacts; the recommendation file, containing the recommendations for agency action made by supervisors after inspections have been made; the permit file, which tabulates information on construction permits issued, and the master file, which contains more enduring characteristics of buildings such as structural features and number of dwelling units.[2]

Buildings and Residents. I have assessed the conditions of buildings in wards by two separate measures. The first is the age of buildings, derived from the master file. These are inspectors' estimates and thus are not fully reliable, but there is no good alternative. The U.S. census estimates of ages of buildings also suffer reliability problems; moreover, the census estimates do not contain sufficient variation for an older city (structures built before 1940 are tabulated together).

The second measure is the ratio of the number of new construction permits issued to the number of demolition permits issued, 1976-79. These data are reliable, and indicate the process of neighborhood investment and disinvestment. The variables indicating the demographic characteristics of ward residents come from standard census sources.

Party Ward Organizations. Where ward organizations do well electorally, they are likely to have the resources to channel citizen service demands more effectively (Rossi and Cutright, 1961). Kemp and Lineberry (1979) argue that it is not enough for a ward organization to turn out a high percentage for the machine-backed candidate in an election. Rather, it is the actual number of votes that is important—particularly the number of votes by which your candidate exceeds the opposition candidate. The index of ward organization strength used here is based on the deliverability index developed by Kemp and Lineberry, which takes into consideration both turnout and direction. The best wards, from the organization's perspective, are those that turn out both large numbers of voters and support the organization's candidates without fail; Kemp and Lineberry term these wards "deliverable."

Of particular interest to the Democratic party organization are the offices at the bottom of the general election ballot, such as Cook County Board Chairman, County Tax Assessor, and Sheriff. Since these are county-wide offices, the organization must turn out enough voters to offset traditional Republican allegiances in the suburbs—taking advantage, of course, of the natural inclinations of city voters to support the Democrats. These county offices control substantial patronage. City precinct captains often request that voters support the minor office candidates even if they desert the party candidates for governor or senator.

The measure of ward power used here is the number of Democratic votes for Cook County Sheriff in 1978, less the number of Republican votes, divided by the percentage of ward population under 21 (to standardize the measure on the potential electorate). Not only is this office extremely desirable to the party organizations, but also the Republican challenger in the 1978 race ran a strong reformist, anti-machine campaign. The focus on this race isolates the organization's ability to deliver votes, eliminating to the extent possible the effects of national, state, and local trends, as well as the personality characteristics of candidates (particularly those of candidates for mayor of Chicago).

Community Groups. I estimated the strength of potential community group influence from information obtained from telephone interviews with community organizations registered with the Department of Buildings, and referrals from the contacts made with these organizations. The department's list included many organizations that had ceased to exist, but included nearly all community groups active in the code enforcement process. The list was supplemented with organizations listed in a widely circulated community organization directory (Chicago Community Renewal Society, 1978). This process yielded 52 organizations whose personnel indicated that they regularly engaged in code enforcement or housing conservation activities. The boundaries reported by the organizations were used to merge the information gleaned from the survey to wards on an area-weight basis.

---

[2] The master file contains information on about 800,000 of the 1.5 million dwelling units recorded by the U.S. census in 1970, but these are the dwellings that are most likely to be the targets of agency action.

The measure of the role of community organizations in code enforcement is an estimate of influence potential. In order for a group to exercise influence, it must possess resources for influencing outcomes and it must make the effort to influence the process. The influence potential of a group regarding a particular objective can be defined as the group's resources times its efforts toward an objective. The measure of the influence potential of community groups in the code enforcement process used here is the resources possessed (the number of years the organization has been in existence times the number of full-time equivalent paid staff) times the number of code enforcement activities engaged in (referring complaints, initiating complaints, recording violations, testifying in housing court). This measure is admittedly imperfect, yet it does include indicators of the bases of community group influence.[3]

Model Estimation

The first step in estimating the model of Figure 1 was to examine a matrix of intercorrelations among independent variables to check for potential multicollinearity. The matrix indicated that two problems existed, one very severe. First, the percent black and percent foreign stock correlate —.95, so that, practically speaking, it will not be possible to obtain independent estimates for these two variables. Percent foreign stock was therefore dropped from the stock of independent variables. Second, the two variables assessing the conditions of structures in wards correlate —.79. Little construction occurs in old neighborhoods. All other correlations are below .65 in absolute value.

Since the model is recursive, ordinary least squares regression analysis may be used to estimate the equations implied by Figure 1. The general approach used in estimating regression equations was to regress each dependent variable on the variables which Figure 1 indicates should serve as independent variables, drop those that do not reach standard levels of statistical significance (.05), and then re-estimate the equation. Variables were dropped in a backwards stepwise process in order to guard against collinearity effects to the extent possible.[4]

Findings

Intermediary Group Strength. Our first interest in model estimation is assessing the social and economic determinants of intermediary group strength. Relevant regression equations are presented in Table 1. The equation for party strength in Table 1 indicates that the Democratic organization is strong where incomes are lower, where owners occupy their homes, and where new construction is low. When these factors are controlled, there is no direct influence from the racial composition of the ward.

The specialized strength of community organizations in code enforcement tends to follow party strength, as is indicated in the second regression equation of Table 1. Community organizations also tend to be strong where there are relatively many renters. Here is where the specialized character of the influence potential doubtless plays a role; community organizations involved in code enforcement activities may act on behalf of tenants against landlords.

The Demand Process: Stimulation Effects. Stimulation effects exist when intermediary groups are able to generate demands beyond what would be generated by citizens acting independently. If we regress service demands on ward characteristics and the variables assessing intermediary group strength, the regression coefficients for civic groups and ward organizations will be positive and statistically significant only if these groups add complaints *beyond* what could be predicted from information about the characteristics of buildings and their occupants alone. Stimulation effects are estimated by using the incidence of contacts from the Building Department's complaint file to assess demand.[5] Logarithms were taken for citizen demands; such an approach is particularly appropriate when the dependent variable is a count of discrete occurrences (see Acton, 1966, p. 223). The final equation is presented in Table 1.

Variations in complaint incidence are strikingly predictable from the three significant independent variables, as is indicated by a coefficient of deter-

---

[3] This measure probably overestimates the importance of years in existence. The use of it is justified entirely by the absence of feasible alternatives which produce the interval-level measures needed for analysis.

[4] Two variables that are intercorrelated may singly be significant but not in combination. The procedure outlined here ensures that both will not be dropped, and the variable with the largest partial correlation with the dependent variable will be retained.

[5] The file contained all contacts made with the department except for emergency heat complaints, which were handled immediately in winter and did not get read to the computerized processing system. It contained 78,708 records for 1978. The contact variable was adjusted by eliminating certain referrals that were not citizen contacts, and was divided by estimated ward population in 1975 (see appendix).

Table 1. Model Estimation

Strength of Intermediary Organizations:				
Party	= 238.08	– 0.019 Income	+ 2.403 Ownerocc	– 5.152 C/D
t:	6.41	– 4.31	5.32	– 2.77
Partial r		– .54	.62	– .38
R^2	= .445; F = 12.32			
Commorg	= 130.25	+ 0.913 Party	– 2.284 Ownerocc	
t:	2.30	2.24	– 2.33	
Partial r		.31	– .32	
R^2	= .170; F = 4.81			
Demands: Stimulation				
Log (Complaint)	= 1.014	– 0.033 C/D	– 0.012 Ownerocc	+ 0.0025 Party
t:	9.76	– 2.48	– 4.13	3.04
Partial r		– .34	– .52	.40
R^2	= .719; F = 39.19			
Demands: Substitution				
% Commorg	= 2.061	+ 0.0048 Commorg	– 0.0346 Bldage	
t:	3.18	4.71	– 2.87	
Partial r		.57	– .39	
R^2	= .338; F = 12.00			
% Official	= 0.841	+ 0.061 Party	– 0.080 Black	
t:	0.56	4.63	– 4.23	
Partial r		.56	– .52	
R^2	= .399; F = 15.63			
Agency Outputs: Incidence of Severe Actions				
Log (Severe)	= – 1.389	+ 0.198 Log (Complaint)	+ 0.022 Bldage	+ 0.003 Party
t:	= –10.83	4.84	7.54	4.94
Partial r		.58	.74	.59
R^2	= .878; F = 110.68			
Impact of Agency Action				
Repair	= 0.411	+ 0.165 Severe	+ 0.002 Party	
t:	4.75	4.15	1.95	
Partial r		.52	.27	
R^2	= .538; F = 27.35			

Source: Compiled by the author.

Note: All variables are as defined in the appendix, except:

% Commorg: Proportion of complaints from ward coming from community organizations.
% Official: Proportion of complaints from ward directed at an alderman or building department official.

mination for the equation of .72. The three significant variables are the measure of neighborhood investment (C/D), which is negatively related to the incidence of complaints; the proportion of owner-occupants in the ward, also negatively related to complaints; and the strength of party organizations, which is positively related to contacting. The variable assessing community organizations was not significant. Complaints are high, then, in wards where neighborhood investment is low, in wards with high proportions of renters, and in wards where the party is strong. In Chicago, the party is an independent source of complaints about code enforcement, but community organizations do not generally stimulate demands beyond what would be generated anyway.

The Demand Process: Substitution Effects. Substitution effects can be studied because of the system of source codes maintained by the Building Department. The source codes provide information on the channel through which the complaint comes into the department. While there are a number of categories, the most important are the Building Department complaint desk, the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information, a community organization, an alderman, a referral from another city agency, and direct contact with code enforcement officials.

The vast majority of complaints (89.5 percent) are direct, unmediated contacts with government.[6] Yet the totals mask wide variability. In the 11th Ward, a machine stronghold, only 28.8 percent of contacts with the department were unmediated, but in the four black wards on the west side of the city, 98.2 percent of contacts came directly from citizens.

Do citizens rely more on intermediary organizations to channel demands on city agencies where these organizations are strong? The reliance on a channel of access may be measured by the percentage of complaints whose source is that channel. If we regress this variable on ward characteristics and strength of intermediary organizations, we expect the coefficient for the latter to be positive and statistically significant. The results are shown in Table 1.

The first equation presents results for reliance on civic organizations as a linkage channel. It indicates that there is a substitution effect; complaints whose source was a community organization are a higher proportion of all complaints in wards where community organizations are strong. Independently, there is a tendency for citizens to rely more on community organizations to forward their complaints to the Building Department where buildings are newer.

Party ward organizations may also serve such a substitutive function in the demand process, as may the ward aldermen. While the Building Department records complaints from aldermen, it does not do so for complaints coming from ward organizations. Interviews with department officials indicated that party officials were likely to transmit their code enforcement complaints directly to line officials—particularly bureau chiefs and the heads of the geographic districts in the conservation division, which handles the majority of citizen complaints. The measure I have employed to assess the reliance on party as a complaint channel is the percent of complaints whose source is a Building Department official. While some of these complaints were not party-generated, most were.

Where the Democratic party organization controls the aldermanic seat, the offices of the alderman and those of the organization are linked. During 1978 only three independent, antimachine aldermen, and no Republican aldermen, sat on the council. Because it serves no useful purpose to segregate complaints handled by the alderman from those handled by the ward organization, I have combined complaints from these sources in the final measure.

Table 1 contains the regression equation for substitution effects. Party strength is positively related to the degree of reliance on city officials to transmit complaints; where the party is strong, citizens rely on city officials, both elected and appointed, to handle their code enforcement complaints.

Agency Outputs. The relevant equation for outputs is in Table 1. There the dependent variable is the incidence of more severe agency actions taken in 1978 as a proportion of housing units in the ward. A severe action is deemed to have been taken when a case was either sent directly to housing court or to the department's compliance board, which is an internal hearing procedure for cases that do not immediately threaten health or safety. Housing court, of course, may or may not move expeditiously against violators, but the court at least possesses legal sanctions to act; the agency does not. Logarithms were taken for the dependent variable; the table presents the final equation after insignificant variables were eliminated.[7]

---

[6] The source codes underestimate mediated complaints to some extent, since representatives of mediating organizations may not reveal themselves as such to departmental personnel.

[7] The scatterplots between severity and age of buildings and between severity and complaints were substan-

The equation indicates that street-level discretion does not affect the overall distribution of agency actions. The incidence of severe actions is highly predictable from the three significant variables in the equation (incidence of complaints, age of buildings, and strength of party organization); the coefficient of determination indicates that almost 88 percent of the variability in agency outputs can be explained.

The bureaucratic decision-rule hypothesis is strongly supported by the equation. Both the number of complaints and the age of buildings are significantly related to severity. High-complaint neighborhoods, and, independently, neighborhoods composed of older buildings, receive more severe agency responses. Moreover, as is indicated by the partial correlation, the age of buildings is the most important determinant of agency outputs.

Finally, the attention-rule hypothesis also receives support. There is no indication of discrimination on the basis of race or class, since these variables are insignificantly related to agency outputs. Moreover, communities with active civic organizations are not better served. However, wards with effective ward organizations do receive special attention. Even with other factors controlled, wards with strong party organizations receive more agency services than do wards not so blessed.

The Impact of Agency Action. Citizens are not particularly impressed with government action, unless that action solves problems. A precondition of impact is compliance; only if a building owner complies with a directive from the Building Department or an order from housing court can results be achieved. I have used the number of permits taken out in response to an order from the Building Department as an indicator of compliance.[8]

The final regression equation for compliance is presented in Table 1. Only the variables assessing agency outputs and the efficacy of ward organizations are significant determinants of the extent to which owners comply to building code violations by taking out repair permits. The two variables measuring conditions of structures were not significant, surprisingly; one would think that owners in deteriorated neighborhoods would be less likely to take out such permits. Agency effort is directly related to outcomes; the more numerous the severe actions taken, the higher the level of compliance. Neighborhood problems are more likely to be solved if agency effort is extensive.

A more interesting finding, however, is the influence of party. Even when other factors are controlled, party—that is, strong ward organization—emerges as a determinant of compliance. The relationship is not as strong as others in the model, but is statistically significant (for the one-tailed test that is appropriate when directionality of regression coefficients is implied by theory).

Conclusions and Interpretations

The Ubiquitous Party. The most consistent finding to emerge from this research is the influence of the political party structure at all stages of the service delivery process. Indeed, the complex network of variables which were initially postulated as affecting code enforcement collapses into the simple model diagrammed in Figure 2. Of all the variables entered into the different stages of the model, only the strength of ward organizations is significant at each of the stages of the code enforcement process: the citizen contact stage, the output stage (assessed as the incidence of severe actions taken), and the impact stage (assessed as the extent to which building owners comply to directives involving structural alterations). Community organizations do not match the party in stimulating citizen demands, intervening in the internal procedures of the service bureaucracy, or helping to produce service.

---

tially curvilinear, suggesting the logarithmic correction. The log transformation adequately corrected the plots, and additionally served to bring "outliers" relatively closer to the main body of the data. The data are from the recommendation file, which contained 47,621 records for 1978. There is no exact match between the complaint file and the recommendation file. Some complaints from 1977 were processed in 1978; some 1978 complaints were processed in 1979. The disparity between the number of complaints and the number of recommended actions is due primarily to the complaint screening process, which eliminates duplicate complaints against builldings recently inspected, and complaints against buildings currently in court.

[8] Only violations that involve structural repair require permits. Moreover, housing court will often order owners to produce plans and permits for the court to inspect; recalcitrant owners may go through the effort and expense of obtaining a permit, and then never complete (or only partially complete) the work. Most, however, are eventually completed. I have used all the records on the permit file, from 1976 through mid-1979, rather than just those for 1978, because of the relatively small number of permits. The file contained 76,354 records at the time the analysis was performed, but only about 20 percent of these permits were taken out in response to agency action.



Source: Compiled by author from Table 1.

Figure 2. Statistically Significant Links in the Model of Figure 1

Penetrability and Uncontrollability. The standard finding in the study of urban services is that bureaucratic decision rules are primarily responsible for the distribution of services to urban neighborhoods. That neighborhood-based political organizations are able to use such rules for community gain does not contradict the basic thesis: a neutral bureaucracy can exist in a political environment. Yet the findings presented here indicate that the local party structure can influence service provision independently of the system of standard agency operating procedures. This state of affairs does not characterize all bureaucracies in strong-party systems, as Mladenka's recent study of Chicago demonstrates (1980).

It may be possible to explain the degree of neighborhood-based political influence in a service delivery process by three factors: the nature of governmental system in which the agency operates; the penetrability or openness of the agency to political influence; and the nature of the agency's service product.

Reformed governmental systems, including nonpartisan elections, ward constituencies, council-manager governments, and strong civil service systems, are more likely to provide service primarily through bureaucratic channels. Reformism seems to lead to decreased responsiveness to aggregate demands (see Hawkins, 1971; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Karnig, 1975). This finding, which is derived from cross-city research, can probably be explained by the internal decision-making processes of urban service agencies.

Even in machine cities, agencies vary in the degree to which they have been reformed. Certain characteristics of agencies make them susceptible to political influence. Just as reformed institutions blunt the effect of political demands, the reform of individual agencies tend to close them to political influence. The most important reforms include stringent enforcement of civil service requirements such as professional or technical requirements for positions, merit or seniority-based promotions, and protection from arbitrary (politically based) firing. Such provisions give bureaucrats the power to ignore and even rebuke political forces. Indeed, the replacing of attention rules with decision rules is one key ingredient in the recipe for governmental reform.

Finally, an agency's degree of responsiveness to political forces is affected by the nature of the service it offers. Some agency services can be altered only marginally in the short run. The distribution of park land, for example, is virtually uncontrollable in a built-up city; this is also true for fire stations and library branches, as well as other capital-intensive services (see Jones, 1980, Ch. 8). Past decisions are more influential in distributing service than present policy. Present political forces can have but marginal impact.

One expects the strongest connection between outcomes and politics where the pattern of outcomes is controllable and where the agency is penetrable. One measure of penetrability is the number of patronage positions within an agency —positions not rigidly defined by civil service requirements or professional qualifications. In Chicago, an indicator of patronage jobs is the number of employees on temporary authority, a classification which requires no civil service examination and which carries with it no tenure rights. Most positions on temporary authority are patronage jobs.

Using data obtained from Chicago's personnel department, I ranked city departments by the proportion of temporary personnel employed. The police and fire departments carry the fewest temporary lines; these departments are relatively patronage-free. At the other end of the continuum are the Department of Streets and Sanitation, the Department of Public Works, and the Department of Buildings. In Chicago, the fire department is impenetrable and its services are relatively uncontrollable, since the distribution of fire stations involve such substantial sunk costs that the pattern can be altered only incrementally. The Building Department, on the other hand, is penetrable and its services are controllable. It is relatively easy to alter the distribution of building code enforcement actions.

Where services are controllable and where political forces can more easily penetrate the organization, the connection between political forces and urban outcomes is likely to be strongest. In reformed cities, and in relatively impenetrable municipal agencies, one is likely to find a pattern of bureaucratically determined outcomes.

Incentives and Linkage. Even in penetrable agencies, only strong external forces are likely to be able to influence service outcomes over the long haul. While political parties can provide linkages between urban neighborhoods and urban government, community organizations are not likely to provide long-term stable connections between citizens and governments.

The powerful inducement of patronage distinguishes the efficacy of party from that of community organizations in distributing urban services. Community organizations, with their small paid staffs and volunteer labor, cannot provide the day-to-day incentives that are necessary to keep government agencies constantly in touch with citizens. It may be true, as Johnson (1979, p. 395) has stated, that "jobs leave much to be desired as organization-maintaining incentives" because the "lumpiness" of jobs as rewards prevents direct tradeoffs between patronage and performance. But patronage jobs are far better as incentives than volunteer positions.

Recently, the Chicago political machine has been weakened by electoral defeat. Even though incumbent mayor Michael Bilandic was endorsed by the Democratic Central Committee, he was unseated by challenger Jane Byrne. Byrne has had trouble unifying the disparate and formally decentralized Chicago governmental structure; some have proclaimed an end to the "Daley Machine." As Wolfinger has noted (1972), the demise of a centralized party structure does not mean the end of machine politics, defined as party-centered behavior motivated by material incentives. The activities documented in this article do not depend on a strong central party organization, but they do depend on an ample supply of incentives available to party leaders.

The findings presented here describe a special case. They come from a very politicized bureaucracy in a machine city. The importance of these findings lies not in their generalizability, but in what they tell us about the interaction of urban political parties and government service agencies. Linkages between neighborhoods and service outcomes seem to be forged only where neighborhood-based forces are extraordinarily strong, and yet where these forces are strong, the norm of bureaucratic neutrality is likely to be violated. In all probability, either governmental responsiveness to neighborhood demands or bureaucratic neutrality must be sacrificed. There does exist a contradiction between democracy and bureaucracy, and the key to that contradiction is located in the decision rules used by urban service agencies. A choice must be made, and the history of urban America leaves no doubt which alternative has been chosen.

Appendix: Variables Used in Estimating the Model

1. Condition of Structures

C/D: The ratio of construction permits (new, additions, alterations) to demolition permits issued by the Department of Buildings (1976-1979).

Bldage: Average age of buildings from the Department of Buildings master file. (The file contains all buildings in the annual inspection program and all those inspected since the file was established in the early 1970s.)

2. Nature of Residents

Black: Percentage nonwhite, 1970.

Foreign Stock: Percentage foreign stock, 1970.

Income: Median family income, 1970.

Ownerocc: Percentage of owner-occupied dwelling units, 1970.

Education: Percentage completing high school, 1970.

Spanish: Percentage with Spanish surnames, 1970.

3. Intermediary Organizations

Party: (D-R)/%21 where D = number of votes for the Democratic candidate for Cook County Sheriff, November, 1978 general election; R = number of votes for the Republican opponent; and % 21 = percentage of residents over age 21 in 1970.

Commorg: Resource x Effort, where resources = number of years in existence x number of full-time equivalent paid staff, and effort = the number of code enforcement activities engaged in (referral of complaints, initiation of complaints, recording of violations, testifying in housing court).

4. Quantity of Complaints

Complaint: Number of cases handled by the Building Department during 1978, less certain referrals not generated by citizen contacts, divided by 1975 estimated population.

5. Severity of Government Action

Severe: Number of cases in which the building department initiated serious measures (the case went to the compliance board or to housing court) against the building, divided by the number of housing units.

6. Impact of Government Action

Repair: Repair permits issued by the building department as a result of a violation notice (1976-79), divided by the number of housing units.

Sources: City of Chicago Department of Buildings computer files; City of Chicago Department of Planning, 1973, *Chicago Statistical Abstract,* Pt. 4, *1970 Census-Ward Summary Tables,* Chicago; Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago (1978), "Election Summary Statistics," mimeographed; survey of community organizations made by the author; Chicago Area Geographic Study, "Population Estimates for the Chicago SMSA by Census Tract and Community Area within the City of Chicago, 1975," Department of Geography, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, n.d.

References

Acton, Forman S. (1966). *Analysis of Straight Line Data.* New York: Dover Publications.

Banfield, Edward (1961). *Political Influence.* New York: Free Press.

Board of Education Commissioners of Chicago (1978). "Election Summary Statistics." Mimeographed.

Brody, Richard A. (1978). "The Puzzle of Political Participation in America." In Anthony King (ed.), *The New American Political System.* Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 287-324.

Chicago Area Geographic Study (n.d.). "Population Estimates for the Chicago SMSA by Census Tract Area Within the City of Chicago, 1975." Chicago: Department of Geography, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle.

Chicago Community Organization Directory 1977-78. Chicago: Community Renewal Society.

City of Chicago Department of Planning (1973). *Chicago Statistical Abstract, Part 4: 1970 Census-Ward Summary Tables.* Chicago.

Crecine, John P. (1969). *Government Problem-Solving.* Chicago: Rand-McNally.

Crenson, Matthew A. (1978). "Social Networks and Political Processes in Neighborhoods." *American Journal of Political Science* 22: 578-94.

Dornan, Paul (1977). "Whether Urban Policy Analysis: A Review Essay." *Polity* 9: 403-27.

Gosnell, Harold (1968). *Machine Politics, Chicago Model.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Guterbock, Thomas (1980). *Machine Politics in Transition: Party and Community in Chicago.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hawkins, Brett (1971). *Politics and Urban Policies.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Johnston, Michael (1979). "Patrons, Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage." *American Political Science Review* 73: 385-98.

Jones, Bryan D., et al. (1977). "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit." *American Political Science Review* 71: 148-65.

______, et al. (1978). "Service Delivery Rules and Distribution of Local Government Services: Three Detroit Bureaucracies." *Journal of Politics* 40: 332-68.

______, with Saadia Greenberg and Joseph Drew (1980). *Service Delivery in the City: Citizen Demand and Bureaucratic Response.* New York: Longman's.

Karnig, Albert (1975). "Private-Regarding Policy, Civil Rights Groups, and the Mediating Impact of Municipal Reforms." *American Journal of Political Science* 19: 91-106.

Kasperson, Roger (1965). "Toward a Geography of Urban Politics." *Economic Geography* 41: 95-107.

Kaufman, Herbert (1956). "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration." *American Political Science Review* 50: 1057-73.

Kemp, Kathleen (1978). *The Regulated City.* Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.

______, and Robert Lineberry (1979). "The Last of the Great Urban Machines and the Last of the Great Urban Mayors? Chicago Politics Since 1955." Evanston, Ill.: Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University.

Levy, Frank, Arnold J. Meltsner, and Aaron Wildavsky (1974). *Urban Outcomes.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lineberry, Robert (1977). *Equality and Public Policy: The Distribution of Municipal Public Services.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

______, and Edmund Fowler (1967). "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 61: 701-16.

Lipsky, Michael (1980). *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services.* New York: Russell Sage.

Mladenka, Kenneth (1978). "Rules, Service Equity and Distributional Decisions." *Social Science Quarterly* 59: 192-202.

______ (1980). "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits to Political Control." *American Political Science Review* 74: 991-98.

Nivola, Pietro (1979). *The Urban Service Problem.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Rakove, Milton (1975). *Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rich, Richard (1979). "Neglected Issues in the Study of Urban Service Distributions." *Urban Studies* 16: 143-56.

Rossi, Peter H., and Phillips Cutright (1961). "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting." In Morris Janowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems.* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Wald, Kenneth (1980). "The Electoral Base of a Political Machine: A Deviant Analysis." *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 16: 3-31.

Research Frontier Essay:
When Are Interests Interesting?
The Problem of Political Representation of Women

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Recent years have witnessed an increasing demand by women for political representation of women. This demand points the way toward a number of important problems for political research, many of which remain unsolved primarily because of the segregation of women's studies from the dominant concerns of political science. This discussion focuses on the problem of group interests and representation, drawing on and suggesting further research on public opinion, interest groups, social movements, international politics, political elites, and public policy.

In the beginning there was no problem of political representation of women. The reason was not that everyone agreed that women should not be represented; rather, the argument was that women *were* represented. The justification for this argument is best exemplified by the often-quoted common law view found in Blackstone's *Commentaries:*

> By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the women is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything (quoted in Okin, 1979, p. 249).

The most serious legal objections to women's participation in electoral politics, both at citizen and elite levels, was that the male is the head of the family (the "head of household," as he is still known), and in him was invested the authority to rule his family and to represent his family's interests in the "outside" world. The question many opponents of women's suffrage asked was how it could be possible for a woman to have interests separate and distinct from those of her husband; that is, how could a woman be considered an individual citizen with the rights of a distinct individual?

The most widely discussed political reform movements of the nineteenth century might be said to have rested on the principle that "all individuals who enter the social contract are members of the political community, but only the males who own substantial amounts of material property are politically relevant members of society" (Pateman, 1979, p. 71). The reform movements of that time considered the most "important" are those that sought to make males who did *not* own substantial amounts of property "politically relevant members of society," that is, to confer upon them political rights, including representation. For women, perhaps the greatest reform issue of the time was not whether political rights could be conferred upon individuals who did not now own property, but whether women were indeed individuals who could own property. It was not until the 1840s in the United States, 1882 in England, and even later throughout most of Europe that married women could own and manage their own property or make contracts. It was only when these reforms were achieved that it became clear that attaining "personhood," even if accompanied by substantial amounts of property, did not confer *political* personhood on women equivalent to that possessed by men of their own class. Liberal democratic theory and reforms did little to weaken the patriarchal concept of social organization where women were concerned.

The contradictions of a political tradition that combines the individualism of liberal theory with patriarchalism has been dealt with extensively elsewhere (Schochet, 1975; Brennan and Pateman, 1979; Okin, 1979). The basic problems have not yet been solved; nowhere are they more evident than in public policies on the family. One might argue, however, that for all practical purposes the problem of women and representation has been solved. Despite the remaining contradictions in democratic theory and practice, women have gained full rights of political participation in most Western nations and they serve in political offices at all levels of government, although in small numbers. It would seem that women, as in-

---

My appreciation goes to Irene Diamond, Kent Jennings, Nan Keohane, and Graham Wilson for their criticisms, suggestions, and encouragement. My thanks to the Research-Service Grant committee of the University of Wisconsin for providing the funding.

dividual members of the political community, now have the right of representation.

New demands by feminist movements have opened a different question. Women (as well as many others) ask not for representation as individual citizens, but as members of a group. They ask not only that citizens who happen to be women be represented, but also that women be represented *because* they are women. What does this demand mean? On what grounds can we argue that women are entitled to representation as members of a group rather than, simply, as individuals? Is the demand for representation of women simply or necessarily a demand for more women in political office? These questions point to vast gaps in political research, gaps that exist for two reasons. One is that barely a decade has passed since the development of interest in the study of women and politics; one could hardly expect scholars in a new field to ask and answer all of its research questions in that amount of time, particularly given the lack of training in women's studies available in universities.[1] The second problem is that most political scientists who study core political questions such as representation have tended to ignore issues concerning women or have regarded such issues as "special topics" worthy of only limited interest. Political scientists have shown little inclination to pursue questions concerning women. This "guide to the frontiers," then, will focus on the problem of research on women and politics as it concerns questions of representation. It is designed for two overlapping audiences: those with a specific substantive interest in women and politics, and those who study representation, interest groups, and policy making.[2]

We turn, then, to the fundamental question of group interests and representation. This discussion is framed by two straightforward questions: (1) What is political representation of women? and (2) To what degree and under what circumstances are political institutions and decision makers responsive to female citizens? The discussion focuses primarily on contemporary empirical research—although the themes are, or should be, puzzles of long-standing interest to political theory. As the responses to these questions are presented, more complex and less straightforward questions will emerge. Evidence and examples will be drawn from a variety of cultural contexts. As anthropologists have shown, people in any given culture tend to think that the roles of women and men, the sexual division of status and labor, are natural and universal (Ardener, 1975, 1978). One way forcefully to bring to light the patterns and meaning of gender stratification is to demonstrate how variable the contours of the "natural and universal" really are. The examples offered here might appear to be drawn rather promiscuously from a range of cultures and times; sometimes the way to spur thought and research is to make statements demanding rebuttal or elaboration. Evidence and arguments are also drawn from a range of disciplines. The problem of representation of women raises economic, psychological sociological, and biological questions. Moreover, much of the most suggestive work has been done in the allied social sciences, partly because of the distribution of women's researchers in the social sciences and partly because of the greater attention other disciplines have paid to the relevant issues.

What Is to Be Represented?

One of the few truly obvious facts of political life is that the proportion of women among those designated as representatives is considerably smaller than the proportion of women found among the represented. This is the fact to which many people turn when they argue that women are underrepresented. This rationale frays under close scrutiny. Let us say, for example, that I am a redheaded woman. Why should I wish to be represented by a woman, indeed, a redheaded woman? I could say, as many people would, that such a person, resembling me, would represent my interests.

> —"And how do you know that?" (the attentive reader asks).
> —"Because she is in the same position I am in and could act for me. She would understand and feel the same way" (I answer).
> —"When you say, 'the same position,' do you mean as a woman or as a redhead?"
> —"As a woman, of course."
> —"Why as a woman and not as a redhead?"
> —"Because being a redhead is not politically relevant and being a woman is."

It is clear that the real question is not whether my representative looks like me—it is whether my interests are being represented. What matters is whether my representative is "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive" to me (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209).[3]

---

[1] Moreover, it is important to note that the question of representation per se has been subjected to reconsideration and revitalization in recent years. See, for example, Eulau and Wahlke (1978) and Lawson (1980).

[2] One of the recurrent problems that women's studies scholars (and probably those of any interdisciplinary field) face is the lack of familiarity people in the "home field" have with the literature of the interdisciplinary field, resulting in questions about lack of evidence. The purpose of this discussion is not to review the literature for those unfamiliar with it, although the major relevant work and especially review works and anthologies are cited in the references.

In order to discuss representation of women we must consider whether women as a group have unique politically relevant characteristics, whether they have special interests to which a representative could or should respond. Can we argue that women as a group share particular social, economic, or political problems that do not closely match those of other groups, or that they share a particular viewpoint on the solutions to political problems? If so, we can also argue that women share interests that may be represented. Framing the working definition of "representable interests" in this fashion does not mean that the problems or issues are exclusively those of the specified interest group any more than we can make the same argument about other types of groups more widely accepted as interest groups. The fact that there is a labor interest group, for example, reflects the existence of other groups such as the business establishment, consumers, and government, which in a larger sense share labor's concerns, but often have viewpoints on the nature of, or solutions to, the problems which conflict with those of labor. That in the abstract "good wages," "fair prices," or "efficiency" sound good for everyone does not eliminate the differences of interest among the groups pursuing these goals. We would not suggest that business people or consumers can adequately represent the interests of labor simply because they too are somehow involved in the industrial enterprise. Nor does our working definition of an interest group mean that all of the potential members of that group are consciously allied, or that there is a clear and obvious answer to any given problem articulated by the entire group that differs substantially from answers articulated by others. In fact, I am not using "interest group" in the narrow sense generally found in political science, which seems to require an organized group of people interacting through conventional political channels in opposition to other organized interest groups. As we shall see, studies of women (and other oppressed groups) demonstrate that part of the political relevance of some groups is that they have been systematically denied the means with which to form themselves into an interest organization: self-consciousness and identification (Sapiro, 1979a). The terms "interest group" and "interest organization" are therefore not interchangeable here, although the latter is formed primarily out of the former.[4]

The term, "women's issues" usually refers to public concerns that impinge primarily on the private (especially domestic) sphere of social life, and particularly those values associated with children and nurturance. But even within this domain "women's issues" can be interpreted in three distinct, although related ways. One interpretation is simply that women are more interested in these issues than in others as a result of their "parochial" domestic concerns (suggested by Lane, 1959). Another is that they are more interested in these issues than are men—that there is, in a sense, a division of labor in political attention. Finally, one could say that regardless of their relative level of concern with these issues, women have a "special" interest, or a particular (potential) viewpoint from which their positions or preferences might be derived. In discussing representation, we are more concerned with the latter two, and especially the final interpretation. In order to analyze women's interests, we will follow two lines of inquiry. The first is the problem of women's "objective situation" and its relevance to political interests; the other is the hardly less difficult question of women's consciousness of their own interests and the "subjective" condition of women.

Research in various fields of social science provides evidence that women do have a distinct position and a shared set of problems that characterize a special interest. Many of these distinctions are located in the institutuion in which women and men are probably most often assumed to have common interests, the family. Much has been made of the "sharing" or "democratic" model of the modern family, but whatever democratization has taken place, it has not come close to erasing the division of labor and, indeed, stratification, by sex.[5] A case in point, time-use studies show that housework and child care are the responsibilities of the woman, regardless of her employment status, and that she spends about the same amount of time on and does the same proportion of housework and child care now as women did at the turn of the century (Robinson, 1980; Vanet, 1980). We are accustomed to the idea that divisions of labor and stratification in public life define group interests in politics; can the same case be made for divisions of labor in private life? (See the editors of *Questions Feministes,* 1980; Delphy, 1980). One can make such a case if these "private arrangements" are either determined at least in part by public policy or governmental organization, or if these arrangements affect objects of public policy and policy debate. Gender divisions of labor and stratification within the family meet these tests. Law and policy serve as direct and indirect buttresses of such differentiation and stratification. In addition, gender differentiation and stratification in private life buttresses the political economy, affecting, at minimum, child care and welfare, education, consumption, employment and labor supply, and property and wealth arrangements.

---

[3] I will return to this question later, suggesting that having a representative who looks like me may well serve my interests.

[4] If we were to argue that an "interest group" must be entirely self-conscious and organized, we must then argue that an entirely oppressed group has no special interest and is, in fact, theoretically irrelevant to the political system. For a defense of the more orthodox definition of "interest group" see Wilson, 1981.

[5] Evidence suggests that familial modernization and democratization have altered relations between the sexes very little. Indeed, the burden of socio-historical research points to these as forces that have decreased women's value within the family and, in many cases, increased the gap between the sexes. See especially Rosaldo and Lamphere (1974), Rowbotham (1974), and Boserup (1970).

Law and public policy continue to create and reinforce differences between women and men in property and contract matters (especially regarding marriage, divorce, and widowhood), economic opportunity (including employment, credit, and social security), protection from violence (rape and wife battery), control over fertility and child care, educational opportunities, and civic rights and obligations.[6] Women and men have different relationships to pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation. These biological differences are exaggerated by women's having been given nearly total responsibility for reproduction, child care, and even child support. Marxist and non-Marxist scholars alike understand a group's relation to the mode of production, their relative control over both processes and products, as at least part of the basis for defining political interests. Children are perhaps the most important "products" of a society. Reproduction must be considered in a serious way as a factor in the political economy of governance (as in Eisenstein, 1979; Delphy, 1980).

The indicators generally used to describe differences in socioeconomic position also show that the politically relevant situations of women and men are different. Social and individual goods are very unevenly divided between the sexes. Women in almost all countries have less education than men, and where they achieve equivalent levels of education, segregation by field and therefore skills and market value remains. Women are less likely to be in the labor market. Men and women remain segregated in different sectors of the labor market and in jobs of different status within the same sectors. Wealth and credit are unevenly distributed. Men and women do not have the same access to physical and mental health, in large part because of socio-political factors. When we consider the half of the female population in paid employment, we find that they do not have equal access to leisure. Few groups in any society have a lower proportion of its members in positions accorded high status, value, or power. Only in life expectancy do women "outdo" men, a bonus that has little compensatory value in some countries, given the poverty of the aged and the inadequate support services available to them.

To say that women are in a different social position from that of men and therefore have interests to be represented is not the same as saying that women are conscious of these differences, that they define themselves as having special interests requiring representation, or that men and women as groups now disagree on policy issues on which women might have a special interest.[7] Studies of public opinion on the status and roles of women show relatively few significant differences between the sexes, and do not reveal women to be consistently more feminist than men (e.g., Sapiro, 1980; Inglehart and Inglehart, 1975). Some of the problems in such research cannot be resolved until more validation studies have been done. Why do American men receive high scores on vague, abstract questions on sex equality when they continue to leave child care and housework to their wives? What is the relationship between conscious replies to questions and nonconscious prejudice and stereotyping? (On nonconscious prejudice, see Deaux, 1976; Sapiro, 1979a.)

Political systems are not likely to represent previously unrepresented groups until those groups develop a sense of their own interests and place demands upon the system. This requires the development of political consciousness and political activism based on this new group consciousness. Social movements and protest activity, especially in their early stages, are intended to develop such group consciousness as much as to place demands on other groups. It is no coincidence that the women's movement has emphasized "consciousness raising" so heavily, using phrases such as, "The personal is the political." These efforts are meant to increase awareness among women that what they might perceive as personal and isolated problems (such as underdeveloped skills, poor pay, or even feelings of "middle-aged depression") are widely shared problems that are due in large part to widespread social, economic, and political factors. Research on women and politics has begun to make contributions to our knowledge of how political interests develop, and especially how development of subjective group interests is repressed or inhibited in the cases of non-dominant and minority groups. However, much more work needs to be done (Freeman, 1975; Hole and Levine, 1971; Rowbotham, 1973; Sapiro, 1980; DuBois, 1978; Evans, 1980). It should be fascinating to a political scientist to ponder how a group could so long accept as in its interest the denial of education, income, economic and physical security, and political power to its own members. Women's studies scholars have taken a strong hand in demonstrating how a subgroup learns to adopt the viewpoint of opposing groups, leading them to act against their own interests (Hacker, 1951; Thorne and Henley, 1975; Deaux, 1976; Daly, 1979; Sapiro, 1979a).

---

[6] A catalogue of specific policies would be too long to mention here because of the vast number of restrictive policies. For international comparison see Adams and Winston (1980) and the "World Plan of Action" in Tinker and Bramsen (1976). For an introduction to American law and policy, see the Sage Yearbooks in Women's Policy Studies (Chapman, 1976; Chapman and Gates, 1977; Chapman and Gates, 1978; Feinstein, 1979; and Berk, 1980) as well as Goldstein, 1979, and Brown, Freedman, Katz, and Price, 1977.

[7] For further discussion see Jennings and Farah (forthcoming).

What are the limits of the issues on which one might find a woman's interest? This would be difficult to answer, especially before a wider range of policies are investigated for their differential impact on women and men. Such laws and policies need not have "women" in the title or text. When a local council grants or does not grant zoning approval for a new shopping center or parking facility, women's time and work are affected. When the government restricts the money supply, women's work is increased; it is women's domestic labor that compensates for relative unavailability of money to provide food, clothing, child care, or household equipment.[8] One problem worth investigating is how interest groups come to define their issues; an early bone of contention between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization, for example, was how widely the term, "labor issues" should be construed. Similar arguments may be heard in the women's movement. It would be wrong, however, to ignore the divisions of interest among women. Although women share many common problems, they are also divided, for example, by class, race, age, and marital status. It sometimes appears that while mainstream social scientists overplay these "cross-cutting cleavages," feminist scholars often underplay them.

When Does Representation Occur?

We have argued that there is a woman's interest to be represented. Let us, for now, limit the conception of this interest to the expansion of rights, liberties, and opportunities for women where these have been denied or inhibited in comparison with those of men. We now turn to a new set of questions: Under what circumstances are political systems representative of women? Under what circumstances do they act in the interests of the represented—in this case, women? In order to answer these questions, we must look at the sources and effects of public policies that concern the quality of women's lives and women's ability to control the quality of their lives. This discussion will offer four possible explanations for change in public policy on women. They are (a) problems of the general political economy, including the structure of government and secular political needs, (b) ideology, (c) interest organization, including especially feminist movements, and (d) the effects of women as members of the political elite. Not all of these sources directly concern the relationship between the representative and the represented. Rather, they focus on the relationship between the actions of government and the interests of citizens.

A. Political Economy. A careful examination of women's political history suggests that women's own actions have sometimes played only minor roles in some of the most profound legal or policy changes in comparison with other current problems and features of the political system. The 1940s Married Women's Property Acts in the United States provide a case in point; the women's rights movement of the time was led by a relatively tiny group of women with virtually no influence on public officials, and certainly no mass following. Even in the instances in which women's movements were active, influential, and successful, as in the case of a number of suffrage movements, it would be a mistake to analyze the movement activities without paying careful attention to the more general political context. Social movements and interests succeed and fail only partly because of their own goals and strategies. In New Zealand and Australia (the first two nations to grant women the vote) and in Britain and the United States, for example, the political questions of women's suffrage must be understood in the context of current waxing, waning, and jockeying of contemporary political parties, and in the pitting of women's suffrage against other issues such as progressivism, governmental reform, the immigrant question, and the Irish question (Morgan, 1972, 1974). In Germany and Russia the women's movements appear to have played very little part indeed; rather, one must look to the general wash of the Weimar Republic or the Communist revolution (Stites, 1978; Thönnessen, 1969; Evans, 1976). In many cases policies that affect and even expand the status and opportunities of women appear to be propelled by sources other than women's interest organizations.

---

[8] When money becomes tight, except in the case of poverty, a family will not do without food; rather, it will avoid paying for the labor costs of prepared foods. Similarly, it will not purchase as many new items of clothing. In the former case, women do more cooking, in the latter they do more sewing and mending.

One rather commonplace assumption, based in the functionalist school of political development, is that modernization breeds secularization, mass communication, merit rather than parochially based social systems, and ultimately egalitarianism, including equality for women and men. As pleasant as such a parsimonious, comprehensive theory might be, it is wrong in many respects and in many cases. It is also misleading or silent on the evolution of specific policies. Numerous anthropologists have pointed not to a linear but to a curvilinear relationship between economic development and egalitarianism (especially Sanday, 1974). Some African countries offer stark examples of the effects of modernization and especially the "reforms" of Western nations which destroyed many of the rights and opportunities of women and increased the gap between the power and status of women and men (Hafkin and Bay, 1976). Although the sweeping view of development theory per se is of little help, comparative studies uncover certain aspects of the needs and structures of the political economy that appear to support or inhibit change in the status of women. What follows is merely a laundry list; the work that remains is to develop these into more coherent theory and, especially, to model their interaction.

1. *Economic needs.* Women constitute a marginal labor force whose status and specific activities fluctuate according to systemic needs for production, reproduction, and consumption. Changes in policies concerning women appear especially linked to the rise and fall of population needs. Among the policies most linked to population needs are those concerning birth control, child care, marriage and sexuality, and employment. Birth control policies offer an interesting example of this link. Many of the laws barring contraception and abortion (and, for that matter, homosexuality) were instituted in the nineteenth century and at times in the twentieth century when expansion of the population was needed (Gordon, 1976; Kennedy, 1970; Weeks, 1977). The legalization of contraception and abortion in many nations at about the same time as the boom of postwar babies reached adulthood, and the remarkable fluctuations in population policy in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union from the 1920s on testify to how the supply of labor (including military labor) influences policies that directly affect women.

Fertility and employment of women are directly related; employment policies appear to have histories similar to that of birth control. Women were, in effect, drafted into traditionally male employment during World War II. When new sectors of the economy expand and, especially when auxiliary or lower-status workers are demanded for this expansion, women have often provided the new source of labor. The massive expansion of the female labor force as a result of the need for communication facilitators (clerical workers, including those associated with computer technology) was accompanied by the first major governmental encouragements for female employment (in the U.S., the 1963 Equal Pay Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act). Similarly, provision of services that affect child care and household management seem to depend on national needs (Steinfels, 1973). The United States offered limited day-care facilities during World War II; nursery schools and kindergartens were expanded in the same postwar period that saw the rise of female employment. Particularly interesting are the cases in which national needs require both female *productive* labor and female *reproductive* labor. The result has been the creation of a "double burden," by which is meant the longer hours of labor faced by women as compared with men. Rarely has there been any attempt by government to shift part of the burden of domestic labor onto men.[9]

2. *War.* Although war is supposed to be the domain of men, not to mention a major force shaping male life, war has often had profound effects on the status and roles of women. As a marginal labor force, women have been used as substitutes for men in the domestic labor force, which has meant both the expansion of female employment and, to some degree, expansion of the types of jobs in which women are employed. During and especially after wars, policies are also designed to restock the population, which means pushing women out of productive and into reproductive work. In some cases, as we have suggested, contradictory needs lead to contradictory, or at least

---

[9] For an exception, see King (1977). In addition there have been policy suggestions that would create government-sponsored incentives for some women to remain full-time homemakers. For analysis of some of the possible implications of these policies, see the excellent novel by Fairbairns (1979).

fluctuating, policies, as in the cases of Germany and the USSR just prior to and during World War II. Just as war encourages female entry into the labor force, war can develop new political roles for women, which are often institutionalized by law and policy after the war is over. In some cases governments have used women's part in the war as what amounts to an excuse for extending women's rights, as in the case of suffrage in Brit- and the communist parties of the predominantly attention to women seems to follow from new roles and influence they acquired during a war, as exemplified by the revolutions and wars of national liberation in the USSR, India, Cuba, and Mozambique. Changes that accompany war must be treated with care; one would want to distinguish between changes that are part of temporary dislocations and compromises of a period of national crisis and those which are more directly due to these crises but more lasting. (On women, war, and the military, see Enloe, 1980; *Armed Forces and Society,* 1978).

3. *International Politics.* With the exception of some of the studies of Third-World women, most research on policy and law on women (and, for that matter, domestic law and policy in general) is confined to domestic sources. Scattered throughout studies of women and policy are suggestions that international politics play an important role as well. We have already suggested the roles of war. Colonialism and neocolonialism, as was mentioned earlier, have worked against the interests of women, but the direction of effects has by no means been uniform. These forces have also supported increased education for women, reform of marriage laws, attacks on the initiation rites of female genital mutilation, and, despite recent events, have helped to chip away at the walls of *purdah.*

It should not be assumed that the effects of international politics are limited to the Third World. Both the nineteenth- and twentieth-century women's movements were international movements. Just as ideas and policies associated with the Enlightenment, property reform, and Marxism spread from one country to the next, so too do ideas and policies associated with the emancipation of women. One of the unstudied aspects of policy on women is the process by which international politics affects domestic policy. In some cases it appears that feminists of one nation uses the example of policies discussed or employed in another, as in the case of the growing interest in American affirmative action policies in Europe. In others, the role of women may be used as a national sign of status or a symbol to other nations; in an odd sense, in this case the women represent the government rather than the reverse. One of the clearest examples is found in Germany at the turn of the century, when women were allowed into universities in part because German leaders felt they could not convincingly lead the world as a rational, scientific nation as long as they were among the few "advanced" nations to bar women from higher education (Evans, 1976, p. 19). The sex equality clause of the Japanese constitution, like the rest of the original postwar document, was imposed by Americans, but of course not by Americans using their own Constitution as an example. Many communist nations have used the image of women working as an important symbol to the noncommunist world. Although such examples abound, it is not yet clear under what circumstances international politics enters the picture, and how this happens.

4. *Federalism and International Organization.* One common observation in American politics in the 1960s and one of the assumptions of many political reform groups, is that alteration of civil liberties and rights is most easily accomplished at the federal rather than at the state level, that a federal structure is particularly conducive to change. American history offers numerous examples of this principle with regard to women. Land-grant colleges were among the leaders in extending higher education to women. The Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution accomplished what could have taken years longer in the South and much of the East. In the post-World War II era, the Supreme Court in particular, but also Congress and the executive branch, have pushed change far beyond what most states would initiate on their own. Examples are not limited to the American case. International organizations such as the United Nations (Galey, 1979; Hevener, 1978) and the organizations associated with European integration have been far ahead of most of their member nations and have, in some cases, stimulated changes in domestic policies. Federalism is becoming a more important feature of politics worldwide; its effects on women must be more clearly understood.

5. *Intergroup Tensions.* One of the points suggested earlier is that policy on women must be considered in the context of conflicting political demands and problems. Progress on the status of women appears to occur at times when the status of other social groups is under question as well, but it seems just as apparent that women's demands are often blocked by policy considerations involving those other groups, and often other minority groups. From the time of consideration of the Civil War amendments to recent debates over policies of preferential treatment, women's fate has been tied in part to racial problems and policies (Chafe, 1977; DuBois, 1980). Women were introduced into Title VII of the 1964

Civil Rights Act in an effort to block the bill, which resulted in a curious temporary coalition of opponents of black civil rights and supporters of extensions of civil rights. Recent immigration policies in Britain, which discriminate between the rights of entry for males and females, are based on the desire to restrict entry of nonwhites into the country. Soviet population policies and thinking are based in part on fears that the eastern Muslim populations will out-reproduce the more "desirable" Western groups. Revitalization of *purdah* in the Mideast and continued support of the practice of cliteredectomy in some parts of Africa are due in large part to the desire of male leaders and governments to combat foreign, especially Western, influence. Under what circumstances are policies on women linked to the fortunes of other social groups rather than to the women's interests? Do these linkages serve the function of blocking the development of effective coalitions?

B. Ideology. The previous section presents what might be considered rather mechanistic forces shaping policy on women. It points to socio-political forces beyond ideology or specific attitudes toward women's roles and status. There should be little doubt that ideology is an important factor as well, but its exact role is unclear. Parties of the left are not always remarkably different from parties on the right in their policy efforts toward women. Until 1980 Republican and Democratic parties alike gave the nod to the Equal Rights Amendment, and, despite his general recalcitrance on matters of civil rights, it was Richard Nixon who extended the executive order of affirmative action.

If left-right ideology is truly the linchpin of women's rights policy, differences between communist and non-communist parties and systems should constitute an important test. Every communist nation made conscious efforts to improve the relative status of the sexes at a very early stage, and the communist parties of the predominantly Catholic nations of France and Italy have, in general, been forces for improvement. But, as numerous analysts have pointed out, the matter is not a simple one. Both liberal and social democratic systems and Marxist systems have within their ideologies fundaments on which to base emancipatory policies. Policy history shows great fluctuation in all these types of systems. When we compare *overall* degrees of stratification and segregation in economy and politics across these different systems, we find little difference. The question, "Does socialism liberate women?" still ends with a question mark (Atkinson, Dallin, and Lapidus, 1977; Scott, 1974; Eisenstein, 1979; Wolchik, 1979).

Religiosity versus secularism is another important dimension of ideology that serves as a basis from which to understand governmental actions on women's interests. The Catholic nations of the West (and Canada's Quebec province) lagged far behind the Protestant nations in granting women basic civil rights such as the vote or property rights, and the Catholic nations have also been slower to change marriage and reproduction policies. (On women and politics in Catholic European nations, see Caldwell, 1978; Cantarow, 1976; Makward, 1975; Porter and Venning, 1974.) Islamic nations have tended to lag even more (Mernissi, 1975; Nelson, 1974). Religion and secularism have played very important roles within nations, often in interaction with left-right politics that is well worth untangling and examining. In France and more so in Italy the communist parties have led in battles for reform of women's status not simply as the parties of the left but as the anticlerical or, at least, secular parties. In Israel feminists clash with religious authorities as well. In the United States degrees of religions fundamentalism or orthodoxy may be more important than religious denomination per se, but "separation of church and state" has by no means eliminated the role of religion in political debates on the status of women as the "moral majority" shows. Indeed, some of the major rifts within religious organizations, regardless of the specific religion or country, are based on attitudes toward women's roles and status.

C. Feminist Movements and Interest Organizations. Thus far we have said little about feminism per se as an influence in policies on women. Although there are numerous worthwhile studies of women's movements, there are vast gaps in analysis of the role of women's movements and organizations in the policy-making process (but see Boles, 1979; Freeman, 1974; Morgan, 1972, 1974; O'Connor, 1980).

The very nature of patriarchalism makes the development of a woman's interest group and strategies for successful influence a complex and interesting problem. Conflict that may be understood as a battle between the sexes tears at the most basic structures of society as well as personal life. Pressures against such an interpretation make it difficult for women's interest organizations to define the grounds of political conflict over the status of women (Sapiro, 1980). Whereas most interest organizations would be loath to blame their socio-political problems on themselves (especially when members of their own group are notably absent from positions of power), women are under pressure to underscore their own participation in their oppression in order not to appear to be staging the battle for greater equality as a battle between women and men. Thus, women's organizations are caught in a dilemma regarding which strategies will suit the needs of *intra*group mobilization and *inter*group influence. If women's groups feel pressed to criticize themselves in the early stages of the development of a movement, they are unlikely to mobilize vast numbers of other women, particularly because a principal problem among women is low self-esteem and a relatively low sense of personal and political efficacy (Deaux, 1976). On the other hand, if women's movements blame those in power, who tend to be men, they are often labeled as cranks and "man-haters," and on those grounds may again be easily dismissed by those—male and female—they attempt to influence. This is a common tactic used to undermine the legitimacy of interest groups: blacks who point to the injustices against them perpetrated by white society have often been labeled racists; early labor organizers who pointed to the ills of industrial organization were attacked as anti-American. Women's movements, then, provide a case study of conflicts among strategies of mobilization and influence in women's eforts to press their interests.

Women's movements and organizations include a wide variety of strategies and ideologies. One cannot analyze the impact of women's interest organization without at least outlining these differences. Taking the problem of strategies first, we can identify at least eight different types used by women's organizations. One is *conventional pressure techniques,* including legal action, lobbying, electoral participation, and contact with public officials and the press. These strategies have been the basis of action for perhaps the best-known women's organizations such as the National American Women's Suffrage Association (NAWSA) of the nineteenth century and the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) of today. A second form is the use of *nonconventional pressure techniques,* including symbolic political action, protest and demonstrations, and from time to time, violence. When American and British suffragists chained themselves to the gates of important governmental buildings, when the British suffragists smashed windows of MP's houses, when American feminists crowned a pig Miss America, and when French feminists put a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier for that man's wife, they were adopting serious political strategies designed to force the unaware to see that there was a problem to which the political system had to respond.

A third strategy which identifies particular types of feminist organization is *consciousness-raising,* or activities oriented directly toward intragroup mobilization. Included here would be not only groups specifically devoted to "consciousness-raising," but also other means designed to develop knowledge about women and gender stratification. Fourth, women have established *alternative institutions,* providing services to women as diverse as health, transportation, banking, protection, legal aid, publishing, and education. These institutions have been established with the goal of satisfying the needs of women that are not covered by existing, especially male-dominated organizations. In some cases they have not remained self-contained; rather, they have created demands for more comprehensive and public coverage and investment. Many of the rape crisis centers, womens' transit systems, and shelters for battered wives that now have some public funding were begun as organizations operated solely by volunteer work and private funds. As the use of these services increased and stretched beyond the limits of volunteer organizations, more widespread and forceful demands began to be placed on public authorities. In the United States these services were often given partial federal funding to serve as experimental social services, to be picked up later by local and state authorities. A fifth strategy, related to the former, is *separatism,* or the establishment of groups, institutions, and networks whose goal is to provide self-contained services and communities. One of the principles underlying separatist strategies is the desire to avoid having the goals, styles, and motivations of women's organizations reshaped or diverted by male institutions or nonfeminist ideology.

A sixth strategy might be called *caucus* organization. A vast number, and indeed many of the oldest women's groups, are formed as a subset of women within occupational, educational, or political organizations and institutions. These, of course, tend to restrict themselves to the specific concerns of women within these organizations. Sometimes, rather than working within other organizations, women's groups attempt to form *coalitions* with others, which requiires emphasizing shared concerns and, often, submerging what can be profound differences. This is a seventh variety. Finally, as mentioned above, women have engaged in *international organization.* International congresses of women's groups extend back to the nineteenth century and women's history books are filled with references to women in one country importing the people, ideas, and strategies of women in other countries. Although these efforts often take place within larger organizations, such as the United Nations, international socialist organizations, or international congresses of other sorts, many and various international organizations have been established by women specifically for the purpose of discussing and solving problems of women's political status and social roles.

Women's groups also differ widely in their ideologies, or their understanding of the nature and sources of women's problems, as well as their solutions. The various types of feminism share three components: (1) a belief that women's opportunities and the quality of their lives are limited in part simply because they are women, (2) a desire to release the constraints imposed by patriarchy and sexism, and (3) a belief not simply in individual action, but also in group action to improve the conditions of women. Beyond these points, varieties of feminism differ widely. Some are derived primarily from traditions of liberal individualistic thought, others from socialist thought. In France, and to a lesser extent in England and the United States, psychoanalytic theory is serving as an important underpinning of feminism. Increasing numbers of feminists are attempting to wrench themselves from the context of theories and ideologies developed within and reflective of gender-stratified societies in an effort to find new ways of understanding and responding to women's interests (Rich, 1979; Daly, 1978; editors of *Questions Feministes,* 1980). Of course here we are discussing more sophisticated ideologies than would commonly be found across the wide span of mass-level politics, but the various types of feminism among leaders and activists in women's organizations reflect these different strains.

The point of presenting this catalogue is not merely to describe, but also to provide means for comparison and analysis. Women's political organization and activities differ in strategy and ideology, in the breadth of their issue concerns, in their degree of self-containment, in the directness with which they approach women's problems as political problems, and political problems as government problems, in the size and type of their constituencies, and in the degree to which they, individually or together, are likely to be effective instruments of change. If feminism and feminist organizations stand as "independent variables" in analyses of governmental action regarding women's interests, the complexity of those variables must be understood.

Analysis of women's interest organizations cannot be restricted to examination of the groups themselves, but rather must focus on the response of governmental and quasi-governmental groups as well. A variety of studies discuss the content of law and policy on women, but in general these provide only indirect information about the process of governmental response to interest-based demands, and the conditions under which demands are successfully placed (Brown, Freedman, Katz, and Price, 1977; Goldstein, 1979; Sachs and Wilson, 1979). Taking a cue from William Gamson's study of responses to social movements (1975), we observe that the range of responses is more complex than a simple dichotomy of rejection and acceptance. It has been argued, for example, that while governments and political parties may display "interest" in women's status, at the same time there is a constant attempt to depoliticize and diffuse the issues (Dahlerup, 1980). One reason this is possible is that women's issues, perhaps more than any others, tend to fall somewhere between what are considered "public" and "private" interests and welfare. Every time someone questions the impact of a new policy affecting women's status on "the basic unit of society, the family," that public-private distinction is being questioned.

At times governmental response is predominantly one of cooptation, diffusion, or symbolic manipulation. A most interesting example in the United States is provided by the executive actions of President Kennedy and the ensuing 1963 Equal Pay Act. Although Kennedy's Presidential Commission on the Status of Women and the resulting state commissions of similar title can be seen as important steps in both politicizing women's problems and in seeking solutions (Freeman, 1975), it has also been argued that Kennedy's efforts were designed in part to forestall serious interest in the Equal Rights Amendment, for which he, along with previous presidents, had voiced support. More broadly, the history of governmental response to women provides an excellent case study of the function of study commissions and conferences in policy making. Non-decision making does not necessarily mean that issues are not raised. If issues can be discussed long enough and in a manner confusing enough to allow time, energy, interest, or money to run out, the effect can be the same.

D. Women as Representatives. Certainly one of the most often-voiced desires of the women's movement is placing women in positions of influence. The very term, "representation of women" is usually taken very specifically to mean increasing the number of women in political office because of the assumption that women in power would be more responsive to women's interests than men would be. Questions about the validity of this assumption have led to a wealth of research on women in elite positions, much of which provides some clues, and much of which raises further questions.

The major questions posed in the literature on women as public officeholders are (1) are women different from men; and (2) if so (or not), why (or why not)? Research on these questions reveals considerably more similarity between the sexes than difference, although some of the differences are of great importance to the problem of representation.

Very few women seek political offices with the intention of representing women's interests per se (Kirkpatrick, 1974; Carroll, 1979; Mezey, 1978b, 1977; Vallance, 1979). Female candidates tend not to initiate discussion of women's issues, in part because "too much emphasis upon women's issues in a campaign might generate speculation that the candidate is to narrow in her concerns and will not adequately represent all the people" (Carroll, 1979, p. 27). Emily Stoper shows that women candidates place less emphasis on their home lives in their campaigning than do men, presumably because it is suspected that a woman is easily distracted from her public work by her private concerns, while for a man reference to family shows the solidity of character of a good "family man" (Stoper, 1977).

There is evidence that a woman's desire to represent women, if voiced, would be a drawback in campaign politics. In a recent experimental study, a pro-equal rights male defeats an anti-equal rights male by 28 percentage points, but a man who says nothing on the subject defeats a woman who runs as a representative of women by 32 percentage points (Perkins and Fowlkes, 1980). In a study of candidates for state legislative seats in 1976, Susan Carroll finds that women who did not discuss women's issues at all during their campaigns fared somewhat better than did those who discussed the issues (Carroll, 1979).

Although women might fare better, in terms of campaign strategy, not to discuss women's interests or, especially not to claim to represent them, female candidates and officeholders are forced into a "woman's role," or at least they are forced to be defined as "woman" candidates or politicians rather than, simply as candidates or politicians. They are more often asked about their families than are men (Mezey, 1978a). Once women are in office, their committee assignments, initiation of legislation, and the topics on which they speak tend to reflect traditional women's concerns (Vallance, 1979; Diamond, 1977; Hough, 1977). What we do not know, however, is the degree to which these differences are attributable to self-initiation or to the constraints of organizations and other elites. Research does show that perceptions of women among the politically elite are shaped in part by stereotypes, and that sexism plays a role in elite recruitment and promotion (Dubeck, 1976; Hedlund, Freeman, Hamm, and Stein, 1979; Welch, 1978; Sapiro, 1981; Carroll, 1979). Do women, then, constitute a group that must stay "in the closet" (Carroll, 1979) or sneak into office?

Do women make a difference once in office? There is little evidence of differences when general policy questions are asked (Mezey, 1978b; Francovic, 1977), although this result is not universal (Cook, 1978). Beverly Cook's study of judges shows women, who are more feminist on some issues than are men, are more likely to "transfer symbolic resources to women" than are men (Cook, 1979, p. 27). Although women may not run "as women," they tend to be sympathetic toward feminism and may become partially concerned with women's issues once in office (Carroll, 1979; Mezey, 1978a, 1978b). Even when it appears that male and female officeholders share preferences on women's issues, it is often up to the women to do the real legislative work (Vallance, 1979). Although sympathetic attitudes are important, legislative work is crucial.

With more research on elite behavior, it may become possible to determine the effects of organizational roles and structures on the ability of members of the elite to respond to women's interests. Although legislators may become most effective when they become specialists, or take a leading role on specialized committees, is the same true when the specialty is women's issues? Or, as suggested above, is this type of specialty interpreted as a narrow interest compared with, for example, the fortunes of the airplane industry in Washington? What policy implications can be drawn from studies that show that women are less likely to be promoted or placed in important positions within governmental bodies, or that they may be less well integrated informally and socially into the "men's club" called government (Vallance, 1979; Mezey, 1978b; Diamond, 1977)?

Research in social psychology shows that men and women use different communication styles and strategies, and studies of group interaction show that men can effectively—even if unintentionally—freeze women out of conversations and debates, or simply render their communication ineffective (Deaux, 1976; Frieze et al., 1978). Most of these studies focus on informal groups; are these forces at work in legislative halls, executive offices, and judicial chambers as well? Reports from the earliest studies (Breckinridge, 1933) to the most recent (Vallance, 1979) suggest that they are; more rigorous communication studies will determine the degree. Social psychology research also suggests that women's leadership in primarily male domains such as politics may be curbed by the difficulties which all people, and especially men have in being supervised or led by a woman (Deaux, 1976; Frieze et al., 1978). How does this problem affect, for example, personnel relations and effectiveness in organizations such as Congress, where large staff are critical to legislative work? Studies in social psychology and organizational behavior are filled with suggestions for forces that may affect policy making and implementation as they concern women's issues.

In recent years governments increasingly include special offices, commissions, committees, or people whose job it is to concern themselves with the problems of women (Stewart, 1980). Political parties of all types have generally contained women's sections. These offices do not always appear designed to promote change; in some cases it appears more that these groups are designed very much for appeasement or cooptive purposes (Mossink, 1980). Although special women's offices may be important symbols, indicating that women's status is a topic of concern, their mere presence does not necessarily indicate that governments are responding to women's interests. All states in the United States formed special commissions in the early 1960s in response to President Kennedy's call, and a vast number of countries have done the same, particularly as part of the United Nations' declaration of an International Women's Decade. Masses of policy agendas were drawn up by the appointed commissions. What were the results?

We may also look at *formalization* of the women's interest in terms of strategies of segregation and integration. Special offices within parties or governments have important symbolic meaning and they are generally, although not always, staffed by activists and specialists in women's problems. At the same time, however, segregation can "ghettoize" the problems; it can segregate the issues both from other related problems and from experts and leaders in other fields. How do these forces balance in the policy process?

These observations about the problems of women as representatives of women returns us to a question posed at the beginning: is an increase in the number of women in positions of power the key to representing women? We can now argue that it is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. We have seen that the presence of female officeholders is only one element among the factors determining the degree to which government responds to the interests of women. Moreover, the role of women in government is shaped by the effects of recruitment procedures and organizational constraints in a political system dominated by patriarchal norms. Not the least of the problems is the presence of many female leaders who, to varying degrees, accept and make decisions according to these patriarchal norms. (For a radical example, see Koonz, 1977.)

Can we argue that the presence of more women among public officeholders will mean women will be more represented than they were? Increasing the number of women in government is not sufficient, but it is necessary. First, we have seen that women in office do make some difference in government responsiveness to women's interests. Second, the mere presence of women in positions of power readjusts what is now a thoroughly inequitable distribution of political values in society: power, participation, and decision making. If we accept the democratic ideal that participation in governance is valuable, can we argue that systematic exclusion of a particular social group is acceptable? Finally, increased representation of people who "look like" women will effect powerful symbolic changes in politics. Women and men continue to think of politics as a male domain because the empirical truth at this moment is that politics *is* a male domain. People of both sexes find governance by women odd, remarkable, extraordinary, and even inappropriate. Can we consider a governing system to be representative of women if women are not considered "representative" of governance? More women in office will increase the acceptability of women in government (MacManus, 1981).

Conclusion: When Women's Interests Are Interesting

The question of what is to be represented and under what circumstances are women represented has left us with a vast web that needs untangling. Research on these questions will serve two functions. First, it will develop knowledge about a large portion of humanity that has received little serious attention in the past. But just as knowledge developed about specific institutions, leaders, policies, or nations is useful to those who spend most of their time focusing on these specific areas, research on women and politics or, more properly, gender and politics, will fill gaps in our understanding of politics more generally. What does "representation of women" mean? What is to be represented? Under what circumstances are women's interests represented? The answers require new investigations of fundamental questions of politics, informed by a recognition that gender differentiation and stratification profoundly structure human life. The relation between women and politics is no mere "special topic." It is a field of study from which political scientists have much to learn. Some suggestions of what these things are follow.

Analysis of women's political interests and how governments represent and respond to them require renewed attention to the thorny problem of the limits of politics and government, the boundaries of and relationship between the private and public domains. Women are largely defined as belonging to the private rather than the political world; often the objections raised against the demands of feminist movements are framed as rejection of government incursions into private life.

Protection against violence serves as a good example. Many of the legislators who most strongly advocate "law and order" are bitter opponents of domestic violence legislation which is designed to protect women from one of the most common forms of violence, wife battery, on the grounds that what happens within the family is beyond the proper reach of government. Conservatives label shelters for battered women "houses for runaway wives," thus defining these women not as people escaping from crime, but wives abandoning their proper domain.

As we asked earlier, why is an individual's relationship to the production of children not commonly accepted as a matter of political interest while one's relationship to other forms of production is? The answer cannot be dismissed simply by arguing that reproduction is a private matter with no political or social interest; myriad laws on birth control, legitimacy, and sex education show that our political system does regard reproduction as a state matter. Indeed, many of the justifications for restricting women's educational, employment, and civic opportunities have been phrased in terms of the overriding state interest in the quality of motherhood and in assuring "necessary" production levels. The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that reproduction and children are fundamental concerns of the state. Women's interests have played key roles in the historical fluidity of our definitions of "public" and "private." It is no coincidence that the development of women as political persons and of their status and roles as policy questions coincides with twentieth-century expansion of government in social welfare and socialist states. The Supreme Court first explicitly delineated a constitutional right to privacy in a 1965 case involving contraception (*Griswold* v. *Ct.* 381 U.S. 479) and expanded upon it in later cases on abortion. Scholarship profits most from attention to the most difficult questions; in debates over what is private and what is public, what is personal and what is political, many of the most difficult questions have unique relevance to women's lives and interests.

Taking a serious interest in women and politics will also change some of the ways in which political scientists approach and discuss politics. Women's studies research has already pointed out flaws and gaps in accepted political theories and models. It has also revealed many pieces of conventional wisdom to be false, usually by transforming common and sometimes unstated assumptions into questions and hypotheses (e.g., Shabad and Andersen, 1979). Research on women uncovers critical problems in democratic theory and research which are of direct relevance to the problem of representation (Brennan and Pateman, 1979; Okin, 1979; Sapiro, 1979a, 1979b).

Women's studies research also criticizes and refines the basic tool of any type of research: language. We have already suggested that analysis of women and representation offers an opportunity to scrutinize the "political," the core concept in our vocabulary. We have made many of our words more blunt tools than they need be. "What is the nature of man, what are his needs and wants? How do these relate to political interests, goals, strategies, and structures?" If we ask these questions of our political philosophers and psychologists, the answers depend in large part upon whether we understand "man" to be a generic term or one that refers to a specific gender. Most of our great philosophers held that the nature of males and females is very different. What do we mean, then, when we ask about the political implications of the "nature of man"? (On the "generic man," see Moulton, 1977; Silveira, 1980; Martyna, 1978; Schneider and Hacker, 1980.) Political scientists have difficulty incorporating women into the political world because they lack or reject the appropriate language. "Patriarchy," "sexism," "feminist," and "male-dominated" appear to be emotionally charged words, the tools of the polemicist rather than the scholar. But are these words necessarily more charged than "monarchy," "democratic," "Democratic," or "authoritarian"?

For now, the root of the study of politics is, as an eminent political scientist has argued, "man" (Eulau, 1963). In politics the sum of the parts is not equal to the whole. The argument of women's studies scholars is that by focusing our attention primarily on half of humanity, assuming that that half speaks for—represents—all, we have done worse than understanding half of politics. Political science can only benefit by expanding its view. As one of the first sociologists wrote in 1837, "If a test of civilization be sought, none can be so sure as the condition of that half of society over which the other half has power,—from the exercise of the right of the strongest" (Martineau, 1974, p. 125).

References

Adams, Carolyn Teich, and Kathryn Teich Winston (1980). *Mothers at Work: Public Policies in the United States, Sweden, and China.* New York: Longman.

Ardener, Shirley, ed. (1975). *Perceiving Women.* London: Malaby.

———, ed. (1978). *Defining Females: The Nature of Women in Society.* New York: John Wiley.

Armed Forces and Society (1978). Special issue, Summer, entire issue.

Atkinson, Dorothy, Alexander Dallin, and Gail Warshovsky Lapidus, eds. (1977). *Women in Russia.* Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Berk, Sara Fenstermaker, ed. (1980). *Women and Household Labor*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Boles, Janet K. (1979). *The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process*. New York: Longman.

Boserup, Ester (1970). *Women's Role in Economic Development*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Breckinridge, Sophinisba (1933). *Women in the Twentieth Century: A Study of their Political, Social, and Economic Activities*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Brennan, Teresa, and Carole Pateman (1979). " 'Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth': Women and the Origins of Liberalism." *Political Studies* 27: 183-200.

Brown, Barbara, Ann Freedman, Harriet Katz, and Alice Price (1977). *Women's Rights and the Law: The Impact of the ERA on State Laws*. New York: Praeger.

Cantarow, Ellen (1976). "Abortion and Feminism in Italy: Women against Church and State." *Radical America* 10: 8-28.

Carroll, Susan (1979). "Women Candidates and Support for Women's Issues: Closet Feminists." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Chapman, Jane Roberts, ed. (1976). *Economic Independence for Women: The Foundation for Equal Rights*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

______, and Margaret Gates, eds. (1977). *Women into Wives: The Legal and Economic Impact of Marriage*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

___________, eds. (1978). *The Victimization of Women*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Caldwell, Lesley (1978). "Church, State, and Family: The Women's Movement in Italy." In A. Kuhn and A. M. Wolpe (eds.), *Feminism and Materialism*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 68-95.

Cook, Beverly Blair (1979). "Judicial Attitudes on Women's Rights: Do Women Judges Make a Difference?" Presented at the IPSA Roundtable on Women, Essex.

Dahlerup, Drude (1980). "Approaches to the Study of Public Policy Towards Women." Presented at the joint sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Florence.

Daly, Mary (1978). *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*. Boston: Beacon.

Deaux, Kay (1976). *The Behavior of Women and Men*. Monterey, Calif.: Wadsworth.

Delphy, Christine (1980). "The Main Enemy." *Feminist Issues* 1: 23-40.

Diamond, Irene (1977). *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Dubeck, Paula J. (1976). "Women and Access to Political Office: A Comparison of Female and Male State Legislators." *Sociological Quarterly* 17: 42-52.

DuBois, Ellen Carol (1980). *Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Editors of *Questions Feministes* (1980). "Variations on Some Common Themes." *Feminist Issues* 1: 3-22.

Eisenstein, Zillah R., ed. (1979). *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Enloe, Cynthia (1980). "Women—The Reserve Army of *Army* Labor." *Review of Radical Political Economy* 12: 42-52.

Eulau, Heinz (1963). *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics*. New York: Random House.

______, and John C. Wahlke, eds. (1978). *The Politics of Representation:* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Evans, Richard J. (1976). *The Feminist Movement in Germany, 1894-1933*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Evans, Sara (1980). *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left*. New York: Random House.

Fairbairns, Zoe (1979). *Benefits*. London: Virago.

Flexner, Eleanor (1973). *A Century of Struggle: The Women's Rights Movement in the USA*. New York: Atheneum.

Feinstein, Karen Wolk, ed. (1979). *Working Women and Families*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Francovic, Kathleen A. (1977). "Sex and Voting in the United States House of Representatives, 1961-1975." *American Politics Quarterly* 5: 315-30.

Freeman, Jo (1975). *The Politics of Women's Liberation*. New York: David McKay.

Frieze, Irene, et al., eds. (1978). *Women and Sex Roles: A Social Psychological Perspective*. New York: Norton.

Galey, Margaret E. (1979). "Promoting Nondiscrimination against Women: The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women." *International Studies Quarterly* 23: 273-302.

Gamson, William A. (1975). *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.

Goldstein, Leslie Friedman (1979). *The Constitutional Rights of Women: Cases in Law and Social Change*. New York: Longman.

Gordon, Linda (1976). *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America*. New York: Viking.

Grimes, Alan (1967). *The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hedlund, Ronald D., Patricia K. Freeman, Keith Hamm, and Robert Stein (1979). "The Electability of Women Candidates: The Effects of Sex Role Stereotypes." *Journal of Politics* 41: 513-25.

Hevener, Natalie Kaufman (1978). "International Law and the Status of Women: An Analysis of International Legal Instruments Related to the Treatment of Women." *Harvard Women's Law Journal* 1: 131-56.

Hole, Judith, and Ellen Levine (1971). *The Rebirth of Feminism*. New York: Quadrangle.

Hough, Jerry F. (1977). "Women and Women's Issues in Soviet Policy Debates." In D. Atkinson et al. (eds.), *Women in Russia*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, pp. 355-74.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Margaret Inglehart (1975). *European Men and Women*. Brussels: European Economic Community.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Barbara G. Farah (1981). "Gender and Politics: When Is a Cleavage Not a Cleavage?" In H. Kerr, H. D. Klingemann, and P. Personen (eds.), *People and Their Polities*, forthcoming.

Kennedy, David M. (1970). *Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

King, Marjorie (1977). "Cuba's Attack on Women's

Second Shift, 1974-1976." *Latin American Perspectives* 4: 106-19.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane (1974). *Political Woman*. New York: Basic.

Koonz, Claudia (1977). "Mothers in the Fatherland: Women in Nazi Germany." In R. Bridenthal and C. Koonz (eds.), *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 445-73.

Kraditor, Aileen (1965). *The Ideas of the Women's Suffrage Movement: 1890-1920*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kreps, Juanita M., ed. (1976). *Women and the American Economy: A Look to the 1980's*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Lane, Robert (1959). *Political Life*. Glencoe: Free Press.

Lapidus, Gail Warshovsky (1977). *Women in Soviet Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lawson, Kay, ed. (1980). *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University.

Lewis, Gwendolyn L. (1978). "Changes in Women's Role Participation." In I. Frieze et al. (eds.), *Women and Sex Roles*. New York: Norton, pp. 137-56.

Makward, Christiane (1975). "French Women in Politics, 1975." *Michigan Papers in Women's Studies* 1: 123-28.

Martineau, Harriet (1974). "Society in America." In A. Rossi (ed.), *The Feminist Papers*. New York: Bantam, pp. 125-43.

Martyna, Wendy (1978). "What Does *He* Mean—The Use of the Generic Masculine." *Journal of Communication* 28: 131-38.

Mernissi, Fatima (1975). *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society*. New York: Wiley.

Mezey, Susan Gluck (1978a). "Does Sex Make a Difference? A Case Study of Women in Politics." *Western Political Quarterly* 31: 492-501.

______ (1978b). "Support for Women's Rights Policy: An Analysis of Local Politicians." *American Politics Quarterly* 6: 485-97.

Morgan, David (1972). *Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

______ (1974). *Suffragists and Liberals: The Politics of Women's Suffrage in England*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield.

Mossink, Maryke (1980). "Emancipation or Liberation? Government Emancipation Policies and the Feminist Movement." Presented at the joint sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Florence.

Moulton, Janice (1977). "The Myth of the Neutral 'Man.' " In M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Ellison, and J. English (eds.), *Feminism and Philosophy*. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, pp. 124-37.

Nelson, Cynthia (1974). "Public and Private Politics: Women in the Middle Eastern World." *American Ethnology* 1: 551-63.

O'Connor, Karen (1980). *Women's Groups' Use of the Courts*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Okin, Susan Moller (1979). *Women in Western Political Thought*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Pateman, Carole (1979). *The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory*. New York: John Wiley.

Perkins, Jerry, and Diane L. Fowlkes (1980). "Opinion Representation versus Social Representation: Or, Why Women Can't Run as Women and Win." *American Political Science Review* 75: 92-103.

Pitkin, Hannah (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Porter, Mary Cornelia, and Corey Venning (1974). "Church, Law, and Society: The Status of Women in Italy and the Republic of Ireland." *Michigan Papers in Women's Studies* 1: 125-41.

Rich, Adrienne (1979). *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence*. New York: Norton.

Robinson, John P. (1980). "Housework Technology and Household Work." In S. F. Berk (ed.), *Women and Household Labor*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, pp. 53-68.

Rosaldo, Michelle and Louise Lamphere, eds. (1974). *Women, Culture, and Society*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Rowbotham, Sheila (1973). *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World*. Baltimore: Penguin.

______ (1974). *Hidden from History: Rediscovering Women in History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present*. New York: Random House.

Sachs, Albie, and Joan Hoff Wilson (1979). *Sexism and the Law: Male Beliefs and Legal Bias in Britain and the U.S.* New York: Free Press.

Sandy, Peggy (1974). "Female Status in the Public Domain." In M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere (eds.), *Women, Culture, and Society*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, pp. 189-209.

Sapiro, Virginia (1979a). "Sex and Games: On Oppression and Rationality." *British Journal of Political Science* 9: 385-408.

______ (1979b). "Women's Studies and Political Conflict." In J. Sherman and E. Beck (eds.), *The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 253-66.

______ (1980). "News from the Front: Inter-Sex and Intergenerational Conflict over the Status of Women." *Western Political Quarterly* 2: 260-77.

______ (1981). "If Senator Baker Were a Woman: An Experimental Study of Candidate Images." *Political Psychology*, forthcoming.

Schneider, Joseph W., and Sally Hacker (1980). "Sex Role Imagery and the Use of Generic *Man* in Introductory Texts." *American Sociologist* 8: 12-18.

Schochet, Gordon J. (1975). *Patriarchalism in Political Thought*. New York: Basic Books.

Scott, Hilda (1974). *Women and Socialism: Experiences from Eastern Europe*. Boston: Beacon.

Shabad, Goldie, and Kristi Andersen (1979). "Candidate Evaluations by Men and Women." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43: 18-35.

Silveira, Jeanette (1980). "Generic Masculine Words and Thinking," *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 3: 165-78.

Steinfels, Margaret O'Brien (1973). *Who's Minding the Children? The History and Politics of Day Care in America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Stewart, Debra W. (1980). "Institutionalization of Female Participation at the Local Level: Commissions on the Status of Women and Agenda Building." *Women and Politics* 1: 37-63.

Stites, Richard (1978). *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Stoper, Emily (1977). "Wife and Politician: Role Strain among Women in Public Office." In M. Githens and J. Prestage (eds.), *A Portrait of Marginality.* New York: Longman, pp. 320-38.

Thorne, Barrie, and Nancy Henley, eds. (1975). *Language and Sex: Differences and Dominance.* Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House.

Tinker, Irene, and Michele Bo Bramsen, eds. (1976). *Women and World Development.* Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council.

Vallance, Elizabeth (1979). *Women in the House: A Study of Women Members of Parliament.* London: Athlone Press.

Vanek, Joann (1980). "Household Work, Wage Work, and Sexual Equality." In S. F. Berk (ed.), *Women and Household Labor.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, pp. 275-92.

Weeks, Jeffrey (1977). *Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, from the Nineteenth Century to the Present.* London: Quartet.

Welch, Susan (1978). "Recruitment of Women to Public Office: A Discriminant Analysis." *Western Political Quarterly* 31: 372-80.

Wilson, Graham K. (1981). *Interest Groups in the United States.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Wolchik, Sharon L. (1979). "The Status of Women in a Socialist Order: Czechoslovakia, 1948-78." *Slavic Review* 38: 583-602.

Beyond Interests in Politics: A Comment on Virginia Sapiro's "When Are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women"

IRENE DIAMOND
Purdue University

NANCY HARTSOCK
Johns Hopkins University

In "When Are Interests Interesting?" Virginia Sapiro makes a number of stimulating and important arguments. Her article is particularly useful because it both suggests new research directions and serves as an example of the difficulties of approaching the study of women and politics within the conventional categories of political analysis. We disagree with Sapiro on a number of points, but rather than addressing these here, we hope to expand the discussion by focusing on the ways in which Sapiro's arguments illuminate the problems created by attempting to make do with the conventional categories.[1] Recent developments in feminist theory have begun to uncover fundamental weaknesses in the categories of political analysis themselves, thus forcing researchers to move beyond the positions Sapiro has taken.[2]

Sapiro's treatment of women's representation underscores the major problem her article presents: on the one hand, she holds that women are an interest group, but on the other, she states that conflict over the issues raised by including women in politics "tears at the most basic structures and conceptions of society." If women are simply another interest group, however seriously one may take their interests, they remain a special interest group not fundamentally different from others, and in discussing their concerns one need raise no important new political or methodological questions. But if the inclusion of women in politics threatens the most basic structures of society, one cannot fit their concerns into the framework of interests. These inconsistent positions are an inevitable consequence of trying to work within the conventional categories of political analysis. Here we will point to the new directions which research can take if one follows the implications raised by the question of women's political representation.

If women have common interests, as both we and Sapiro believe they do, any attempt to ascertain these interests involves one in the difficult problem of understanding objective social situations and their relevance to political interests. In addition, one must recognize that the different objective situations of the sexes may not necessarily be clearly reflected in women's consciousness of these differences. While Sapiro understands these things, she is vague about which characteristics are most salient and how they relate to women's objective interests.[3]

---

[1] Among our specific points of disagreement with Sapiro are her claim that women have accepted a denial of equality as in their interest, that separatism is best understood as related to self-help and involving self-contained services to other women, that the major goal of the women's movement has more than anything else been to put women in positions of influence, and that women developed as political persons and women's roles became policy questions in the context of the twentieth-century expansion of social welfare. We hold instead that there is a centuries-old tradition of female resistance to inequality, that separatism must be understood as more strategy and philosophy than as delivery of services to other women, that important parts of the women's movement have as their goal the creation of a just society for all human beings rather than the installation of women in powerful positions, and finally, that women's roles have been policy questions in political theorizing at least as far back as Plato's *Republic*.

[2] A representative selection of the work most central to the study of politics would include Bunch et al., Chodorow, Daly, Dinnerstein, Eisenstein, Elshtain, Ferguson, Griffin, Harding and Hintikka, Hartsock, Okin, Sargent, Young. For a more comprehensive discussion, see the two review essays by Berenice Carroll (1979, 1980).

[3] There are two important difficulties with Sapiro's description of what it means to share common interests. First, her definition of what it means to (objectively) share an interest is so vague that it cannot even differentiate the interests of labor from capital. Second, she fails to address the several important methodological problems presented by the concept of objective interests. An adequate ground for attributing common interests to a group must address issues such as (1) control

Instead of a consideration of these issues—all of them presenting complicated problems for research—Sapiro's essay offers a mixed list of factors and social indicators which may be politically relevant, and some references to the few significant differences between women's and men's attitudes as these emerge from public opinion data. The attribution of common concerns to women needs a firmer institutional foundation than this.

If women's issues have been defined by the division of labor in private life, as Sapiro and others have suggested, why not base an account of women's common concerns on a more thoroughgoing analysis of this division of labor? We hold that despite the real differences among women, there are commonalities which grow from women's life activity of producing and sustaining human beings. At the level of grand theory, it may be fruitful to proceed on the basis of the radical-feminist hypothesis that all forms of oppression and domination are modeled on male/female oppression. However, the power relations of race and class which mediate this common female experience remain important for middle-level theory and empirical accounts; failure to take account of them will lead to errors and may even undermine the legitimacy of feminist scholarship.

In schematic and simplified terms, "women's work" occurs in a context characterized by concrete involvement with the necessities of life rather than abstraction from them, a context in which the specific qualities of individuals and objects are central, and in which the unification of mind and body, of mental and manual labor, is inherent in the activities performed. In this context, relations with others take a variety of forms which transcend instrumental cooperation for the attainment of joint ends. Feminist theorists have pointed out that the depth and variety of a woman's relations with others grows both from her socialization as a female human being and from the biological fact of living in a female body (e.g., Rich, 1976, p. 63; Chodorow, 1978, p. 59). In the face of menstruation, coitus, pregnancy, childbirth, lactation—all challenges to bodily bounds—a female cannot maintain in any simple way the distinction Freud saw as central to human existence—the clear disjunction between me and not-me (1961, pp. 12-13). And the social circumstance that typically women, but not men, nurture the young has meant that the child's task of differentiating from the mother follows different patterns in each sex; this differentiation reinforces boundary confusion in female egos and boundary strengthening in males.[4] Psychoanalytic evidence suggests that as a result of these early experiences, women tend to define and experience themselves relationally, while men are more likely to form a sense of self as separate and disconnected from the world (Chodorow, 1978, p. 198).

We hypothesize that these different psychic experiences both grow out of and in turn reinforce the sexual division of labor. And different male and female life-activity leads toward profoundly different social understandings. For men, "masculinity" can only be attained by means of opposition to the concrete world of daily life, by escaping from contact with the "female" world of the household into the "masculine" world of public life, and at least in the *polis,* politics. This experience of two worlds—one considered valuable, if largely attainable, the other considered useless and demeaning, if concrete and necessary—organizes what might be termed *phallocentric* social existence. In contrast, women's relationally defined existence, as constructed through the sexual division of labor, results in a social understanding in which dichotomies are less foreign, everyday life is more valued, and a sense of connectedness and continuity with other persons and the natural world is central.

Our argument is that female experience not only inverts that of the male but also forms a basis on which to expose the traditional conceptions of masculine existence and the political community men have constructed as both partial and fundamentally flawed (Hartsock, 1981, Ch. 10, discusses this in more depth). Throughout Western history the life-activities most important to survival—motherwork, housework, and, until the rise of capitalism, any work necessary to basic subsistence or survival—have been held to be unworthy of those who are fully human.

One result of these "reversals" of the proper order of things, perhaps the most devastating of all, is illustrated by the Western cultural preoccupation with violence and death. In both philosophy and practice one finds the pervasive belief

---

over the political agenda, (2) latent possibilities for conflict as well as observable conflict, (3) the relation of "real" to subjectively held interests, (4) the relation of interests and desires to human needs. The attribution of common interests requires an understanding of human nature and social structure which can satisfactorily account for the systematic failure of large groups to perceive and act on politics from which, arguably, they would benefit. Whether or not one finds the Marxian account of political and economic domination persuasive, it does at least meet these formal requirements for an attribution of objective interests.

[4] We have not failed to notice that recently some fathers have begun to participate more fully in childrearing. The small scale on which this has so far occurred, however, does not vitiate our general point.

that it is the ability to deliberately risk one's life, to seek with Achilles a short life but a glorious one, which sets human beings above animals. From Homeric times to our own, this belief has carried such power that even a feminist theorist such as Simone de Beauvoir held that combat, whether against nature in the form of hunting or fishing, or against men in the form of war, is essential to the affirmation of "spirit" as against mere life. Thus she argued that "the worst cause that was laid upon woman was that she should be excluded from these warlike forays. For it is not in giving life but in risking life that man is raised above the animal; that is why superiority has been accorded in humanity not to the sex that brings forth but to that which kills" (1961, p. 58).

A systematic examination of the psychic and institutional consequences of the sexual division of labor could provide the necessary base for the attribution of common interests to women. The processes which both create and reinforce the sexual division of labor and translate its psychic and institutional consequences into hierarchical relations of power would need to be specified. Clearly this is no small task. Yet pursuing this line of inquiry becomes even more compelling when one recognizes that while the meanings of "public" and "private" have changed over time, women as a group have remained excluded from public authority. What feminist theorist Mary Daly (1979, pp. 14, 233) has labeled "gynephobia" may be inherent in the very construction of state societies in the West.

Attention to the sexual division of labor also calls into question the appropriateness of the language of interests for understanding political life. As Christian Bay has remarked, this language fails to assign priorities to human wants, needs, objectives, and purposes, and in so doing implicitly supports the "right of the strong to prevail in every contest" (Bay, 1980, p. 332). We should remember that the language of interests emerged along with the changes in the division of labor in production and reflected society's understanding of itself as dominated by rational economic men seeking to maximize their satisfactions. But human beings are moved by more than interests. The reduction of all human emotions to interests and interests to the rational search for gain reduces the human community to an instrumental, arbitrary, and deeply unstable alliance, one which rests on the private desires of isolated individuals. An account of social life such as this is clearly partial: certainly a mother's characteristically nurturing relationship to her child is difficult to describe in terms of instrumental interests in individual gain. Close attention to women's activity rather than men's and the consequent thoroughgoing focus on whole human beings necessitates the development of *more* encompassing categories of analysis for political life.

A focus on the expansion of rights for women leads to similar questions. But here too Sapiro's discussion of the circumstances where political systems have responded to the expansion of the rights previously denied women in comparison with men does not go far enough. By focusing the discussion as she does, Sapiro perpetuates the belief that women are primarily seeking to catch up with men; instead she should address the fact that much of what women want and need is not the same as what men want and need. Reproductive freedom and access to abortion are perhaps the most prominent examples. Perhaps the best way to determine whether a public issue is concerned with advancing the representation of women is to establish whether it merely advocates extending to women rights established for men, or whether the discussion moves into new territory. Our outline of the sexual division of labor points to why issues centering on the reproduction of life cannot be covered by agendas which take account only of the demands appropriate to male individuals.

The problems feminism poses for the conventional understanding of individual rights can, ironically, be found in their shared intellectual roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: not only has feminism used the theory as far back as the eighteenth century, where feminism was based on the conception of the independent and autonomous self, but also at the same time it has argued for a recognition of women as a sexual class. (Eisenstein, 1981, pp. 3-173, traces this history.) More recently feminist theory has challenged the use of the rights framework on the issue of abortion and forced sterilization. For example, while liberal, pro-choice activists in the U.S. articulated the need for abortion in terms of rights, recent work argues that the achievements of this struggle have had contradictory impacts, and that failures are partly attributable to the inappropriateness of the language of rights and the problematic nature of communities constructed around rights (see Petchesky, 1980).

Sapiro's implicit adherence to the language of interests and rights and the assumptions of individualism which this language carries makes her discussion of the conditions that permit women to control the quality of their lives less useful than it might be. Her discussion is both too comprehensive and too narrow, since we are offered a bibliography of explanations at a variety of levels of analysis with no suggestion about their relative importance or interrelationships. Sapiro's unwillingness to focus on the importance of any group, female or otherwise, leads her to ignore the influence of three of the most significant factors that structure social relations—sex, race, and class. This blank in the midst of comprehensiveness grows from her failure to make a clean break with the assumptions of the interest group framework. Though Sapiro clearly holds that the state is not neutral vis-à-vis women, her conceptual tools do not permit her to develop this insight. Where can she put her own recognition of the important ways in which gender differentiation and stratification structure human life? Indeed, her very use of the term "responsiveness" carries with it the hidden and untested assumption that women's demands can be integrated into political systems. Before one accepts this assumption, or the counter-claim of the inherent impenetrability of political life, one must have more precise empirical specification of the dynamics of representation, the tensions which emerge in response to demands, and the contradictions which accompany policy success.

Marxists have long argued that state policy is intimately linked to the social divisions deriving from productive activity. We are suggesting, with Sapiro, that this concept should be expanded to recognize the profound implications of the social divisions deriving from *reproductive* activity. The task at hand is to begin to take seriously the full complexity of state power and state policies. Within ongoing states, the entire policy process—from identifying legitimate needs to implementing specific policies that affect the lives of women—is shaped by a social fabric in which hierarchies based on gender, class and race are heavily intertwined. Empirical work needs to dissect the changing character of these interconnections, and thus we propose more systematic investigations both of the different phases of the policy process and the survival strategies of women of different classes and races. Once issues have been defined and political coalitions have been mobilized, the votes of female and male legislators do not differ substantially. Men seem to be able in these circumstances, to represent and "act for" women. Our hypothesis, however, is that the ability of men to act for women varies considerably through the different phases of the policy process: only women can "act for" women in identifying "invisible" problems affecting the lives of large numbers of women. At the same time, women's ability to "act for" women must be understood in the context of the survival strategies women have created in response to their powerlessness. Thus, in dealing with policy changes made without the agitation of women, such as the Married Women's Property Acts, one must recognize that this advance was of little material consequence for the survival of the vast majority of women in nineteenth-century America. In contrast, the current attention public officials are giving to the abuse of women in the family is a direct outcome of women's collective action on "invisible" problems. A focus on women's survival strategies which takes account of women's lack of access to resources and information would also be useful for understanding how differences in consciousness among women develop during periods of change, and why women's own actions sometimes conflict with their own welfare and survival. For instance, early pregnancy among black teenage girls lacking job opportunities might be examined as their way of achieving adult status and a sense of self-worth. In a somewhat different vein, women's participation in right-wing political activities concerning the family and sexual issues might be better viewed as efforts to achieve human dignity in the face of change: these women's opposition to the routine assaults on female sexuality in the contemporary news and entertainment media has taken the form of banning sex education in public schools, and their response to the socioeconomic changes undermining survival strategies appropriate to family-based patriarchy has been to attack feminism.

The most fundamental question to be addressed, one which has been only hinted at in our discussion thus far, is the extent to which inclusion of questions regarding reproduction and sexuality may change the political process itself. We believe that taking women's lives seriously would have far-reaching and profound consequences, and that the very concepts of what is political and what is public may be threatened by the inclusion of women's concerns in political life.

From women's perspective, one sees the intimate interconnections between the purportedly separate private and public realms. Yet the origins of Western politics in the Greek city-states provides a forceful reminder of the extent to which politics has been structured by the exclusion of women's concerns. In ancient Greece the public, political world was constructed as an arena in which participants were freed of the constraints of necessary labor, and political power rested on courage in war and courage in speech. Women, slaves, and all the concerns associated with the household and the world of necessity were excluded from the public world. This public world of course in reality depended on and could not have existed without the private world of household production. Yet this dependence was rarely recognized by political thinkers. While the content of the public world has changed, and the formal barriers between the spheres have been removed, the refracted impact of the ancient dualities still structures much of our thinking about politics. That the ancient understanding of the citizen as warrior is still with us is illustrated by the depth of opposition in the United States to authorizing women to serve in combat. Civic personality is not yet separate from military capacity, but the need to re-think the relationship between war and politics is made more urgent by the present technological possibilities for total destruction.

In sum, we are not saying, as Sapiro does, that recent scholarship in women's studies can show that political science has been studying the actions of only half of humanity, and that the subject matter of political science should be expanded. Instead, we are suggesting that the focus on the activity of only half of humanity is fundamental to what has been understood as political life for the last 2500 years. To include women's concerns, to represent women in the public life of our society might well lead to a profound redefinition of the nature of public life itself.

References

Bay, Christian (1980). "Peace and Critical Political Knowledge as Human Rights." *Political Theory* 8: 293-318, 331-34.

Bunch, Charlotte, et al. (1981). *Building Feminist Theory: Essays from Quest*. New York: Longman.

Carroll, Berenice (1979). "Part I: American Politics and Political Behavior." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 5: 289-306.

______ (1980). "Part II: International Politics, Comparative Politics, and Feminist Radicals." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 5: 449-58.

Chodorow, Nancy (1978). *The Reproduction of Mothering*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Daly, Mary (1978). *Gyn/Ecology*. Boston: Beacon.

de Beauvoir, Simone (1961). *The Second Sex*. Translated by H. M. Parshley. New York: Bantam.

Dinnerstein, Dorothy (1976). *The Mermaid and the Minotaur*. New York: Harper and Row.

Elshtain, Jean (1981). *The Public and the Private: A Critical Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eisenstein, Zillah, ed. (1979). *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

______ (1981). *The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism*. New York: Longman.

Ferguson, Ann (1979). "Women as a New Revolutionary Class in the U.S." In Pat Walker (ed.), *Between Labor and Capital*. Boston: South End Press, pp. 279-304.

Freud, Sigmund (1961). *Civilization and Its Discontents*. New York: Norton.

Griffin, Susan (1978). *Woman and Nature*. New York: Harper and Row.

Harding, Sandra, and Merrill Hintikka, eds. (1981). *Dis-Covering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Hartsock, Nancy (1981). *Money, Sex, and Power: An Essay on Domination and Community*. New York: Longman.

Lukács, Georg (1968). *History and Class Consciousness*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Okin, Susan (1979). *Women in Western Political Thought*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Petchesky, Rosalind (1980). "Reproductive Freedom: Beyond 'A Woman's Right to Choose.' " *Signs: Journal of Women, Culture, and Society* 5: 661-85.

Rich, Adrienne (1976). *Of Woman Born*. New York: Norton.

Sargent, Lydia, ed. (1981). *Women and Revolution*. Boston: South End Press.

Young, Iris (1980). "Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory." *Socialist Review* 10: 169-88.

Communications

ON ARTICLES

Comment on Morgan and Pelissero (Vol. 74, December 1980, pp. 999-1005)

TO THE EDITOR:

Infrequently noticed but of potentially serious consequence in the comparative policy output literature is the problem of making time-relevant inferences from cross-sectional data. David Morgan and John Pelissero (1980) have provided valuable guidance for addressing the situation directly. This communication is not a critique of Morgan's and Pelissero's discussion, but rather an attempt at further clarification of the problem. I submit that much of our work is guilty of the "cumulation-marginality fallacy."

Substantively, my concern is piqued by the continued citation of the cliche that "politics do not matter for policy"—an assertion sometimes supported, but also often challenged in a literature too rich to be credited merely by a footnote to work done in the 1960s by Dawson and Robinson, Dye, Hofferbert, or Sharkansky. I fear that Morgan's and Pelissero's methodological lesson will be lost on many in the field, probably because of their apparent reaffirmation of the cliche that politics are irrelevant to policy.

The common error is committed in the following manner. We look at indicators for "independent" (socioeconomic, political, governmental) and "dependent" (policy output) variables for a set of jurisdictions (nations, provinces, cities) at a point in time. A pattern of covariance shows that those jurisdictions scoring high or low on the independent variables either do or do not score similarly on the dependent variables. So far, so good. The revealed pattern *describes* the coincidence, or lack of coincidence, of theoretically interesting phenomena.

The sin is that we often assert that *change* (either past or future) in the independent variables has probably caused *change* in the dependent variables. We see a pattern of association (or lack of it) and conclude that it accounts for how the particular units of analysis *got to* their relative positions on the dependent variables. Such reasoning is fine for "predicting" scores for units for which we have information regarding the independent variables and for which we want to estimate scores on the dependent variables. That is how we teach regression analysis, but it is seldom how we conduct social research. In the policy output field, we have not been engaged in *prediction;* we have been attempting *explanation.*

There is a demonstrable growth pattern to the contents of some cross-sectional correlations (e.g., of socioeconomic and expenditure indicators), justifying a *developmental* assumption. That is, something about the pattern of change in *X* is closely associated with changes in *Y*. But such is not revealed by a cross-sectional equation. It can be revealed only by retrospective longitudinal data. Multiple jurisdictional covariance, however, is at least a test of the extent to which units with different starting points or different trend lines have ended up showing an apparent connection between *X* and *Y*.

The problem arises, however, when we are testing for the additional effect of an independent or intervening variable such as political conditions or governmental structure. These features of the process are usually lumpy in their occurrence and rarely temporally linear or continuous in the way that changes in income, industrialization, or public expenditure are. And therein lies the danger to the type of causal inferences common to comparative policy output studies.

In many fields of social inquiry, but particularly in comparative policy studies, analysts have frequently committed what I have labeled the "cumulation-marginality fallacy." The fallacy is committed when one makes inferences about the processes (determinants) of short-term change through time on the basis of cumulated variance across units at discrete time points. The fallacy is most likely to lead to inaccurate inferences when there is a differential cross-time slope and/or linearity between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables.

The cumulation-marginality fallacy often occurs when one fails to distinguish between the cumulation of similar trends in independent and dependent variables, as revealed in a high cross-sectional correlation, and the determinants of marginal changes between time points.

The data matrix customarily employed in comparative policy analyses includes, for multiple jurisdictions, indicators of selected independent and dependent variables at a single point in time or, at most, episodic time points (Hofferbert, 1970). Longitudinal inferences are drawn, despite the inherently static quality of the data.

The contrast being suggested is illustrated by the oversimplified, hypothetical trends portrayed in Figure 1. The illustrations of the four sets of cases show alternative patterns of dependence of expenditures on party and/or socioeconomic conditions over time in multiple contexts. The key point is that cross-sectional simple or partial regression analysis (measured by vertical "slices" through each set) can be very misleading and can result in the rejection of valid causal inferences. In the case of these examples, the focus is on the independent effect of political party control ("Right"/"Left") on level of expenditure, controlling for level of socioeconomic development.


Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
Case 5
Case 6
Case 7
Case 8
Case 9
Case 10
Case 11
Case 12
Case 13
Case 14
Case 15
Case 16
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
R
L
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6

Source: Designed by the author.

Key: ______ Expenditures
_ _ _ _ Socioeconomic Level
R = Right Party Control
L = Left Party Control
E = Election (Time)
Cases 1-4 = Secular Competition: Partisan Determination
Cases 5-8 = Realignment: Partisan Determination
Cases 9-12 = Secular Competition: Socioeconomic Determination
Cases 13-16 = Realignment: Socioeconomic Determination

Figure 1. Hypothetical Patterns of Partisan Change, Socioeconomic Levels, and Public Expenditures

In each of the four sets, the individual cases (e.g., nations, cities, provinces) doing the spending (i.e., making the policy) vary (between "High" and "Low") in their starting points on two of the three variables: level of socioeconomic development and level of expenditures. The party control varies only over time, dichotomously. Now, the question is: is there any systematic relationship between the level of expenditure and which party is in control in any or all of the cases in a set? Will that relationship survive if one controls for level of socioeconomic development?

In any one of the four sets, a correlation between partisan control and level of expenditure (assuming a number of cases sufficiently greater than the four illustrated in each set), controlling for or apportioning the variance in socioeconomic development, will reveal no relationship linking the consequences of partisan forces to expenditure—despite the fact that in the cases of "secular competition: partisan determination" (cases 1-4) and in those of "realignment: partisan determination" (cases 5-8) *all* of the increase was enacted under left governments, with expenditures remaining absolutely flat under the right governments. Only if one measures the impact of *change* in partisan control and *change* in expenditures will the real relationship be revealed.

The customary conclusion drawn from cross-sectional correlational analysis—that there is no independent political control/expenditure relationship, controlling for level of socioeconomic development—would be justified in only the hypothetical cases which I have labeled, respectively, "secular competition: socioeconomic determination" (cases 9-12) and "realignment: socioeconomic determination" (cases 13-16). The real-world situation will, no doubt, be a mix of the four situations. But that mix will never be revealed by cross-sectional analysis. It will be seen only by time series analysis, taking account of the impact of changes in independent and dependent variables.

Such a misleading situation will result from cross-sectional analysis whenever there is a differential trend or linearity in the mix of independent variables included in a multivariate analysis. This is nearly always the empirical situation in comparative policy studies.

Most policy patterns, especially those involving large expenditures for social programs, tend to be subject to a ratchet effect. Perhaps "neoconservatism" will change that, but the data encompassed to date by policy analysts reveal few exceptions. From the examples in Figure 1, one can see that socioeconomic change is generally linear. These two conditions will yield a high positive correlation between socioeconomic level and expenditure level across jurisdictions at any single time point or across time in any single jurisdiction. They will also yield a high positive correlation between *change* in socioeconomic level and *change* in expenditures where such change is measured over T_1 to T_n. And these findings will fail to make the distinction between the full patterns illustrated across the four sets.

The conclusion that I see as unavoidable is that no cross-sectional regression analysis can be assumed to be appropriate as a test for independent or intervening effect of one variable if it is known that one of the competing independent variables is episodic or discontinuous in its occurrence or even where there is simply differential linearity between any of the independent variables or between any independent variable and the dependent variable.

There are a variety of analytic strategies available to deal with the cumulation-marginality fallacy. Morgan's and Pelissero's interrupted time-series quasi-experiment is one. Another is the use of change indicators in a pooled cross-jurisdictional, cross-time analysis (e.g., Jones, 1974; Winters, 1976; Hofferbert and Sande, 1976; Klass, 1979; Ingraham and Schneider, 1980). Such efforts use techniques rather new to our field. No doubt, considerable experimentation will be required before all of the bugs (e.g., the bedeviling effect of autocorrelation with short time strings) are worked out to our collective satisfaction. But the central message is clear: We can no longer routinely and unconcernedly make casual causal inferences about change on the basis of cross-sectional data.

RICHARD I. HOFFERBERT

State University of New York, Binghamton

References

Hofferbert, Richard I. (1970). "Elite Influence in State Policy Formation." *Polity* 3: 316-44.

———, and Terje Sande (1976). "The Malleability of the Policy Process: Strategies for More Useful Comparative Analyses." Presented at the 1976 Annual Joint Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

Ingraham, Patricia W., and Saundra K. Schneider (1980). "Alternative Models of Citizen Participation and Policy: Voting in the Streets or at the Polls." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Jones, E. Terrence (1974). "Political Change and Spending Shifts in the American States." *American Politics Quarterly* 2: 159-78.

Klass, Gary M. (1979). "Determinants of Policy and Politics in the American States, 1948-1974." *Policy Studies Journal* 7: 745-52.

Morgan, David R., and John P. Pelissero (1980). "Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?"

American Political Science Review 74: 999-1005.
Winters, Richard (1976). "Party Control and Policy Change." *American Journal of Political Science* 20: 597-636.

Comment on Lustick
(Vol. 74, June 1980, pp. 342-53)

TO THE EDITOR:

Ian Lustick's article on disjointed incrementalism claims to employ "deductive analysis" and the "implicit assumptions" of incrementalism to identify those categories of situations that limit the usefulness of this familiar problem-solving method. A forceful deductive argument, however, must show that a proposition is a necessary implication of a set of acceptable assumptions. The assumptions that Lustick is concerned with are the properties of disjointed incrementalism and synoptic decision making. But his analysis of these properties is unfortunately vague, due to a failure to make several important distinctions. This leads directly to a difficulty in demonstrating deductive linkages between the assumptions and his propositions. Depending upon how the particular properties are defined, Lustick's propositions can be shown to be false, and plausible counterpropositions can be derived.

Lustick's first proposition is that sharp discontinuities in issue salience limit the relative usefulness of incremental decision making. Lustick's argument is based on the example of regulatory versus incentive schemes to manage environmental pollution. Disjointed incrementalism (the incentive approach) is presumably inappropriate for situations in which pollution might lead to an environmental catastrophe. To safeguard against this possibility, governments must impose central enforcement of standard regulations, as they do with nuclear power regulation.

The example is puzzling because what Lustick supposes is synoptic decision making is in fact *centralized satisficing*. The crucial factor in nuclear power regulation is the poor state of knowledge about the task environment. If full knowledge were available, cost-benefit factors and other key tradeoffs would be known and the issue could be effectively programmed (assuming political agreement). But regulatory organizations have only limited knowledge of the most efficient and safe method of pollution control, and regulatory directives typically take the form of centralized, satisficing rules that seek to prevent Type II error at the expense of Type I error (Fiorino and Metlay, 1977). Since all advocates of incrementalism agree that satisficing is an important property of incremental problem solving, Lustick is clearly incorrect in regarding centralized regulations as evidence of synoptic decision making.

While the issue salience of a possible catastrophe may make it desirable to regulate risk-taking centrally, it does not necessarily diminish the usefulness of all incremental experimentation. Would it be better to have all nuclear power plants based on a centralized, standardized procedure if that proedure were the Babcock and Wilcox one? We feel more comfortable with the ten to twelve different designs developed by different companies, all of course within the framework of centrally enforced risk aversion. The preferred strategy in the presence of a salient issue like nuclear power, therefore, is not a synoptic one but rather a combination of two closely related aspects of incrementalism: decentralized, incremental experimentation within the context of "satisficing" regulations guaranteeing risk aversion.

In Proposition Two, Lustick claims that complexity of a severe, nondecomposable variety limits the usefulness of incrementalism. For instance, he describes how fears of widespread cancer epidemics led to federal restrictions on experimentation with recombinant DNA. As further experiments in this complex area indicated that the danger of infectivity was less than was originally thought, federal regulations were eased.

Here again, however, the illustration serves only to demonstrate a confusion between centralized regulation of risk and synoptic decision making. The changes in regulatory restrictions are clearly incremental adjustments, often of a rather crude variety, even if they were imposed through centralized regulation. They most closely resemble Simon's notion of incremental shifts in aspiration levels, but do not illustrate synoptic decision making, as claimed by Lustick.

While this example might illustrate that a complex problem of high risk may call for centralization, it does not respond in a serious way to theorists who hold that, in general, *even for complex problems,* decentralization is more useful than centralization. Since Adam Smith, theorists have been pointing out that complex interaction effects are often resolved by automatic adjustments in decentralized processes, market or otherwise, and without the burden of maintaining a centralized bureaucracy. Coordination is possible without a central coordinator.

So even if one reads "decentralization" for "incrementalism," as seems to be necessary with Lustick's illustrations, Proposition Two does not compel belief. If we take incrementalism to mean what it normally means, in fact the opposite of Proposition Two seems to be true. The more a problem is characterized by nondecomposable complexity, the less likely it is that all the interaction effects among the parts of the problem will be understood. The less understood these complexities, then the more likely it is that synoptic decision making will fail, since synoptic decision making assumes a comprehensive theory capable of accounting for every relevant factor and interaction effect. Clearly, it is in the presence of little-understood complexities that incrementalism has a comparative advantage over synoptic decision making, if ever. Indeed, it is the primary thrust of the incrementalist literature that this decision-making mode is appropriate when little-understood complexities make comprehensive modeling prone to major error. Lustick's discussion of Proposition Two does nothing to turn this incrementalist tenet on its head.

Lustick's third proposition suffers from a similar kind of shift in meaning from the statement of the proposition to the analysis of his illustration. In the statement, he claims that a lack of resource redundancy limits the usefulness of incrementalism; but in the analysis, a key additional factor is added without any warning to the reader. "In extremis, only a comprehensively planned [approach] . . . (however likely to fail) holds out the logical possibility of success." In other words, in the analysis Lustick is concerned with situations in which "the survival of the organization is immediately at stake."

Lustick is clearly incorrect in equating organizational emergency with resource inadequacy. Many organizations, such as poorer American cities, find themselves in a chronic state of relative scarcity without facing the problem of survival. But whether Lustick intends to deal with organizational emergency or inadequacy of resources, he is not justified in linking either of these problems to the inadequacy of incrementalism. His evidence for the proposition is the observation that dictators tend to emerge when organizational survival is at risk. Here he once more confuses centralization of authority with synoptic decision making. A dictator may "program" a solution to a problem by superior force, but this in no way means that the empirical requisites for synoptic decision making are present (Lindblom, 1959).

Furthermore, under conditions of simple resource insufficiency (as opposed to extreme emergency), a counter-proposition to Lustick's is more plausible. If planners don't have sufficient resources to undertake complex synoptic decision-making techniques, then they shouldn't waste their resources undertaking synopsis on the cheap. An incrementalist strategy, with its frankly limited analysis and independence from expensive expertise, is made to order for an organization needing inexpensive, safe options; hence the observation that American cities follow classic incremental practices to cope from one year of resource scarcity to the next.

Lustick's final proposition claims that unequal distribution of power limits the utility of incrementalism. He notes that the incremental decision-making process which brought the United States into the Vietnam War was one in which the military dominated other foreign policy agencies, suggesting that military dominance subverted incrementalism. But evidence also shows that this unequal power distribution severely impeded the ability of any of the actors to engage in synoptic decision making. For instance, the CIA and the military's own intelligence organizations were pressured to distort their analyses of enemy infiltration and other issues. The treatment fails to explain why incremental decision making should be *more* seriously distorted by political dominance than synopticism. Since sophisticated synoptic decision-making techniques often implicitly assume political neutrality on the part of analysts (and incrementalism does not), the former mode may be *more* sensitive to biases introduced by power dominance.

In summary, it may be the case that the factors Lustick identifies affect the probability of successfully solving a problem by way of disjointed incrementalism. That is, additional resources help problem solvers and additional complexities hinder them; a concentration of power is likely to introduce bias and the possibility of a catastrophe makes risk aversion more likely. We find these propositions interesting but not remarkable. But confusions about centralization and synoptic decision making, decentralization and incrementalism, regulation and risk aversion hinder Lustick in his attempt to define the *relative* utility of disjointed incrementalism to some other problem-solving mode. With more precise definitions of incrementalism, a counter-proposition seems more nearly accurate than each of Lustick's propositions. Issue salience *increases* the relative desirability of disjointed incrementalism (defined as risk-averse satisficing). Issue complexity *increases* the desirability of incrementalism (defined as trial-and-error experimentation on the margin), where theoretical understanding is insufficient for synoptic decision making. Lack of resource reduncancy *increases* the desirability of incrementalism (again defined as trial-and-error experimentation) where resources are insufficient for the expense of synoptic decision making. The presence of a dominant political actor *increases* the desirability of decentralization, because the analysis of a single centralized problem-solving unit is more easily subverted by distorting biases.

The existence of our counter-propositions does not mean that Lustick is wrong in every case, or that we are right, but it does indicate the need for a more careful definition and differentiation of phrases if we are to begin to understand when to apply disjointed incrementalism and when some other form of problem solving.

JACK H. KNOTT
GARY J. MILLER

Michigan State University

Reference

Fiorino, Daniel J., and Daniel S. Metlay (1977). Theories of Agency Failure, or Why Regulatory Agencies Continue to Be Unreliable When the Solutions Seem So Obvious." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Reply

TO THE EDITOR:

Jack Knott and Gary Miller criticize my article for not delivering a deductive analysis of the assumptions on which the utility of disjointed incrementalism is based. However, since they make no reference to those sections of my argument in which that analysis is presented, I can only refer the reader to the article itself.

The criticisms Knott and Miller raise can be traced to three basic errors on their part: (1) Their interpretation of disjointed incrementalism is simplistic and largely ignores the *disjointedness* of coordination in disjointed incrementalism. (2) They measure "incrementalism" against "synopticism" in either/or terms as two purely disjunctive ways to *solve* problems. (3) As a consequence, they treat illustrations I use as the basis for attacking arguments I do not make.

As a result of these errors, Knott and Miller fail to address the central concern of my article: to explain why, in task environments of roughly equivalent complexity, the comparative advantage of strategies for coping with uncertainty varies relative to methods which incorporate, to a greater or lesser degree, the organizational and decisional modalities associated with synopticism—centralization, planning, standardization, hierarchy, and a priori analysis.

Their simplistic approach to the problem I address is well illustrated in their almost knee-jerk characterization of "the poor state of knowledge" as "the crucial factor in nuclear power regulation." If, for the sake of argument, their characterization of nuclear power regulation as "centralized satisficing" is accepted, then it can readily be seen to illustrate my point. As Knott and Miller aver, the nuclear power issue is very complex, and contains more uncertainty, than the air pollution abatement issue to which I compare it. If heightened complexity/uncertainty makes appropriate more disjointedly incrementalist decision strategies, and if, as Knott and Miller apparently believe, complexity is the only important independent variable, then the emergence of *"centralized,"* as opposed to "disjointed" satisficing on the issue of nuclear power should certainly surprise them. On the other hand, it is precisely the point of my first proposition that in issue areas (such as nuclear power) in which causal chains link issues of different degrees of salience, the relative utility of disjointed incrementalism decreases, and the relative utility of more standardized, comprehensive, hierarchical strategies (such as centralized satisficing) increases. As I am careful to note, this need not result in the cost effectiveness or actual emergence of more centralized, planned, and analysis-based forms of regulation. But it is instructive that on the subject of nuclear power, and in other of the empirical domains to which I refer, differences in the evolution of organizational design and practice do correspond to the "rational" expectations generated by deductive analysis.

In their comments on my second proposition Knott and Miller miss the mark because they misinterpret my argument as a claim that "synopticism" exists as a "problem-solving modality" which can *solve* nondecomposably complex problems. In fact, with regard to complex problems, neither relatively disjointed and incremental nor relatively synoptic decision strategies should be seen as "problem-solving modalities," but rather as different means of coping with complexity and the uncertainties associated with it. Rather than construed as two disjunctive approaches, disjointed incrementalism and synopticism are much more usefully interpreted as the poles of a continuum of organizational forms and processes (such as "centralized satisficing") that are more or less incrementalist, analysis-based, decentralized, etc. I might add that Knott's and Miller's reference to Adam Smith reflects no appreciation of the enormous implications of "sleeper effects" and other manifestations of nondecomposable complexity which reduce (though do not necessarily eliminate) the comparative advantage which disjointed decision strategies typically enjoy in complex task environments.

Their critique of my third proposition is based on a misunderstanding of how consideration of logical extremes of propositions can help reveal the implications of hidden assumptions.

With regard to their comments on my fourth proposition, I can only agree that, however power is distributed among actors, distortions in the direction of parochial interest will take place in their analyses. Strong actors will not become impartial. But to rely on countervailing power to achieve analytical redress when that countervailing power does not exist, is to compound parochial distortion with the mistaken expectation that its effects will be ameliorated in the political arena and the "marketplace of ideas."

All decision strategies implemented in uncertainty-laden task environments entail costs and risks. Identifying types of complex problems in the context of which various types of costs are likely to be more consequential can help us cope with uncertainty more effectively and help explain variation in organizational responses to complexity. Obsession with complexity as the only variable of consequence in the design of organizations and explanation of organizational behavior will lead to a *standardization* of analysis and advice (to decentralize and become more incremental) which directly contradicts the insight on which that response is based.

IAN LUSTICK

Dartmouth College

Comment on Jennings (Vol. 73, June 1979, pp. 414-29)

TO THE EDITOR:

Researchers studying the effects of interparty competition on state policy outputs have typically assumed that in competitive situations both parties try to appeal to disadvantaged voters, thereby liberalizing welfare policies. In a recent issue, Edward Jennings (1979) argues that the key party system characteristic affecting welfare policies is not competition per se but rather the extent to which support for the parties is divided along social class lines. After presenting his theory, Jennings derives two propositions and tests them using cross-sectional data from eight states and longitudinal data from six states. We contend that one of these propositions is inconsistent with Jennings' stated theory, and then develop and test here a somewhat more general version of Jennings' key hypothesis.

Jennings contends that interparty competition leads to more liberal welfare policies only if (1) support for the parties is divided along class lines and (2) the party supported by the lower and working classes controls the government:

> The generosity of a state's social welfare policies depends upon the organization and mobilization of the lower classes in the electoral process. When a party or faction which receives substantial electoral support from the lower-class voters attains office, social welfare benefits should increase. When a party or faction which receives minimal support from the disadvantaged attains office, social welfare benefits should remain constant or decline. Party systems which organize the electorate along lines of class cleavage should generate more generous welfare policies than party systems which do not organize the electorate, so long as the lower- or working-class party has enjoyed success in its pursuit of office. When a party system fails to organize the electorate along class lines, welfare policy is likely to have low salience and neither party will use welfare benefits to reward its supporters (pp. 416-17).

Jennings derives two propositions from this theory: (1) "States with class-based electoral politics will score high on measures of welfare policy relative to states without class-based electoral politics"; and (2) "In states with class-based electoral systems, change in welfare policy will be positively related to the degree to which the party or faction with lower- and working-class support gains control of government." In our view, Proposition 1 is inconsistent with Jennings' stated theory, for his logic does not lead to the prediction that states with class-based electoral politics will necessarily have more liberal welfare policies than states without class-based electoral politics; whether they will or not should depend on which party or faction controls state government. Thus, for example, in direct contrast to Jennings' first hypothesis, states with class-based electoral politics, and in which the government is controlled by the upper- and middle-class party or faction, should have *less* liberal welfare policies than states without class-based electoral politics.

Although Proposition 2 is consistent with Jennings' theory, we know of no reason why "the extent of class-based politics" should be considered a dichotomous rather than a continuous variable. With this in mind, we can derive a hypothesis which subsumes Proposition 2 and which deals with *non*-class-based as well as class-based electoral systems: the extent to which electoral politics in a state is class-based and the degree to which the lower- and working-class party or faction controls the government *interact* in influencing the "generosity" of state welfare policy. In particular, if we let P represent the "generosity" of state welfare policy, C represent the extent of class-based electoral politics in a state (where C ranges from 0 to 1), and G represent the degree to which the lower- and working-class party (or faction) controls state government (where G ranges from 0 to 1 and equals .5 when the upper- and middle-class party [or faction] and the lower- and working-class party [or faction] share equally in the control of government), then Jennings' theory can be expressed as a multiplicative model:

$$P = b[C(G - .5)] \qquad (1)$$

where b is a constant greater than 0.

If we denote "the slope of the linear relationship between G and P" by b_{PG}, and "the slope of the linear relationship between C and P" by b_{PC}, model (1) is consistent with the following expectations about the relationship among C, G, and P:

1. When $C = 0$, $b_{PG} = 0$ (i.e., in states where class-based electoral politics are completely absent, the generosity of welfare policy should be unaffected by the degree to which the lower- and working-class party controls the government).
2. When $C > 0$, $b_{PG} > 0$, and as C increases toward 1, b_{PG} increases in magnitude (i.e., in states where there is some degree of class-based electoral politics, the "extent of working-class governmental control" should be positively related to "welfare generosity" [as in Proposition 2], and as the degree of class-based politics increases, the strength of the relationship between "working-class governmental control" and "welfare generosity" should increase).
3. When $G = 0$, $b_{PC} < 0$, and as G increases toward .5, b_{PC} decreases in magnitude until $b_{PC} = 0$ when $G = .5$ (i.e., when the upper- and middle-class party has total control of government, the degree of class-based electoral politics should be negatively related to "welfare generosity," and as upper-class governmental control diminishes toward the point of even party strengths, the strength of the relationship between the degree of class-based politics and "welfare generosity" should decrease).
4. When $G > .5$, $b_{PC} > 0$, and as G increases toward 1, b_{PC} increases in magnitude (i.e., when the lower- and working-class party has greater control of government than the upper- and middle-class party, the degree of class-based electoral politics should be positively related to "welfare generosity," and as working-class governmental control increases, the strength of the relationship between degree of class-based politics and "welfare generosity" should increase).

We can test this theory with a regression model in which P is regressed on the product $C(G - .5)$ as in

$$P = b_0[C(G - .5)] + e. \quad (2)$$

Jennings' theory predicts that b_0 should be greater than 0. In estimating the model, we use the same six indicators of welfare "generosity" (P) that Jennings employed; these indicators—identified in Table 1—all measure the *change* in an aspect of state welfare policy during the gubernatorial administration in office during 1969. This time frame was employed to make the P indicators correspond temporarily to our indicator of C. Using data for 11 states from the Comparative State Elections Project (CSEP), we measured C as the difference between (1) the percentage of working-class respondents in the 1968 CSEP survey who identified with the state Democratic party, and (2) the percentage of middle- and upper-class respondents who identified with the state Democratic party; class was determined on the basis of the blue-collar versus white-collar/professional distinction. (Two states were excluded from the CSEP sample: Minnesota, because of its nonpartisan legislature during the period under analysis, and Texas, because of its class-based *intra*-party factionalism, the precise extent of which could not be measured.) Finally, G is measured by the unweighted average of three components: (1) the percentage of seats in the state senate controlled by the Democrats, (2) the percentage of seats in the state house controlled by the Democrats, and (3) a variable which equals 1 if the governor was a Democrat and 0 if Republican. (In all states in the sample, identification with the Democratic party was more frequent among lower- and working-class respondents than among upper- and middle-class respondents.)

The parameter estimates for regression model (2)—given in column 1 of Table 1—do not support Jennings' theory, for b_0 is not consistently positive; instead, the results are mixed. For two policy indicators, b_0 is positive, while for four indicators it is negative. Indeed, for the indicator that Jennings considers "the best single indicator of welfare policy"—per capita welfare expenditure—b_0 takes on its strongest *negative* value, thereby indicating that in states with some degree of class-based electoral politics, the degree to which the lower- and working-class party controls government is negatively related to the generosity of welfare policy. In addition, the values obtained for b_0 are very weak. In fact, a comparison of b_0 with the simple correlations between P and G (r_{PG} in column 3) and between P and C (r_{PC} in column 2) shows that for five of the six policy indicators, C alone and G alone are better linear predictors of P than the multiplicative term $C(G - .5)$. Thus, when Jennings' theory is accurately specified (in an interactive multiplicative model), empirical analysis fails to demonstrate support for the theory.

WILLIAM D. BERRY
LEE SIGELMAN

University of Kentucky

Table 1. Parameter Estimates (Standardized) for b_O in Regression Model (2), and Correlations between C and P (r_{PC}) and between G and P (r_{PG})

Dependent Variable P	(1) b_O (Standardized)	(2) r_{PC}	(3) r_{PG}
(1) Per-Capita Welfare Expenditure	−.29	.45	−.32
(2) Welfare Effort	−.03	.49	−.10
(3) Recipient Rate	−.26	.40	−.20
(4) Expenditure per Recipient	−.03	−.37	−.28
(5) Per Recipient Effort	.05	−.38	−.21
(6) Unemployment Insurance Benefits	.16	−.21	.20

Sources: Data compiled from volumes of U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, *Social Security Bulletin,* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *State Government Finances,* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; *Book of the States,* Chicago: Council of State Governments; and the Comparative State Elections Project survey.

Reply

TO THE EDITOR:

William Berry and Lee Sigelman provide an interesting, useful extension of my work. They correctly assert that my first proposition misstated the theory that I developed. Indeed, as I said in the theoretical discussion, whether a state with class-based electoral competition would score high relative to states without such competition would depend upon whether the party with lower-class support had gained a share of power. They are also correct in stating that the extent of class-based politics can be hypothesized as a continuous, rather than dichotomous, variable. This latter point may be subject to certain qualifications, depending upon the way in which the class basis of politics is measured.

The degree to which parties differ in the support they receive from voters of different socioeconomic backgrounds is an indicator of class-based political competition. It is possible, however, that differences in the degree to which members of different classes support a party must reach a threshold level before such differences will affect policy developments. In addition, if party differences in class support are artifacts of other cleavages (e.g., regional, urban-rural), direct measures of differences in the degree to which members of each class support different parties may not be valid indicators of class-based competition. Instead, one would want a measure of the independent effect of class on vote.

There may be a problem with the Berry-Sigelman measure of party control, because only share of seats in the legislature is given importance. Control of a legislative body is irrelevant in the formulation. Thus, if a party with lower-class support holds the governor's office and 40 percent of the seats in each house of the legislature, the score for control is .6. If that party holds 60 percent of the seats in each house, but does not control the governor's office, the control score is only .4. This strikes me as a poor indicator of potential responsiveness to the lower class under the two situations. Beyond the greater weight attached to gubernatorial control, we can note that majority control of a legislative body is crucial. Increasing a party's share of legislative seats from 35 percent to 45 percent is not nearly as important for the success of that party's legislative program as increasing its share of seats from 45 percent to 55 percent.

This is a knotty problem, since it is desirable to take into account shares of seats as well as control of the legislative body. I cannot resolve the issue in the brief space allowed this response, but I can offer one possible solution. This would be to add a score for control of a legislative body to the calculation. If a party with lower-class support controls a body, it is scored 1; if not, it is scored 0. In doing this, one would want to double count control of the governor's office in order to avoid underweighting it in the calculus of control. Thus, we could calculate

$G = (2E + H_c + S_c + H_p + S_p)/6$, where

$E = 1$ if lower class party controls governor's office; otherwise $E = 0$;

$H_c = 1$ if lower-class party controls House; otherwise, $H_c = 0$;

$S_c = 1$ if lower-class party controls Senate; otherwise, $S_c = 0$;

H_p = proportion of seats lower-class party holds in House;

S_p = proportion of seats lower-class party holds in Senate.

In my example of the previous paragraph, this would result in scores of .46 and .53, respectively.

I have some doubts about Berry's and Sigelman's specification of the multiplicative model. Under their specification, when $C = 1$ and $G = .5$, then $C(G—.5) = 0$, and when $C = 0$ and $G = 0$, then $C(G—.5) = 0$. This suggests that a complete division along class lines with evenly divided control of government has the same consequences for welfare policy as a situation in which social divisions do not distinguish the parties. I do not think these situations would have similar consequences for welfare policy.

I also would not necessarily expect $b_{PC} < 0$ when $0 < G < .5$. In the first place, it is possible for G to be less than .5 and greater than 0 when the party with lower-class support controls one of the branches of government. Under such conditions, I would think that there are reasonable opportunities for increased welfare benefits. In addition, the findings of my study suggested the possibility that competitive, class-based politics could cause both parties to move toward increased welfare benefits.

There are, of course, a variety of reasons why Berry's and Sigelman's data may fail to support the hypothesis about the effects of class-based electoral competition on welfare policy. One is that the theory itself is incorrect, and class-based politics has no effect on welfare policy. Another possibility is that the small number of observations at one point in time misrepresents the true relationship—that nonrandom selection has produced a biased data set. In addition, there may have been other factors operating during the period of these observations that acted to distort the normal relationship between the class basis of politics and welfare policy. Finally, just one deviant case or outlier would distort statistical relationships with a sample of eleven, quite possibly reversing the signs of coefficients.

EDWARD T. JENNINGS, JR.

University of Missouri, Columbia

Comment on Thompson
(Vol. 73, December 1979, pp. 1100-08)

TO THE EDITOR:

Fred Thompson argues that there is substantial theoretical reason to suspect that "where a necessary condition for the enactment of a legislative proposal is its approval by a majority vote at each of several decision sites" the number of votes cast in support will be more than sufficient to win. This comment disputes both Thompson's theoretical explanation of the violation of the simple size principle and questions the validity of his proposed test for its existence.

The Competitive Theory of the Supply of Legislative Support

Thompson's reasoning is based on the idea that the supply curves for support for a proposal will differ as between decision points. This will raise the majority required for approval "given a competitive, price-taking legislature." The price offered to obtain the minimum winning coalition at one site will lead to more than a majority supporting the proposal at other sites where supply curves are lower.

An essential element in the logic is the presumption that the buyer of support must offer all sellers the same price. Why competitive supply of support *at any one decision point* precludes offering different prices at different decision points is unclear. Thompson's reasoning is similar to the fallacious argument that since both catchers and second basemen are supplied competitively and required for a successful baseball team, both second basemen and catchers will be offered the same price and this will create an excess supply of second basemen relative to needs.

The Empirical Test of the Size Principle

According to Thompson, if the number of decision points in a legislative setting is reduced, the necessary supply price offered and measured majorities on any issue will fall. Interpreting a previous supporting position taken by the governor of California on contested authorizing legislation on spending bills in California during August and September of the second half of legislature session of 1974-75 as a reduction in the number of decision points, Thompson confirms his prediction that majorities will be lower in such cases.

Even if the criticism made above is ignored it does not follow that his simple ordinary least squares regression is a fair test. It presumes that the error term for the different observations are normally distributed and uncorrelated with the presumed exogenous variables. If the observed size of a majority on a proposal influences whether or not a governor takes a favorable position, this condition will not be fulfilled. The resulting regression coefficient will be biased and inconsistent. But there is at least one conceivable model of reality where there may be this simultaneity problem. If governors suggest bills where they feel that the majority is tenuous and where their power and influence might "turn the tide" but refrain from pronouncements where the likely majority will be large, then this simultaneity problem can exist. A fair test of the size principle requires a much more detailed model admitting of the interaction between governor positions and legislative actions.

KENNETH V. GREENE

State University of New York, Binghamton

Comment on Bueno de Mesquita (Vol. 74, December 1980, pp. 917-31)

TO THE EDITOR:

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita demonstrates in his recent article the power of expected utility theory in explaining international conflict. This comment extends the application of that framework by explicitly considering the logical implications of the expected utility theorem for international deterrence (Arrow, 1965).

We show that if, as Bueno de Mesquita asserts, a national decision on conflict can be modeled by focusing on a single decision maker and that this decision maker is a rational expected utility maximizer, then the expected utility theorem implies that there is a point beyond which increasing the destructive capacity of retaliatory forces cannot make up for losses in credibility. On the other hand, we show that increases in credibility may be traded against decreases in retaliatory forces indefinitely so long as retaliation remains punitive. Formally we establish that:

1. There is no level of nuclear retaliation, including assured destruction, sufficient to deter an attack for all non-zero probabilities of retaliation.
2. As long as an attack with retaliation is not preferred to the status quo ante, there will always exist a probability of retaliation strictly less than one that will deter attack.

In other words, the expected utility theorem implies that no matter how massive the level of nuclear destruction from a counterattack, a nation that will benefit from an attack in the absence of retaliatory action will, for some sufficiently low but non-zero probability of retaliation, risk the "unthinkable" and attack. However, the same theorem also implies that for any level of retaliation that makes the attacking nation worse off after the attack than it was before, there exists a probability of retaliation strictly less than unity that will deter the attack.

We now turn our attention to demonstrating these implications of the expected utility theorem. The utility or objective function of the conflict decision maker may be written $U(\{S,A,R\})$, where S is a set of attributes of the nation's social and economic system, A is a set of attributes of an attack on another nation, and R is a set of attributes of that nation's retaliation. For the case where there is no attack, the variables A and R will be the null sets, ϕ_A and ϕ_R, respectively. In the case where there is an attack but no retaliation only the variable R will be the null set. The variable S is defined assuming that the nation neither attacks another nation nor is subjected to retaliation. All consequences of an attack are summarized by the variable A and all consequences of a retaliatory strike by R.

The proof of the assertion that assured destruction does not assure deterrence follows directly from the boundedness of the utility function and the expected-utility theorem. Let $\underline{U}$ be the greatest lower bound of the value of $U(\{S,A,R\})$ taken over all possible consequences. Boundedness of U is sufficient for the existence of $\underline{U}$. Now consider an attack on another nation such that $\bar{\bar{U}} = U(\{S,A,\phi_R\}) > \bar{U} = U(\{S,\phi_A,\phi_R\})$, or in other words, an attack that, if not met with retaliation, is considered better than the status quo ante. Next define a probability of retaliation, p^*, such that for the conflict decision maker the following holds: $\bar{U} = p^*\underline{U} + (1-p^*)\bar{\bar{U}}$. That is, define p^* for the decision maker such that the expected utility of an attack with probability p^* *of resulting in the least preferred outcome and probability (1—*p^*) of attack without retaliation is just equal to the strategy of not attacking another nation. For any possible retaliation, R, including assured destruction, $U(\{S,A,R\}) \geq \underline{U}$ and for any p, $0 < p < p^*$ it follows that $pU(\{S,A,R\}) + (1-p)\bar{\bar{U}} > \bar{U}$, i.e., the expected utility of attacking another nation is greater than the status quo, $\bar{U}$. Hence one cannot continuously trade credibility against higher levels of retaliatory destruction and maintain a constant deterrent.

The converse, however, is true. To see this, consider an attack, A, and retaliation, R, such that $U(\{S,A,R\}) < \bar{U}$; that is, an attack such that the attack and retaliation are worse than the status quo, $\bar{U}$. Then there is always a $p^{**} < 1$ such that for p, $p^{**} < p < 1$, $pU(\{S,A,R\}) + (1-p)\bar{\bar{U}} < \bar{U}$. In other words, there always exists a probability of retaliation strictly less than one that will act as an absolute deterrent. Roughly speaking, the ex-

---

The results reported here were initially derived in the context of criminal deterrence: see Block and Lind (1975). We would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments on this communication.

pected utility theorem implies that there always exists a sufficiently credible threat of counterattack to deter aggression.

MICHAEL K. BLOCK

Stanford University

ROBERT C. LIND

Cornell University

References

Arrow, Kenneth J. (1965). *Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing*. Helsinki: Yrjö Janhsonin Foundation.

Block, Michael K., and Robert C. Lind (1975). "Crime and Punishment Reconsidered." *Journal of Legal Studies* 4: 241-47.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1980). "An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 74: 917-31.

Editorial Note

The following articles have tentatively been scheduled to appear in the December, 1981 issue:

G. Bingham Powell, Jr., University of Rochester, "Party Systems and Political Performance: Participation, Stability and Violence in Contemporary Democracies"

Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity"

Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski, University of Michigan, "The Paradoxical Nature of State-Making: The Violent Creation of Order"

Bert A. Rockman, University of Pittsburgh, "America's Departments of State: Irregular and Regular Syndromes of Policymaking"

Deborah Baumgold, University of Florida, "Political Commentary on the History of Political Theory"

Martin P. Wattenberg, University of Michigan, "The Decline of Political Partisanship in America: Negativity or Neutrality?"

Robert S. Erikson and Kent L. Tedin, University of Houston, "The 1928-1932 Realignment: The Case for the Conversion Hypothesis"

David Lowery and Lee Sigelman, University of Kentucky, "Understanding the Tax Revolt: An Assessment of Eight Explanations"

Bradley C. Canon, University of Kentucky, and Lawrence Baum, Ohio State University, "Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines"

Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, Rice University, Research Frontier Essay: "Toward a Diachronic Analysis of Congress"

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory and Methodology

Foundations of Political Analysis: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice. By Robert Abrams. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 357. $16.50.)

In the last 30 years, efforts to make political *science* more than a metaphor have centered around two basic approaches to theory-building: the inductive and the deductive. The inductive mode has come to dominate partly because of historical accident and partly because of the abstractness of the assumptions and the mechanics necessitated by the deductive mode. Thus, although some of the most original and important work in political analysis in the last three decades has come from deductive theorists (Kenneth Arrow won the Nobel Prize, in part, for his work on democratic constitutions), it has been relatively inaccessible to students and classical political scientists.

In the last several years, a few books have been published to provide a wider audience with the research of deductive analysts. In 1973, Riker and Ordeshook published *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* which remains the most comprehensive treatment of deductive theory construction. However, since the understanding of some topics requires knowledge of finite mathematics and calculus, the uninitiated must look elsewhere for a basic exposition of deductive political analysis. Frohlich's and Oppenheimer's *Modern Political Economy* (1978), Frey's *Modern Political Economy* (1978), Mueller's *Public Choice* (1979), and Brams' *Game Theory and Politics* (1975) and *Paradoxes in Politics* (1976) provide valuable, relatively non-technical discussions of the research of the two clusters of literature that define the approach—those of economics and game theory.

Robert Abrams' *Foundations of Political Analysis* helps mark, in some respects, the "coming of age" of the approach. The deductive literature has evolved from mimeograph, to specialized monograph, to Riker and Ordeshook to books of a textbook nature. Abrams' work is a successful attempt by someone familiar with the deductive literature to translate complex work into a form accessible to graduate and upper-level undergraduates. It is an attempt to "talk to the discipline" rather than to an "invisible college" of initiated practitioners. A key question has been whether the basic methodology and findings of the approach can be communicated without finite mathematics and calculus. Abrams' work shows that it can.

There is very little new or original in *Foundations;* the virtue of the book lies in its simplicity and clarity of presentation. Abrams illustrates the great empirical range of the approach and the cumulative nature of the research by distilling the "classics" of Arrow, Black, Downs, von Neumann and Morgenstern, Olson, Riker, Tullock and Buchanan and the reconceptualization and refinement of their work by others. The topics dealt with lie at the core of traditional political theory and political science—voting, parties, constitutions, power, bargaining, the just society, political leadership, coalition formation, and democracy.

Abrams intelligibly introduces the reader to the major variants of deductive theory—game theory, coalition theory, collective goods theory, spatial modeling, and axiomatic choice theory, using only set notation, algebra and graphs.

The book is not without weaknesses. The discussion of game theory contains several highly questionable assertions. Abrams states that in game theory "cardinal utility has been accepted without question" (p. 340). The issue of cardinality has long troubled game theorists and the work of several leading practitioners (Brams, Howard) has relied in large part on ordinal rankings. Also, Abrams states that prisoner's dilemma "requires an external coordinating or coercive force in order to bring about mutually desired outcomes" (p. 343). Howard's extensive work in metagame theory (and Brams' and Wittman's more recent work on nonmyopic equilibria) demonstrates the opposite.

In his final chapter, Abrams attempts to integrate the many strands of the approach. He points out, as have others, that many of the issues dealt with by one strand can be translated into another; for example, the spatial model process of electoral choice can be formulated as a non-cooperative 2-person game defined on an n-dimensional issue space. However, Abrams fails to demonstrate his claims that the disparate results of positive political theory can be related into a unified theory and that *therefore* the political processes these theories attempt to explain are also "structurally" related

(p. 345). Nonetheless, I share Abrams' belief that the positive theory approach will emerge as the preeminent orientation in political science—that it will provide the paradigm for the discipline.

I would suggest that, given its value as an introductory exposition, *Foundations,* although not strictly a textbook, should be used as such. For instructional purposes, the book can be used with the "classics" themselves, specialized synthetic works such as Brams' and learning modules such as Merrill's UMAP module on voting systems.

However, if the work of deductive theorists is to be fully understood, appreciated and applied, there must be a greater integration of mathematical/economic and political science training. The exposure to the reasoning of economics and game theory will take on added significance as the deductive approach to the burgeoning subfield of policy analysis gains ascendancy.

DOUGLAS MUZZIO

Baruch College,
City University of New York

Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory. By Walter L. Adamson. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. x + 304. $20.00.)

This is an important book. Gramsci's niche in the Marxist Pantheon is secured and assured by scholars whose concern is "Western Marxism" as distinct from the "Marxist-Leninist" variant. The history of Marxist theory has convinced Walter Adamson that "there exists an unambiguous . . . tradition of what Merleau-Ponty called 'Western Marxism' " (p. 3).

Adamson shows convincingly that Gramsci's own intellectual development was shaped by the inherited conglomerate of Nietzsche, Croce, and Hegel. It not only saved Gramsci from the perdition of "totalitarian" Marxism, but also helped him to develop the "first version" of a Western Marxist alternative. The inherited conglomerate may have deflected Gramsci from Stalinism. But the prison cell, more than anything else, provided Gramsci's Socratic moment to create *fur ewig.* Tracing the Marxist thought to the heritage of Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, Adamson notes some interesting parallels between Gramsci's "reappropriation" (p. 133) of Marx and Georg Lukács' "road" to Marx.

Undeniably, to Gramsci and Lukács the cultural hegemony was a basic and prior condition of attaining political power. Gramsci dreamed of a Marxism based on the synthesis of humanism and Reformation, yielding a culture that would be "European and World-wide" (*Works* 2: 200). Cultural hegemony as means to political power, however, contradicts Lenin's technical prescription that political power must be seized where circumstances allow it.

Somewhat incongruently with his own interpretation, Adamson declares Gramsci a "Leninist" (p. 100). Equally strange, the influence of Christianity on Gramsci's thinking receives no mention. Yet both Lukács and Gramsci were impressed by the ideological strength of Christianity. Gramsci in particular acknowledged the Church's mastery over human conscience.

Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* are the subject of Adamson's most perceptive and original analysis. Nor is it difficult to see why. In prison, Gramsci was free to compose his *Cogito, ergo Marxismus.* In Moscow, Lukács wrote his *Sentio, ergo Stalinismus.* Adamson is correct to note a certain "historical closure" in Lukács' Marxism (p. 138). Nor would any reader of the *Notebooks* fail to notice that Gramsci's quest for the "autonomy" of politics owes more to Machiavelli than to Marx. To revitalize Machiavelli and yet adhere to Marx's "economic factor" analysis is contradictory. Adamson sees the contradiction, but misjudges its source. If Gramsci subscribed to Marx's concept of human nature, then this, more than anything else, invalidates Gramsci's neo-Machiavellian claim for the "autonomy" of politics.

Ironically, by far the most provocative part of the book is tucked away in the conclusion. This is unfortunate because it contains a minor essay, which ought to be read by all students of Marxism, on Gramsci's political theory and its place in Western political thought. Given the paramount importance of the issues involved, the conclusion should have become a separate chapter, particularly since the conclusion is rather fragmentary and inconclusive.

One would like to know, for instance, just how Gramsci embodied Western political theory's "classical quest for the good city" which, we are told, is the historical pathway to communism (p. 232). Classical Marxism indeed stands at a curious "intersection in modern European intellectual history." The "sociologizing" of human understanding is one intersection Adamson associates, among others, with Tocqueville—the exemplar sociologist. To a degree, this will do. But eminent precursor of the Marxist "transformative method" Tocqueville was not. Despite his undeniable sociological insights, Tocqueville was also a moralist like Pascal and Rousseau who, incidentally, strained, if he did not constrain, Tocqueville's sociological vision.

There are some minor errata. Gramsci reached Moscow in May 1922, not June (p. 75). As for Gramsci's criticism of "vulgar Marxism" (p. 86), readers should be informed that it originated during Gramsci's stay in Vienna. Vienna of the mid-1920s was the hothouse of anti-positivism and the epicenter of European Marxism. Gramsci was in Vienna, as was Lukács, when Lenin died and one can measure the importance of this event by comparing Gramsci's and Lukács' assessment of Lenin.

Though the book is jargon-free and lucidly written, some concepts are left undefined. What, for instance, is "historic bloc"? And to the uninitiated, "pragmotological dialectic" and "pragmatological Marxism" may carry as much meaning as the Pythia's Delphic utterances (*boai*) to the non-Greeks. But these are negligible flaws in an otherwise compelling scholarly work. Adamson sees in Gramsci's political theory the possibility of "democratic and historically serviceable" theory within Marxism (p. 244). The "serviceable" part of Marxism is its "ethical impulse," postponed indefinitely by the sociological and technological bias of Soviet Communism. Nor is Marx exempt from Adamson's stricture. Though Marx, he notes, endorsed the unity of ethics and politics, he took a Machiavellian shortcut to ethics. The rest, as the cliché has it, is history.

ARPAD KADARKAY

University of Puget Sound

Power and Politics in Organizations: The Social Psychology of Conflict, Coalitions, and Bargaining. By Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1980. Pp. xviii + 249. $15.95.)

Like a tender-hearted drunk, this book is very good, within limits. Its spirit is shown in formal theories explicated, using the authors' naming: social exchange, power-dependence, coalition (power, minimum resource, bargaining, weighted probability model, ideological distance models), game, equiity, level-of-aspiration, tactical action, power-distance-reduction, balance, coercion, subjective-expected-utility, deterrence, attribution, the conflict-spiral idea, a network metaphor. The ultimate goal is a value-free, quantitative, predictive, empirically based, deductively developed, universally valid behavioral science of organizations. It requires a particular social science faith.

Abstract and formal, the book proceeds by critical analysis of (mainly social psychology) theories. Empirical studies on which generalizations rest are rarely given. It presents 111 hypotheses to be tested by research. The first is: "The smaller the power difference between U and the prospective ML coalition, the greater the inclination of U to form a coalition with M or L" (p. 70; [U,M,L: upper, middle, and lower hierarchical level subgroups]). Reasoning is clever, but sometimes puzzling, e.g., "The greater the external pressure on the organization, the greater the probability of integrative bargaining between conflicting coalitions" (p. 112). Presumably external pressure sometimes units, sometimes leads to dog-eat-dog. Hypotheses are severed from history, circumstances, institutions, cultures. Bacharach and Lawler apply to organizations the "abstract, formal treatments of coalition action" of social psychology, but without linking observations to "particular organizational contexts" (pp. 45, 217). Much analysis seems not specific to organizations.

Social interaction as exchange is central. It requires both parties to believe they will benefit, i.e., reciprocation rests on parties' self-interests. In social exchange theory, "power becomes the heart of the sociological enterprise" (p. 21). Organizational politics is mostly in the realm of influence (informal, multi-directional), not authority (formally specified). The power of an actor is a function of the other's dependence, continually negotiable. The greater one's dependence on the opponent, the greater one's concessions, the less tough one's tactics. Tactics are efforts to improve one's power position, but power inequalities resist change.

Coalitions are two or more interest groups joined against others. Coalition theory provides "a set of basic predictions embedded in a very abstract, content-free, idealized model" (p. 66). It is applicable to competing nations, political parties, unions; the authors' innovation is to apply it within hierarchical organizations. Their example is an organization trisected into upper management, middle management, and lower level (workers). They hope to create a "theory of *organizational* coalitions" (p. 67).

Interest groups are "natural" groupings of persons in similar occupational categories or an organizational unit, while coalitions are "mobilized" political units not based on deeply grounded common interests. Interest groups decide whether and with whom to form coalitions, based on "subjective expected utility" (expectations of gain to themselves). Interest group politics is likelier in nonroutine (professional) occupations, because professionals control more resources (knowledge) than routine workers do, so may not need coalition to improve their power position.

Bargaining within and among coalitions of interest groups is the form taken by intraorganizational conflict. (Game theory roughly conveys the analytic mode.) Bargaining is a series of tactical moves and countermoves by each party to maximize its gains. Coercion (capability to threaten or actually punish) may be a part of bargaining, though problems inhere, e.g., a threat binds the user. Formal organizations are ultimately based on coercion, and their structure may be termed "a set of legitimized threats" (p. 195).

Bacharach and Lawler distinguish their work as a political analysis of organizations. Responding to industrial psychology and organizational sociology, they emphasize conflict among subgroups, not cooperation and subordination to authority. Actors within an organization continually bargain, form and reshape coalitions, use influence tactics. Politics is power; it is "a series of competitive tactical encounters" (p. 7).

Whether or not an organization is a political system is not deeply considered here. If the state is too constricted a focus for politics, power conflict is too ill-specified a definition. The larger political system and the public are absent from this book. Purpose enters essentially as utilitarian calculation of self-interest, though probably there is unease with protracted aggressive conflict, as threatening an organization. Ambitious and scholarly, this "paradigm of intraorganizational politics" (p. ix) seems oddly distant from the phenomena, and silent concerning the professional literature and thought concerned with politics and public administration. Organizational social psychology has its limits.

LEWIS C. MAINZER

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science. By Steven R. Brown. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 355. $35.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

This treatise is designed to justify, explain and illustrate the uses of Q methodology in political science. It is not a methods text in the usual sense, although it could be used for that purpose. It devotes a great deal of attention to justification, but that is understandable in light of the controversy that this methodology has generated since its development by William Stephenson.

Certainly this book is as thorough an elucidation of Q methodology as one could ask for. It is clearly written and composed in such a fashion as to be understandable by readers with only a basic knowledge of methodology in general. More technical matters are not neglected, but are placed in a series of appendices at the end of the work. The book is an ideal introduction to this subject, especially for political scientists; but I expect that those with exposure to this methodology will find it worth reading.

Among four main chapters, the first two can be described as "meta-methodological." They contain a general description of the methodology, emphasizing its philosophical and epistemological bases. Differences between Q and "R" methodology are spelled out in detail, and criticisms of Q methodology are taken on directly. The third chapter encompasses nearly half of the book and reviews a wide variety of applications (e.g., public opinion and attitudes, decision making, literature, imagery, personality, etc.). The discussions of these applications serve not only to illustrate the range of uses, but are often thorough enough to be useful to scholars who may be interested in applications of the methodology in their own work. The fourth chapter involves "technique and method" and is a non-technical discussion of how to design a Q sample, select respondents, collect data and analyze and interpret the results. A basic discussion of factor-analysis techniques is included that should be comprehensible to those with no previous exposure to factor analysis.

This book should do a great deal to reduce the confusion about differences between Q and R methodology. Brown especially emphasizes that Q methodology is far more than a special way of factoring a data matrix. It also involves administration of series of statements to be ranked by subjects, providing "intensive" analyses of small numbers of cases vis-à-vis the "extensive" analyses of the conventional R methodology. However, whether this book will convince the critics of Q methodology is another matter.

The generalizability of findings has been a major source of criticism for Q methodology, and on this subject Brown says: "Generalizations in Q, unlike those in surveys, are not best thought of in terms of sample and universe, but in terms of *specimen* and *type*" (p. 67). "To criticize Q techniques for its inability to generalize [to whole populations] is akin to criticizing surveys because they cannot predict individual behavior" (p. 126 n.). "Both intensive and extensive observational analyses are necessary for a complete analysis, the two working hand in glove" (p. 156). Nevertheless, it seems to me that some of Brown's interpretations of a study designed to illustrate how to interpret Q methodological studies approximate the kind of "extensive" generalizations that Q methodology is supposedly not designed to allow. (See pp. 247-258.)

Another issue of some importance is the role of theory and the notions of causality in this methodology. With regard to causality, Brown says "in interdependency analysis [characteristic of Q methodology] there is no a priori distinction among variables [with regard to independence and dependence], each being considered of equal importance" (p. 56). Brown also emphasizes that the subject in Q methodology controls the outcome of the results to a greater extent than in R methodology, and some of his statements suggest that the theoretical perspective of the investigator is relatively inconsequential: "It is one thing to 'put' something to a subject, as in the form of scale items; it is quite another to allow the subject to speak for himself" (pp. 454-45). On the other hand, a "universe" of items must be defined by the investigator, presumably on the basis of his own theoretical perspective. Indeed, "the selection of statements or other stimuli for inclusion in a Q sample is of utmost importance but remains more an art than a science. . ." (p. 186). And in general, "Phenomena can naturally be viewed from different theoretical standpoints, the elements of observation being assigned different theoretical meanings or significance depending on the observer's frame of reference" (p. 165).

This is not a fair sample of Brown's arguments and statements on this issue, but I am not convinced that the book as a whole produces a coherent picture. Of course, readers will have to make their own judgments on these and other controversies surrounding Q methodology. But it is certain that this work is provocative enough to be of interest to anyone interested in the "scientific" study of human behavior.

TED W. MECKSTROTH

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory. By John Dunn. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp. x + 355. $34.50.)

A new book from John Dunn—whose demonstrated intelligence, integrity and literary skill have produced a study as fine as his *The Political Thought of John Locke* (Cambridge, 1969)—is always a welcome event. To be sure, the present volume is not (mainly) new: indeed, it is a collection of extraordinarily various essays—on consent in Locke's philosophy, on the reception of Lockeanism in colonial America, on political theory as something vacillating between inept history and bad philosophy, on MacPherson's efforts to "retrieve" democratic theory, on the success and failure of revolutions, on politics in Ghana and Sri Lanka—published in a half-dozen journals and books over a dozen years. And it may be the wish to *impose* order and coherence on this assortment which yields the rather aggressive assertiveness of the introduction, as well as the slightly artificial grouping of the philosophy pieces under the general heading, "The Historicity of the Questions," and of the Ghana, Sri Lanka and revolution essays under "The Historicity of the Answers."

"Historicity" may not be enough of a bond to hold this collection together—though several of the pieces in it, individually very fine, forcefully restate Dunn's familiar view that most "historians" of political thought are *poor* historians who fancy that all the members of the Great Tradition, from Plato to Rawls, coexist and converse in a timeless *nunc stans.* Ironically, it is probably Dunn's *insistence* on "historicity" which is the most troublesome feature of the one wholly new piece in the book (and the only one that can be treated here)—a long and repetitious but thought-provoking and bracingly independent essay called "Political Obligations and Political Possibilities."

Near the end (p. 293) of this new essay, Dunn asserts that "political duties are acts in relation to the political realm which an agent has a good reason to perform." This argument, which makes "duty" and "good reason" coextensive, seems at first to be close to Stephen Toulmin (*The Place of Reason in Ethics,* Cambridge, 1950), or to Geoffrey Grice (*The Grounds of Moral Judgement,* Cambridge, 1967), or even to Isaiah Berlin—though far indeed from Dunn's own assertion (at pp. 30-31) that "any general theory" of "political duty" must "be a compound of sociological banality and ethical truism." This last passage makes one wonder how good (or reasonable) Dunn's "good reasons" for political duty can be: and that wonder is intensified when he insists (p. 289) that even if people as "historical agents" have "comprehensively critical evaluative rationality" at their disposal, this still "cannot suffice to direct them in political theory, where the central question is always what they have good reason to do," and that "what historical agents have good reason to do depends, *inter alia,* on what, within a scheme of beliefs which is truly theirs, they have good reason to judge efficacious." Here, of course, "good reasons" have stopped being coextensive with "duty," and have turned into what *seems* good to particular historical agents—perhaps inevitably, if "evaluative rationality" (whose relation to "good reasons" is never specified) *cannot* "direct" political conduct.

Now one sees why Dunn wants to insist on "historical agents" and "their" reasons: it is, after all, his conviction that "no one can have rational duties which require their holding comprehensively different beliefs and values from those which they do"; such a requirement, in Dunn's view, would amount to "a proposal to the agent to become someone else, to . . . escape from history." But Dunn, on the other hand, *wants* reasons for political obligation to be (really) good:

he does not countenance all reasons, however historically real. He insists, for example, that "vigorously corrective theories of value" (such as those of Plato, Rousseau, Hobbes, Kant and Marx) seek to "*alter* an agent's estimate of his or her rational political duties by altering their normative attitudes"; and he goes on to argue that these "vigorously corrective" theories are most likely to be helpful in "the identification of intrinsically deplorable types of social institution or social relationships (slavery, the subjection of females to males, the capitalist mode of production or the dictatorship of the proletariat as thus far institutionalized)."

Dunn, moreover, says flatly that the obligation to "recognize" the "moral odiousness" of such institutions at least "might" be a "cognitive duty" which would be ignored only by those who "prefered to avert their eyes from the . . . moral demerits of arrangements which suited their convenience." Here, then, plainly, even "historical agents" *ought* to abandon certain beliefs and values, though they are "theirs"; they ought (to that extent) to "become someone else." Dunn is caught between the belief that some "vigorously corrective" moralities "might" indeed reveal "odious" and "deplorable" institutions which all people have a "good reason" to shun or dismantle, and his (historical) belief that people's "good reasons" need to be "truly theirs" (and perhaps more "theirs" than "good"). Given these tensions, it is scarcely surprising that Dunn should conclude that "the prospects for a theory of rational political obligation" are "beyond hope," not because "there is nothing for such a theory to be about" but because "there is so much that such a theory has to be about."

It is possible that in his notion of "so much" Dunn has included *too* much; that he is the victim of his own double view of political philosophy. In understanding a "past philosophical performance" (e.g., Locke's), he insists, one must grasp historical genesis and truth status equally: "The only account . . . which could be said to be complete at any one time must comprise the complete Skinnerian story of its genesis *and* the best available assessment of its truth status." But in getting people to abandon values and beliefs which are "odious" and "deplorable," must not history be cast away, not clung to? Is the correct *understanding* of "past philosophical performances"—giving equal weight to history and to truth—transferable to the correct *evaluation* of our (present) obligations? Should one have the same reverence for one's own past that historians have for the past of others? In determining what we *ought* to do, does "genesis" let there be light?

PATRICK RILEY

University of Wisconsin

The Technological System. By Jacques Ellul. Trans. by Joachim Neugroschel. (New York: Continuum, 1980. Pp. vi + 362. $19.50.)

When Jacques Ellul burst upon the intellectual scene with *The Technological Society* (Knopf, 1964), he did much to set off the whole contemporary debate on the place of technology in modern life. Since then the French lawyer/historian has continued to pour out a stream of books and articles on social and theological issues. He has now returned to his major theme, the technological domination of the modern world.

The Technological System is a maddening book to read or review. It is typically modern French in its method as well as its perspective, consisting largely of a rambling philosophical commentary on the opinions of various theorists who have addressed the problems which concern the author, and it deliberately avoids taking a clear position on the basic issues. As Ellul himself writes in a footnote:

> That is why . . . I refuse to present my thinking in the form of a theory or in a systematic fashion. I am making a dialectical ensemble that is open and not closed and I am making sure not to present solutions of the ensemble, response to problems, theoretical outlets for the future. If I did do these things, I too would be contributing to the technological totalization. But my not doing them leaves the reader dissatisfied and makes it seem that by refusing, I must *therefore* be hostile to technology (p. 344).

Though he refuses to try to define his subject in a clear, simple fashion, it can easily be inferred that what Ellul is talking about is all rationalization of life. Not only is organization a technology, but also so is "speed reading" (p. 26) and the "Kama Sutra" (p. 174). Quite literally, everything which exists or happens in the modern world is technological for Ellul and hence part of a technological system:

> Total technization occurs when every aspect of human life is subjected to control and manipulation, to experimentation and observation, so that a demonstrable efficiency is achieved everywhere. . . . "Detechnicization" is impossible. The scope of the system is such that we cannot hope to go back (p. 82).

The "technological phenomena" is characterized by its autonomy, unity, universality, and totalization and "technological progress" is marked by self-augmentation, automatism, causal progression and the absence of finality, and the problem of acceleration (all of these are chapter headings). The modern state cannot be a democracy, because democracy and technology are ultimately antithetical, since technology renders impossible the political choices which are the essence of self-government as one can choose only among possibilities presented by technology and thus there is no fundamental difference between Western democratic and other regimes. Ellul denies he is anti-technological, since many desirable qualities are not incompatible with advanced technology:

> One should not view the technological system as manufacturing human robots. On the contrary, it develops those things on which we make our humanity most strongly dependent: diversity, altruism, nonconformity. But they are perfectly integrated into the system itself (p. 114).

The major problem which Ellul's new book raises is the same as that raised by *The Technological Society*. If technology is so all-inclusive, what else is there? On this he is not clear, though he occasionally provides hints. Technology is an environment which has replaced the natural environment, but this in itself is not normative (p. 47). (Actually Ellul is personally a convinced Christian of Calvinist proclivities, and one cannot thoroughly understand his political positions without reading his theological writings). What makes man human is apparently many things:

> Men prospered . . . [in] an active relationship . . . of mutually gratifying exchange with a human and natural environment full of difficulties, temptations, hard choices, challenges, surprises, unexpected rewards (p. 314).

But above all there must be the ability to make meaningful choices, including the ability to renounce technology as such:

> This is the central issue. It is by establishing voluntary limits that man sets himself up as man. The sole act of authentic, verifiable and concrete control of technology would be to set limits to its development (p. 355, n.).

Ellul seems very pessimistic about this possibility, for to do so man would have to reach "a peak of collective spiritual independence" (p. 225).

The Technological System is a difficult book not simply because of its disorganized, nonlinear style but because it is full of loose statements both particular and general. Also, it is marred by misspellings of both common words and proper nouns (Macluhan appears several times). But it remains, despite all that has been said, important and probably necessary reading for all political scientists and others concerned with technology or the modern world, since Ellul does have something important and original to say. In it he promises us a further work, a study of the "dysfunctions" of the technological system (pp. 15, 236). One can only hope that it will be somewhat more careful, coherent and better produced than the book at hand.

VICTOR FERKISS

Georgetown University

Self, Society, and Womankind: The Dialectic of Liberation. By Kathy E. Ferguson. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 200. $22.95.)

The founding of the Women's Caucus in Political Science a decade ago was the organizational part of an effort by women political scientists to increase their capacity for self-definition. Since then, a number of women have sought increased intellectual self-definition by attempting to formulate a compelling yet liberating feminist theory. Whether that is ultimately possible, or whether a feminist approach inevitably entails only a partial view is not yet clear. What is certain, though, is that feminist exploration and explanation have gone far beyond liberalism's "I/me too" and the hyphenation of Marxist-feminist/feminist-Marxist thought. Kathy Ferguson's *Self, Society and Womankind* is an analysis of oppression from a feminist perspective which draws upon the socio-psychological thought of George Herbert Mead. Any course in modern political thought which considers this clearly written volume will be enriched.

Ferguson sees the view of self, the relationship between "I" and "me," as central. She argues that Mead actually offered two views of the I/me relationship. The first, she says, ends in a socially determined self which cannot accommodate liberation. The second incorporates individual creativity and also social control; this view she finds useful. Its essence is its incorporation of both sociality and process.

Sociality makes it possible for the individual to take on the attitude of the generalized other toward herself or himself; it also makes it possible to think and to discourse. Yet "the self" is not the unit of analysis; Mead's unit is social acts (which necessarily *relate* subject and object) and his focus is on the ongoing process of development represented in those acts.

Useful as Mead's theory is, Ferguson finds it limited because it fails to provide an adequate basis for value choice, and because it does not confront the nature of institutions and the power they wield.

In her analysis, Ferguson pursues the concepts of power and domination which Mead neglected. Both are missing in his account because he limited his analysis of socialization to one describing the cognitive interaction between equals. Ferguson argues that the generalized other in fact embodies power and, moreover, that individuals acquire and maintain power through the institutional positions they hold. Thus, some individuals are able to define the situation in which they act and some are not; some must try out and respond to the perspectives of others and some need not. In addition, institutions perpetuate and reinforce the power which some have that others do not.

According to Ferguson, the achievement of liberation requires two things: the capacity to define the self and the capacity to take the role of the other. Freedom is required but so is compassion. In liberation, self-definition and taking the other's perspective become "two moments of the same process" (p. 122). These conditions for liberation (freedom and compassion), then, exist in a dialectical relationship which is fulfilled when they achieve unity.

In placing her work in its contemporary setting, Ferguson distinguishes her interpretation of Mead from that of Irving Zeitlin by arguing that Mead's processual self cannot be merged with Freud's instinctual self. She also examines critically the interpretations of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and that of Richard Ropers which attempt to integrate Meadian concepts and a Marxian analysis.

In conclusion, Ferguson compares her view of womankind based on Mead with Simone de Beauvoir's existentialist description. De Beauvoir sees women as men's "other"—as a necessary but not equal "other" which confirms him but does not challenge or oppose him (p. 142). The fact that women and men require each other may make mutuality theoretically possible, but de Beauvoir nevertheless associates transcendence with men only; also, she clearly values transcendence over what she terms women's immanence. To de Beauvoir, women's liberation requires the adoption of maleness. Ferguson understands why de Beauvoir makes this argument but she does not accept it. At the same time she does not underestimate the difficulty of self-definition when the very process for its attainment (adoption of the perspective of the generalized other) undermines and discourages it. Nor does she underestimate the trap compassion has become for women. Ferguson maintains her hope, though, that while women work to achieve legal and economic independence, they can also begin to reject the male-defined view of them represented by the generalized "other." The means to this, she thinks, are increased sociality, increased access to a variety of perspectives, and shared experience. While men's liberation will be a part of the human liberation Ferguson ultimately seeks, she does not subscribe to the manipulation of men by appealing to their self-interest, nor does she suggest that the asymmetry of contemporary sex roles results in an equally sad result for both sexes.

Ferguson's work explains why the psychological oppression of being defined by others is serious and how it is deeply rooted in the structure and distribution of power. Unfortunately, those who fancy themselves "more radical" often dismiss genuine manifestations of that oppression as mere fretting by the privileged.

JUDITH HICKS STIEHM

University of Southern California

Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism. By Michael Freeman. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. 250. $21.00.)

Edmund Burke continues to intrigue scholars, as the steady flow of books about him shows. This is one of the better recent studies of his political thought. It is superior to Frank O'Gorman's *Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy* (Allen & Unwin, 1973), which regards Burke as "essentially a practical politician and a propagandist" (p. 11) and much superior to Isaac Kramnick's *The Rage of Edmund Burke* (Basic Books, 1977), which explains Burke's political theory by psychoanalyzing him. Freeman pays Burke the respect of taking his thought seriously.

His particular concern is to "assess the important and, I believe, underrated contribution made by Edmund Burke . . . to the solution of the scientific and moral problems raised by modern revolutions" (p. 6). Burke, he finds, "was a much better sociologist of revolution than is usually recognized" (p. 243). Freeman's exposition of Burke's analysis of revolution is the strongest part of his book.

The book's title is a bit misleading since it is more a critique of Burke's conservatism than a presentation of his critique of political radicalism. It is a curious lacuna in the work that Freeman does not bother to tell us what was the radical political ideology that Burke attacked. "Nowhere in his works," says Freeman, "can we find a scrupulous account of the ideas or actions of any particular radical thinker or politician" (p. 237). That is substantially true. But it is also true that Burke had a definite ideology in mind, knew people who advocated it, such as Thomas Paine, and told his readers what it was, however unscrupulous he may have been in attributing it indiscriminately to English advocates of parliamentary reform and sympathizers with the French Revolution.

Freeman's failure to explain the theory that Burke opposed leaves him concentrating on a step-by-step criticism of Burke's own conservative theory. The criticism is marred in spots by a penchant for purple phraseology. For example: "Burke's metaphysics collapsed under the impact of the French Revolution" (p. 25); "At this stage, Burke's conservatism changes to panic" (p. 127); "He disguises the vacuity of the argument by arbitrarily calling English property law 'the pattern of nature' " (p. 19).

Freeman is also at times more quick than perhaps he should be to find Burke inconsistent. It is not that Burke was immune to this fault. But time after time Freeman discovers "inconsistencies" in Burke that do not meet the eye, at least not mine. Thus he has Burke bogged down in self-contradiction for denouncing British despotism in America, India and Ireland, while holding that the unity of the British Empire was a benefit to all its parts (pp. 143-47). But this means only that Burke advocated a policy of enlightened and benevolent imperialism. Whether his policy, if adopted, would have worked and whether even then it would have been morally justified are debatable questions. But the policy was not in any obvious sense self-contradictory and inconsistent.

These, however, are blemishes on an otherwise careful and intelligent piece of work. It is a serious effort at understanding Burke's thought and has the merit of pointing out ways in which it is relevant to our own revolutionary age.

FRANCIS CANAVAN

Fordham University

The Frontiers of Political Theory: Essays in a Revitalised Discipline. Edited by Michael Freeman and David Robertson. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 308. $32.50.)

This collection of nine essays is something of a ragbag: "The editors deliberately made no attempt to put together a homogeneous selection" (p. ix). But, while the various chapters are unrelated, the revitalized frontiersmen who wrote them share an affiliation with the Essex Department of Government. Essex, we learn, has a "deliberately modern ethos" (p. ix), boldly advertised in the book's title. Unrivaled up-to-dateness, or so the editors tell us in their introductory essay, is the one quality the assembled essays have in common. This introduction, unfortunately, is the saddest patch in a motley volume. The editors seem to have no grasp of English syntax. They also exhibit little understanding for the essays which they commissioned and which they pretend to summarize.

The volume proper begins with a playful polemic by Benjamin Barber entitled "Deconstituting Politics: Robert Nozick and Philosophical Reductionism." Barber deploys all the standard "realistic" arguments against Nozick's flimsy fiction of the pre-social individual: if the concept of "autonomy" is going to be useful for political theory, it must refer to freedom *in* society and not freedom *from* society; the idea of a purely "voluntary choice" is hard to reconcile with what we otherwise know about the cultural and institutional factors that influence the development of an individual's preferences; it makes little sense to suggest that the "state" is the sole source of rights-violating interference, given the multitude of powerful groups and organizations operating in extra-political (misleadingly labeled "private") sectors of society. Barber, however, seems unduly confident that his all-purpose remedy of "public citizenship" or "democratic community" can resolve the problem that Nozick has exposed: the intractable *conflict* between our ideal of "just transfer" and our ideal of "just distribution." David Miller's "Social Justice and the Principle of Need" is flawed by a similar demand that we "re-establish our sense of community" (p. 194) as a means for combating "the values of capitalism" (p. 192). Capitalism, Miller informs us, fosters the optical illusion that society as a whole is a "voluntary association." It is even said to dupe us into believing that the individual is "an independent monad who contracts for everything he receives" (p. 191). Miller dispels this capitalist mirage with the keen insight that "society . . . is not a voluntary association" (p. 193). It is too bad that such silliness should be allowed to distract from Miller's more interesting and arguable claims: that income redistribution for relief of the poor should be conceived as a matter of "justice" rather than of "mere humanity," if only because the latter principle makes welfare payments seem a degrading stigma; and that only shared membership in a national community can transform one individual's needs into a claim of justice upon another. On the basis of this second claim, Miller defends the controversial thesis that in questions concerning redistribution of resources on the basis of need, there can be no "justice" across national boundaries, but only relations of prudence and humanity (p. 195).

John Gray has written a moderately useful (though somewhat garbled) survey of several recent articles on "negative liberty." If liberals want to hold onto their intuition that the "contented slave" is unfree, they may be forced to abandon their meticulously preserved impartiality toward rival conceptions of the good life. Gray believes this to be the case, and thus he does not hesitate to regale us with his very own idea of "the *necessary form* of a human life" (p. 95). Another useful, if limited essay is Peter Morriss' "The

Essentially Uncontested Concepts of Power." Morriss organizes his study around a simple dichotomy between "power over" (or influence) and "power to" (or ability). He blames much of the confusion in recent theories of power on a careless blurring of this distinction. Patrick Riley provides an artful debunking of Alexander Kojeve, who turns out to have been a slipshod historian of ideas and "not any sort of Marxist in a strict sense" (p. 246). David Robertson insists that Dworkin's "rights' jurisprudence" cannot eliminate but can only camouflage the role of judicial discretion in hard cases. Ernesto Laclau, the volume's token Althusserian, shares with the world his audacious and heterodox view that politics cannot be reduced to economics. In a long, rambling monologue, Kenneth Macdonald chides political theorists for ignoring the existence of time: "The argument of the present paper is that temporal order is not a discountable fact" (p. 153); while Michael Freeman blazes another frontier trail by assaulting the "naive and mechanical empiricist methodology" (p. 54) that, in his opinion, has made the subject of "revolution" disappear from contemporary social theory.

This haphazard compilation of essays reads like an average issue of a political theory journal. There is no decisive reason why it should not have been published as a book. But perhaps there is no overwhelming reason why it should have been.

STEPHEN HOLMES

Harvard University

Theories of Organizations: Form, Process, and Transformation. By Jerald Hage. (New York: John Wiley, 1980. Pp. xxi + 558. $24.95.)

The best aspects of this book are that it cites and characterizes a tremendous amount of literature in organizational behavior and treats subject matter so that anyone interested in a particular topic may get ideas that will prove useful for research. It is difficult to find that the book accomplishes much beyond that. On the other hand, how much it seems to accomplish perhaps depends upon the reader's philosophy of research. The book's philosophy, which may be correct, suggests that if we just write and talk about a subject enough, some theoretical good will eventually come of it.

Even so, there might profitably have been some careful, probing analysis of what subjects are worth talking about. In this book, however, a vast range of little topics are considered fair game, and equally deserving. One gets little sense of what is major and what is minor, or which directions are likely to bear theoretical fruit. As one of the larger examples, a great deal of the book is taken up with what some would consider the agonizingly dull, tired, and fruitless pursuit of cross-sectional relationships among aspects of centralization, formalization, and specialization. On the other hand, a statement of immense possible interest and importance appearing in the midst of one of these discussions is abandoned without further treatment: *"This is nontrivial and supports the idea that organizations keep tending to centralize, all other things being equal."* There might be some responsible narrowing on the basis of theoretical needs and payoffs. The responsibility for such narrowing can justifiably be expected to lie in those works which scan a field in perspective, such as those on theories of organizations.

Within topics, Hage tends to assume that citing studies that deal with an aspect of a problem contributes to its solution. In most cases, tight solutions to problems are not given in this book, nor of course do they appear in the literature cited. There is, for example, the problem of whether the particularism-universalism of the dominant coalition explains certain organizational goals, in connection with which one is referred to whole literatures on professionalism and on cosmopolitans and locals (p. 147). Another is how coalitions form: "A large literature in cross-cutting statuses can be applied to this problem" (p. 93). Unfortunately, the same practice tends to be followed for studies rendered in greater detail. The author is too easy on us researchers. Hage considers too much to be a contribution on a topic without nailing down hard just what function the piece of research really performs. Hage is most kind, but somewhat undiscriminating.

The motivating force is apparently Hage's belief that a new theory, or "thesis," can be produced by synthesizing the work already published —that the wealth of admittedly inconsistent and divergent findings can be synthesized into a grand picture (p. 105). But the reader will be far from convinced that the complexity has been mastered, with parsimonious theoretical statements distilled from it. The most that is gained through this approach is numerous divisions and subdivisions under which to talk about organizational research, such as "form, process, and transformation" in the book's subtitle, but theories of form, process, etc. are still lacking. In spite of the appearance of the word "theories" in the title, no definition of that term is given; in fact, Hage shifts the focus away from that demanding terminology toward more permissive terms such as "paradigm" and "framework." This shift provides a basis for talking about a variety of loosely related research under a given title without the responsibility for pulling it together in some hard, final statement. Over and over, Hage bumps into an apparently overwhelming complexity in attempted explanation, as most researchers in the field also have done, but one would be hard pressed to say that he has shown us the way through it.

Hage repeatedly says that something is "likely." But a likelihood must either be a powerful insight or an author must specify the conditions under which the phenomenon occurs or the likelihood prevails. Neither tends to be true in Hage's book. The treatment of the effects of worker participation in decision making is typical: "The solution to the need for worker participation can now be given: it is complex and there is no simple yes or no" (p. 99). But that is no solution unless one can say something systematic about when yes and when no. Hage cites a multiplicity of studies leading in the direction of yes or no, but in the last analysis the subject is left in disarray. The disarray is left intact later in the book (pp. 328-29) when he treats the apparently contradictory hypotheses that (a) participation creates conflict and (b) participation produces consensus. Elsewhere he gently criticizes Blau: "In my own opinion, this is a too hierarchical view of organizations. Blau is correct for a certain as yet undetermined percentage of cases. More important in my view" (p. 124), and Hage goes on to give his own perspective on the same phenomenon. But it, too, is correct only for a certain as yet undetermined percentage of cases—the author would not claim otherwise. So all is undetermined, and whatever value there is, in the end, lies primarily in mentioning in one place the miscellany of ideas that people have had on what may be considered one subtopic. When one closes the book, one does not have the feeling that organization theory has been simplified.

Some of the difficulty also lies in the author's not being hard enough on himself. Much looseness is tolerated. There are many definitions, but they are not used to separate material ostensibly or superficially on the same subject. Major terms are not rigorously defined, such as the terms "specialist," "dominant coalition," and "professional values." The most important result of this is to weaken foundations throughout the whole of the book, but it also occasionally flares into more conspicuous lapses such as the following dramatic tautology (pp. 130-31): *"The naked reality—the power reality—is that the preferences of the dominant coalition carry the day;* . . . the dominant coalition's objectives are those of the organization because, by definition, they have the power." But if they have the power only by definition, and are not otherwise identifiable, why call it a naked reality? If their preferences fail to carry the morrow, is that a falsification of theory or a contradiction in terms?

Perhaps by design, the book hews fairly closely to the surface level, even when reporting extended statistical analyses. The reader will find that many statements and hypotheses are sensible and appealing, but it is now well known in this field that the sensible and appealing have a way of crumbling under data. As one example, the author proposes that centralizing authority and communications will decrease the amount and quality of information available for decision making (p. 280). Much of Jay Galbraith's work, however, has shown that in many situations it is eminently possible and desirable to cope with the need for increased information flows, and do it extremely well, by increasing rather than decreasing centralization.

The book contains a long speculative passage on radical innovation that appears sensible yet facile (pp. 189-99). The same is true of the speculative discussion of decision making that makes up chapter 4. One of the core propositions in the integration of this treatise is that "an organization cannot continue to be effective without innovation, production, efficiency, and morale" (p. 44). Perhaps this sounds sensible to some, but the statement is fraught with immense complications. In the end we know (and Hage knows) that with respect to innovation, efficiency, and morale, at least, either the statement is tautological or, if made not to be so, then probably wrong. What was really meant by that proposition? In another place (pp. 87-90), the text glides back and forth between the concepts of centrality, coping with uncertainty, and substitutability on one hand, and expertise and skill on the other, as if they were nearly equivalent. But they are not equivalent, and the value of considering them similar is highly problematic. In short, here is a type of scholarly writing that may cause difficulties for some readers, that sprinkles throughout a high number of apparently innocent but unsystematic or unsupported statements. Some of them may be correct, but no reader has the time or energy to think about more than a few. The effect, for me, was to repeatedly bring up possible reservations, which detracted heavily from the force and persuasiveness of the discussions.

Perhaps it is unfair to blame an author for not writing one book when he perhaps intended to write another. If one reads this volume as an attempt to organize in some fashion much of the organizational research that has been published and to present many of the author's own ideas —the perspectives of one of our senior and venerable organization theorists—then one can certainly see it as a contribution.

LAWRENCE B. MOHR

University of Michigan

Reappraisals of Rousseau: Studies in Honour of R. A. Leigh. Edited by Simon Harvey, Marian Hobson, David Kelley, and Samuel S. B. Taylor. (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1980. Pp. viii + 312. $27.50.)

This *Festschrift,* originally published by the Manchester University Press, marks the occasion of the completion of R. A. Leigh's edition of Rousseau's *Correspondance Complète.* Leigh's *Correspondance* is a remarkable scholarly achievement; for the most part the articles which compose this celebratory volume are not, although the level of interest sustained by the collection is high, though perhaps falling short of the value promised by its inflated price.

There are sixteen papers here, ten in French and six in English. A number of the most prominent British and continental Rousseau scholars are among the authors, including several of those responsible for the Pléiade edition of Rousseau's works, such as Bernard Gagnebin, Robert Derathé, John Spink, Jean Starobinski, and Henri Gouhier. These and the other contributors share a commitment to careful textual scholarship, a critical affection for Rousseau, and a pronounced bias against insufficiently nuanced interpretations. If these "reappraisals" have any connecting thread, it is certainly not a matter of shared method, still less of doctrine; rather, they all reflect a lively taste for discrediting those one-sided caricatures of Jean-Jacques as romantic, revolutionary, neurotic, or whatever, which stand between Rousseau and the contemporary reader. One comes away from these essays without a sharp image of Rousseau in mind, but this is hardly a shortcoming in a volume whose goal is to suggest the richness and complexity of an author more frequently appropriated than read.

The articles are grouped in four sections: ways of feeling and seeing (four papers on the sentiment of existeence and happiness), politics, writing, and intellectual relationships. The section titles are not, however, reliable guides to content, and many of the articles throughout the work are concerned with political issues. Ten of the pieces raise questions about Rousseau's relationship to earlier and later writers. Some of these seem laboriously concerned with the minutiae of historical detective work, such as John Lough's study of possible Rousseauean influences on the authors of articles appearing in the later volumes of the *Encyclopedia,* Gagnebin's argument that Rousseau's conception of law may have had some but not much influence on the authors of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,* and Robert Shackleton's piece on the possibility of the young Rousseau's collaboration in the Dupins' repsonses to Montesquieu.

Others, however, have larger matters squarely in view. Derathé provides an instructive and entertaining account of nineteenth-century misreadings of Rousseau from a variety of points along the political spectrum (by DeBonald, Constant, Comte, and Proudhon), revealing the prevalence, then as now, of the tendency to consider the *Social Contract* through the dark light of each reader's political nightmares. Another example of the way in which detailed literary historical studies can illuminate an important text is Georges Poulet's discussion of early eighteenth-century appearances of the crucial concept of the sentiment of existence. Poulet shows that use of this concept always involved the claim that the transformation of feeling into reverie and the triumph of repose over frenzy are necessary conditions for human happiness, and that it provided the basis for a secular alternative to the more familiarly early modern notion of happiness as activity and acquisition.

Among the other pieces on the concept of happiness, one deserving special mention is Starobinski's characteristically elegant and suggestive paper on the *day* as the unit of happiness. His point is that the moments of greatest happiness in the *Nouvelle Héloise* and *Emile* are revealed through the image of a daily cycle (as in the festival of the grape harvest at Clarens and the day in the country at the end of book 4 of *Emile*), a period of time organized by the natural rhythms of sunrise, sunset, work, rest, and (always) meals. Human happiness is imagined as the precarious restoration of "biological time" over "historical time" (the disorderly march of events set in motion by passion) as the rule and measure of human life. A similar claim is made in Samuel Taylor's very exciting essay on Rousseau's romanticism. Taylor argues that Rousseau indeed prefigures romanticism but not in the way usually thought (he is not the founder of the cult of nature and the great champion of passion against reason). His romanticism rather consists in his diagnosis of the human problem as the inevitable conflict of antagonistic forces within the psyche, and his apparent conviction that the solution to the species-defining problem of incoherence lies neither in the *mores* of ordinary society nor in philosophy, but in the power of imaginative reconstruction. By thus reconceptualizing the function of art as redemptive, Taylor's Rousseau is less the forerunner of Lamartine and Byron than of Baudelaire and Gide (and, I would add, of Nietzsche and Heidegger).

Readers of the *APSR* may also be interested in Bronislaw Baczko's plausible account of why Rousseau treats Moses as a legislator rather than a prophet (strangely, there is no mention of Machiavelli here). But the best piece in the book is

Felicity Baker's treatment of why Rousseau chooses to express an easily comprehensible thought in such a strange way when he says that whoever disobeys the general will "will be forced to be free." Not only is this article, entitled "La Route Contraire," a brilliant discussion of the force/freedom issue, but also the most edifying treatment of Rousseau's paradoxes that I have seen. Baker's writing is heavy going for readers not familiar with the semanticist's vocabulary (beware of "hyponyms," "polysemy," and "semantic fields"), but the effort pays. Baker's case, too briefly, is that Rousseau uses paradox as a pedagogical device designed to loosen the grip of prejudices embedded in ordinary language. The desired effect is not quite shock, but a temporary *depaysment* (this suggests interesting parallels with the Socratic practice of inducing *aporia* through paradoxes of his own). This essay was a revelation to me, and of all those in the book seems most likely to keep the copying machines, if not the cash registers, humming.

STEPHEN G. SALKEVER

Bryn Mawr College

Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. By David Held. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. 511. $32.50, cloth; $12.75, paper.)

Ironically, David Held's *Introduction to Critical Theory* succeeds as an exercise in exposition and fails as an effort at critical evaluation. Held notes in his introduction that he intends to "explicate and assess central aspects of critical theory" (p. 14). His attempt, however, reveals him as an apologist for critical theory, one who excels in lucid discussion of complex ideas and defense against hostile interpreters but falls short in his self-appointed task of assessment of critical theory's key assumptions and implications.

The strength of this book lies in its informative discussion (which at times borders on the oversimplified since Held has a propensity to put things into lists and charts) of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas. Held selects these four as central figures of critical theory, a tradition of thought which flourished in the Frankfurt school—comprised of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Lowenthal, and Pollock—and continues in the contemporary work of Habermas. He clearly establishes the unique contribution of critical theory to political discourse, and notes that the critical theorists' interest in the state and mass culture and their commitment to traditions too often overlooked in the Anglo-American world revitalized Western Marxism and sparked the political activism of the New Left. Their works "recast the terms of reference of critique and reinforce the emancipatory intent of Marx's enterprise" (p. 353). Individually and collectively, their ideas provide an ongoing challenge to orthodoxy of the left and right. Furthermore, to Held's credit, he does not dwell on material which is readily available to the interested reader. His discussion of the origins of the Frankfurt school, for example, is sufficient to place his subject in its proper historical perspective without recapitulating what has been discussed in such works as Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination*.

Held's reply to Marxist attacks on critical theory is well organized and forceful. He argues that there are significant differences among the critical theorists which these critics, influenced by "Leninism or Trotskyism and/or by Louis Althusser's understanding of Marxism" (p. 354), overlook as they conflate the individual positions. Held places the criticisms into four general categories: critical theory reproduces idealist positions, overemphasizes philosophical and theoretical problems at the expense of Marxist topics, devotes too much time to superstructural phenomena such as aesthetics and culture, and demonstrates an isolation from working-class politics. He notes, for example, that Marcuse might be guilty of reproducing idealist positions, but that this charge cannot be leveled against Adorno.

Unfortunately, the internal contradictions which will appear in Held's own assessment of critical theory are also evident in his rebuttal to the Marxist critics. In his eighth chapter, in which he discusses Marcuse's ideas in detail, he applauds Marcuse's interpretation of Hegel. Held's own comments indicate that he does not think that Marcuse reproduces idealist positions. He writes, "The truth of Hegel's philosophy," as Held reads Marcuse, "was negated by historical reality itself. The critique of society could no longer remain valid at all stages of history" (p. 232).

Held's treatment of Marcuse further illustrates the qualitative disparity between Held as explicator and defender and Held as critic. One of Held's major criticisms of Marcuse is that the latter ultimately falls prey to the concept of a universal essence of human nature and thereby abandons his credentials as an historical thinker. In Held's works, "As such, he [Marcuse] relies on a general theory of 'man' to understand the specific actions of human beings and yet, at the same time, claims the specific actions of human beings are the locus of the general theory of 'man.' The position tends toward an essence which is fugitive among its own historical manifestations" (p. 389). Actually, Held himself responds to this criticism in an earlier chapter in which he argues, in effect, that

Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's concept of species being resolves the apparent contradiction of an historical thinker positing a universal human essence. He writes, "Species being, therefore, does not refer to some abstract human essence which remains valid at all stages of history" (p. 235). In another section, the one in which he responds to the Marxist critics, he again rebuts the charge which he himself will join in his concluding section. The following comments seemingly were forgotten by Held as he drafted his final chapter: "His [Marcuse's] writings on the concepts of species-being and labour seek to capture the dynamic character of sensuous, practical activity and make it the foundation of the notion of essence" (p. 357); and "to reflect on historically constituted human capacities, on unfulfilled needs and wants is not, moreover, to 'collapse' into a 'metaphysical humanism' " (p. 357).

In the final analysis, however, Held's work should not be dismissed. He has managed to construct a much-needed introduction to the works of these important thinkers, and his book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on critical theory.

GETRUDE A. STEUERNAGEL

Kent State University

Beyond Adversary Democracy. By Jane J. Mansbridge. (New York: Basic Books, 1980. Pp. xiii + 398. $20.00.)

In speaking of politics, we must do justice *both* to the manner and process of setting priorities *and* to the structural constraints ("institutions," characterized politically in terms of hegemony and sovereignty) within which everyday political life occurs. Jane Mansbridge's book is a foray into the former. More specifically, it is an exercise in micro-political analysis, based on two case studies, one of a Vermont town meeting, and the other of an urban crisis center.

The case-study materials are presented both phenomenologically and by way of charts and tables. They are revealing, charming, and rich. Those of us interested in the actual dynamic of primary-group decision making will find many preconceptions eroded. Those who have not thought through their emotional commitment to participatory democracy will be a little discouraged and angered by this detailed account of the more sinister edges of democracy.

For instance, it is depressing to learn that town meetings in a poor Vermont village are arranged (under state law) so that the day of The Meeting is a school holiday (freeing teachers while keeping mothers at home) but not a general holiday (keeping wage-laborers on the job). Attendance is fairly low; and many who come to the meeting are afraid to speak up because they do not think they are "educated" enough.

A reviewer, on the contrary, does have to speak up: the difficulties with Mansbridge's interesting and provocative book fall under three headings—choice of data; choice of concepts; and micro/macro dialectics. Just as complexity and perhaps conflict, and organizational contradictions, are the hallmarks of larger systems, so redundancy is the bane of primary groups and case studies. There are lots and lots of primary groups, and their aims and dramatis personae change rather quickly.

The lack of a convincing justification for studying *these* two cases is compounded by the lack of a summary of the vast literature on (for example) communes and the historical role of isolated, antinomian groups. One is also disturbed that two American groups are the core of the book whose title does not suggest that it could be ethnocentric.

Further, as with the foundation of a house, one *must* be ruthlessly fastidious with basic concepts. Here the key concepts are "democracy," "equality," "consensus/conflict," and "interest." Now there is among reasonable people no settled consensus over the meaning and use of such concepts; they are opaque and elastic notions, each with its own history. "Interest," for example, embraces everything from the "conflict of interest" to which a politician might be exposed, to the intractable conflicts between master and slave or employer and employee. Moreover, the choice of definition is itself a political choice, since "interest" is used in context to intimate "legitimate interests" in one direction and "selfish interest" in the other.

Without a theory of how micro-political behavior fits into the larger world, it would appear impossible to gauge the significance of case studies. For example, Mansbridge finds, as others have in other contexts, that participatory democracy entails long hours of discussion. But the (unmeasured) question is whether the actual *execution* of policy is better or worse or quicker or slower as a result of those long hours. Similarly, it must be said that the traditional argument over "consensus" goes neither to a sentimental point about togetherness nor to the priority of the Individual over the Collective. It goes instead to the claim that a consonant social group has more intelligence and gets more done. (Rousseau warned in the footnotes that he would be misread in the premises.)

In sum, the reader will be pleased to find here an attempt to integrate political theory and empirical work—a project that can only be admired. One may be discouraged to find an analysis reduced to a dichotomy between "unitary" and "adversary" democracy, somewhat to the exclusion of the subtle, verdant world of democratic theory even in this century. The reader may end up feeling that these two case studies—reflecting, as our research with primary groups so often does, little worlds of blurred pain and stale desire—say a good deal about democracy, without knowing precisely what.

D. A. STRICKLAND

Northwestern University

Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy. By J. G. Merquior. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. 275. $37.50.)

The problem of legitimacy has come to occupy a prominent position in modern political and social thought. It is thus with some interest that one turns to a book that promises to compare eighteenth-century social contract theory with twentieth-century political sociology on what the author bravely calls the "theory of legitimacy." Having studied with Lévi-Strauss in Paris and Gellner at the London School of Economics, J. G. Merquior seems well suited for this task.

Unfortunately Merquior's work is not quite so ambitious. It does not elaborate a theory of legitimacy, nor does it really pursue a comparative investigation of Rousseau and Weber. Instead, the author's more modest aim is "to describe and assess" the contributions of Rousseau and Weber through "two quite separate studies, only tangentially connected." He believes this will be sufficient to offer "a fairly illuminating perspective" on legitimacy theory (p. 1). But that is all. (One should note that the text actually contains *three* separate studies of equal length on Rousseau, Weber, and "historicism." If they are connected at all, it is indeed by tangents.)

Rousseau is treated as a proponent of the so-called "power theory of legitimacy." This rather surprising terminology is chosen because of Rousseau's advocacy of "legitimate authority as power based on the full freedom of consent" (p. 9). "Consent theory" might be a more accurate label, then, but Merquior wants to avoid the consent quagmire while showing that Rousseau too can tread the high, clean ground of realism. This is also the ground occupied by Rousseau's "theory of democratic legitimacy," having at its center "the idea of participatory democracy" (p. 57). The author will have none of those "conflicting misinterpretations" from Cassirer's to Shklar's which read this most paradoxical of theorists rather differently; he devotes an entire chapter to refuting them. Despite these warnings, one cannot help but marvel at some of the judgments that follow: as "the first theorist of democracy," Rousseau "was also one of the least Utopian" (p. 71); on moral questions he "would clearly side with rule utilitarians" (p. 76). It is difficult to imagine that even Rousseau's most starry-eyed admirers would want to burden him with such virtues.

Weber is presented as an advocate of the "belief theory of legitimacy," a theory (read: concept) shared by Friedrich, Lipset and Easton. Merquior finds scarcely anything good to say about it. In fact, an annoying shift in tone and method intrudes: Rousseau's contradictions are muted, Weber's amplified; Rousseau is allowed to speak for the ages, Weber for strictly local and personal necessities. The author acknowledges a few worthwhile aspects of Weber's "theory of legitimacy" (read: typology of legitimate domination), but on the whole he finds it shaped (vide Mommsen) by the clash between bureaucracy and charisma, or even more dangerously by a "wildly Manichean view of history" (p. 113). Regrettably, one has the impression of an argument developed *ad hominem*. Far too little is said about Weber's actual text, *Economy and Society* (the most fragmented and difficult of his posthumous works), for the reader to be able to correct this impression. Furthermore, I suspect that Merquior's critique would have turned out rather differently had he paid closer attention to Weber's uses of the distinctions between *Zweck-* and *Wertrationalität*, and formal and substantive rationality.

The last third of these studies deals with historicisms (in the plural) and a package of loosely joined topics from Weber's thought. The importance of the former for Weber and the latter for legitimacy remains murky. First Weber is charged with a *Kulturpessimismus* that is "inextricably interwoven with the bearing of historicism" (p. 137); after much turgid analysis one then learns "that Weber's sociology differs decisively from its main intellectual background—German historicism" (p. 180). Perhaps the less said here, the better.

The author's choices regarding form and content exact important consequences: First, the question of the sense in which Rousseau can be said to have a theory of *legitimacy*, or Weber a *theory* of legitimacy, is never seriously broached. Second, the author completely misses Weber's critique of Rousseau and Rousseau's probable response to Weber. The key intermediary for this dialogue is Weber's friend and colleague, Robert Michels, an early follower of Rousseau, the humanistic Marx, and (by 1905) Sorel, and *not* (as Merquior alleges) the heir of Mill and Mosca (p. 117). How much more instructive these studies would have been had they allowed Weber and

Rousseau to square off against each other, using Michels as an arbiter. Third, as a result of this failure Merquior is lulled into writing about Rousseau and modern politics as if Weber and the last two centuries never happened. Thus, when one reads in the conclusion (in passages praising Rousseau) that "deliberative participation on an egalitarian basis in decision-making seems the only reasonable way to cope with the power dimension of the 'unplanned revolution' which . . . 'drew most of the work force out of small farming and small enterprise into authority relations of the modern bureaucratic enterprise' " (pp. 203-04), one can only wonder whether the author has understood Weber after all. Finally, in order to make any comparisons whatever, the author must fall back on an uncritical terminology: Rousseau's contributions are characterized as "democratic" and "normative," Weber's as something else—perhaps "elitist," "historical," "taxonomic," "empirical" or "heuristic" (pp. 6, 9, 100, 135-36). What is one to conclude? Are Rousseau and Weber addressing the same questions, or are they not? Surely such terminology suggests a complexity that should have been more thoroughly explored and clarified.

What is really at stake in these studies much of the time, I suspect, is not even so much Rousseau's or Weber's ideas about legitimacy as the author's own *Weltanschauung.* "History," Merquior asserts, "and not just morality, is on the side of the democratic *principle*" (p. 68). This avowal of faith, the most important sentence in the book, vibrates with the author's naive Enlightenment enthusiasms; it accounts for his attachment to Rousseau (*his* Rousseau) and antipathy toward Weber, a demystifier who can never be forgiven for reminding us that neither morality nor history may be on the side of our most cherished principles.

LAWRENCE A. SCAFF

University of Arizona

Property: Nomos XXII. Edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. (New York: New York University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 418. $24.90.)

The basis for this collection was the 1977 meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, which produced seven of the sixteen essays included here. Because it is impossible to review a collection of sixteen essays with due regard to each, I shall make some general comments on the collection as a whole and then say something about a few of the essays.

It is important to recognize the intent and limit of the volume. As the editors put it, the contributors "deal both historically and analytically with the concept of property and the right to property, including its relation to other rights, and also with certain aspects of the law of property as it is related to legal theory and to the Constitution. The issues that arise out of the distribution of wealth in modern societies are not discussed in any systematic and empirical manner; and the same is true of Marxist inspired critiques of capitalism" (p. vii). It is also to a great extent limited to the U.S.

In 1981 on opening a book modestly entitled *Property,* I was surprised by these limitations. The almost universal assumption that capitalism is a good thing, the generally unquestioned assumption that there are "property rights," the narrow Anglo-American focus—all struck me as severe problems. While I think that the volume has considerable value, the self-imposed limitations undercut that value, since the most interesting questions and the most important challenges to the general perspective of the book are simply ignored. Still, any collection that includes essays by Richard Flathman, Kenneth Minogue, Peter Stillman, and Lawrence Becker, among others, is bound to be worth examining. I shall comment on a few issues raised by some of the essays.

The first essay, "The Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance," by Kenneth Minogue, is wide-ranging and argues that, on the whole, property is only important in political philosophy as a reflection of some more important problem, such as justice, liberty, or equality. The rest of the essays tend to make the same case, but I want to focus on an issue that Minogue raises, but tends to be ignored by the other writers: the difference, if any, between private and personal property. Loosely, private property relates to the means of production, and personal property to those material goods, such as clothes, that are necessary for daily life. The line between them varies greatly, depending on the theory.

In capitalist theory, personal and private property are conflated to suggest that they are the same thing. In some socialist theory they are separate, to suggest that individual or corporate control of the means of production is not desirable, while individual control of personal goods is justified. This division also meets the silly but common argument that an attack on private property includes the collectivization of toothbrushes and the like.

Minogue's position is, in essence, the first one. He argues that what we have is a spectrum of types of property, and that it has proven both theoretically and practically impossible "to establish watertight classes of property" (p. 15). In one sense, he is clearly right; it hasn't been done, but it is not obvious that classes of property need to be watertight. Also, Minogue confuses the issue by referring to Marlene Dietrich's legs and "the magnetism of a dictator or the glib tongue of a confidence trickster" (p. 15) as aspects of personal property. Such things are personal characteristics, and while, since Locke, we have referred to a person's property in his or her life, if there is a watertight bulkhead to be found which divides classes of property, it is found between personal characteristics and material possessions. Dismissing that red herring, one can observe two types of material possession defined primarily by their use for productive and non-productive purposes. Unfortunately, in a review it is impossible to go further, but this is a key issue that both capitalist and socialist theorists need to address at length, since it is central to any developed socialist theory of property.

Lawrence Becker and Richard Flathman join issue over the justification of property rights. Becker argues, in an essay that he says is in some ways superior to his recent book, that on the basis of a series of descriptive statements about human nature, it is possible to demonstrate that there is a moral basis for property rights. Flathman argues "that Becker fails to discredit the possibility" of a categorical anti-property position (p. 223). Flathman wins the round, but again more work is needed.

Over the 22 years since the first volume was published, the *Nomos* series has been an essential, albeit uneven, part of political thought in the United States. This volume is no exception. It has a number of thought-provoking articles, some carefully reasoned historical studies (Peter Stillman is particularly good on Hegel and Marx), and a number of slight pieces that at least do little harm to the value of the volume. It is certainly useful to have a collection of essays that leaves one with more questions than answers, and, in a fairly new departure for the *Nomos* series, a bibliography, by Gerald F. Gaus, is provided to point one toward further work, both on the topics in the collection and those that were left out.

LYMAN TOWER SARGENT

University of Missouri, St. Louis

Graham Wallas and the Great Society. By Terence H. Qualter. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 204. $25.00.)

Michael Oakeshott once paid a memorably astute tribute to Graham Wallas. Speaking many years after Wallas' death, Oakeshott characterized his predecessor at L.S.E. as "a thinker without a system whose thoughts were nevertheless firmly held together by a thread of honest, patient inquiry."

Wallas was many things: a leader of the Fabian Society, a municipal politician, university professor and the author of several highly influential books in political theory and social psychology. Above all things, however, he would have liked to be remembered and judged as a political thinker, and he viewed the activity of a thinker as one of inquiry. With Wallas a correct method of political inquiry was a lifetime search. Agreeing with Aristotle, he believed that the method of inquiry must always be adapted to the character of the subject under investigation and that in political science one must learn not to insist upon precise knowledge.

Wallas was far more brilliant as an observer and analyst than as a systematic thinker. A cautious man, not one to be dazzled by fancy formulas, he was able to avoid the pitfalls of system-building. But it may also be said that he lacked that power of construction upon which thinkers often stake their claims to lasting fame. In post-Victorian England this aversion to system-building was hardly unique to Wallas. What makes his relative obscurity in our time so conspicuous is that while he was alive Wallas was, on both sides of the Atlantic, a formidable, indeed ubiquitous intellectual presence, one who enjoyed influence and respect that were almost unmatched for a generation. Harold Laski spoke for his own generation when he declared that since the appearance of Wallas' *Human Nature in Politics* in 1908, "few treatises on this theme have been usefully written, that have not been coloured by its conclusions," further noting that nothing quite so important had ever been done in the realm of political psychology since Thomas Hobbes. With his later works, notably *The Great Society, Our Social Heritage* and *The Art of Thought,* Wallas' influence spilled over into other fields of social inquiry provoking a chain of spirited debates among the pundits.

Not that only the academic specialists were fired by his brilliant suggestions: the term "Great Society," which Wallas coined to describe the unhappy product of the modern industrial revolution and urbanization, was literally a household phrase in the United States in the 1930s among the New Deal liberals. Indeed, according to the late Samuel Eliot Morison, Wallas had been the most influential English political philosopher in America since Herbert Spencer.

It is only fitting that books should be written about a man of such great intellectual stature half a century after his death. With this new volume under review there are now two book-length studies of Graham Wallas, the first one being

Martin Wiener's *Between Two Worlds* (Oxford), which appeared in 1971. The author of the new book believes confidently that there is now a market "not just for two books on Graham Wallas, but for several, and perhaps a reissue of his major original works" (p. x). In comparing his own effort with Wiener's, Terence H. Qualter tells us that Wiener's book was "very much the kind of book I might have wanted to write had I started a few years earlier"; he decided to proceed with his study, even though he "had no quarrel with Wiener" (p. ix), once he had seen the possibility of a different emphasis.

Wiener had accurately described his book, slightly longer than Qualter's, as "an intellectual study," as opposed to a full-blown intellectual biography which deals with life and times. Thus his main concern was to help us better understand the origins, character and scope of Wallas' principal intellectual contributions. Curiously enough, that in essence is just what Qualter has attempted—i.e., an intellectual study—though the scope is even more limited than Wiener's. Qualter notes that Wiener's book had appeared "just as mine was starting" (p. x). So it is that he decided to proceed without expanding the scope of his undertaking, despite the added advantage of the intervening years that had opened up new archival materials for possible incorporation. Rather, Qualter was persuaded that a new focus on the old materials was enough to justify a new volume, even if that meant, as it has turned out, that his focus would result in the superficial treatment of some key areas of legitimate concern. Qualter's focus is the "Great Society," and he does an admirable job of tying together Wallas' lifelong mental efforts as one unending quest for a more rational and humamen world than the one in which we now live. He believes that Wallas' vision for a "Good Society"—Qualter introduces the phrase without crediting Walter Lippmann with having coined it in 1937—speaks directly to our current condition with compelling urgency.

The book ends on a highly hopeful note as the author predicts that Wallas is "likely to find today an audience more sympathetic, more willing to listen, than that of twenty or thirty years ago" because he is "perhaps more relevant today than any time since 1908" (p. 172). One hopes that Qualter will prove to have been correct; one learns from reading this book that we will all be the poorer should it come to pass that he was not.

SUGWON KANG

Hartwick College

The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse. By Morton Schoolman. (New York: Free Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 399. $19.95.)

Morton Schoolman's book is the most complete attempt we have at placing all of Herbert Marcuse's thought in perspective. It takes the form of an intellectual biography, focusing almost entirely on Marcuse's writings. The only two historical events which play any prominent role are the advent of fascism and the rise of the "counterculture" in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

We learn much about Marcuse's writings here: Schoolman deals with virtually everything that Marcuse wrote or said, both in an expository and critical fashion. Schoolman's overall stance might be said to be the wish that Marcuse had been a better theorist. The sin is mainly one of omission: Marcuse had the opportunity to achieve a better theory but lost it in his concern with fascism; he came close to regaining it with the development of the movement among the young in the latter part of his life. For Schoolman, the fundamental failing in Marcuse's work is that he adopted the position of the "imaginary witness" (the phrase comes from Horkheimer and Adorno), which has an insufficiently concrete and historical notion of the subject. Bluntly, for Schoolman, Marcuse does not deal with "real" people and "real" experience, but instead with "an individual who no longer exists" (p. 351). This is a sin of omission, for "opportunities would have been available to Marcuse to develop such a theoretical conception, specifically from his reading of Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, and even Plato. His interpretation of their thought prevented him, however, from stressing the significance of the quasi-autonomous spheres of subjectivity for which in different ways their writings establish grounds" (pp. 220-21). Schoolman is in effect accusing Marcuse of lacking a notion of *politics* in the period between his early writings (until 1933 and under the influence of Heidegger and the discovery of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*) and his next-to-last work. Whereas Marcuse seemed to be close to adopting a "radicalized liberal politics" before the advent of fascism (p. 36), the development of society under the Nazis led him to the conclusion that "the subject . . . possess[es] no faculties which cannot be molded by social structures" (p. 79). Likewise, after the Nazi period, in a society increasingly seen by Marcuse to be dominated by technological rationality (Schoolman is very interesting, if not as full as one would like, on the influence of Weber on Marcuse), man's autonomous reasoning capacity—the basis of politics for

Schoolman—is "eroded" to the degree that politics is "cancelled as a separate and independent function" (p. 147).

It is quite true that Marcuse *seeks* a new vision of the subject in this period in books like *Eros and Civilization.* However, argues Schoolman in a series of three chapters on "Civilization without Discontents," all of these attempts are unconvincing. Schoolman argues that Marcuse misread Freud and once again eroded the potential strength of his theory of the subject. Specifically, by substituting a theory of gratification based on "surplus repression" for Freud's more constitutional theory of the subject, Marcuse is able to argue that under certain social conditions, the ego will become as one-dimensional as the society by which it is shaped.

Before turning to the aesthetic writings which mark the end of Marcuse's career, let me express a note of concern here. Schoolman comes very close to asserting that most of Marcuse's failures to develop what Schoolman would consider an adequate notion of the subject result from a "predisposition" (e.g., p. 259). This places Schoolman in the interesting and troubling position of saying that Marcuse took fascism too seriously, or so seriously that he let it blind him to the consequences of what he was arguing. I am not sure what one is to respond to this claim that Marcuse has the intellectual equivalent of a "concentration camp mentality." Had he been in the camps, we would honor him for surviving that experience. It is not clear to me that one should honor a man less for having seen hell in his soul, even if not on his body.

At the end of his life Marcuse turns to his origins. His thesis had been on *"Der deutsche Kuenstlerroman";* his writings are now on aesthetics. Schoolman seems to argue that in *Counterrevolution and Revolt* Marcuse finds again in aesthetics the beginnings of a notion of the critical subject. The aesthetic achievements of the bourgeois past, Marcuse argues there, can be conjoined with "a critically disposed individual" (p. 346)—i.e., one who grasped art—and the grounds for a practical opposition to existing society would be recovered. Unfortunately, argues Schoolman, Marcuse eschews this possibility in his very last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension,* and we are left again without a *praxis.*

We have a very rich book here. Perhaps it is richer than its apparent thesis that Marcuse should have been either the young Marx or Charles Taylor or William Connolly will carry successfully. Schoolman never develops the thesis of his fascinating implication that the poverty of Marcuse's achievement (and not only his) is to be attributed to the unresolved trauma of fascism. But he has written a major book, engaging in its detail, coherent in its argument and independent in its stance.

TRACY B. STRONG

University of California, San Diego

Karl Kautsky, 1854-1938: Marxism in the Classical Years. By Gary P. Steenson. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978. Pp. xii + 308. $15.95.)

Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938. By Massimo Salvadori. Translated by Jon Rothschild. (London: New Left Books, 1979. Pp. 375. £9.50 and $19.95. Distributed by Schocken Books, New York.)

Karl Kautsky is generally thought of as the foremost Marxist theoretician in the two decades between the death of Engels and World War I, and probably did more than anyone else in that period to spread Marxist ideas. He is mentioned in most every book on Marxism as the great antagonist of Bernstein on the one hand and of Lenin and Trotsky on the other, but until recently only one major work about him—by Marek Waldenberg—had been published (Cracow, 1972), and it is in Polish. Now, however, two fine books have appeared that fill this gap in the secondary literature on the history of Marxism, socialism and the European labor movement. One is by an American historian, an expert on the German Social-Democratic party with a good understanding of Marxist theory, the other is a translation of a book by an Italian historian and left-wing intellectual.

The two works are similar in some respects. Both rest on a thorough study of much of Kautsky's published work—no mean feat, since it comprises nearly 2000 books, articles and pamphlets. Both are marked by careful, reliable scholarship, the translations from Kautsky's German are excellent (and, in Salvadori's book done from the original sources, not via the Italian), and the footnotes (33 pages of them in Steenson) and indexes are helpful. Steenson's book is written in and Salvadori's translated into excellent, easily read English. Above all, both works display great sensitivity and understanding. Both stress Kautsky's contribution to shaping Marxism into the theory of a mass party and a mass labor movement as they had not been known to Marx and Engels. On the other hand, neither author overestimates Kautsky's originality nor his influence in practical politics, and neither is uncritical of him, both pointing to inconsistencies and ambiguities they see in the role he played.

Evaluation, positive or negative, however, is not the principal task of either book. Indeed, Salvadori's disagreements with Kautsky are expressed mostly by mere hints that leave his own political position and preferences somewhat unclear. The main objective of both authors is to set forth and explain Kautsky's views. Both do this—Steenson perhaps even more consistently and successfully than Salvadori—by placing Kautsky's statements in the context of the intra-party debates of the German Social Democrats and by relating them to the views of other party and trade union spokesmen, which are well summarized. Both authors are also very good at characterizing a historical situation in a single concise paragraph as background to these debates; indeed, Steenson does so brilliantly in some instances. Both make excellent use of the records of SPD congresses, and Steenson also relies heavily on published and unpublished letters. Their approach is both much fairer and far more enlightening than the usual treatment given to Kautsky and some of his contemporaries of judging their views and behavior from present-day perspectives.

Both authors, then, stress the positions Kautsky took and defended in the great debates that divided Marxists in the half-century after the deaths of their two masters—debates over violence and parliamentarism, the agrarian question, the relation of the socialist party to the trade unions, revisionism and "ministerialism," the mass strike, imperialism and war, nationalism and internationalism, the Russian revolutions, communism, terror and dictatorship. On the other hand, neither author is primarily interested in Kautsky's voluminous writings in history and social science, Salvadori deliberately ignoring most of them and Steenson dealing with them only relatively briefly but providing some insightful summaries and characterizations.

In spite of these similarities, Steenson's and Salvadori's books supplement much more than they duplicate one another. Salvadori's book is more useful for the careful summaries of and quotations from well-selected writings by Kautsky, while Steenson does a beautiful and thoughtful job of pulling together material from Kautsky's many writings, published and unpublished, relevant to particular points. He evidently worked his way through some 10,000 letters and personal papers by Kautsky in the archives of the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam and has made ample use of them. Thus Steenson has produced a picture of Kautsky as a human being (the book also includes a number of photographs of Kautsky and his family) and a biography dealing with his intellectual development from its beginnings, his involvement in numerous political conflicts and alliances, especially as editor of *Die Neue Zeit* from 1883 to 1917, and to some degree even his private and family life.

Salvadori's book is not designed to do any of these things. Only a two-page biographical note is appended to the book, for which the author may not be responsible. It lists "main dates in the life of Karl Kautsky," a couple of them erroneous. (A summary on the dust jacket is also misleading and, with its crude Leninist overtones, does no justice to the author's subtle analysis.) Salvadori's sole interest is in Kautsky's thought, particularly on the relationship of socialism to democracy and specifically on elections, parliamentarism, coalition politics, and bureaucracy, which constituted an adaptation of Marxism to a political situation not known to Marx and "which the Western Communist movement has recently come to accept" (p. 14). It is only these few words and one other passage in his preface that suggest that Salvadori's interest in Kautsky may in good part be motivated by the fascinating phenomenon of Eurocommunists now pursuing policies quite similar to those advocated by the man Lenin hated as a "renegade."

Steenson, interested primarily in Kautsky's role in the context of SPD politics, can say with a good deal of justification from his point of view that "by mid-1919, Kautsky was a man whom time had passed by . . . a peripheral figure" (p. 181). Since, as Salvadori stresses, Kautsky's postwar positions were consistent with his prewar views, Steenson's book, in explaining the latter, provides invaluable understanding of the former as well, but he devotes only a ten-page section to Kautsky's views of "the Russian Revolution," two pages to his later "Critique of the Bolsheviks" and two more pages on "Nazism." In contrast, Salvadori has a chapter on Kautsky on Fascism and three chapters, comprising nearly 100 pages, on Kautsky's attack on Bolshevism, his analysis of the class character of Stalinist Russia, and his attitude on popular fronts on the one hand and coalitions with "bourgeois" parties on the other—all problems relevant to Eurocommunism today.

Each book alone and, even more, both of them together can serve excellently to provide a thorough analysis of Karl Kautsky's political thought and role in such readable form as to be attractive to any reader interested in the history and politics of Kautsky's long lifetime. At the same time, both offer new insights and information—in Steenson's book often from generally inaccessible sources—even to specialists and to the many more readers who have known Kautsky only from references to him in works by and about other Marxists. We owe both authors a debt of gratitude for restoring a balanced and well-rounded image of a man who has been far less read and studied as a central figure in the history of Marxist theory and politics than denounced and misunderstood as both a fanatically rigid Marxist and a renegade from Marxism.

JOHN H. KAUTSKY

Washington University, St. Louis

A Theory of Political Decision Modes: Intraparty Decision Making in Switzerland. By Jürg Steiner and Robert H. Dorff. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 239. $19.50.)

This book analyzes 466 decisions made in 1969-70 in 111 meetings of different committees of the Free Democratic party in the Swiss canton of Bern, varying in size from seven members or less to 100-150 members. The data, collected by participant observation, provide the empirical material for the development and testing of a theory of decision making in face-to-face groups, intended to predict whether a "conflict" will be resolved by majority decision, amicable agreement, decision by interpretation—or will be left unresolved ("non-decision"). The theorizing process starts with 21 independent variables grouped in four categories: structure of the decision group, substance of the conflict, context of the conflict and the decision process itself. The testing of these hypotheses begins with a bivariate analysis and is followed by "discriminant analysis," a categorization technique based on the discriminant association of independent variables with nominal-level dependent variables, which in this case are the four decision modes. The three "discriminant functions" enable the authors to select the independent variables with the highest coefficients on these functions, i.e., which contribute most to the prediction of a decision mode, and to correctly predict 55.5 percent of the observed decisions. Finally, the seven most predictive independent variables are used for a computer simulation testing seven hypotheses derived from the previous testing of the original hypotheses. The simulation confirms 57.7 percent of the 411 cases for which a single-outcome prediction had been made. The entire case study is presented within a broader discussion of the ambiguities of consociational theory and linked to a comparison of consociational and majority decision making.

A Theory of Political Decision Modes is undoubtedly a superb example of methodological rigor and technical sophistication in empirical, "grounded," theorizing. Moreover, most stages of deliberation in the research process and in the analysis are described in some detail: problems inherent in participant observation in the decision-making bodies of a political party; the choice, and sometimes subsequent rejection, of variables or indicators for such variables; the interplay between theory, data and techniques; the cogent demonstration that intuitively appealing hypotheses do not always survive empirical tests, or that even a variable displaying the highest coefficient in an equation has to be discarded—at least temporarily—if no theoretical justification for its inclusion can be found. Finally, the choice of techniques used in the analysis demonstrates both methodological and theoretical concerns: discriminant analysis served to reduce the number of independent variables for the subsequent stage, while the computer simulation incorporated the processual aspects of decision making, including thresholds and interaction effects.

The theory is articulated in terms of the "likelihood of occurrence" of any of the four decision modes, given different sets of structural "antecedents." If the simulation predicted the dependent variable correctly in almost 60 percent of the cases, this seems to be due to a higher rate of success for the smallest committees, which constituted almost one-third of the cases, and where decision-making behavior "is strongly predetermined by the characteristics of the decision situation" (p. 168). Indeed, in only 4 percent of these cases was there a vote. A theory positing decision modes as the dependent variable seems to apply best to groups with predominantly informal interactions. The authors do not report the rate of correct predictions for different categories of larger committees, in which a chairperson, a steering committee or powerful leaders might exercise influence and structure the proceedings to accomplish their goals, no matter what decision mode is most conducive to such results. Yet the highest rate (70 percent for the pooled data) of successful predictions by discriminant analysis was obtained for majority decisions, relating apparently to larger groups, but constituting only 10 percent of the cases. The indeterminacy factor, inherent in a predominantly structural model, is explicitly included in the theory, the leadership factor is implicitly excluded, and the behavior of participant decision makers is assumed to be both parametrically and strategically rational. Amicable agreement and decision by interpretation are viewed as means for minimizing losses and optimizing benefits in terms of pursued values, given "structural conditions" that make the division inherent in a vote dysfunctional or unnecessary.

Does this theory contribute to a clarification of the ambiguities of consociational theory? In the question of causality in consociational politics—i.e., are low levels of hostility the cause or the effect of the decision mode—Steiner and Dorff apparently posit the "primacy" of structural conditions. But can this "micro-theory" be translated to the system level? Lijphart explicitly stipulates elite roles that are necessary conditions for implementing consociational decision making. The "ability to accommodate divergent interests" and to "transcend cleavages" imply initiative, persuasion, influence and bargaining. But once elite roles have been incorporated at the very core of consociational theory, structural conditions become limiting or facilitating contextual variables.

As a research strategy for decisions in committees, across a wide range in the variability of structural contexts, the authors' approach consistutes a significant improvement over experimentation, most certainly in terms of external validity. Going beyond the relatively unstructured committee setting, the theoretical payoffs of this study are primarily of heuristic value. The authors add that "it would certainly not be unproblematic to apply our micro-level theory to [the] macro-level, because we would also have to consider systemic variables" such as the economy and international relations (p. 176). Another interesting area for further research, suggested in a brief final chapter on the implications of decision modes for normative democratic theory, is the relative conservatism, or slow rate of change, associated with consociational regimes (the case of Switzerland is discussed as an example), as opposed to the role of majority rule in promoting innovation.

A Theory of Political Decision Modes is an important contribution to empirical theory and sets the stage for new challenges in cross-level and cross-systemic theorizing. It is also a benchmark of methodological rigor and elegance.

MOSHE M. CZUDNOWSKI

Northern Illinois University

Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism. By Stephen J. Whitfield. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 338. $18.95.)

This book focuses on Hannah Arendt's writings on totalitarianism, but it is neither an introduction to her theory of totalitarianism nor a systematic explication of that theory. Rather, writing in an intellectual climate which has called into question the very concept of totalitarianism, Stephen Whitfield sets out "to vindicate" the "historical value of her understanding of modern tyranny" (pp. 14-15). His analysis is topical and selective rather than comprehensive and presumes a rather detailed understanding of Arendt's work, her critics, and the literature on totalitarianism. Whitfield handles the task of evaluating Arendt's theory and the arguments of its critics with an admirable evenhandedness. While he concludes that recent historical evidence "has tended to confirm the terrible accuracy of Arendt's book" and that "she constructed the most convincing articulation of the idea of totalitarianism" (p. 259), he is willing throughout to admit qualifications to her theory where they seem justified.

In the first chapter, Whitfield surveys the literature on totalitarianism including recent critiques of that concept. This review of the literature sets the stage for the "vindication" of Arendt's theory. The second chapter focuses on Arendt's assumption of symmetry between Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia. Whitfield concludes: "Arendt should have admitted qualifications into her thesis, but she was right not to regard the dissimilarities as decisive" (p. 29). In the third chapter Whitfield addresses more generally the question of the historical validity of Arendt's theory. An interesting and probably valid observation here is that Arendt could have placed greater emphasis on the roles of Stalin and Hitler in creating totalitarian systems with no loss of consistency in her theory. The fourth chapter examines Arendt's account of mass society and of the failure of the nation-state to guarantee human rights as these developments prepared the way for eventual extermination and slave labor. The fifth chapter explores the relationship between Arendt's writing on totalitarianism, including *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* and the balance of her work. The declared purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that there is in Arendt's later writing "a loss of interest in modern tyranny so decisive that genuine disjunctions emerged, contradictions that could not easily be reconciled" (p. 134). But the arguments presented, in what is certainly the weakest chapter in the book, often seem not quite to the point or to be based on a very strained reading of the texts (see especially pp. 128-31, 140, 148). Apparently Whitfield's major reason for finding inconsistencies lies in Arendt's failure to countenance liberalism as a safeguard against totalitarianism. But regardless of how convincing Whitfield's case for liberalism is, it seems a strange basis for evaluating the consistency of Arendt's writings. The sixth and seventh chapters, comprising almost one-third of the book, treat *Eichmann in Jerusalem* and the extensive condemnation and debate which it provoked.

The strength of this book lies in the frequently illuminating analysis of specific points, and it is on this level that the book will be of value to the specialist. But as a work of interpretation, with an explicit thesis to advance, the book is less satisfying. The problem, it seems, is a lack of structure and a certain pervasive inconclusiveness. While in some cases the failure to reach a clear and unambiguous interpretation may be entirely justified by the complexities of the texts, it often seems that Whitfield's presentation of those complexities serves to obscure rather than to elucidate them.

Despite these defects—some of which, it must be admitted, may appear as such to me simply out of disagreement with the author's interpretation of Arendt's work—the book is a needed, if not wholly successful, corrective to some of the more recent writing on totalitarianism. Whitfield is certainly right to compare Arendt to Kafka, Orwell, and Koestler because of her "equally specific and intense power to evoke and express such horrible crimes against human life and dignity" (p. 114). Whitfield accomplishes his deepest moral purpose: "to fulfill the obligation of remembrance" (p. x). Perhaps we share no more important obligation.

JAMES T KNAUER

Lock Haven State College

Foreign Policy Behavior: The Interstate Behavior Analysis Model. By Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gerald W. Hopple, Paul J. Rossa, and Stephen J. Andriole. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980. Pp. 288. $22.50.)

This book is a report of the Interstate Behavior Analysis (IBA) Project, a very large research undertaking housed primarily at the University of Maryland and sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. For those interested in the scientific, comparative analysis of foreign policy, this report is imperative reading. Despite some interesting insights, on the other hand, it offers little to those whose major focus is on the substance of foreign policy and nothing to the general reader.

Portions of this report have appeared elsewhere, but here are presented the major findings of the project to date. There is a good review of the literature, using the criteria of comprehensiveness, comparability, operationalizability, and public policy relevance, and these criteria are also applied to the project itself. A distinction between source and process analyses is made, this research dealing exclusively with source analysis. Using data on 56 states for the years 1966 to 1970 gathered for this project and the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data, the remainder of the book reports on the project, specifying variables, developing models, explaining methodologies, and presenting results. The conclusion is a thoughtful assessment of this project and the state of the subfield.

Emphasizing methodology, the authors regard operationalization as the key to explanation of foreign policy. They do employ sophisticated analytical techniques, and the study makes a methodological contribution by adapting the analytical technique used in James S. Coleman et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (1966) to the study of foreign policy. Although methodologically imaginative, this technique is used to deal merely with the tired question of the relative potency of internal and external variables. The main conclusions relate differences among clusters of independent variables to three different forms of foreign behavior: constructive diplomatic behavior, nonmilitary conflict, and force. The authors observe, among other things, that in situations involving force, the dynamics of the situation leave decision makers very little scope for choice. There is an interesting chapter on elites.

The book has many strengths. The researchers have worked hard. The argument is very clearly presented, and the presentation is well integrated into the literature. The authors have generated a large amount of data, and they demonstrate impressive methodological skills. One must admire their candor in recognizing many of the limitations of their own work.

At the same time, there are real problems. One could dispute the adequacy of many of the operational definitions. In the case of political variables, these scholars were unable to develop any satisfactory measures at all. The authors are very conscious of such problems of operationalization, but they have not discussed the limitations of others of their ideas. In particular, their criterion of comprehensiveness produces redundancy, and it violates the scientific canon of parsimony. What is one to make—other than to remark upon the redundancy involved—of a comment that a set of variables "explains 69 percent of the variation in foreign behavior" (p. 182) when it is claimed that other variables which account for "50 to 90 percent" (p. 177) were excluded?

At the end, the authors recognize that they "have not yet satisfied the policy-relevance criterion" (p. 250) and that "the promise of scientific foreign policy analysis has clearly been greater than the payoff" (p. 251). In response, they make some suggestions for modest adjustments in research strategy for the continued pursuit of scientific analysis as they understand it. Here, one must dissent. I believe that the aspiration for systematic analysis of foreign policy need not be abandoned, but strategies should be profoundly reconceptualized. I suggest three kinds of reorientation. The first is to apply what insights, low-level generalizations, and hypotheses we have to case studies: this would help to narrow the gap between "science" and the real world. The second is to begin to formulate some new questions to address with the sophisticated analytical techniques commanded by Wilkenfeld and his colleagues. In this regard, I recommend Ahmed Zaky's dissertation, *International Interaction Models* (City University of New York, 1978). My third suggestion is that we abandon the belief that science means primarily measurement, mathematics, and statistics, and adopt an interest in theory of the very rigorous kind that many of us pay lip service to but only a few—such as Kenneth N. Waltz and Oran R. Young—practice.

The book under review is surely among the best that the subfield of scientific analysis of foreign policy has produced. Yet it tells us nothing about the people, the institutions, or the problems that it purports to explain. To me, that indicates that there is something profoundly wrong with the subfield. It is time not for modest adjustments but for serious reorientation.

HOWARD H. LENTNER

Baruch College
City University of New York Graduate School

American Politics

The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era. By Willi Paul Adams; translated by Rita and Robert Kimber. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Pp. xviii + 351. $23.50.)

The Bicentennial of the founding of the Republic has opened the scholarly floodgates: sometime between now and 1987 some flinty-eyed antiquarian will doubtless prove that the animating principles of the United States Constitution were provided by Marsilio of Padua. Others will assert that the American colonial elite spent their evenings reading Montesquieu, Locke, Harrington, and perhaps even Polybius. In short, American progress towards independence will be converted into a permanent, floating political theory seminar, rather than a brilliantly conducted political exercise in "do it yourself" institution-building, in literally kidnapping sovereignty from the king and Parliament.

To say this is not to play down the role of ideas, or the extraordinary learning of a handful of the founders such as Adams, Dickinson, Madison, Jefferson, and Franklin. It is to change the level of analysis by suggesting that these were the intellectuals to whom their less-knowledgeable peers turned for the apt formulation of a proposition already *de facto* set in place. Recall that the Framers of the Constitution had piled up roughly a thousand years of public service, elected and appointed. They usually had little time for ratiocination.

A random example: on October 21, 1774, the First Continental Congress fired off two blasts at royal usurpations—the "Address to the People of Great Britain," and the "Memorial to the Inhabitants of the Colonies"—each including a denunciation of the Quebec Act for establishing "in that country a religion that has deluged your island in blood, and and dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder, and rebellion through every part of the world."

Yet, five days later they approved an "Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec," written by the versatile Dickinson (complete with a compliment to Montesquieu), inviting the *Québécois* to join the American cause and send delegates to the Congress! The usual committee of veteran pols (the delegates had over 550 years of *legislative* experience in the bank) could handle the attacks on George III, but it took an artist like Dickinson to explain to the *Québécois* that their gallantry as enemies in the recent unpleasantness demonstrated their competence to become the fourteenth member of the Continental Congress.

Willi Paul Adams' study of the background of the state constitutions suffers acutely from an overdose of high theory and a lack of understanding of how Americans operated at ground zero in their institution-building. Indeed, having read the state constitutions about a decade ago in the course of supervising a dissertation on the subject by Fred Richardson (unfortunately not published), I wonder on occasion if Adams and I looked at the same documents. Perhaps as a German scholar he has extrasensory perceptions of the *zeitgeist*, but to me much of his work is fundamentally trivial esoterica.

Let me lay out the sequence as I see it. From the day they escaped the European abbatoir of the seventeenth century to the "New World," Americans (slaves excepted) took their freedom for granted. In the early years of Plymouth, Governor Bradford was forced indignantly to deny that women and "children" were voting, and in 1655 a committee of the Massachusetts Bay General Court complained that everyone, including "scotch servants, Irish negars (sic!) and persons under one and twenty years," was voting.

Since every British province in North America had one elected branch, and since the councils and governors were dependent upon the legislature for their salaries and were coopted with remarkable ease by the local elite, legislative supremacy became the bulwark of popular liberties. This meshed nicely with pristine Lockian doctrine as conveyed in the writings of "Cato"—Trenchard and Gordon, the "radical Whigs."

As J. H. Plumb has demonstrated, the reality of representative government underwent a rapid decline in early eighteenth-century England, but in America it flourished. I would venture that for one American who read Locke, a thousand read "Cato," whose virulent assaults on the growth of the prerogative were widely reprinted here. Working with the late Clinton Rossiter on his splendid *Seedtime of the Republic* (Harcourt, Brace, 1953), I was impressed by the ubiquity of "Cato" in leading American newspapers and in statements by politicians.

Although it would be difficult to discern it from Adams' book, what Americans did when they wrote their first state constitutions was to turn to the "radical Whig" model, absolute legislative supremacy. They did not, with the exception of John Adams, believe in the "balance" or "separation" of powers. And Adams didn't get his chance at Constitution framing until 1780. Let's look at the profile of the early state constitutions: only in New York (and later Massachusetts) was the governor popularly elected, and endowed with a modified veto. In *all* other states he was chosen by the legislature—with a special wrinkle in Pennsylvania whose counties chose an executive council of 12, who in collaboration with the unicameral legislature chose one of its members president.

Virginia provided a paradigm of that fake high theory which has so enamoured many students of American constitutionalism, including Willi Adams. The rhetoric glistens with reference to the principle of the separation of powers—"the legislative, executive, and judiciary department[s], shall be separate and distinct, so neither exercise the powers properly belong[ing] to the other." But when you turn to the organization of government, you find a vetoless governor elected by both houses of the legislature to execute the laws with the advice of a Council of State chosen by the legislature. All judges and state executive officers were appointed by joint legislative vote. The governor couldn't even pardon a criminal without the approval of the Council of State! Is this the incarnation of the "separation of powers"?

Enough; though perhaps I may conclude with a reminiscence that high theorists should keep in mind. When he was writing his dissertation, published as *God, Church, and Flag: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the Catholic Church* (North Carolina, 1978), my friend, now Professor Donald F. Crosby, S.J., and I got into an abstruse theolotical argument. By coincidence, a few days later the late Richard Cardinal Cushing came to Brandeis for some ecumenical affair and we threw a reception for him to which I invited Father Crosby.

As I took Don to meet the Cardinal, the young Jesuit brightened visibly: "John," he said to me, "we'll ask his Eminence about that point we were discussing." "Don't do it," I urged. He was determined: "Your Eminence, Professor Roche says our Church adheres to the doctrine of the Dual Procession of Grace, but I think that's the Greek Position. Is he right?" The grand old prelate put his arm around Father Crosby's shoulders, laughed, and observed in his gravel voice: "My son, see the monsignor at the chancery, the one who handles my theology. I have to spend all my time keeping the Irish, Italians, French and Portuguese from starting riots: they all want bishops!" In examining political theory it is important to distinguish the monsignors in charge of theology from the practitioners of the high art of politics.

JOHN P. ROCHE

The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
Tufts University

Power and Protest in American Life. By Alec Barbrook and Christine Bolt. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 375. $28.00.)

Alec Barbrook and Christine Bolt, two British scholars, have attempted to describe and assess the significance of what they consider to be a new development in the American interest group universe. This new development is the rise of the "non-economic" interest group to a place of importance in contemporary political life (p. 20). Such groups include "public interest" groups, women's rights groups, environmental groups, and organizations which seek to represent racial and ethnic minorities. The authors suggest that the emergence of such groups is a symptom of the "post-industrial society" (pp. 14-15). Growing with this new society is a technocratic-humanistic class that is "public-regarding" in spirit and whose concerns are manifest in such issues as consumerism and environmental protection (pp. 16-17).

The allusion to the "post-industrial" epoch is a promising theoretical beginning. Unfortunately, the point is never really developed. Rather the remainder of the book, excluding the final chapter, is a broad historical description of a wide variety of associations from colonial times down to the present. Barbrook and Bolt describe the early associations of ethnic immigrants, women's rights groups, Chicano, Afro-American, and Native American organizations. Later still, they touch on "public interest" groups, of which Common Cause and the Nader "network" are the best-known examples.

The reader is soon awash in a sea of groups and sometimes confused by the use of acronyms (NACW, NAIA, NAWSA, NWSA, NIYC, NNLU, NOW, NWP, etc.) as the authors touch base with every association formed to represent "non-economic" interests. The reader is therefore often forced to return to the glossary at the front to see which acronym refers to what group. Meanwhile, the theoretical linchpin offered in the first chapter, the "post-industrial society," disappears from view. Why then are Barbrook and Bolt giving all these details? Clearly some of the groups discussed are more significant than others. What do the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Black Panther party (both mentioned by the authors) have in common? Are both just "pressure groups" (pp. 143-50)? Were not the Black Muslims a part of the black protest of the 1960s? If they were, the authors failed to note this significance.

The authors' decision to focus only on what they have labeled "non-economic" protest movements appears at first to be sound. But having done so, they make a significant omission. Clearly the most successful of the "non-economic" protest groups in recent years have been the environmental organizations. Environmental groups have had an influence in public policy far out of proportion to the number of persons they represent and the resources they have at their command. Yet, inexplicably, the authors do not discuss them in detail.

Two types of groups they do discuss, the "public interest" group and the student protest movement, paralleled the growth of the environmental movement. Unfortunately, the authors' treatment of these types (Chs. 7 and 8) is superficial. The discussion of "public interest" groups tends to be uncritical and too admiring. For example, the authors tell us that Ralph Nader is "one of the most visible public figures in America" (?) and that though he is a contemporary muckraker, he is, thank God, "no overgrown campus radical" (p. 242). On the other hand, in discussing the campus radicalism of the 1960s, the authors intimate a level of violence that simply did not exist when they suggest that the killing at Kent State University was "the final blood-letting between students and National Guardsmen" (p. 267). How many guardsmen were seriously injured or killed during the campus turmoil in those years?

In conclusion, *Power and Protest in American Life* is a broadly descriptive survey of one segment of American interest group life. Non-American readers who are totally unfamiliar with the peculiar role of organized interests in the United States will perhaps find this book interesting and informative. Those already conversant with the subject will see little that is new or startling. The authors would have better served their subject had they chosen to focus on one particular manifestation of the "new" group phenomenon such as the "public interest" or environmental group. As it is, they try to cover too much ground and leave the reader to speculate about the theoretical meaning and contemporary political significance of it all.

JERRY W. CALVERT

Montana State University

The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement. By Harry C. Boyte. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 257. $14.95.)

Those who have decried the 1970s as a period of political inactivity should definitely read *The Backyard Revolution*. The book evolved from a project begun by Harry Boyte in the mid 1970s on the dangers to American democracy posed by the social policies of the large corporations. During his research and travels across the country he was surprised by the extent of the resistance by aroused citizens to the "new corporate offensive." As he enlarged the scope of his inquiry, Boyte recognized that the wide range of community building, self-help and cooperative efforts belied the "Me Decade" and "The New Narcissism" labels with which some commentators had summarily dismissed the seventies. The potential of grass-roots political activism for bringing about positive changes tempered his own fears for America's future with hope.

The major impetus of the "new citizens movement" came from the desire by an increasing number of people to regain a sense of social and political empowerment in a world that appeared increasingly indifferent to their needs and concerns. Towards this end over a half million mutual-aid groups came into existence in the

1970s, and the cooperative movement increased both in numbers and in the variety of people whose lives it touched. The revitalization of neighborhoods became a major concern. Strides were made by women organizing against sex discrimination, by workers seeking to combat occupational diseases, and by the elderly.

Boyte sees the overcentralization and depersonalization wrought by excesses of "liberal big-government philosophy" as a significant problem. But his real *bête noire* is the corporate institution and the kind of elitism which was manifested in the Trilateral Commission.

The citizen activism which emerged to confront the forces of "bigness" focused on concrete issues like bank redlining, unfair utility rates, and "consumer ripoffs." Dealing with these issues has led at times to alliances of disparate groups—blacks and white ethnics, the young and the elderly, homeowners and welfare recipients, banding together to struggle against corporate power or unresponsive government.

Boyte provides excellent documentation on the emergence, growth, problems and possibilities of a plethora of organizations which sprouted across the country such as the Citizens Action Program (Chicago), Communities Organized for Public Service (San Antonio), the Oakland (Cal.) Community Organization, and Ralph Nader's P.I.R.G.'s. Much of the organizing theory of the 70s stemmed from the approach originated in earlier decades by Saul Alinsky, but later developed its own unique styles, particularly in the area of coalition-building.

Boyte is most eloquent when he cites examples of "ordinary people" developing a sense of purpose, self-confidence, and leadership capacity as an outgrowth of their involvement in citizens' organizations. In a chapter entitled "The Economics of Self Reliance," Boyte points to a number of neighborhood revitalization projects in desolate urban areas. For example, in the Bronx and in East Harlem, Hispanics, blacks and whites have worked together renovating old apartment buildings, planting gardens in vacant lots and on rooftops, and developing solar heating units. It will take a great deal to stem the tide of America's urban decay, but the fact that such efforts are even occurring at all augers some hope.

Boyte closes with a civilian agenda for the 1980s. He sees the necessity of widely divergent citizens' groups coming together as a "counterforce to corporate and bureaucratic power." While not minimizing the difficulties of organizing and sustaining a broad-based national movement, he holds that the citizen activist can have a considerable impact on national politics in the future. Advances made in the U.S.A. also can have a positive effect on the struggles for workers' rights and human dignity taking place in other parts of the world.

For Boyte, the historical roots of a new social order can be found in the tradition of mass democratic protest in America—as expressed historically by the Jacksonians, the 1890s Populists, the women suffragists, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s-1960s. Today he sees a new vanguard in such groups as the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (with which he personally identifies), the New American Movement, the Campaign for Economic Democracy, and the Citizens' party. He also recognizes the positive role that such traditional institutions as family, church, voluntary groups, and small-scale economic enterprises can play in shaping a revitalized, democratic polity.

While *The Backyard Revolution* was written before the 1980 elections, one can imagine Harry Boyte advising, "Don't Mourn, Organize." As America trods onward toward 1984, the hopes for avoiding the Orwellian foreboding rest in part in enlarging the participatory role of the citizenry in the decision-making process.

In his enthusiasm for the new citizen activism, Boyte acknowledges, but does not deal as much as he might have, with some of the inherent problems of localism and narrowly defined self-interest stemming from America's past. For example, the 1890s Populist tradition which he admires unfortunately had a component of racial and religious bigotry. And during the 1970s there was local organizing and fund raising for some rather seamy social and political causes.

Big is not always bad, nor is small necessarily beautiful, but I heartily agree with Boyte that our times call for de-scaling overgrown institutions to humanely manageable dimensions. In this sense, it is imperative to develop, in E. F. Schumacher's words, a new conception of "economics as if people really mattered."

The systemic critique put forth in *The Backyard Revolution* may offend some political sensibilities, but the arguments presented in this pathbreaking study need to be carefully considered.

ARTHUR STEIN

University of Rhode Island

Financing Government in a Federal System. By George F. Break. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980. Pp. xi + 276. $17.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

For a book that proports to cover the financing of government in a federal system, it has one very serious deficiency—it virtually leaves the states out of the discussion. Except where George Break must consider the state role in explaining federal aids or urban fiscal systems, only seven pages are devoted to state aid programs. There are, however, very excellent chapters on tax coordination, the economics of intergovernmental grants, the federal aid system, and urban fiscal systems.

As a friend is fond of saying: "It was a cold day in the Tartarus of Hades when economists became soothsayers of the Republic." They tend to look at macro and micro without considering what lies in between. Too little attention is given to the governmental and political aspects of our federal system. Most of the analyses of formula federal aids are based on social, fiscal, demographic, or economic variables, i.e., the same or similar variables to those used to distribute federal aids. This is fine if you are checking to see how well the formulae are working. The correlations between social, economic, and fiscal need variables shown on page 196 should be high; perhaps they should be even higher if they are part of the formulae. It doesn't really tell you whether the funds are going to the right governments or levels of government when dealing with 50 complex and disparate state/local systems. Moreover, the nomenclature the census applies to local governments is spurious when the role of each type (counties, municipalities, towns, townships, etc.) is analyzed across state lines.

Break's classification of grants is excellent, as is his discussion of federal aids. When considering state aids, with the exception of a brief aside, he does not disaggregate the data and there is no such thing as an average or typical state aid system. The range in the number of state aid programs is from 7 in Hawaii to 97 in New York, FY 1977.

Break seems to contradict himself on pages 33 and 149 where he mentions discrimination against out-of-state businesses and individuals, then talks about the use of severence taxes and oil and gas rents to export taxes.

More attention needs to be given to the political aspects of intergovernmental finance and the role of public interest groups (PIGs) relative to both state and federal aids. Many of the constraints in federal (and state) formulae are not to help the needy, but to spread the money around. Moreover, federal and state aids go mostly to the administrative branches of recipient state and local governments and are never passed upon by their respective legislatures. This has the effect of increasing the relative power of the administrators involved.

In several places Break mentions that many of the fiscal problems of local governments could be eased if only federal and state governments would assume more financial responsibility for welfare, education, health, and/or social services. But this is happening. The state and federal levels in FY 1977 paid for 69 percent of all education, 96 percent of welfare, and 70 percent of health and hospitals. At present, only New York has a locally administered welfare program; in 40 states the state level is primarily responsible for welfare services; and in 9 others it is a joint state/local operation.

My major criticism of this book is that the title is misleading, given its emphasis on the federal and local levels. States play a pivotal role in intergovernmental finance in the American federal system. Further, as the twentieth century has progressed, states have assumed a larger role vis-à-vis local government in both paying for and delivering public services—a role not always recognized by policy makers in Washington, D.C. Break does an excellent job on those topics he considers, but I would like a bit more comprehensive approach to fiscal federalism.

G. ROSS STEPHENS

University of Missouri, Kansas City

Science at the White House: A Political Liability. By Edward J. Burger, Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xx + 180. $14.95.)

Ever since Nixon abolished OST and PSAC in 1973, science policy literature has almost entirely bemoaned the treatment of White House science advisors as lamentable and unwise. Therefore, when a book appears claiming that the scientists deserve their treatment, that book warrants a second look.

Edward Burger is in a position to make such an argument. As a physician and biomedical researcher, he spent six years on the White House science advisory staff, watching Nixon and Ford dismantle and then rebuild the advice machinery. Somewhere in that six years, Burger finally decided that the endless struggles that never quite led to policy simply were not worth it for science or for the White House. With a sense of frustration that shapes each page, he attempts to explain why he reached his conclusion.

He tells us that "the thesis of this book is that the liaison between science (and scientists) and the public policy machinery at the corporate level of government is a difficult and tenuous one at best —in any era" (p. 3). Actually, he goes much further, contending that effective scientific analysis requires that kind of long-range planning that closes too many options for a politically responsive president. While science advisors may be fairly useful for the technical short-range issues they once addressed, they become a political liability when they discuss the social or more general issues they have studied in recent years.

After a brief historical introduction to science advisors in the White House, Burger spends the bulk of his book presenting case studies of projects in which he was personally involved. All deal with health and family planning, except for nine pages of "some additional issues." Much of the information is new to those in science policy and even in health policy. However, despite his casual claim to the contrary, a sampling of issues that does not include the SST or Vietnam is not representative of OST's efforts in the 1970s.

It is entirely possible that Burger's view of science advisors as a political liability will become more popular as they continue to search for a role in the White House labyrinth. However, that change will not be sparked by this book; this book has too many weaknesses.

Most notably, the book needs a good editor. In chapter 2, Burger presents his history of science advisors. Reaching the end, he finds a different perspective and simply starts over. Then he weaves back and forth through time to illustrate new points until even those familiar with the history become lost.

This is also a book that cites some science policy literature, but seems to be written with little awareness of it. Much of what is presented as profound is old hat; much of what is challenging is presented as mundane. Thomas Kuhn once argued that the revolutionary thoughts come from those new to the field. Unfortunately, this author seems too new to the field, and some concepts run together so much that they make the arguments unnecessarily weak.

For instance, until the last five pages of the book, Burger makes little distinction between analytical processes and science advice. He finds anti-science pressure in several departments. He positively belabors PPBS, assuming that the forces that subverted that process are the same that cripple science advisors in the White House. If that means that all analysis in government should be stopped, he does not say so.

The book presents a jarring thought to which I am somewhat sympathetic—that White House science advisors may not be worth the effort. However, that thought will need to be developed by someone more in the mainstream of the literature before it will be able to defuse the counterarguments that already dominate this field.

DANIEL MARTIN

University of Baltimore

The Governance of Energy: Problems, Prospects and Underlying Issues. By Dudley J. Burton. (Palo Alto, Calif.: Cambria Press, 1980. Pp. xxix + 387. $8.95, paper.)

This book is an almost encyclopedic treatment of energy as a national and transnational problem. Dudley Burton believes that the energy problem permeates the entire social fabric of American society and thereby provides an excellent opportunity for serious-minded citizens to reexamine fundamental questions of governance in high-energy, technology-intensive societies. Burton argues that energy governance, which is never well defined, can be achieved through a reaffirmation of the democratic process and "a great deal of rethinking, reformulating and reorganizing the processes of energy production and consumption" (p. 294). He views this latter task to be especially difficult, given the hold on governance in the energy arena by the giant oil corporations and the continuing emphasis on mass consumption, growth, high technology, and free enterprise. Burton's message, in short, is pessimistic rather than optimistic about the future of energy governance.

The book was written primarily for a general audience, although Burton asserts that it should be equally useful to engineers, economists and students "seeking an interconnection between the technical issues of resources or environment and the political and institutional apparatus for this allocation or appreciation" (p. ix). The book was not written for political scientists and, in my judgment, is not likely to be well received by them. Many of the terms and concepts employed throughout the book are vague and used in a global fashion. For example, Burton states at one point that "the aim of this work is to examine energy problems from the perspective of social and political affairs" (p. ix). This perspective, he continues, is "one of *governance,* to distinguish it from politics, economics, or sociology as academic disciplines" (p. ix). These statements are so encompassing and embracing that they have little meaning. At another point Burton argues that "energy issues are governance issues, and that, as governance issues, they involve history, organizations, and environmental conditions" (p. xix). In other words, energy governance means whatever one cares to make it mean. However, if one is not satisfied with the idea of supplying one's own definition of a key concept and decides to read more carefully for assistance, one finds that Burton attempts some clarification by noting that the ultimate governance problem in energy is the reconciliation of the desire for individual freedom and collective self-control (pp. 7, 294). This problem, although perhaps new to Burton, has long been recognized by political theorists to be an essential, continuing tension in democratic polities, one which transcends all issues and problems. What, then, does Burton mean by the "governance of energy"? My best guess is the effective resolution of energy problems by society as a whole.

This difficulty aside, the book's six chapters are painstakingly long and tedious. The first chapter addresses the issue of energy as a problem of governance. The second chapter, 62 pages in length, including 28 pages of charts and tables, presents the "fears" and facts of the energy problem. The third chapter contains 82 pages of observations and lengthy quotations meant to inform the reader about the substantive issues of energy governance, i.e., corporate ownership of energy resources, public opinion toward the energy problem and alternative solutions, geopolitics and national security, and so forth. Chapter 4 is a critique of why government, particularly the Carter administration, cannot cope with the energy problem. This chapter also sets forth Burton's views about what must be done to avoid an energy catastrophe and therefore a national crisis of governance. The fifth chapter is a sweeping and sometimes rambling assessment of how energy questions and problems are intertwined with the private and public sectors, social and economic growth, democratic values, technology, and what the author calls the new international economic order. The final chapter is a summary of the central ideas and recommendations made throughout the book.

As noted, this book was not written for political scientists, but for a general audience. Unfortunately, it may not even be well suited for that audience. The chapters are difficult to read because of (a) the prose, (b) long quotations, and (c) numerous tables and graphs which are often distracting. Finally, although every author is entitled to a point of view or a message, Burton's message seems overly zealous and approaches ideological proportions in places.

DONALD C. MENZEL

West Virginia University

The Sense of Well-Being in America: Recent Patterns and Trends. By Angus Campbell. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Pp. xiii + 263. $14.95.)

This volume reports findings from several national surveys of American "well-being" which the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan began conducting in 1957. Campbell makes a considerable point of describing this body of data in plain English with few statistical embellishments, in the hope of reaching a broad audience. To this end, the book eschews multivariate techniques as steadfastly as it avoids complex social theory.

Three aspects of this strategy trouble me. First, the absence of an articulated conceptual framework—aside from a brief bow in the direction of Maslow—gives the reader precious little purchase on the significance of the findings. Campbell himself believes that the findings possess far-reaching implications, but, if so, readers must supply those implications for themselves.

Second, Campbell's unwillingness to employ demanding statistics forces us to question the causal status of his independent variables. The bivariate relationships upon which he relies paint a portrait of Americans' attitudes towards self and society during the past 23 years, but they do little to account for the portrait itself. Thus, the individual parts of the picture stand out more clearly than does the whole.

Finally, the policy-relevance of mass psychological states eludes me, as I suspect it does others who have followed the social indicators movement. Indeed, the problem appears elusive even to Campbell, who can suggest only that an affluent society should invent new policy modes for coping with psychological unease. How to do so he does not say—and thus reveals one of the limitations of his investigation.

Despite these reservations, the book contains some important and provocative findings. Chief among these are the comparative contentment of southerners—black and white—in a region still economically "underdeveloped"; the smallness of gender differences, despite both pro- and antifeminist consciousness-raising over the last decade; the high level of reported satisfaction with manual work; and, most important, the declining connection between material success and the sense of well-being.

Several empirical patterns stand out for the theoretical questions they raise. One cannot help but be struck by the viscosity of mass psychological well-being. By "viscosity" I mean the slowness with which American feelings of personal well-being alter over time. Campbell's book will appeal to readers tired of journalistic diagnoses of "crisis" in American life. If a crisis exists, it does not appear in these pages chiefly because, for most people, satisfaction depends upon aspects of personal life that are far-removed from the dramatic events journalists describe. The significance of such viscocity in the social process deserves further exploration.

A second interesting pattern is the deterioration of Americans' confidence in their society, though not in themselves. There is nothing particularly new in Campbell's findings on this subject, yet they reveal much slippage between the political and the personal realm—the latter comparatively stable, the former volatile and decaying. It is worth wondering how Americans manage to remain so privately oriented in the face of perceived political decline. Can it be that the oft-decried separation between public and private in the liberal polity serves to protect the individual against political stress, while in happier political times the separation discourages many people from seeking "self-fulfillment" in an expanding political universe?

Finally, the theoretical significance of the declining relationship between status and well-being demands more discussion. As Campbell correctly points out, social policy has inaccurately assumed that mere economic security would generate a higher perceived standard of life. But his suggested alternative—a vision of "psychological man's" generation of "post-material" needs—is pretty thin stuff. Campbell's own data show that people's well-being depends as much on their social "connectedness"—their family life, their friends, their sense of neighborhood—as on some hypothetical sequence of need generation. Psychological Man—like his predecessor, Economic Man—unfortunately falls prey to a limited individualism that is false to the reality Campbell discovers: the reality of Social Man. What is needed is a Durkheimian rather than a Maslowian analysis, for, as Campbell shows, what makes people happy is a sense of social solidarity rather than the realization of purely individual values. Campbell's failure to suggest this alternative makes his own argument no more persuasive than the "material well-being" school of policy making he wishes to supplant.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory. Edited by Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 352. $22.50.)

Realignment is an intriguing concept. Unlike the norm of electoral analysis, where everything fluctuates and nothing changes, the idea of galvanizing change that permanently restructures the political landscape cannot fail to capture our attention. And of course it has. The study of this phenomenon—never examined in progress—occupies a considerable role in our literature.

We pay a price to give such a central role to a phenomenon we cannot observe close up. Never having touched the animal, we are hard-pressed to describe it. And conflicts about the proper description are about matters of central, not peripheral, import. Are realignments sudden and massive, or does it take a decade or more for their cumulative impact to be large enough to be observed? Does the partisan change have the drama of the revival tent or is it just the inexorable pull of demography? Are realignments caused by crises or by the natural decay of old alignments? Because satisfactory answers to these questions do not exist, they will not be found in this volume.

The volume manages most of the time to speak to a unifying concern about whether and how realignments manage to overcome the electoral and institutional noise that hampers representational democracy in normal times. In their introductory remarks, the authors write:

> A common view of the democratic process pictures it as a continuous phenomenon, in which popular sovereignty forms a constant basis of legitimacy for the decisions of government. Some critics who claim that democracy does not exist in such a form have jumped to the untenable conclusion that democracy therefore *does not exist at all. Realignment offers a middle* ground (p. 4).

If most of the time elections signal nothing meaningful about popular preferences, produce only routine turnover of governmental personnel, and influence public policy but little, perhaps the occasional realignment is enough still to give meaning to democratic forms. This occasional democracy by realignment is a central theme of the volume.

It is difficult to keep sixteen authors, two of whom were not writing for the volume, all on the same track. But to a considerable degree the successes and failures of this work depend upon success or failure in addressing the unifying theme. Bruce Campbell's work on electoral realignment, David Brady's on the impact of realignment on Congress, and Susan Hansen's on tax policy outcomes are three that nicely fit the design. Of these, Brady's chapter, "Elections, Congress, and Public Policy Changes: 1886-1960" is particularly notable for its elegant theoretical combination of congressional institutions and electoral behavior.

Weaker aspects of the book include almost theological discourses on the definition of realignment which fail to bring about consensus—even between co-editors—and a number of stolid essays which add little to the state of knowledge.

JAMES A. STIMSON

Florida State University

Fair Science: Women in the Scientific Community. By Jonathan R. Cole. (New York: Free Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 336. $17.95.)

Although I originally assumed that in the title of this book, "fair" referred to the "fair sex," it was quickly apparent that it referred, rather, to Jonathan Cole's belief in the even-handedness of science in allocating rewards. The operative assumption in this book is that science, although "far from an unblemished meritocracy," is a social system with a high degree of fairness in its distribution of rewards.

The central question the author asks: Are women scientists subject to sex-based discrimination in matters of hiring and promotion? Pointing out the dangers in basing an analysis of the existence of sex (or race) discrimination on "residual analysis," where differences in income or other rewards which cannot be explained by control variables are assumed to be the result of discrimination, he stresses the importance of considering "role performance" in any analysis of the distribution of rewards.

The dimensions of possible inequality which Cole investigates with his matched sample of 565 academically employed men and women scientists are: quality of department, academic rank, honorific awards, visibility among peers, reputation among colleagues. (Interestingly, salary is not included.) Little difference is found (based on zero-order correlations) between men and women with regard to prestige of academic affiliation or honorific awards. Women scientists, however, do tend to have lower academic rank, less visibility and poorer reputations than their male counterparts. This is, of course, where the role performance argument enters: Cole looks at publication and citation patterns and finds that men are more productive than women and that controlling for role performance (i.e., quality and quantity of publication), observed sex differences in status and reputation generally become insignificant. His conclusion follows: "The data thus far do not require that we modify significantly prior conclusions that the scientific stratification system is basically universalistic" (p. 86).

There are several things wrong with this analysis and the resulting conclusion. First, the operationalization of the crucial concept of role performance seems, at best, superficial. Karen Oppenheimer Mason has pointed out in a review in *Science* (18 April 1980) that Cole's "quality of research" measure—number of citations—should have been standardized by number of papers published, and that when this is done the correlation between sex and research quality disappears.

In addition, an academically employed scientist's "role" involves much more than simply publication and research, yet no mention is ever made of the possibility that teaching or service to department, university or professional organizations should be taken into account.

Second, and more important, simply saying that women scientists are worse off because they publish less not only begs the question, but certainly cannot be used as a basis for concluding that "science is fair." Strangely, Cole himself seems to recognize this implicitly, if not explicitly, in his discussions of possible differential access to funding, sponsorship, collaboration opportunities, research facilities, etc., and in his later discussion of where and how to apply affirmative action policies. But although further research in this area is suggested, without some investigation of the possible discrimination faced by women with regard to the initiation of their scientific careers and with regard to their access to the "means of production" in science, Cole's conclusions about the absence of discrimination do not seem warranted.

Cole recognizes that his conclusions are counter-intuitive to many female scientists and academics. He attempts to account for this discrepancy by an interesting and plausible hypothesis: that individuals who occupy unusual combinations of social statuses—the black physician, the male nurse, the female scientist—can never be sure whether their successes or failures are based on universalistic concepts such as merit or performance or on their ascriptive characteristics.

This explanation for the widespread perception of sex discrimination in academia, whatever its empirical merits, makes it clear how much richer this book's investigation would have been had it included some qualitative and perceptual data.

Despite these misgivings, I found several parts of the book to be valuable. Cole's discussion of the relationship between fact-finding and proof in the social sciences and the proof needed to establish legal arguments is illuminating, especially in the context of the increasing role of social science evidence in litigation. His chapter on the history of the relative status of women in science, though some of the material can be found elsewhere, is thorough and interesting. In the final chapter, Cole describes the "problematics" of affirmative action, with particular emphasis on the empirical underpinnings of the assumptions often used in debates about affirmative action. He approvingly cites Ruth Bader Ginsburg saying, among other things, that "the generators of race and sex discrimination are often different" (p. 296), but uses the Bakke case as a springboard for discussing these assumptions. Thus, while some of the points made in this chapter seem less than relevant to the main thrust of the book, the exercise of systematically questioning common assumptions and accepted "facts" is eminently worthwhile.

This is an important book, written by an established scholar in the sociology of science, and hailed by the *New York Times* (17 December 1979) on its publication as proving that women scientists do not suffer from discrimination. Whether or not one accepts that conclusion, it is a book worth reading for anyone interested in the sonal structure of science, changing sex roles, affirmative action policy, or the use of social science in policy making.

KRISTI ANDERSEN

Ohio State University

Paths to Political Reform. Edited by William J. Crotty. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980. Pp. xxix + 366. $26.95.)

Ambrose Bierce's definition of a liberal, as one who seeks to replace existing evils with new ones, has become the political science profession's conventional wisdom about reform of the political process. William Crotty has been one of the foremost challengers of that orthodoxy, and in numerous publications has argued forcefully that institutions can and should be changed for the better. In this volume he has assembled nine perspectives on reform since the 1960s in such areas as registration laws, the Electoral College, political parties, and Congress.

Crotty himself introduces the book with a brief overview of the reform process, distinguishing between reforms of chronic ills and those involving a sudden and dramatic revelation of abuse; between mass reform movements and those involving narrow-gauged elites; and between reforms involving the mass public and those involving institutions. I must confess that while each of these distinctions makes sense in principle, Crotty's assignment of cases to specific categories left me baffled.

According to Crotty's scheme, the first four essays deal with the electorate. Michael Kagay and Greg Caldeira use SRC/CPS/ISR surveys to measure changes in voting behavior from 1952 to 1976. It is a competent job, but its main findings —that issues rose and partisanship declined as influences on the vote—will surprise no one even cursorily familiar with the literature. I also wish that the data from 1976 had been integrated into the rest of the study rather than being relegated to a separate section. Jack Dennis follows with an update of his studies of Wisconsin citizens' attitudes toward political parties, using surveys from the mid-1970s. He discovers that parties continued to decline in public esteem throughout the 1964-1976 period, and his path analysis concludes that support for the regime was the highest correlate of support for parties. Crotty then weighs in with a study of turnout and changes in registration laws. His review of the literature on nonvoting is followed by a brief case study of how legal changes led to higher turnout in the South in the 1960s, surely an exceptional set of circumstances of limited relevance to the problem of turnout in general. Finally Crotty presents a variety of reforms of the registration laws. Lawrence Longley analyzes the Electoral College—its origins, who benefits from it, and the fate of various reform proposals. As in other publications, he advocates direct popular election, and expresses some optimism about its prospects.

The next four essays deal with institutional reform. (Why the Electoral College is in the preceding section and party reform is in this one is a mystery to me.) Charles Longley reviews trends toward the nationalization of parties since 1968, restricting himself to certain events and ignoring *why* parties became more nationalized and the role of the party chairperson as well. Paul David discusses the presidential nominating process, and seems to oppose a nationwide primary and support proportional representation of candidates' supporters. In a study drawn largely, as he acknowledges, from his *Money in Congressional Elections* (Yale, 1980), Gary Jacobson treats campaign finance reforms in the light of democratic theory and concludes that we may not see any further reforms for a long time as various political actors seek to preserve their advantages. In reviewing changes in Congress, Roger Davidson presents an analytically useful distinction between what he calls the "two Congresses," or more accurately the two *roles* of legislator and constituent-server, with the latter role being augmented at the expense of the former.

Concluding the volume are Kenneth Janda's thoughts on party reform. Like other critics of party reformers, Janda accuses them of inconsistent goals, notably incompatibilities among the aims of democratization, centralization, representation, and programmatic thrust. He calls for centralizing the parties in order to give them greater organizational coherence, but the only specific reform he emphasizes is campaign financing reform.

The strengths of this book are in the capabilities of the individual authors. All are justly respected specialists in their various fields, and all essays are coherently written. Some authors, I should note, do go beyond reviews of the academic literature and *Congressional Quarterly*, most notably Dennis, who presents important original data, and Janda, who delves furthest into the theoretical questions which are dealt with briefly in most of the other essays. Most of the essays quite naturally will invite criticism both from orthodox critics who stress unanticipated consequences and others, like myself, who wonder whether limited structural reforms can overcome long-term social trends of complex origin.

The book's chief weaknesses are editorial. Crotty's introductory essay does not set forth a model that guides other authors, and so there is less thematic consistency than the reader might expect. Moreover, the Kagay-Caldeira piece seems out of place here, despite procrustean efforts by the editor to justify its presence. Finally, there are numerous typographical and similar errors; at seven cents a page, the buyer deserves better.

HOWARD L. REITER

University of Connecticut

From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Accountability. By Philip L. Dubois. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 318. $22.50.)

Because of concern over the pernicious effects of partisan politics on the quality of state courts, many states have replaced partisan elective systems with some form of non-partisan elections or "merit selection" plans. Legal professionals, bar associations and scholars have claimed superiority for merit selection, arguing that elective systems fail to recruit the best legal talent, destroy the independence of judges, and provide ineffective controls of accountability over the judiciary.

With research from his Corwin Award doctoral dissertation, Philip Dubois attempts a "searching scrutiny" of the empirical evidence used against elective courts. He concludes that earlier research suggests that alternative systems do not place higher quality judges on the bench. On the question of accountability, we have very little prior research. Thus, Dubois makes this question the primary focus of his own efforts. In establishing the notion of accountability as an empirical concept, he investigates all statewide judicial elections from 1948 to 1974 for justices of state courts of last resort in non-southern states. In these states he looks at the behavior of judicial electorates, the extent of electoral competition, the patterns of gubernatorial appointments for vacancies and the electoral fate of these appointees. Finally, in eight selected states he studies the strength of the linkage between judicial selection method and the behavior of the state supreme court justices.

Dubois recognizes that no amount of empirical evidence can determine what the proper balance should be between independence and accountability. However, he does conclude that partisan elections are superior to nonpartisan ones. Partisan judicial elections "maximize voter participation in the selection of judges, structure the voting decisions of the electorate in directions relevant to the resolution of political issues, reduce the proportion of gubernatorial vacancy appointments, and enable voters to exercise some control over gubernatorial appointments" (p. 248). Moreover, and most significantly, the author concludes from his analysis of eight supreme courts that partisan elections are superior to all other systems as instruments of accountability. Through scalogram and bloc analysis, he confirms earlier investigations that revealed basic differences in the voting of Democratic and Republican judges selected under partisan systems. But he also finds these same partisan differences in voting in courts selected in nonpartisan and merit systems.

Because there is as much partisanship under one system as another, the question is who selects the partisans. Dubois concludes that "if popular control is the objective . . . partisan elections are about as effective in assisting voters to retrospectively evaluate and prospectively predict the behavior of judges as they are with respect to the selection of legislators and executives" (p. 249).

This study offers an important balance to the often unsubstantiated claims made for both nonpartisan and merit systems. The research design is impressive and the data give strong support for the conclusions. Dubois does not demand that readers accept partisan elections as the only choice. He knows that the "best system" of judicial selection can be decided only after a number of explicit value choices are made. His work helps us make those choices.

RICHARD J. RICHARDSON

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Your Man at the UN: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy. By Seymour Maxwell Finger. (New York: New York University Press, 1980. Pp. xx + 320. $26.50.)

This book is a valuable and welcome addition to the literature of international organization in relation to American foreign policy and the United Nations. The text focuses on the 14 incumbents of the post of Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations from Edward Stettinius to Andrew Young, but enlarges this perspective to include the role of the Permanent Representative and the mission staff in influencing and carrying out policy in the United Nations. This study is more comprehensive and penetrating than any previous work of its type and therefore, reaches beyond an updating of Arnold

Beichman's *The "Other" State Department* (1967), its closest previous counterpart.

The accuracy of the information is enhanced by Seymour Finger's role in a series of responsible posts in the United States Mission (USUN) from 1956 to 1971, nearly half the period covered. Furthermore, the text is heavily documented from official and unofficial sources. In addition to personal experience and exhaustive documentation, Finger interviewed all the key personnel against whose assessments and judgments he could check his own. Only an insider could produce such a discerning account and analysis.

The principal arrangement of the material is chronological from 1946 to 1979. However, the introductory chapters provide a perspective on the role of the USUN in American foreign policy and the final chapter summarizes the assessment of the effectiveness of each head of mission in carrying out and developing that role. Throughout the historical sections the treatment is a mixture of narration of events and analysis of the virtues and shortcomings of each incumbent, as well as a history of major issues debated during that incumbency. The style is lucid and the only slight irritant for me are the rather frequent allusions to the author's personal role in policy, which seem overstressed for the purposes of the study.

The most interesting and valuable aspect ofthe analysis concerns the personal qualities of the Permanent Representative which contribute to his or her effectiveness both in the United Nations and in United States foreign policy. In condensed form, the author suggests that, "In sum, our man at the UN must have political stature, the full confidence of the President, a creative and analytical mind, negotiating skills, experience in foreign affairs and sensitivity to the Congress, to foreign representatives and to trends in American public opinion. He must also be a leader, a good team player and an effective organizer and manager. This is no small order, but neither is the job that must be done" (p. 313). In Finger's judgment, the head of mission must be a political figure, not a career diplomat. An additional asset is a personal fortune that allows entertainment of foreign delegates at a family estate in a relaxed atmosphere. Henry Cabot Lodge, George Bush and William Scranton had this advantage.

On the basis of the above criteria, Lodge, with his closeness to Eisenhower, public stature, debating skill, organizing ability, decisiveness and personality, is judged as the most effective of the U.S. representatives at the UN. Patrick Moynihan lacked a political base or support from either President Ford or the State Department. His relations with the USUN's staff were not close and he antagonized delegates from most countries, especially those from the Third World. In spite of his brilliance and oratorical ability, he was probably, in Finger's judgment, the least effective representative. Arthur Goldberg, who lacked public speaking skills but rated high on most other counts and was a superb negotiator, is ranked among the most competent representatives. Adlai Stevenson, perhaps the highest in public stature of any incumbent, was frustrated and hampered by his lack of influence with President Kennedy and the State Department. None of the Nixon appointees was allowed by the president or Henry Kissinger to exercise the full potential of the USUN because of the negative attitudes of Nixon and Kissinger toward the United Nations. Andrew Young enjoyed the support of the White House and good relations with delegates from the Third World, but he lacked administrative skills and his indiscreet statements jeopardized his worth.

In Finger's judgment, most of the staff of the USUN should be career diplomats allowed to serve tours of duty of four or five years. The annual delegations to the General Assembly have benefitted from the participation of members of Congress and judiciously chosen public personalities, but the choosing of entertainment celebrities or those to whom political debts are owed is a disservice to the national interests.

Throughout the book, Finger stresses the policy initiatives of the United States. Not everyone would agree with Finger's judgment of the importance of the role of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, he is reasonably successful in overcoming his own biases by producing a work which is objective, accurate, instructive and scholarly.

A. LeRoy Bennett

University of Delaware

Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. By John Gaventa. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 267. $16.50.)

The origin and maintenance of inequality is the theme of *Power and Powerlessness.* Using the central Appalachian area of Clear Fork Valley as a case study, John Gaventa attempts to provide insights into the development of power relationships which benefit the elite at the expense of individuals, who despite what appears to be in their best interest, "consent" to this condition. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau expressed it in the *Social Contract,* "Man is born free, and is everywhere in chains." In Clear Fork Valley individuals lived in a state of freedom and in harmony with nature before the arrival of American Association Ltd., a British-owned company which acquired land in the region for the purpose of mining coal. How America Associated Ltd. gained control over the land and the mineral wealth beneath, and in the process became economically and politically the dominant power in the valley, is developed with exceptional insight and ability by John Gaventa. He also provides at least partial answers to the equally if not more important question concerning the quiescence of the natives.

In analyzing the conditions in Clear Fork Valley, Gaventa draws upon various theories or models of decision making or power from the behavioral sciences. One of these, which he labels one-dimensional, is the pluralist model associated with political scientists Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby. According to this approach, decision making occurs in a forum open to almost all competing groups, and policy is the end result of the adjustment or reconciliation of the various competing claims or values. Power is not monopolized by an elite, but is widely distributed and exercised by many groups or their leaders, and this competition among these groups insures that no particular interest or view can long be neglected.

Gaventa examines another model of decision making, defined as a second-dimensional approach, for its utility in explaining the power relationships which developed in the valley. This approach relies not only upon the obvious instruments of power: jobs, votes, resources associated with the one-dimensional model, but also upon more subtle means such as the mobilization of bias. By the manipulation of symbols and other ways of influencing values and belief systems, the power elite is able to defend their vested interests and to control those who might attempt to undermine or destroy existing relationships. This approach to decision making focuses not only upon those actions which take place in the political arena but also upon "non-decisions," which could be defined as an activity which suppresses and prevents those values and interests which threaten the elite from reaching the political agenda.

The third model or approach involves the method or process of indoctrination, by means of which the ruling group transmits beliefs and roles to the quiescent groups. As a result of this process the dominant group determines the "reality" of the suppressed individuals.

Gaventa correctly and convincingly illustrates the deficiency of both the pluralist and two-dimensional models in exploring how American Association Ltd. acquired and maintained its power in Clear Fork Valley, and why the natives passively accepted a relationship which was clearly not in their best interests. The company by the exercise of economic, political and cultural power was able to prevent other groups representing other interests from organizing and competing effectively in the decision-making arena. They were also able, through the mobilization of bias, to determine what matters were placed upon the public agenda and in this manner added a more subtle instrument of control.

A more promising approach, according to Gaventa, is to explain quiescence as a condition created and sustained by a sense of powerlessness. In Clear Fork Valley, American Association Ltd. used overt as well as subtle instruments of control to limit participation by the natives. Lacking an opportunity to participate, individuals became conditioned to accept passively the existing power relationships.

Power and Powerlessness is an important contribution to the list of community power studies.

VERNON N. MARTIN

Western Kentucky University

The Organizational Politics of Criminal Justice: Policy in Context. By Virginia Gray and Bruce Williams. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980. Pp. xiv + 175. $17.50.)

This study should interest anyone concerned with urban policy, criminal justice, organizational behavior and policy analysis in general. In addition, as a case study of the push-pull history of the management of LEAA-funded programs from the Johnson up to the Carter administrations, this book illustrates the gap between presidential initiative and implementation of domestic policy in a manner that is also instructive for those concerned with public administration or the American presidency.

The Organizational Politics of Criminal Justice is based on government statistics, interviews with leading actors in the criminal justice process, and a reading of relevant materials on interorganization theory during the past decade. Virginia Gray and Bruce Williams ground their study in the emerging field of organizational sociology and interorganization theory. This case study serves to exemplify two major concepts of interorganization theory: the exchange and power-dependency perspectives to explain the formation of linkages between organizations in an organizationally dense society.

In chapters 1 and 2, Gray and Williams present a thorough but concise synopsis of interorganization theory. In chapter 3, they develop an organizational history of LEAA politics and its actors. Chapter 4 outlines the research design and briefly surveys regression analysis as an analytical technique. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe the results of the empirical tests of hypotheses developed in chapter 4. First, patterns of functional allocation are analyzed: the amounts of money that each state subgrants to the police, the courts, and to corrections. Second, instances of joint projects between functions are considered, and these projects are treated as evidence of system building or coordination. Third, six specific innovative programs are considered, two in each of the functional categories: three are programs initiated by LEAA discretionary programs and followed up by the states: three are invented by the states themselves. The extent of each state's financial commitment to the six programs is examined.

The final chapter concludes the study and places the empirical findings in the larger context of interorganization theory and public policy making in federal systems. Gray and Williams have taken us farther down the road of understanding. They continue to build on the past, breaking new ground in several areas of policy analysis and indicating by their style of presenting complex methodology and analysis that it can be done in an understandable way. The work also demonstrates that research by social scientists can be potentially helpful to policy makers and can provide empirical evidence for use in general public discussion of policy alternatives. These are very substantial contributions.

CRAIG REDPONY WANNER

University College, Newark

Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America. By Bertram Gross. (New York: M. Evans, 1980. Pp. ix + 410. $15.00.)

Friendly Fascism presents an alarming message. Its title succinctly summarizes the main point. There are signs that the United States is veering toward a fascist takeover. Rather than using the crude and brutal tactics of the 1920s and 1930s, this time fascism will bear a friendly face. It will develop so imperceptibly that few citizens will recognize it. Like frogs that remain in water that is slowly brought to a boil, most citizens will not realize until too late that they have been entrapped in totalitarianism of the right.

Bertram Gross distinguishes between classical fascism and friendly fascism. Classical fascism developed in Italy, Germany, and Japan after World War I. Its characteristics were charismatic dictators, one-party rule, glorification of the State, dissolution of legislatures, termination of multiparty elections, ultra-nationalism, and attacks on rationality. In contrast, friendly fascism will require no one-party rule, no mass fascist party, no glorification of the state, no dissolution of legislatures, no denial of reason. Rather it will be characterized by the integration of big business-big government power structures. Democratic procedures, political parties, and human rights will be subtly subverted through manipulation and control. The radical right will be restructured and made more potent as it is financed by corporate wealth, and as it uses twentieth-century technology to serve its ends.

Friendly fascist economics will favor the interests of the corporate elite rather than those of the average citizen. Stagflation, shortages, unemployment, environmental pollution, waste, and nuclear poison will become more common. These problems will be used to rationalize the need for the kinds of political and economic controls favored by the establishment.

An important tactic of friendly fascism will be the management of information and human minds. Both the mass public and the intellectual elite will be increasingly mesmerized by the mass media. Popular myths concerning the virtues of individualism and popular choice, the neutrality of key social institutions, the unchangeability of human nature, and media pluralism will be stressed in such a way as to dominate the thinking of the masses. The agenda for public discussion, as defined by the media, will be slowly pushed to the right, until liberal options are no longer considered. Public opinion will be manufactured by the media, and then it will be "measured" by pollsters who have been coopted by the political right. Womb-to-tomb dossiers on all citizens will be computerized and used to blacklist critics of the system. Educational institutions will be infiltrated gradually, and pressured to serve the new fascism. Like classical fascism, friendly fascism will discredit and subvert labor movements and related political parties. As a consequence, labor unions and their parties will slowly decline until they are no longer significant. To those who doubt that such a scenario will ever occur in the United States, Gross presents evidence that friendly fascism has already established itself. He reminds readers that to speak of "a little fascism" may be something like referring to "a little pregnancy."

Gross does not conclude, however, on a pessimistic note. He believes it is still possible to reverse the current trend. Despite clever attempts to subvert them, democratic values and traditions remain a viable force in American society. The author urges concerned citizens to support coalitions and movements that seek to strengthen democratic institutions and ideals. He warns that the rewards for such activities are likely to be slight. After all, no one who persists in attacking the establishment, or who resists its cooptation, can expect to be materially rewarded by it.

Bertram Gross' new publication adds to a growing collection of literature on elitism in the American political system. Elites have always existed, but today their activities need to be given special scrutiny because they have powerful new techniques with which to control the masses. Although there is not a great deal that is new for most political scientists in this book, it merits wide reading by college students and other citizens. It is stronger on diagnosis than on cure, but perhaps the diagnosis is part of the cure. Some critics might charge that the author is only making another polemical argument from the left. These critics are probably the same ones who disregard hundreds of right-leaning polemical arguments that go out to millions of citizens every day by various means of communication. This, by the way, is the kind of apathy Gross hopes to prevent. He argues, persuasively, that unless the current drift is checked, we will be entrapped within a new kind of totalitarian system.

MERLIN GUSTAFSON

Kansas State University

Electing the Cincinnati City Council: An Examination of Alternative Electoral-Representation Systems. By Howard D. Hamilton. (Cincinnati, Ohio: Stephen H. Wilder Foundation, 1978. Pp. 124. $3.00, paper.)

In the nineteenth century most American cities had a mayor-council form of government, in which council members, who were numerous, were elected in partisan ward-based elections. In the early part of the twentieth century progressive municipal "reformers" sought to destroy machine politics (and the parochialism which they were seen as fostering) by replacing ward elections with at-large elections, partisan elections with nonpartisan ones, large city councils with small city councils, and mayors with city managers. To a remarkable extent these municipal reformers were successful in their ambitions, although the current decline of local machine politics can also be attributed to a number of factors having nothing to do with structural reform in municipal elections. We are now witnessing the beginnings of what may turn out to be a new period of municipal "unreform," in which a new generation of reformers seeks to *undo* the reforms of their spiritual forebears. In this conflict between one generation's reforms and another generation's unreforms, Hamilton is a judicious referee.

The central focus of Hamilton's monograph is the estimation of the probable and possible effects, both immediate and long-run, of a shift in election methods for the Cincinnati City Council *from* its present method of at-large nonpartisan elections *to* a single-member district (ward) system. Because more than 60 percent of American cities use at-large elections and because this election mechanism (and to a lesser extent, other early twentieth-century reforms with which it is associated) has come under increasing attack in the past decade (especially as leading to significant underrepresentation of minority voting strength), Hamilton's study is of considerably wider interest than its seemingly narrow case-study focus might at first suggest.

The importance of this study as a contribution to the general literature on the political consequences of electoral laws is enhanced by Hamilton's combination of detailed knowledge of Cincinnati's electoral politics (bolstered by an extensive series of interviews with political and community leaders) and his grasp of the empirical literature on U.S. local politics and local election systems. Apparently missing, however, is any familiarity with the recent theoretical literature on seats-votes relations, such as Douglas Rae's *Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (Yale, 1967) or Edward Tufte, "Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems," *APSR*, 67 (1973): 540-54.

Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of the arguments that have been advanced in favor of and against wards versus at-large systems. He is well aware of two important points which too often are neglected by students of the effects of municipal election systems. First, he is aware that the world is more complex than a simple trichitomy between district elections, at-large elections, and mixed district and at-large elections might suggest. Variations include geographic residence requirements; the Texas place system (which generates head-on-head contests for numbered district seats with an at-large election) for each seat; requirements for limited voting; and nonpartisan primaries versus open partisan primaries versus closed partisan primaries versus systems without a primary. Second, he is aware that the same election systems may operate quite differently in different cities because of differences in a city's political party system, political traditions, or the institutional context of which the electoral system is only a part. Moreover, rather than merely reporting a litany of the alleged defects and virtues of ward and at-large systems, Hamilton provides an insightful review of the (alas, all too scant) empirical literature examining the claimed benefits and drawbacks of the ward and at-large systems.

Chapter 3 is a before-and-after review of political outcomes in three cities (Dallas, San Francisco, and Indianapolis). In these cities he finds district elections to have increased parochialism of city council members but also to have increased the diversity of groups represented in the city council and the diversity (in terms of age, income, profession, sex) of the council members themselves. In chapter 4 Hamilton reviews some recent research involving comparative cross-sectional analyses on the impact of local government election mechanisms on black city council representation—research which suggests that district-based elections are more favorable to the achievement of minority representation proportional to their numbers than are either at-large or mixed systems; but he is careful to add the caveat that "black presence or absence on city councils may or may not be an accurate reflection of black political influence." In chapter 4 Hamilton presents a sophisticated computer-drawn map of the density and location of the Cincinnati black population and then uses this data to compare and contrast the effects on black representation of five different sets of equal population district boundaries. In color-blind districting (i.e., districting which follows as closely as possible census tract and neighborhood boundaries and seeks to maximize district compactness) he finds blacks can expect only one and a half of nine or two of ten seats; and even in districts drawn to maximize the election prospects of black candidates, Hamilton is able to show that blacks could only expect control of two of nine, or three of ten seats—compared to a black population proportion of somewhat over 30 percent. Only with PR (used in Cincinnati 1925-1956) could blacks control one-third or more of the council seats.

In recent at-large elections black representation on the nine-member Cincinnati City Council has ranged from zero to two. However, no party had (as of 1978) put more than one black candidate on its slate. Hamilton asserts, correctly I believe, that "districting would be less advantageous for blacks in Cincinnati than in most cities because the black population is more dispersed" (p. 45), but Hamilton also notes that many black leaders expect that "districting would place the choice of black councilmen exclusively in the hands of blacks and that a black district councilman would be a more vigorous champion of black interest than a black councilman elected in at-large elections" (p. 55).

Although in many ways favorable to at-large elections, asserting that they appear to be "a valuable asset to the city" which "should not be discarded lightly" (p. 105), Hamilton summarizes arguments pro and con concisely and judiciously. His is a highly nuanced treatment which recognizes that election systems do not operate in a political and social vacuum. *Electing the Cincinnati City Council* is a careful and thorough case study of the implications of alternative election systems for Cincinnati. It is also an excellent treatment of the theoretical and empirical issues of ward versus at-large elections for municipal government. It should be of considerable interest both to students of local politics and to students of comparative electoral systems.

BERNARD GROFMAN

University of California, Irvine

Community Power Succession: Atlanta's Policy-Makers Revisited. By Floyd Hunter. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 198. $15.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.)

Floyd Hunter has reaffirmed the old adage that "the more things change, the more they remain the same." After a quarter of a century, Hunter revisits Atlanta, the site of his classic study, *Community Power Structure* (North Carolina, 1953), and he once again finds power to be centered in far too few people for the good of the whole. This study is not a revised edition or abridgment of his earlier investigation, but a new venture in determining the pattern of community power. It is not couched in pseudonyms of place and people, replete with sociograms of the powerful or schematic pyramids depicting the prevailing patterns of power. Hunter names individuals and describes how project goals are achieved.

Hunter confirms his assumption that the institutional structure of power continues fairly unchanged despite a succession of elites. The persistence of the community power structure is all the more surprising, since Atlanta has experienced enormous downtown redevelopment, economic growth, population increase, and the election of the first black mayor in a major southern city. Similarly, one would have expected fundamental transformations of power due to the impact of the civil rights movement led by locally based Martin Luther King and the federal efforts of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. Hunter compares the list of reputed leaders of the 1950s with those of the 1970s, and notes seven holdovers, as well as the dynamic of family inheritance of power. He acknowledges that there is some democracy *within* the power structure when two self-made men—major real estate operators and urban developers—became enimently successful. Nonetheless, Hunter believes these changes are minor in relation to the persistent, steeply pyramided power structure based upon economic dominance which has remained for a century or more. He also extends the important role of the exclusionary processes of prestigious community associations and their role in power succession.

However, Hunter corrects assumptions about the role of property and capital. He finds that its management is not open and democratic. Instead, Hunter formulates a four-class system of patronage based on property and capital accumulation: (1) the *lords* who own property and capital and collect the rents and profits; (2) the *managers,* well-paid corporate and government personnel, many of whom occupy informal positions of power; (3) the *patronized* mass consumers who receive salaries and wages without much hope of saving to gain their own personal capital accounts; and (4) the *dispossessed* who have lost most rights of income and property and live in slums of cities and rural non-farm areas.

Hunter acknowledges that there has been an important movement of blacks into political and economic positions as well as a movement eastward into residential areas heretofore reserved for white middle-class suburbanites. Furthermore, he reports that blacks are no longer drastically screened from direct participation in policy making at top levels. Despite the rise of blacks to positions of power in Atlanta, involving magnificent displays of personal courage, the author believes that blacks are "easily cooptable" by the larger structure of power. Hunter notes that when blacks call upon whites in power (white liberals are perceived as relatively powerless to aid them in solving any particular problem), the black power structure is acknowledged as powerful *only* so far as its members are granted power, financial credit, and social recognition by the white overlords. Thus, despite a black mayor, City Hall still has a favorable bias toward the business community. For example, the real estate operators and a consortium of creditors concerned with the high vacancy rate in the downtown buildings informed Mayor Maynard Jackson that *if* taxes were increased, Atlanta could expect absolutely no credit from the New York area. The mayor assured his visitors of his personal good intentions. Thus, black elected officials are learning an important lesson that the authority of government is indeed limited by economic considerations and their ability to deflect or change the system is difficult. Instead, they have found that within the "diversionary maze" of government they can only tinker with parts of the system.

Hunter's revisit to Atlanta not only focuses on who governs and who benefits and bears most of the costs; but also is concerned with what kind of society exists and how it seems to reproduce itself. Hunter is disturbed by what he observes and takes issue with those who claim that massive, unidentifiable, irrational forces, rather than an identifiable minority of irrational men, rule our lives. He is especially critical of those who would obscure the fact that particular persons holding specific positions make major decisions which in turn are directed from control centers of the private enterprise sector. He believes not only that basic changes are required but also that those who engage in change must be guided by an adequate map of the whole structure—socioeconomic and political. Hunter advocates the cooperative movement as a reasonable means of bringing about preferred changes in a broad spectrum of community relationships with less pain and disruption.

Hunter's portrait of power in Atlanta continues to be disquieting. Far too few people influence the course of events. Silence, fear and secrecy persist. The cost-benefits of Atlanta's enormous growth reflect the mobilization of bias. One would think that the investigator who reports so unfavorably about Atlanta would have some difficulty in gaining access to the top leaders, yet Hunter seems to have moved with great ease among them. In fact, he notes that local power holders actually have used his earlier insights into community power to achieve their own ends. Perhaps his view of the powerful and the kind of society they shape is more disturbing to Hunter's academic critics than to those who wield power. The latter seem not to be embarrassed about power.

The validity of Hunter's view of power in Atlanta has been seriously questioned by the pluralists. Perceiving academic arguments as relatively fruitless, Hunter unfortunately does not respond to his critics in this book. The study undoubtedly will be criticized on its methodology, especially with regard to the "Hunter Scale of Leadership Power Weights." The author acknowledges that the measure could have used the refinements of a scaling expert. More important, however, is that while the scale attempts to measure the relative power among reputed leaders, it is not applied systematically to test its utility upon any set of specific policy outputs.

I hope this book signals a series of revisits to a number of places which were the sites of important community power studies because the patterns of power and their change dynamics should be a continuing concern. If revisits are to be undertaken, I would urge social scientists to engage in more careful comparative work which uses multifaceted approaches, with shorter time intervals, more comprehensive contextual community analysis, as well as trend analysis of policy outputs and consequences.

BERT E. SWANSON

University of Florida

Crime and Justice in Urban America. By Herbert Jacob. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980. Pp. ix + 198. $7.95, paper.)

As crime rates have escalated since World War II, the criminal justice process has often generated crucial issues in local, state, and national politics. Mayors, legislators, governors, and even presidents have relied on these issues to gain wider public support. Yet, while much has been written on the politics of crime and criminal justice, few scholars have examined the many facets of these subjects with the clarity of Herbert Jacob's most recent book.

Much of *Crime and Justice in Urban America* is devoted to analyzing crime, its victims, the police, and the courts. Its more noteworthy purpose, however, is to integrate into one slender volume recent criminal justice research, much of which relates to major cities throughout the nation, and some of which refutes received wisdom from the past. In separating mythology from reality, Jacob addresses the inevitable interactions between criminal justice and politics. As Jacob shows, related decision making is typically quite complex, especially given fragmented city, suburban, state, and federal governmental structures that exist in most large metropolitan areas.

Some of the more interesting of Jacob's conclusions should be underscored. First, fewer than one out of ten crimes reported to the police are violent in nature. The vast majority of crimes, instead, involve damaged or stolen property. We often think of crime in terms of violence mainly because of the focus and exaggerations of the media. Second, the best single explanation of criminal behavior, Jacob contends, is the huge gap between the economic expectations of young persons as they grow up, and then the realization that high-paying jobs are virtually impossible to find. Hence, individuals "may attribute their failure to society and begin to deny the legitimacy of the social norms that underlie criminal laws" (p. 32). Third, concentrations of wealth and property in cities are natural targets for those who lead a life of crime, and Jacob carefully distinguishes between the types of criminals that function in today's society. As a final example, almost half of all crimes are committed by juveniles. One cardinal problem, therefore, is that the police and the courts "concentrate on offenders whose criminal careers lie more in the past than in the future. Thus, they do not incarcerate the most productive criminals" (p. 188). Case studies of different cities are then used to illustrate these and other traits of crime and the criminal justice process.

Other important "myths" that Jacob endeavors to undermine include the ideas that blacks rarely experience overt discrimination in criminal cases, that plea bargaining does not significantly soften penalties, and that public defenders represent their clients as well as private attorneys do. But these subjects do not receive a great deal of attention, and the book is not well documented regarding Jacob's assertions. Consequently, in some instances the reader is forced to choose between past studies that have indicated opposite conclusions, and Herbert Jacob's beliefs concerning the latest trends in criminal justice.

Although the book's title suggests otherwise, significant attention is also paid to the civil justice process. Data are introduced showing that most civil cases involve evictions, personal injuries, and disputes between citizens and local governmental agencies. Civil dispute processing is explained in terms of avoidance, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication, Again, case studies are relied upon to indicate the chief characteristics of civil justice in the United States.

In light of the stated purposes of *Crime and Justice in Urban America,* Herbert Jacob has largely accomplished his goals. However, although Jacob often sympathizes with those denied criminal and civil justice, he rarely suggests reforms that would move the nation toward its more democratic ideals. Indeed, the book is laced with an underlying theme of pessimism. For instance, cities are portrayed as having "little effective control over the delivery of justice. . ." (p. 188). Police activities are particularly singled out as having only a limited impact on crime rates. And with respect to civil law, "cities play a surprisingly modest role in assuring civil justice" (p. 190). One can only hope that the prospects for criminal and civil justice in America are not as bleak as Jacob seems to paint them.

CHARLES M. LAMB

State University of New York, Buffalo

Managing Community Development in the New Federalism. By Donald F. Kettl. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980. Pp. xi + 159. $19.95.)

Donald Kettl's study is quite timely, given the strong interest in continuing and expanding "New Federalism" programs during the Reagan years—especially block grants.

Basically, Kettl's book addresses two fundamental questions facing students of the federal system: Can the decentralization of federal programs adequately target scarce resources to solve national problems? Do local governments have the wherewithal to manage complex programs without federal guidance? Kettl's tentative answer to both of these questions is: "Perhaps!" However, he argues, it depends on the level of expertise (and indirectly, political leadership) available locally.

In *Managing Community Development in the New Federalism,* Kettl documents the performance of four cities struggling to implement eight community development block grant (CDBG) projects in Connecticut. Focusing on the cities of Bridgeport, New Haven, New London and Norwich, during the first three years of the CDBG program, Kettl arrives at a number of illuminating insights using a model of comparative case studies.

Kettl looks at two CD projects in each city: its "best" and its "worst" case. The criteria of each are "defined solely in terms of a city's ability to fulfill its plans. . ." (p. 37). By using such an approach, Kettl is able to segregate out different stages of project implementation and identify patterns and differences of political and administrative behavior that lead to project success or failure. This approach, while methodologically limited, does allow him to develop some interesting, albeit tentative, general conclusions.

First, local interest-group politics dominated the projects selected and the funds allocated for each project. Second, the projects selected were "characteristically scattered around city, designed for short-term results. . ." (p. 132). Consequently, there was little comprehensive planning aside from the general plan submitted to HUD—a plan that, in reality, existed "only in the imagination of planners who sought, after the budgetary decisions were made, to write an application that would win HUD's approval" (p. 132). Third, successful projects, ones completed as planned, depended on the political support of elected officials, on citizens, and on the implementing agencies' planning capacity.

While Kettl's findings are hardly startling to those who have followed the history of local performance under the CDBG approach, they do raise a number of important issues. The most pressing of them revolves around the often simplistic solution to the problem of an overloaded federal grant-in-aid system, namely, the model of decentralization that New Federalism programs rest on.

If local political and administrative capacities are uneven in their ability to plan, administer, and implement such complex programs as the CDBG, then there is an important reason for federal intrusion.

For example, Kettl argues that in New Haven and New London "local officials made substantial progress in implementing at least their pet projects—the 'best cases' " (p. 62). This progress was all the more laudable in light of the pressures brought to bear on city officials by local interest groups with unrealistic expectations, limited federal funds and inevitable implementation delays. However, from a different perspective, scattered "pet projects" and porkbarrel politics do not add up to a systematic comprehensive CD plan nor do they address the most pressing local development needs.

Kettl's analysis suffers from lack of attention to the larger issues: should limited federal resources support incumbent officials and their provincial strategies for funding personal, as opposed to community-wide, projects? Will their projects benefit the entire community or only selected communities and neighborhoods? Can one, in all honesty, make a "best case" for such outcomes? Kettl in short, accepts the limited abilities of local officials and planning agencies. By accepting their limitations, he falls into the trap of defining success (the best case) narrowly.

It could be argued that stronger federal oversight is called for in the selection and budgeting stages of CDBG projects. This would provide a buffer zone to deflect local pressure groups from influencing locally elected officials directly. Second, more federal attention should be directed to the relationship of proposed projects and the general community development plan. Finally, the federal government should support the development of local planning capacities to a greater degree. The conclusion running through all of Kettl's case studies is that not all cities are adequately prepared, administratively or politically, to take on CDBG projects.

In all fairness to Kettl, he does advocate grant centralization when it comes to developing long-term strategies to ameliorate national problems. However, the rationale of the CDBG (collapsing categorical CD grants into a single block grant) was to insure that national urban problems would be addressed. The block grant mechanism was to provide greater flexibility, lower administrative overhead, a clearer implementation process and to allow local officials to develop the best CD plans for their cities. By reducing federal intrusion, it was argued, "locals" would and could solve urban problems.

The impacts of New Federalism programs, in this case the CDBG, do not square with this rationale, or the ideological claims advocates of decentralization often make. Decentralizing federal grants does not, in itself, insure that national goals will be met effectively, if met at all! Rather, it only shifts the political forum to the subnational level.

Therefore, questions of targeting, accountability and comprehensive planning must compete for attention in a much smaller arena. In the case of Kettl's study, such questions were never seriously entertained. This fact, along with the problem of formula-based grants, that spread federal resources too thinly, gives one cause for reflection on the state and direction of American federalism.

While Kettl ignores such issues, he does document the political, administrative and budgetary problems locally elected officials face in the intergovernmental grant system. Kettl notes the particular problem of understanding what federal grant officials expect—a major problem with grant decentralization.

Although Kettl's cases are very brief, they do paint the frustrations and (limited) achievements of local grant discretion in a straightforward manner. Especially valuable is the way Kettl uses qualitative analysis and official records. A number of studies that have addressed the impacts of CDBG, General Revenue Sharing and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act have focused almost exclusively on "number crunching." However, numbers alone do not tell the whole story. It is necessary to develop models that illuminate the dynamics and interdependence of intergovernmental relations.

Therefore, Kettl's book is a welcome addition to the literature. His model and style of analysis contribute to the current policy debate over New Federalism programs and the future direction of intergovernmental relations.

JOHN G. SANZONE

California State University, Chico

The Fiscal Congress: Legislative Control of the Budget. By Lance T. LeLoup. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xiii + 227. $25.00.)

Of all the congressional reforms adopted over the past decade, nothing even remotely approaches the excruciating complexity of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The statute fundamentally alters the organization of Congress, its procedures, and the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. Every major bill that reaches the floor, whether to authorize a program, appropriate funds, generate revenue, provide for a tax loophole, or adjust the public debt, demands scrutiny and a response from the new budget committees. The burden of tracking this written record is, in itself, overwhelming. To make matters more difficult, crucial decisions and actions take place off the floor, putting a premium on the judicious use of interviews.

We are fortunate to have from Lance LeLoup a concise, lucid, and penetrating account of this extraordinarily complex process. His book is carefully organized to explain the substantive and procedural changes, the differences between the House and the Senate, and the impact on the tax and appropriations committees. Statistics and tables are used intelligently to highlight the historical record on macroeconomic policy, budget resolutions, floor amendments, committee action, and other indices.

After first describing the political and economic forces that set the stage for the Budget Act, LeLoup examines the composition and operation of the budget committees. Through the use of ADA and ACA ratings, he points out that the Republicans on the House Budget Committee have been consistently more conservative than House Republicans on the whole. The Democrats responded by adding more liberal members to the committee for the 95th Congress, driving an ideological wedge between the two parties. The repercussions from this recruitment pattern have been profound. With Republicans generally refusing to support the budget resolutions, Democrats have had to offer concessions to various elements within the party in order to attract enough votes to pass the resolutions. Much of the energy and effort during these years have been exhausted in trying to protect the process instead of pursuing a deliberate policy.

Turning to the Senate, LeLoup shows that an ideological division also existed within the Senate Budget Committee. The committee Democrats were slightly more liberal than all Senate Democrats as a group; the Republicans were considerably more conservative than Senate Republicans. And yet this ideological division, LeLoup notes, did not produce partisan conflict. Senators Muskie and Bellmon were able to forge an effective partnership. Despite these differences between the House and the Senate, both budget committees have had to accommodate and to defer to the existing power structures (p. 84).

In a cautious but perceptive appraisal of the Budget Act, LeLoup gives it high marks for improving the ability of Congress to act more promptly on authorization and appropriation bills. (The dismal record of Congress in 1980 is beyond the coverage of his book.) He also credits Title X of the act for bringing relative peace on the impoundment issue and cites the effort of the Congressional Budget Office in performing "costing-out" of bills, making legislators more conscious of long-term budgetary consequences. But the congressional effort since 1974 has come at the cost of elevating process over substantive results. Time after time support is requested for budget resolutions not because the product is good but to "save the process." This appeal seemed reasonable the first year or two; after a while it wears thin.

Has the process "worked"? As LeLoup correctly observes, it is impossible to say with any certainty, given the lack of a control budget to make comparisons. Outlays continue to climb. Some of the "back doors" have been closed, but because of the growth of entitlement programs, the Appropriations committees actually have less discretion now than they did before the act. Little has been achieved in coordinating the efforts of the appropriations and tax committees (a key objective in 1974). The Budget Act has made a difference in the economic knowledge available to Congress, but it does not seem to have made much of a difference in macroeconomic policy or in budget priorities. The best that can be said is that a structure exists for Congress to use if it so wills.

In a section called "Defects in the Old System," LeLoup describes the following environment:

> Legislative committees as well as the Appropriations committees initiated spending commitments. Congressional actions in a given year had alarmingly little impact on what the government actually spent that year. The budget was almost constantly in debt. Congress was unable to approve appropriations in a timely fashion, leaving agencies in budgetary limbo for many months (p. 16).

It is sad commentary that identical language can be applied to the new system.

LOUIS FISHER

Congressional Research Service

The Dynamics of Alaska Native Self-Government. By Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. Pp. xv + 125. $15.75, cloth; $7.50, paper.)

This book, despite its brevity, deals well with topics about which good studies are rare: realistic studies of contemporary Indian governments; and the actual impact of anti-poverty programs. The period covered is 1959 to 1980, beginning with Alaska's statehood, and Gerald McBeath and Thomas Morehouse are political scientists who have studied Native and other Alaskan government and politics for some time.

The picture of Native Alaskan (Eskimo, Aleut and Indian) conditions in 1959 is all too familiar. Although retaining much of their aboriginal culture and prior subsistence economies, Natives experienced unemployment, poverty, ill health and powerlessness. Statehood began to bring changes. First, the Alaska statehood act, by authorizing the selection of certain portions of Alaska for state ownership, precipitated a crisis for the Natives over land. The Native land claims had been recognized but never specified precisely, through treaties or other means. Native resistance to state claims on lands they considered theirs led first to a freeze on land transfers and then to the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The latter provided money for Native corporations and formal recognition of Native land ownership, though of only a portion of Alaska.

Natives were ready with relatively well-developed organizations at this point, thanks to the long struggle over land claims. Native organization was greatly aided by churches, the American Association of Indian Affairs, and various anti-poverty efforts, from community action through VISTA to Legal Services. By 1971, there were numerous local groups, the Alaska Federation of Natives, a newspaper (the *Tundra Times*), and a group of able and mostly young Native leaders.

The developments regarding Native corporations are not covered in much detail, but their problems are clearly stated; few of them have a long-run economic base, and after 1992 they will have to compete with larger corporations.

There is, however, a good study of the development of the North Slope Borough, "the only Native-controlled (nontribal) regional government" in the United States (p. 106). Although they had to fight the oil companies to do so, Native leaders in the area, which includes the oil facilities at Prudhoe Bay, organized a local government under Alaska local government provisions which is Native-run and which can tax the oil companies. The result has been the provision of jobs for all Natives and a dramatic increase in health, educational and other facilities and programs for the almost entirely Native residents. McBeath and Morehouse point out that the oil will run out and that not all Natives have participated in the new development, but they believe that for most residents of the borough, the result clearly has been good.

The book presents evidence for an increase in self-government capacities for Natives in general during the 20 years. It also notes the success of many of the federal programs for these people; the attempt to empower Alaska Natives worked. However, another necessary ingredient was the increase of tangible resources to parallel the increase in leadership capacities. The volume is well documented, with a helpful bibliography and index, several maps, but no illustrations.

ELMER R. RUSCO

University of Nevada, Reno

Five-Branch Government: The Full Measure of Constitutional Checks and Balances. By Henry J. Merry. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 278. $17.50.)

This book examines the triangular model of separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches which is often used in introductory American national government courses. Henry

Merry argues that the three-institution separate-function pattern has limited applicability. Rather, he suggests, there is a five-branch model consisting of congressional, presidential, judicial, continuing administrative, and changing administrative branches, which has greater educational utility.

The presidential branch includes not only the president but also those officials within and without the White House who advise and assist him in maintaining a favorable public image, exerting pressure upon various units of government in behalf of his policies, and handling crises. The continuing administrative branch is made up of the permanent bureaucracy, including the various career administrators. The changing administrative branch is composed of noncareer departmental executives, administrators of independent agencies, and those supergrade officials of the civil service and other merit systems who have temporary or noncareer assignments. Thus, the executive branch is not a unified body under complete presidential control, and, as Merry points out, administrators often have close relationships with members of Congress and interest groups. The author explains how the Constitution provides for shared functions and different methods of appointing executive officials.

Although Merry's work is largely synthetic and restates some concepts that other political scientists have discussed previously, it is well written and has practical value for teachers of the introductory course in American national government, the group to whom this book is dedicated. *Five-Branch Government* suggests a fairly simple paradigm for explaining the interactions and constitutional relationships between the components of American national government. The chapter on the changing administrative branch and civil service reform is of interest in light of recent legislation enacted during the Carter administration. Merry raises important questions concerning civil service reform: Does increasing the power of the president over a supposedly monolithic branch make sense when this view of the executive is itself a myth? Will an increase in the authority of political executives make the bureaucracy more responsibe to the public interest?

Merry's efforts could have been of greater value to instructors of American government if he had elaborated on the interactions between the judicial and the continuing administrative branches. As the judiciary becomes increasingly concerned with challenges to the legality of bureaucratic actions, such relationships grow in importance. Moreover, there is a need to examine intergovernmental relations and show how subnational bodies are affected by the interaction of various branches, as well as by the actions of particular parts of the national government. For example, how do the interactions between the continuing and changing administrative branches affect the implementation of federal aid programs? How do federal court decisions influence state and local administration? Finally, it would have been helpful if the author had suggested how his five-branch model should be introduced to students in the basic American national government courses. It is possible that neither the three-branch nor the five-branch model need be used exclusively. Clearly, it would be difficult to discuss the implications of Merry's model with students not already familiar with bureaucratic operations and limitations on presidential power.

CARL LIEBERMAN

University of Akron

The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms. By Barry M. Mitnick. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. xxv + 506. $20.00.)

Barry M. Mitnick's *The Political Economy of Regulation* is a prodigious, encyclopedic effort to bring some order to the vast literature on the politics and economics of regulation. Readers must come to this overly long volume already highly motivated and, even then, they will have to force themselves to struggle through some uninspiring prose in the 447 pages of text. There is a reward at the end, however, though the reader need not defer this gratification. The last chapter—on deregulation—is the strongest in the book; and the 31-page bibliography following that is an extraordinarily valuable compilation both of very recent literature on regulation and of the traditional lore. On the whole, this book is developed in an orderly and careful manner. It reveals an author rich in patience, intellectual commitment, and scholarly care.

The basic problem with this vast enterprise is that it is long on detail and framework and lacks an overarching scientific question or theme. "Why?"—the principal interrogative of science—is rarely asked. It is asked on occasion, as when Mitnick reviews (in his 170-page chapter 3) alternative theories of regulatory agency origin, or when he discusses alternative modes of deregulation (in chapter 9). And when he does ask "why," the reader can understand what motivates the discussion which follows. But the question is not asked or given meaningful content at the outset, and this has the unfortunate consequence of transforming most of the volume into an extended literature review. Inasmuch as Mitnick has, himself, made some important contributions to this literature, the discussions are not entirely renderings of other people's work. For the most part, however, the book consists of snippets of discussion about the ideas of others.

There is a further problem inherent in Mitnick's early decision to describe the political economy of regulation in terms of professional research in economics and political science. This book is not so much about regulation as it is about the scholarship on regulation. Except for an extended illustration on the origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the only references to actual regulatory origins and practices are just that—references. Yet, aside from the valuable bibliography noted above, the references to the research literature are altogether too brief to serve as a reader's guide. After completing the book, I was not at all sure what I had learned: someone already knowledgeable in the literature on regulation needn't read it (except for the last chapter); someone ignorant of the literature will not have have gained much competence from having read it.

Third, there is much too much of an old-fashioned public administration view of regulation in this volume for my taste—a view enamored of mechanical relationships, formal arrangements, and crude behavioralism. This is further reflected in Mitnick's penchant for lists (of pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages), typologies, and diagrams. These devices are often thoughtful but, by themselves, they contain neither knowledge nor wisdom. As part of a theory of regulation, they might prove useful. Such theories, however, are not found in the pages of this book (though Mitnick occasionally elevates complicated diagrams, typologies or frameworks to the status of theories).

In the final chapter, "Deregulation as a Process of Organization Reduction," Mitnick is thrown on his own devices, since there is very little literature on the subject of deregulation. And I think it more than coincidental that he is at his best here. There are no charts, typologies, or tables. There are very few references to the work of others. Instead, there is some content given to the concept of deregulation, a survey of the different forms it can take, and a nascent theory of deregulation given in terms of the behavioral strategies available to proponents and opponents. It is a modest but effective discussion of the politics generated by the economic incidences of regulation. Coupled with a theory of political (legislative) institutions—the supply side of regulation—this last chapter could turn into something very creative and intellectually significant.

Economic theories and empirical studies of regulation have constituted something of a light industry in the last decade. Political scientists, on the whole, have had very little to contribute to it. And when they have, they have tended to dwell, like their economist counterparts, almost exclusively on the "demand for regulation," reducing the subject to one of interest group politics with occasional references to agency and legislative activities. But the political economy of regulation has a "supply side" as well. Political institutions create and monitor regulatory agencies and policies. Political institutions, especially Congress, therefore, need to be integrated into the study of regulation. It is a shame that Mitnick held off until the end, and even then only tentatively, to pursue this possibility. But at least he has made a start.

KENNETH A. SHEPSLE

Washington University

Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America. By Richard E. Morgan. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980. Pp. x + 194. $13.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Richard Morgan has provided a wide-ranging education about constraints on domestic intelligence. In addition to a coherent statement of basic issues, he recites the dangers of monitoring dissent and gives an historical perspective which keeps us from seeing recent abuses as unique. We see displacement of effort from counter-espionage to domestic surveillance and learn both that World War II marked the institutionalization of a "permanent, specialized domestic intelligence capacity" (p. 16) and that the beginning of J. Edgar Hoover's career, focusing on "espionage, radical dissent, and problems of supposed subversion" left "an orientation that would shape much of the [FBI's] structure in his latter career" (p. 27). Although with Hoover, "the shadow of a chief of political police passed over us" (p. 129), Morgan finds that presidents (FDR and Truman) and Congress were much to blame for the bureau's activities and that the FBI had "some measure of authority" (p. 38) to investigate domestic security threats, a matter quite properly separated from *abuse* of authority.

Morgan raises hard questions about the proper roles of various agencies in intelligence work. He gives statutory authority a fair and reasonable reading, although not as narrow as some would like. Overbroad collection of information is carefully distinguished from abuses of collection techniques (electronic surveillance, informants, mail opening). However, a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic dangers is not satisfactory.

Morgan demonstrates substantial skill in identifying issues and providing analytical structure, and is generally dispassionate. However, he engages in unseemly sniping at civil libertarians and the ACLU, with references to society's "thralldom to civil liberties pursuits" (p. 164), criticism of an ACLU's lawyer's views as "highstrung if not downright eccentric" (p. 165), and labeling of Reps. Drinan and Don Edwards as "extremist" critics of the FBI (p. 152).

Morgan's conclusions are problematic. He wishes to limit monitoring of domestic dissent, but uses a balancing test (the need to monitor political activity versus dangers from such monitoring) which, like any balancing test, favors government action. While he would go beyond First and Fourth Amendment protections, he readily dismisses as too speculative surveillance's "chilling effect." He also strongly resists requiring more than a *threat* of violence as a basis for initiating investigations, encourages early information on "those likely to resort to violence" (p. 149), and adopts a stand for the degree to which investigations should be tied to a particular crime ("reasoned expectation"), which is easily misused through retrospective ratiocination. He also argues against development of new criminal or civil remedies for misdeeds, saying the latter would remove the exercise of the judgment to proceed.

If constitutional law is an inadequate substitute for "precise operating standards" (p. 104), we need to channel agency discretion through guidelines. But can we be protected from government abuse by other government officials? Morgan's suspicions about difficulties in controlling agencies effectively lead him to stress the need for charters for the FBI, NSA, and (particularly) the CIA. Yet if the agencies which monitor us are to be monitored, there must be effective oversight. That recent Justice Department guidelines are little more than previous scattered rules reissued should give us pause. Can the agencies generate the will to enforce guidelines, particularrly when professionalism, the best basis for restraint, according to Morgan, can be subverted by signals from politicians?

Morgan is a superb educator on crucial issues. Were he writing on a blank slate, his prescriptions would be more than reasonable. Yet, in light of the history of regularly recurring abuses which Morgan himself recounts, his view is too sanguine and his conclusions far too moderate.

STEPHEN L. WASBY

State University of New York, Albany

Democracy and Mediating Structures: A Theological Inquiry. Edited by Michael Novak. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. Pp. 216. $7.25, paper.)

This book arrived for review in the first euphoric week of the Polish workers' strike of 1980. It was an electrifying strike not for wages, bread, or First Amendment freedoms, but for the right to establish an independent trade union. No event better illustrates the need for this timely analysis of what are being called "mediating structures." The concept itself is simple: "There is more to our society than just government and individuals. There is a range of structures in between that are meaningful, legitimate, efficacious, dynamic, and . . . (in politics) generally ignored." The overall thesis of the book is more ambitious: that mediating structures fill the gap in conventional political analyses which focus on either individuals or governments, that analyses of capitalism and socialism tend to ignore these crucial mediating institutions, that the evils of both capitalism and socialism could be lessened by strengthening the roles of such structures and, finally, that democracy is not possible without their existence.

Democracy and Mediating Structures is essentially a series of essays growing out of an institute held in the summer of 1979 and is based on transcripts of nine oral presentations. In spite of this inauspicious beginning, the essays are remarkably tight-knit and readable.

The subtitle is somewhat mystifying, since only James Luther Adams' introductory essay approaches a strict theological discussion and that only in the sense of tracing the source of the separation of powers concept to biblical times. However, J. Philip Wogaman's excellent essay on "the Church as Mediating Institution" may also qualify insofar as it discusses linkage with ultimate meaning and value.

This book is exciting not only for what it says but also because of its omissions. It's part of a literature far from complete; it invites further analysis and development of the basic concept. For example, in the initial work on mediating structures, *To Empower People,* Pete L. Berger and Richard Newhouse limited their qualifying institutions to family, church, neighborhood and voluntary associations. The current authors include unions, corporations and universities among qualifying institutions. While the case for unions and corporations are well made, that for universities was not pursued.

Perhaps the greatest task left unfinished is an analysis of mass media—television, radio, newspapers and magazines—as a mediating structure.

The absence of any such analysis is the book's greatest weakness. Its greatest strength is Michael Novak's concluding essay, "Changing Paradigms: The Cultural Deficiencies of Capitalism." It alone is worth the price of the book.

PAUL J. WEBER

University of Louisville

Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976. By Robert A. Pastor. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xiii + 366. $24.50.)

Robert A. Pastor's *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976* is a potentially first-rate but ultimately disappointing study of U.S. trade, investment, and foreign assistance policies. The book's potential lies in its strongest and best-documented argument—that U.S. foreign economic policy has been consistently liberal and surprisingly free of special interest intrusions. Unfortunately, the book is disappointing because Pastor chooses to emphasize a weaker theoretical argument about how best to view the foreign economic policy-making process.

Had Pastor chosen to emphasize the nonprotectionist argument, his strongest chapters on foreign trade policy—comprising part 2 of the book—would have become the study's focal point. These chapters present a generally lucid analysis of the formulation and substance of U.S. trade policy during a crucial half-century of American history and provide strong support for the argument that American foreign trade policy has been nonprotectionist and therefore supportive of an open international economic structure. This done, Pastor could have easily moved on to strengthen the relatively weaker chapters on foreign investment policy and foreign assistance policy—part 3 of the book. In these chapters he makes two additional arguments: first, that U.S. foreign investment policy since 1960 has been fragmented, inconsistent, and administratively disorganized; and, second, that U.S. foreign assistance policy since 1945 has been coherent and generous but clearly security-oriented rather than development-oriented.

Overriding these arguments, however, is a further argument that foreign economic policy making is best viewed through what Pastor calls the "lens of interbranch politics." Pastor declares that this lens is "based upon a definition of U.S. foreign policy as the resultant of a sometimes subtle or tacit, sometimes forceful or conflictual, always interactive process between two branches or institutions, the Executive and Congress" (p. 53). Furthermore, Pastor wants to argue that this interbranch lens provides a better explanation of the substance of U.S. foreign economic policy than any of four other lenses that might posibly be used by policy analysts. These additional lenses, described in chapter 2, provide explanations based upon bureaucratic politics, interest group politics, congressional politics, and a structural theory of the international political economy. In an attempt to see which lens seems most useful in understanding and explaining foreign economic policy Pastor orients his book in a theoretical direction rather than simply focusing upon the more practical and interesting question of how to characterize U.S. foreign economic policy over the last 50 years.

The point is that while the theoretical argument and the substantive argument are by no means incompatible goals, neither ever becomes the true focus of the study—though theoretical considerations predominate. This leads Pastor down a path which is both theoretically and substantively disappointing. To be more precise, had the substantive orientation been predominant, then an even more comprehensive analysis of foreign economic policy might have been produced—one that included trade, investment, assistance, *and* monetary policy. But because the study is intended to be more theoretical in nature, foreign assistance policy is included but monetary policy is excluded. Pastor states that this choice was dictated by the fact that monetary policy does not have "the deep constituent roots" that characterized trade, investment, and assistance policy and is, therefore, not as helpful to the theoretical discussion (p. 328).

Were this study a systematic and rigorous testing of the five theoretical lenses, such a decision would be perfectly defensible. But Pastor readily admits that no such rigorous analysis is to be attempted (p. 28). Indeed, Pastor's use of the term 'lens" is meant to signify that the analysis will not in fact be theoretically rigorous. (The research itself is based upon confidential "interviews with over two hundred government officials from Congress and the executive branch and with many people working for nongovernmental organizations," p. 355). Nonetheless, the theoretical purpose remains enough of a driving force behind the study to bring decisions based upon it into question. The result here is that a potentially productive line of inquiry, monetary policy, is ignored in order to advance a theoretical lens that most readers will find insufficiently developed.

Given the title, the reader would seem justified in expecting an analysis of the role which Congress plays in the foreign economic policy-making process. But this is not what one finds. To be sure, congressional participation in the making of trade, investment, and assistance policy is described. But Congress is not the subject of systematic analysis here. Indeed, those familiar with the literature on Congress will find the treatment of that literature, and of Congress, rather weak. All things considered, the book might well have been titled *Executive-Legislative Relations and Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976,* which would have more accurately reflected the true focus of Pastor's study.

It must also be noted that the book suffers from insufficient editing. These problems range from the relatively minor—Ithiel de Sola Pool's name is consistently misspelled—to the more serious. For example, at p. 34 Pastor offers an hypothesis about congressional influence, but bases the hypothesis upon a misreading of a table that appears earlier in the book (p. 11). A couple of pages later Pastor inaccurately identifies David Mayhew's well-known list of reelection-oriented activities (p. 36). Still later he refers to research by John Kingdon and Donald Matthews involving interviews with "one hundred congressmen" (p. 40). While the context seems to imply a joint study, Pastor apparently meant to lump together separate studies by Kingdon and Matthews. In any event, a quick check of the appendices of these two works reveals that only 85 representatives and senators were interviewed. Finally, at p. 281, Pastor notes that "Congress has insisted . . . on single-year authorizations, and loans as opposed to grants [for foreign assistance]." But in direct contradiction three pages later he asserts: "Congress has generally preferred single-year authorizations [and] grants rather than loans. . ." (p. 284). As isolated cases none of these is cause for alarm. Taken together, however, they indicate careless preparation. And, I am sorry to say, additional examples could be listed. Both author and publisher must share responsibility here.

At bottom, Pastor's study is an interesting and reasonably comprehensive account of U.S. trade, investment, and assistance policies marred by the intrusion of an ultimately inadequately developed theoretical framework. To repeat, the reader will find Pastor's strongest argument—that U.S. foreign economic policy has been generally nonprotectionist—interesting and persuasive. But they will also find that it never becomes the true and, it seems to me, appropriate focus of the book. Instead, a theoretical lens becomes the *raison d'être* while a most valuable argument remains something of a *leitmotif.*

CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING

George Washington University

Urban Revitalization. Edited by Donald B. Rosenthal. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980. Pp. 308. $20.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

This volume is a collection of twelve articles, plus an editor's introduction, on selected aspects of the urban revitalization process, with a strong national perspective. With little exception, the authors have been associated with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), either as staff members or as faculty fellows of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration.

The volume appears, as noted by Rosenthal, "at a time when important changes may be taking place in the images if not the reality of life in central cities of American metropolitan areas" (p. 9). Themes of hopefulness have entered discussions of the state of the cities. Reinvestment in central business districts, such as Detroit's Renaissance Center or Baltimore's waterfront and Charles Plaza developments, has captured journalistic and academic attention. The resurgence of neighborhoods through gentrification or "the back-to-the-cities movement" has similarly called attention to investment—this time by young couples and single-person households—as well as other attempts to upgrade cities using private and governmental resources.

The upbeat themes have been reported in the popular press, in a number of scholarly case studies, and in a few other edited collections. Rosenthal's *Urban Revitalization* is, however, the most careful collection to date, with strengths in both quality and significance. Synthesizing the fragmentary empirical evidence on reinvestment and gentrification, these articles point both to the lack of strong evidence for an "urban renaissance" of great magnitude and to the many problems associated with measuring and analyzing the changes that have occurred. The book concentrates on the Carter administration's urban policies, providing a compendium of descriptive information n the present condition of cities, as well as a useful catalogue of research needs and methodological questions in studying the alternatives to the present conditions.

Rosenthal's introduction offers the usual summary of articles included in the volume, but includes a needed placement of contemporary trends into normative models for the shape of the future city. He sorts out three competing views of the future city: the reconstitution of the central city that existed prior to World War II, an unlikely trend; a scaled-down but revitalized city but only in selected areas of reinvestment, a realistic explanation; and, a related characterization, "suburbanizing the central city"—that is, treating the city as one unit in a multi-centered metropolis.

Debates about the shape and content of the revitalized city must first comprehend the present condition of cities and various strategies for altering that condition. That is the contribution of *Urban Revitalization.*

Part 1 examines resources for revitalization, focusing on the nongovernmental sector. Abravanel and Mancini use opinion data and Cicin-Sain uses data on actual reinvestment patterns to conclude that investment has been limited and highly selective. Cicin-Sain also introduces another key focus of the volume, the social costs of urban revitalization, especially the displacement of lower-income residents. Hula's essay, a look at institutional lending practices in Dallas, provides a broad national outline of disinvestment with a specific focus on redlining in one city.

Parts 2 and 3 focus on government policies and their consequences for central city revitalization. Many of the articles are historical treatments of national policies or case studies. These include a reconsideration of the impacts of urban renewal by Sanders, an examination of the National Commission on Neighborhoods by Barry, and a look at the development of Carter's urban policy in historical context by Stowe.

The best theoretical contributions are four articles which examine key changes in intergovernmental relations that have affected the fiscal health of central cities. Ross offers useful lessons on measurement problems in examining the impacts of such programs as general revenue sharing, community development block grants and the Local Public Works program. His analysis of impacts on large cities provides a good summary of the local power issue associated with changing from categorical to block grants, including the approach to targeting resources to lower-income populations. Cho and Puryear take a deeper look at the targeting approach to resource distribution and find that HUD has been reasonably successful in pursuing its goals.

Rosenfeld examines targeting by treating the substantive and procedural issues associated with the community development block grant program. He finds that low- and moderate-income residents may have fared better under the rather uncertain standards for assuring that a significant proportion of community development funds met such needs—those standards that prevailed before Carter took office.

The Carter administration also encouraged middle-class and business reinvestment in central cities. Gist describes the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program and finds that the final choice of projects was not a function of the project's ability to stimulate reinvestment.

Part 4 offers an article by Davis on neighborhood revitalization in Britain and a chapter by Meehan on self-help experiments in Latin America. Both are solid contributions but they do not fit well into the volume's substantive focus on national American policies. Including them is a drawback to the book, as is the strictly national and general emphasis on revitalization, at the cost of sorting out selective applications of strategies for revitalization.

BEVERLY A. CIGLER

North Carolina State University

Large-Scale Policy Making. By Paul R. Schulman. (New York: Elsevier, 1980. Pp. xvi + 146. $14.50.)

Not all policy ventures are routine, incremental, disjointed or dull. Some are unusual, integrated, exciting and—most significant for Paul Schulman —big. Despite other progress, policy analysts have yet to produce convincing and generally useful taxonomies for the policies they analyze. Schulman offers no comprehensive solution to the general problem, but he makes a strong case for accommodating at least one visible feature of policy, namely, "largeness-of-scale."

Nested in a tidy theoretical framework, Schulman offers at appropriate length a readable narration of the rise and fall of the space program—a big policy if there ever was one. The narrative serves as the backdrop for briefer comparisons of the "wars" on poverty and cancer. The theoretical scheme and examples are aimed at the question: "To what extent does largeness-of-scale make a qualitative difference in the conduct of policy?" (p. xii). What is the impact of scale on the decision process and on the survival chances of a policy? The difference is at least sufficient to warrant reading Schulman's book.

In their formation, large-scale policies are poorly fitted to the dominant paradigms of political science and policy analysis. Big policies feature (1) comprehensive rather than incremental commitments; (2) binary, "go/no-go" decisions causing lumpy thresholds of development; (3) heavy start-up costs, requiring "over-selling" to the public; and (4) locked-in targets, making partial success equivalent to failure.

Some readers might quarrel with Schulman's rather casual use of the concept of "decision" to denote what are probably packets of action whose coherence is often more apparent to the analyst than real to the participants. But the vitality of Schulman's focus is not seriously threatened by this codicil.

In their operation, large-scale policies are subject to tight feedback loops. Schulman's book would be worth reading if for no other reason than his clarification of the "reflexive decision" (read "action" or "program" if "decision" is bothersome). It takes two forms: self-frustrating and self-promoting. Both change the target conditions that initially impelled action, and both are forms of consequence that affect the validity of initial premises for action.

Large-scale policies are distinguished by an uncommonly tight interactive relationship between program and environment. As such, they are inherently unbalanced. *"Largeness-of-scale acts to destabilize public policy, depriving it of middle ground between self-generating states of growth and decay"* (emphasis in original, p. 69).

The book does not really attack the question of precisely *why* particular policies are large-scale. The nature of the goal is clearly relevant. One cannot walk to the moon. But, as illustrated in the "wars" on poverty and cancer, largeness-of-scale is as much a matter of billing as of intrinsic goal requisites. However, once the springs are wound, the developmental conditions outlined by Schulman's theory do seem to fit the three examples. The areas of looseness of fit add to rather than detract from the theory.

The space program, like a second-stage rocket, blasted off, did its job, and ejected. The War on Poverty, although less indubitably dead than Schulman leads us to believe, lost the solid fuel thrust of bureaucratic identity. The returns are not yet in on the War on Cancer, but the prognosis is grim. Schulman evaluates the terms of implementation.

Largeness-of-scale fits most effectively where the need for escalated technical capacity rests on a secure conceptual foundation—a feature notably lacking in the cases of both poverty and cancer research. In the absence of such a conceptual foundation, the policy is sure to be oversold and quickly lose its political support. Further, pluralist implementation procedures, such as those welded to the poverty program, are poorly suited to the rigidity of goals produced by largeness-of-scale. The space program rested on attainable engineering goals, was centralized, and succeeded. Although it could not survive, at least it got a classy museum. The War on Poverty "failed" because it oversold its goals, rested on poor conceptual foundations, and was pluralized. The War on Cancer is predicted to fail because it runs afoul of the logic of scientific research; that is, it should be pluralistic, but is actually overcentralized.

Schulman makes a point worthy of study. He convinces us of the necessity to fit decision and implementation strategies to the nature of the policy—a factor often ignored by generalizations about "the policy process." Further, he goes beyond admonition and provides at least one dimension of difference by which to weigh the appropriateness of pluralist versus concentrated processes, namely, the largeness-of-scale of objectives.

This is a timely clarification in a field sorely lacking theoretically sound criteria for classifying its dependent variables.

RICHARD I. HOFFERBERT

State University of New York, Binghamton

Party and Ideology in the United States Congress. By William R. Shaffer. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. Pp. x + 362. $21.00, cloth; $12.75, paper.)

This is an important study. Its findings need to be absorbed by all students of American politics, Congress, and the party system. Its central thesis, which is solidly confirmed, is that there has been a pronounced and, but for the South, systematic ideological gulf of "dramatic" proportions separating Democrats from Republicans in both the Senate and the House from 1965 to 1976. William Shaffer asserts: "The major hypothesis of this book is very simply that Democrats are far more liberal than Republicans."

Shaffer relies exclusively and judiciously on liberalism ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), and supplementing it with 24 ideological portraits of senators and representatives chosen for their typicality according to party, ideology and region. He displays mean party differences for each of the years studied by chamber, for the parties nationally, regionally (six regions in all), and state by state. He demonstrates that not only are there large differences manifest in the averages for the parties taken as a whole, but these differences are also striking when disaggregated regionally. In absolute terms, he finds the Democrats as a group to be slightly left of center in contrast to the Republicans who, with a few noteworthy but numerically insignificant exceptions, are homogeneously clustered on the right. Shaffer's analysis seems to indicate that the Republicans are far more ideologically homogeneous than are the Democrats. Even if one omits southern Democrats, Democrats seem to be dispersed over a far wider range than the Republicans. This is not a point Shaffer examines, but his data suggest that conclusion.

Shafer notes three principal factors contributing to the larger ideological differences between the parties. The first is that the bulk of any given constituency (state or congressional district) may be considerably more liberal or conservative than the nation as a whole. The second is that the constituency (base of support) of a Democrat may be very different from that of a Republican opponent in the same district. Third, as part of the activist stratum, congressional candidates are more polarized than are rank-and-file voters. But the study does not pursue the analysis of these themes, such analysis being outside its intended scope of simply investigating party differences.

The regional differences are interesting. The Northeast, Midwest, and Far West emerge as having consistently the most liberal Democratic delegations to both chambers throughout the period studied. All three regions' Democratic delegations are roughly equal in their degree of liberalism. The border states and the Rocky Mountain states send consistently more moderate Democrats to both chambers, while the South sends Democrats barely more liberal than regional Republicans and no more liberal than Republicans are nationally.

Shaffer takes pains to determine statistically, both for each party's total delegations and for the regional subsets, the degree to which the liberalism of the whole Senate and whole House, or of a region's two-party delegation, is a function of the degree to which they are Democratic. Correlations are all high, but some interesting patterns of variation might have been summarized in a more graphic manner.

As might be expected, in the Senate during the 1965-76 period there were seven aberrant cases of relatively liberal Republicans—Brooke, Case, Goodell, Hatfield, Javits, Mathias and Schweiker (the latter changing colors after 1976). All but Mathias and Hatfield are gone today, even though less liberal but still uncharacteristically moderate Republicans Robert Packwood, Charles Percy, and Lowell Weicker stand out somewhat from the Republican pack. But it does seem that the term "liberal Republican" lacks any actual denotation in today's Senate, and there seems it never had any substantial reference in the House for the period studied. Shaffer notes that "the unmistakable center of gravity in the GOP is far to the right on the political spectrum." He finds it appropriately ironic that Gerald Ford could be contrasted with Ronald Reagen as a "moderate."

Shaffer extends his analysis of each chamber as a whole to 1977 and 1978 and finds no deviation from patterns for the earlier period. He ties the overall findings to the unimodal centrist distribution of ideological sentiment among mass publics with interesting reasoning. One omission is regrettable—he might have given in an appendix a list and brief description of all the roll-call votes that ADA provides to allow a reader a somewhat keener sense in absolute terms of the substance of the differences he brings out. But in the last analysis what is most important about this book is that it succeeds admirably in its goal of discrediting the Tweedledum-Tweedledee thesis of the nature of American parties.

The book is suitable for use as a supplement for upper-division undergraduate courses.

JERROLD E. SCHNEIDER

University of Delaware

Presidential Policy Leadership: Kennedy and Social Welfare. By Alan Shank. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. Pp. xi + 297. $19.75, cloth; $11.50, paper.)

Alan Shank's *Presidential Policy Leadership* reflects the renewed scholarly attention to the truncated presidency of John Kennedy. Shank's effort is a blend of a policy process approach and a more traditional focus on presidential power and leadership. It is a most ambitious project. It examines five major domestic policy issues important during the Kennedy administration: the anti-recessionary housing bill, efforts to establish a cabinet-level department of urban affairs, and attempts to provide federal aid to education, medical care for the elderly, and civil rights protection for blacks. In addition to systematically examining the role of the Kennedy administration in the development and formulation of policy in these areas, the book also attempts (1) an evaluation of Kennedy's performance as president in ceremonial, magistrate, and representative roles; (2) the explication of a new framework for analyzing presidential response to domestic policy; and (3) a testing of hypotheses implied by Edwin Hargrove's "Cyclical Theory of Presidential Leadership" (*The Power of the Modern Presidency,* 1974). Because of these variegated considerations, the book occasionally slips in and out of focus.

A major contribution is the rather successful effort to wed a policy process approach to a study of one presidency. A major conclusion concerning policy incubation—that Kennedy's actions "were influenced by earlier developments" (p. 214), such as policy positions of interest groups, bureaucratic actors, and congressional Democrats; the narrow outcome of the 1960 election; and strongly entrenched congressional opposition to social welfare reforms—is not new. This was the major thesis of James L. Sundquist's *Politics and Policy* (1968). What is novel about the Shank approach is the standardized way he analyzes policy making in the five selected issue areas. A real strength of this approach is the way it affords cross-issue comparisons. Such comparisons are strongly facilitated by Shank's excellent summary tables (especially Figure 4, p. 2551). They show that the nature of policy issues has much impact on how a president acts.

Shank draws five major conclusions. First, Kennedy encountered serious opposition in Congress because "he . . . lacked a popular mandate for his policies" (p. 19). Second, "Kennedy's . . . overall performance in domestic policy can only be rated as disappointing" (p. 263). Kennedy did not become an adroit legislative leader until 1963. Third, "Kennedy's shortcoming as a legislative leader was most strongly affected by the absence of voting support in the 1960 election, while Johnson's success built upon the Kennedy assassination and the 1964 election landslide" (pp. 274-75). Fourth, "Kennedy's Presidency is best characterized as a transition from the consolidation tendencies of the Eisenhower years to the reform achievements under Johnson" (p. 278). Shank is quick to emphasize that this policy transition is distinct from Hargrove's concept of policy preparation. With regard to Kennedy/Johnson social policy, preparation was provided by the "loyal opposition" during the Eisenhower administration, not by Kennedy. A final conclusion is that studies of presidential involvement in domestic policy must take into account historic, political, and policy variables (p. 225).

There are some problems in Shank's application of policy terminology to a study of presidential power. He fails to examine the chief executive's role in policy legitimation and support building. His classification of policy approaches is both incomplete and erroneous. To me, Lowi's typology of policy types (distributive, regulatory, redistributive) is best thought of as an emphasis on variations and not, as Shank contends, a separate single-model approach (p. 223). These shortcomings, however, should not detract from the fact that this book is a very rich source of research on several major domestic issues that dominated one particular administration during an important period of American history.

DAVID C. KOZAK

United States Air Force Academy

From Spokesman to Press Secretary: White House Media Operations. By William C. Spragens with Carole Ann Terwoord. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. Pp. xiv + 243. $19.24, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

The mass media possess the potential power to shape many aspects of politics. Politicians develop elaborate strategies to cultivate the media to their advantage, and introductory textbooks now assign lengthy chapters to a discussion of the media where once the topic was relegated to a few paragraphs. One figure who has grown in importance with the increased prominence of the mass media is the presidential press secretary. William Spragen's book traces the evolution of the White House press secretary and related White House media operations from its embryonic stages to the present. Although it is believed the first individual to hold the title of press secretary was George Akerson under Hoover, the functions of press secretary were performed piecemeal before this time. For example, Spragens reports that Nathaniel Hawthorne carried out such duties for Franklin Pierce.

The major emphasis of the book concerns the modern White House media operations which began with Eisenhower's press secretary, James Hagerty. The book focuses on the press secretary from the following three perspectives: the press secretaries' personal views of the office (Chs. 2-6), the backgrounds of the press secretaries (Chs. 7-11), and the role of the press secretary from the views of presidential aides and news correspondents (Chs. 12-14). The book is based upon information drawn from personal writings of press secretaries; the proceedings from several conferences at which press secretaries spoke; related secondary sources of other analysts' research and writing; and first-hand observation. The main source of information, however, is extensive interviews with former press secretaries and other individuals who interacted with the White House media operations.

One recurring theme in the book involves the issue of what makes a good press secretary. Among the qualities that seem important are prior news experience, an intimacy with the president, some access and potential involvement in the White House policy-making process, a thick skin, an ability to organize the housekeeping needs of the press covering the White House, and a personal flair and good humor. What seems very troubling to those on the White House beat is a press secretary who lacks intimacy with the president because such secretaries are perceived not to have enough information. Thus, even though Jody Powell, Carter's press secretary, had some problems with the news media, on balance Powell was acceptable because of his intimacy with the president.

A second theme involves the role orientation with which the press secretary approaches the job. Press secretaries such as James Hagerty and Ron Nessen believed loyalty to the president guided what they told the press. Hagerty said: "I did nothing except what my boss told me to do and say. . . ." In contrast, George Reedy, Lyndon Johnson's press secretary, was more interested in providing the press with virtually all the information he could supply. Unfortunately for Reedy, Lyndon Johnson believed the press secretary should function as a public relations official, devoted to the promotion of the president. Spragens writes: "Mr. Reedy had a classic case of role conflict. He felt an obligation to the President to serve him, but he felt an obligation to the news media to inform them as fully as possible" (p. 41).

Interestingly, Spragens portrays Ron Ziegler, Nixon's press secretary, as an official caught in the crossfire between the news media and Nixon. Ziegler was not privy to Nixon's inner circle of decision makers, and therefore simply did not have the knowledge to provide the answers to the media. Thus, Spragens believes at least some of the media's frustration with Ziegler was not his fault. In further defense of Ziegler's skill as press secretary, Spragens cites the anonymous view of a leading news official who believed Ziegler was one of the better secretaries at attending to the housekeeping needs of the press corps.

Readers of this book anticipating hypothesis testing, elaborate conceptualization, and complicated analysis will be disappointed. Nonetheless, the book is a welcome contribution, offering some excellent resource material and good insights.

JOHN J. HAVICK

Georgia Institute of Technology

Food for War—Food for Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context. By Mitchel B. Wallerstein. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980. Pp. xxii + 312. $30.00.)

"Food power" is like the weather—everyone talks about it, but few do research on it. Particularly surprising has been the neglect of the program where the U.S. has accumulated its most extensive and continuous experience about the utility and limits of food in foreign policy—our agricultural surplus disposal program, Public Law 480 ("Food for Peace") of the 83rd Congress (1954). Under this program, the U.S. has provided $30 billion of farm surpluses to India, Poland, Egypt, Vietnam, etc. But, until now, this experience has been the subject of only two major published studies—the useful but ingenuous works of Peter Toma (*The Politics of Food for Peace,* Arizona, 1967) and Robert Stanley (*Food for Peace,* Gordon, 1973). Wallerstein now provides us with the third major survey, the best book yet on U.S. foreign food aid.

It falls into four parts. The first purports to be the story of how U.S. foreign food aid has evolved since World War II. The second, putting U.S. efforts into an international context, details the bilateral programs of other food aid donors as well as the major international food aid programs. The third part, with a narrower time frame (1961-1976), takes up the foreign policy aspects of food aid. The fourth and concluding section discusses the merits of multilateral aid and the prospects for global food security.

In his preface, Wallerstein states that his aim is to provide a "comprehensive analysis" of "the political considerations, interests, and objectives that have shaped global food assistance efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, since World War II" (p. xi). To accomplish this aim, he marshaled data "from a variety of sources, including (1) primary documents housed in the National Archives and the Kennedy and Johnson Presidential Libraries; (2) previously restricted government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act; (3) secondary source material of all types; and (4) extensive personal interviews with policy makers—both past and present—" at home and abroad (pp. xi-xii).

Wallerstein got carried away in his preface. His book is comprehensive neither in topics covered nor in research sources consulted. Among the topics neglected are: allied objections to U.S. "dumping"; the material basis for "humanitarian" food aid; and the many parallels between the constraints on UNNRA in 1945-1946 and those on P.L. 480 in 1972-1974.

Wallerstein has researched more strenuously than is the norm among political scientists; his diligence even extends to reading several Ph.D. dissertations. But he overlooks valuable open public sources—the *Congressional Record;* congressional hearings before 1973; the 1950s files of the FAO Committee on Surplus Disposal. He made no trip to the Eisenhower Presidential Library, thus missing out on the abundant and telling P.L. 480 documentation made available there in 1974, 1976, and 1978 de-classifications. He interviewed only one person from the pre-1961 period. He ignores many standard secondary sources: Menzie's study of P.L. 480's origins; Forsythe's dissertation on Clinton Anderson; Fornari's inside account of how the grain trade views P.L. 480; Hadwiger's extensive exploration of the nexus between wheat policy and food aid policy; etc.

Wallerstein is clearly not well grounded in the domestic politics of food aid or farm policy. Rather, his core expertise is in the relationship between food aid policy and foreign policy during the Johnson administration. That is where he did the bulk of his original research, and where his book is most definitive. When he strays from that core expertise, his work falters. His account of the domestic politics of food aid (in part 1 and in chapter 10) is naive, muddled, and misleading. His version of the Eisenhower and Kennedy years is vintage Schlesinger, and thus replete with errors. His account of Nixon and Ford is notably inferior, in both research and analytic penetration, to that provided in another 1980 book, I. M. Destler's *Making Foreign Economic Policy* (Brookings).

Wallerstein's book makes four lasting contributions. First, it contains a compact and serviceable discussion of non-U.S. food aid programs. Second, its discussion of multilateral food aid, although repetitious, is the best in print. Third, his chapter on the diplomatic uses of food aid, a chapter rooted in original archival research in the Kennedy and Johnson libraries, offers a cogent analysis of the limits of "food power." And fourth, all criticisms notwithstanding, it is the best overall survey. A clearly written book, with an author that is intelligent, judicious, and generous (to a fault), this will be consulted for years as a *vade mecum* for researchers seeking a deeper understanding of U.S. foreign food aid, 1965-1975.

WILLIAM ANDERSON

Western Illinois University

Comparative Politics

The Elections in Israel—1977. Edited by Asher Arian. (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1980. Pp. 290. Price not given.)

This is the third in a series of books devoted to the Israeli national elections of 1969, 1973, and now, 1977. Contributors and approaches differ markedly from volume to volume—this diversity permitting authors to emphasize whatever is felt to be important about the particular election with which they are concerned. An idiosyncratic approach sustains a notable cost, however, as it prevents a more systematic analysis of general, generic themes over time. Such free-wheeling impedes continuity while forestalling time-series analyses and a strict comparison of significant variables. Although Asher Arian's efforts are to be applauded, he might profitably benefit from emulation of other, more systematic national election studies such as those done in the United States, Britain, Sweden, Germany, Holland, and Norway. Nonetheless, the book should be reviewed for what it is, rather than for what a lone reviewer feels it should be.

The volume is divided into three sections: "Parties, Processes, and Electorate." It begins with an introduction by the editor, detailing events leading to the disastrous defeat of the once-dominant Mapai-Mapam alignment by the Likud party. This chronicle is useful, although overly descriptive, with Arian writing that "details of [the] period are taken mainly from daily press accounts" (p. 19).

The first section of the volume, "Parties," is its weakest. There is excessive overlap among its four chapters while each, to some degree, re-covers the ground dealt with in Arian's introduction. To those familiar with the intricacies of Israeli politics, there is little here in the way of new analysis or interpretation.

The volume's second section, "Processes," is far better. Neal Sherman, for example, contributes an interesting chapter on the agricultural sector and the 1977 elections. Obviously using original research, Sherman puts documentary and interview data to good use in his analysis of the shifting relations between *kibbutzim, moshavim,* and the major political parties. Sherman might well consider a potentially interesting follow-up on General Ariel Sharon's performance as minister of agriculture.

Other noteworthy contributions to this section include Gabriel Ben-Dor's discussion of Israel's Arab population in the election and Itzhak Galnoor's essay on post-1973 changes in the national political system. Noting that Arab support for Rakah (the New Communist party) has more than doubled since 1965, Ben-Dor persuasively argues that this shift may be attributed to Rakah's character as an "anti-establishment" party. The growing radicalization of Israel's Arab minority raises serious questions as to the state's ability ever to integrate it into the larger fabric of Israeli society as a whole. Galnoor also recognizes the increasing complexity of Israeli politics, he uses the term "fluidity" (p. 147), while speculating on the nature of Israel's political future. He details a number of possible outcomes, many of which are likely to result from *or* to contribute to changes in the level of Israeli democracy. Galnoor's reflections are provocative yet prudent.

The volume's third and final section deals with the Israeli electorate from a variety of perspectives. For example, Zeev Ben-Sira writes on locational, right-left continuums and the utility of looking at Israeli political parties in such terms.

Although he recognizes the dangers of single-case analysis, his findings are nonetheless convincing. Avraham Dishkin looks at a related topic, the distances between political parties. He distinguishes the overlap that characterizes Israel's various centrist parties, while providing interesting insights into the nature of coalition formation. Further investigation into degrees of overlap would prove valuable, however, as in the areas of foreign and defense policies at least, great diversity among parties does not always obtain.

Despite some of its fine contributions, I nonetheless have misgivings about this book as a whole. Although it accomplishes what it sets out to do, with its narrow focus it tells us little about elections in general. And its truncated time-frame denies us a bigger slice of what Israeli electoral politics are all about, where they have been, and where they are going. In short, I look forward to Israeli electoral studies which are theoretically more provocative and empirically richer.

JERROLD D. GREEN

University of Michigan

Israel: A Developing Society. Edited by Asher Arian. (Israel: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1980. Pp. 456. Price not given.)

This book is a collection of papers delivered during a 1978 conference at Tel Aviv University celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of Israel's independence. Most of the participants were members of that university's faculty, joined by a smattering of government officials and scholars from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

The volume begins with papers by David Vital, Aaron Kleiman, and Saadia Touvaal. Vital and Kleiman interpret the challenges facing Israeli foreign policy makers in 1978 in terms of the themes, successes, and failures of Zionist diplomacy in the pre-state era. Vital's discussion of the evolution of the objectives of the Zionist movement stresses the importance of the 1942 Biltmore Resolution calling for Palestine to be established as a Jewish Commonwealth. In David Vital's view, the timely and decisive articulation of this objective was crucial to the ultimate achievement of Jewish statehood. In contrast, Vital characterizes Israel's inability to formulate clear national goals, especially regarding the future of the territories occupied in 1967, as "the great national failure . . . a failure of political imagination" (p. 31). Aaron Kleiman compares Israeli statecraft to Zionist diplomacy and finds similarities of style and tactics (personalism, pragmatism, attachment to one great power, and noninterference in inter-Arab affairs) with differences of substance—notably Israel's post-1948 refusal to recognize the Palestinians as an independent political factor in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Saadia Touval's essay is a useful comparative catalogue of attempts by mediators, from Bernadotte to Kissinger, to orchestrate Arab-Israeli peace agreements. Touval finds, perhaps not surprisingly, that the failure of most of these efforts has been due not to the mistakes or personal inadequacies of the mediators, but to substantive gaps between the positions of the antagonists.

Interesting among the comments of the discussants of these papers are the remarks of Yoram Dinstein on the weakness of Israel's foreign ministry and of Gabriel Cohen concerning the timing of the Zionist movement's public acceptance of partition.

Somewhat incongruously, Shaul Mishal's "Behavioral Portrait" of the West Bank Palestinian elite is paired, under the heading of "Strategic Problems," with an essay by Yair Evron on the effects of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Mishal's paper is an account of how Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestine Liberation Organization policies have combined to discourage independent political initiatives by indigenous West Bank elites. Mishal stresses the importance of local interests and old loyalties in shaping the behavior of even the newer pro-PLO leadership. Evron's is one of the most interesting contributions, and particularly timely in light of recent developments pertaining to Israeli, Iraqi, and Pakistani nuclear weapons development. Evaluating various scenarios for the deployment of nuclear weapons by some or most Middle East states, Evron judges that a stable balance of nuclear terror between Arabs and Israelis is virtually impossible. Evron concentrates not only on the difficulties of establishing secure second-strike capabilities, but also on historical, bureaucratic, and political factors which distinguish the Arab-Israeli confrontation from the relationship between the superpowers.

Under the heading of "Politics and Ideology," sociologist Yonathan Shapiro presents a fascinating cohort and coterie analysis of elite recruitment in Israel. Tracing the emergence of five "leadership groups" from the various early waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine, Shapiro explains the failure of younger Israelis to develop an independent world view and to take the reins of power. In accounting for their sustained submission to the veteran elite and its ideology, Shapiro stresses the availability of military careers in which ambition could be combined with submission to authority, and the absence of traumatic events capable of undermining the world view articulated by the founding generation. In an accompanying essay Michael Keren and Giora Goldberg present the findings of their content analysis of speeches delivered by members of the Israeli Parliament. An increasing technocratic orientation among the deputies is not seen to contradict the continuing importance of ideological formulas.

The second half of the book, divided into sections on immigrant absorption and economic development, will be of interest to a narrower range of political scientists specializing in Israeli affairs. Notable among these essays are a study in social anthropology by Moshe Shokeid of how Middle Eastern immigrants living in a cooperative agricultural settlement adjust to the demands of a complex administrative environment, and Joseph Gabbay's analysis of Israeli fiscal policy. Tax policy and tax reform is a topic of enormous importance in Israel, as reflected in the figures Gabbay quotes showing that in 1978 taxes and compulsory payments totaled 49 percent of the GNP, while the government budget was equivalent to a full 87 percent of the GNP (p. 353). Gabbay's discussion of tax evasion and the social distortions caused by poorly conceived and poorly enforced tax laws offers unusually vivid insights into the mechanics of Israel's unusual economic system.

IAN LUSTICK

Dartmouth College

Financing Urban Government in the Welfare State. Edited by Douglas E. Ashford. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. 224. $27.50.)

Of the challenging questions of comparative politics, few are more daunting than to ask what policy differences occur when states perform similar functions through dissimilar institutions. Investigators must choose among theoretical perspectives, historical situations and states, and types of empirical data in a way such that parsimony is served while sufficient detail is retained to make the case and to provide guidance for further research. When the functional substance under study is public finance, added complications arise.

The subject of public finance brings one abruptly to a choice between the economists' perspectives on the public venture (with the more nettling uncertainties often simply assumed away) and the politics approach (with its grudging acceptance of uncertainty, imperfect information, and downright wilfulness on the part of the participants). The investigator who faces up to the complexities of political and governmental life is forced to admit that elegance and precision are unlikely to characterize what happens, but despite its messiness, the study of the politics of public finance is too important to be left to the economists.

This collection of eight pieces on five countries—the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and the Netherlands—makes an excellent contribution to the emerging literature concerned with the politics of public finance and public policy. All eight substantive chapters were written by members of a research group whose work was carefully drawn to address similar, if not identical, questions across the five countries. The analytical introduction and the conclusion, both by Douglas Ashford, set a context into which the studies fit, but the meat of the book is in the country studies. Thus, though this is an edited volume, all the work was done for the book and in the context of meetings and discussions among the authors. The work hangs together as a result of the commonality of perspective. The book describes center-local governmental interaction in public finance, offers rough comparisons within analytically significant categories, and generates several hypotheses for later work. It does not develop one set of measures with which to test for variations across the five cases, nor does it directly suggest prescriptive remedies for any perceived urban or national ills. It introduces the groundwork for further study of the politics of interactions among local governments and their national governments.

As Ashford rightly demonstrates, the politics of finance are quite different from the economics of finance. The political effects of money are often disproportional to the amounts involved; small amounts frequently having great political significance and large amounts at times eliciting no political interest and few conflicts. If there is a single defining characteristic of the "political," it may well be this disproportionality of the effects wrought by political stimuli. In the realm of center-local financial and taxing arrangements, this uncertainty is translated into short-term bargains periodically struck, and shifting leverage and relative strengths among the sets of decision makers involved. Neither the economist's models nor the administrative theorist's managerial catechisms can satisfactorily capture, describe, and explain these variations. Similarly, traditional comparative government concepts once thought rich with descriptive implications fail at any but the most superficial level to capture the nuance and the substance of center-local interactions. As each set of officials and/or politicians sorts out its alternatives and decides its individual "best course," national objectives may be frustrated or furthered, national plans implemented or undermined.

Similarities between "unitary" France and the "federal and fragmented" U.S. in the degree to which local politicians exercise leverage over central officials result in frequent changes in the amount and nature of intergovernmental transfers and variations in the use of borrowing at the local level. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, shows very little change in the extent to which the last 15 year's growth in "welfare statism" can be explained by rapidly increasing use of central funds at the local level. While many American cities have recently seen up to half their expenditures underwritten by federal grants that were the products of the center's response to the "urban crisis" of the late 1960s, West German cities made do with grants in 1976 equal to about 23 percent of their expenditures, not much more than the 19 percent or so that they received in 1956 (p. 166). Bernd Reissert sees the constitutional constraints on the Bonn government as the basic reason for the inability of the Federal Republic to adjust to the needs of the welfare state as quickly as other European states have. He is also correct in pointing out that the resultant immobilism may grow more problematic as the German economic boom fades.

The difference between the politics of finance and the economics of finance is very nicely demonstrated in the chapter on the Netherlands by Oliver Williams and G. Jan Colijn. In the Netherlands, about 95 percent of local government general revenues come from the national government. If control and coordination were directly tied to the amount of the transfer, this country should show the most coherent and "predictable" policy responses to the pressures of welfare statism. In fact, however, as the authors show in case studies in housing, transportation, and territorial reorganization, unpredictable alliances emerge, "consumption politics" frustrates planning, and political forces converge to form entirely new realities that frustrate both officials and inflexible analysts. Rich with historical detail and generous with analytical summaries, this chapter and the historical chapters on the U.S. by Mark Gelfand and David McKay, on Britain by Ashford and Ken Newton, and on France by Jean-Claude Thoenig are well worth attention. The book will interest a wide array of comparative specialists, and, though it is not highly rigorous and statistically precise in its comparisons, it seems likely to be highly productive of research ideas for further work.

Raymond E. Owen

University of Pittsburgh

Eurocommunism Between East and West. Edited by Vernon P. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 373. $32.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

This important book deals with the diffuse theme of the origins and impact of the reformist impulse in European Communism, popularly labeled Eurocommunism today but equally renowned a decade ago as "socialism with a human face." The editors' stated aim is to explore the East European antecedents of Eurocommunism as well as the reverberations, actual or potential, of West European Communist reformism within the Soviet Bloc and the world Communist movement at large.

Some of the 14 contributors succeed brilliantly at their task. Stephen F. Cohen analyzes the "historical fate" of Nikolai Bukharin's programmatic ideas, from the Soviet Union's (ongoing) efforts to erase them from the historical ledger through their reemergence among the proposals of the East European reformers of the 1960s right up to the West European Communists' virtual rehabilitation of Bukharin and his ideas in the late 1970s. In so doing he has produced a penetrating sketch of the intellectual history of reform Communism. Jiri Valenta's chapter on Czechoslovakia includes a superb discussion of what he calls the "transnational dialogue" that developed between the Marxist intellectuals in Eastern Europe and their reform-minded comrades in the West European parties, especiallly the Italian Communist party, during the 1960s. "In a philosophical-intellectual sense," he writes, "it laid the theoretical foundations for both the Prague Spring and Eurocommunism" (p. 168). Valenta's chapter on the USSR nicely captures the Soviet leadership's ambivalence toward the Eurocommunist phenomenon while bringing to light valuable new documentation on the subject. In his contribution on East Germany, Melvin Croan argues persuasively that the logic of reformist ideas points toward "the eventual liquidation of the GDR," that is, the reunification of Germany under democratic rule, thereby effectively blunting the reformist appeal among the East German political elite. Peter Berton's fine piece on the Japanese Communist party explains why and how reformist ideas have been incorporated into the program of a party too often overlooked in the recent outpouring of volumes on Eurocommunism. Eric Willenz underscores the contradiction between the Eurocommunists' incipient universalist claims and the "national" Communists' (e.g., the Romanian) insistence on autonomy, surmising that this conflict of interests may intensify to the point of schism should one or another Western Communist party join its government.

There are, however, a few minor flaws. Some of the contributors display a rather limited understanding of the contemporary political profile of the major West European Communist parties. Because they are primarily specialists on Eastern Europe, they fail to perceive or anticipate intellectual and political linkages between Communist developments on one half of the European continent and the other. A case in point is the chapter on Poland by Andrzej Korbonski. After reducing the programmatic ideas of West European Communist reformism to support for independence from Soviet *diktat* and to a kind of generic pluralism, he concludes that the Poles have nothing to learn from Eurocommunism. He thus dismisses the eventuality, let alone the past existence, of a "transnational dialogue" among reform-minded Communists in Poland and Western Europe, maintaining that "as time goes on Eurocommunism is becoming even more irrelevant" (p. 138). Korbonski is evidently unaware of such nuances as the Italian Communist party's defense of free trade unions under socialism—highlighted by the withdrawal of the Communist-supported *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* from the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions in 1978. The prospect of an affinity of views between workers in Poland and Communists in Italy thus eludes him.

This brings us to a second, more serious shortcoming. The book's central, if implicit, concern is the question of change in Communist parties and systems. Yet several of the authors pay scant attention to circumstances that may alter the status quo. For example, in a volume whose cutoff date is mid-1979, the mass restiveness and political dissidence that will soon lead to epochal developments in Poland are mentioned only in passing. A corollary of such conceptual constraints is the tendency on the part of some, including the volume's lead essayist Vernon Aspaturian, to question whether Eurocommunism itself signifies any substantial advance over "national" Communism. In his words, "the independence of the Eurocommunists from Soviet control is far more credible than their independence from their own [Leninist] traditions and behavioral reflexes" (p. 20).

These drawbacks notwithstanding, the book is a welcome addition to the still meager literature on the *pan-European* dimension of the Communist movement. Most of the authors do an excellent job of analyzing the dynamics of change within their own areas of expertise. Among the chapters not yet mentioned, those of Robin Alison Remington (Yugoslavia) and Paul R. Milch (Hungary) are notable in this regard. If some of the contributors are a bit parochial in their purview, so too are their colleagues in West European studies when it comes to grappling with the transnational linkages of the European Communist parties. This volume should therefore be read in conjunction with one of the recent collections of scholarly essays on West European Communism, and vice versa.

JOAN BARTH URBAN

Catholic University of America

Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies. By Suzanne Berger and Michael J. Piore. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp. vii + 159. $17.95.)

In this slim volume an economist and a political scientist bring to a common problem—the presence in advanced industrial societies of dualism and discontinuity—the resources of their respective disciplines and, to a remarkable degree, produce an analysis which is richer and more theoretically compelling than either of them would likely have managed separately.

In part 1, Michael Piore explores the problem of dualism (of labor markets primarily, but also between monopoly and competitive firms and between modern and traditional sectors) from two perspectives. On the one hand, he argues, dualism can be seen as the outgrowth of an attempt to redistribute economic uncertainty and flux in industrial societies. Piore suggests that dual labor markets have developed in the United States, France, and Italy because unions are successful at insulating at least part of the labor force from the vagaries of the market. Managers respond to this restriction on their freedom by shifting part of their production out of the modern sector where unions are strong into the traditional sector (through subcontracting, for example) where the labor force is unprotected by legislation and/or made up of individuals (women, minorities, migrants) who are susceptible to manipulation and control. Piore goes on to develop a technological alternative to this "distributional" theory of dualism through an elaboration of Adam Smith's analysis of the division of labor. The two interpretations may be seen as convergent, according to Piore, because the extension of the division of labor intensifies economic uncertainty by increasing interdependence. Hence, the process of the division of labor contributes to the problem of uncertainty to which it is in part a response.

In part 2, the economic analysis of dualism is supplemented by Suzanne Berger's exploration of the politics of survival of the traditional sectors (small, independent property owners [p. 87]) in

France and Italy. Her explanation is a mixture of ad hoc empirical conclusions and broad theoretical generalizations about the economic and political needs which the traditional sectors fill: providing products consumers want but which modern firms do not produce, employing labor in ways that discourage militancy and depress wages, contributing flexibility to economies more and more rigidified by the size of capital investment and the strictures of union contracts, constituting key elements in both the ideological consensus and in the governing coalitions of the French and Italian liberal capitalist regimes.

Most of the individual arguments in these chapters are interesting and enlightening, but it is not clear what general conclusions can be drawn from the book as a whole. Berger and Piore want to pose a new perspective on industrial society against what they call the conventional Marxist and liberal-functionalist views. The latter are inadequate, they contend, because they present essentially unitary visions of society in which the traditional sectors, ethnic and religious communities, etc., are mere vestigial remnants which will eventually disappear in the face of the ineluctable pressures of modernization. Berger and Piore argue, to the contrary, that dualism and discontinuity are not temporary or accidental features of industrial societies, but permanent and structural elements necessary to the whole. Industrial society is mixed, not unitary; dualism is maintained and recreated through political processes intrinsic to advanced societies; and change occurs not only through the activities of the dominant forces of the modern sectors, but from the "interaction among potentially divided and heterogeneous groups" (p. 146).

The strength of this book is the way in which the theoretical apparatus enriches the explanation of the empirical cases. That traditional groups have managed to survive through the use of political strategies is not especially surprising. That they are structurally linked to the growth and survival of the modern sectors is both non-obvious and potentially very significant. There is a tendency, however, for the authors to make stronger claims than either their theory or data can support. First, the theory needs to be tested against a broader range of national systems and traditional groupings. I especially doubt that it can easily account for non-economic segments based on religion, language, and ethnicity. Second, a more rigorous examination of alternative explanations for dualism needs to be considered. In particular, given the recent work in the Marxist tradition on the relative autonomy of the state, much of the authors' criticism of that model's economic determinism seems to be directed at a theoretical straw man. Finally, the authors' striking preference for the concept of industrial rather than capitalist society ought to be buttressed by the consideration of non-capitalist societies.

GARY FREEMAN

University of Texas, Austin

Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union. By Seweryn Bialer. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 312. $19.95.)

Most general analyses of Soviet politics are motivated, indirectly, by the desire to understand the Soviet role in international affairs. Seweryn Bialer has made this focus explicit to an extraordinary degree. His book does not, however, belong to the familiar policy-formation genre. He assumes that a narrow elite circle, centered on the Politburo, has made (since Stalin) all basic decisions in the foreign area. Moreover, the next generation of policy makers will be drawn from lower levels of the Communist party apparatus, especially its provincial branches. At times, Bialer presents the decision-making elite as rational actors; at other points he appears to suggest that policy formation is predominantly incremental. But he explicitly questions the thesis that anything resembling pluralist interest groups determines many Soviet domestic policies, much less foreign policy: "the image that the party tries to project . . . is exactly that of policy guidance not of brokerage; therefore, the image of brokerage is at most the depiction of a state of affairs that sometimes exists but not of the desired state of affairs" (p. 204). Similarly, Bialer discounts the notion that specialists can often determine policy: "While respecting their expertise and responding to their needs, the Soviet politician is unlikely to attribute to them superior insight and wisdom" (p. 171 n.).

Bialer apparently discounts the influence of "experts" like diplomats and "Americanologists" on Soviet foreign policy even more than the impact of, say, economists on domestic affairs. Consequently, he concentrates on the "long period of apprenticeship, years of hard work in low positions" (p. 181 n.) which attainment of power in the *party* apparatus requires. Bialer adduces some new evidence on the apprenticeship of current aspirants to power, whose geographical mobility and job experience is considerably lower than that of present Politburo members. Here (as in several other places) he might have profited from more sophisticated quantitative analyses by investigators like Philip Stewart and Joel Moses. Where Bialer excels is in his conceptual apparatus, derived from a broad range of social science theory on such key variables as generational differences.

After assessing the prospects for a new decision-making elite, Bialer scrutinizes the domestic and international environments in which it must operate. While stressing the stability of the Soviet system as a whole, Bialer—in refreshing contrast to many recent generalizations—emphasizes that the regime need enjoy legitimacy *only* among crucial *sectors* of Soviet public opinion. For example, the spectacular growth of Jewish disaffection is not destabilizing because offset by widespread anti-Semitism. Analogous offsetting factors prevent other nationality ferment from prevailing against intense Russian nationalism, the "imperial socialism" which Bialer perceives as deriving, ultimately, from the decision to build socialism in a single country. While I agree that non-Russians cannot at present destabilize the Soviet system, it is important to note the heavy costs their disaffection entails. First, Soviet limitations in dealing with Third World clients derive, as Bialer notes, from "highly formalized, rigid, stolid, intolerant" (p. 260) cultural patterns among the Soviet elite. For excluding from major foreign policy posts Jews, Caucasians, and Balts, all with more flexible patterns, the dominant Russian elite pays a heavy price. Second, certain other nationality elements like the Central Asians (and non-nationality groups such as women) exercise a tacit veto of regime policy preferences in population growth and labor mobility. Third, Ukrainians, whom Bialer correctly regards as indispensable partners for the Russian elite, are most susceptible to contagion from revolts against the "inauthentic" Communist regimes which the Soviet elite maintains on its East European frontier.

Preservation of the East European satellite sphere is a prime aspect of the elite's demand for a "total security" which, Bialer points out, necessarily entails insecurity for other members of the international system. Moreover, the regime engages in "almost blank underwriting of any and all change and aspiration [in the Third World] which in the Soviet opinion undermines the status quo" (p. 263). By the time his book was published, Bialer had concluded that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "conveys an abandonment of certain assumptions seemingly fixed in Soviet thinking—that the Soviet Union had much to gain from cooperation with the West and especially the United States" (p. 2). Although he displays commendable caution throughout, by suggesting alternative ways in which a new elite generation might proceed, Bialer was apparently more optimistic about "reform" tendencies when he began writing. To me, the logic of his argument, as well as his recognition that Soviet proxy interventions in Yemen, Ethipia, and Angola constituted precedents for Afghanistan, pointed all along to an eventual Soviet "abandonment" of cooperation. In any case, the widely differing alternatives he suggests cannot furnish much concrete guidance for American policy makers. Nevertheless, Bialer's sophisticated framework can serve as a starting point for fresh assessment as new developments confront the American decision makers.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

University of Wisconsin, Madison

History of the International: World Socialism 1943-1968, Vol. 3. By Julius Braunthal. Translated by Peter Ford and Kenneth Mitchell. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 600. $39.50.)

English translations of the first two volumes of the late Julius Braunthal's massive history of the Socialist movement were published back in the 1960s and now the third and final volume, originally published in German in 1971, is at last available. This is certainly a welcome event even though the book itself is disappointing in a number of respects.

As in his earlier volumes, Braunthal presents an enormous amount of information in a clear, straightforward and readable manner. His approach is scholarly and objective, though as a veteran Austrian Social Democrat and the secretary of the Socialist International in 1949-1956, he is hardly a neutral observer. His point of view is that of a Marxist who, while opposing capitalism, believes that freedom and democracy are inseparable from socialism and is therefore firmly opposed to Stalinism. His account of the years from the disbanding of the Comintern in 1943 to the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 is resonant not only with this faith in the socialist vision and his pride in its achievements, but also with a sense of tragedy at opportunities lost and hopes betrayed.

This volume is divided into four major sections. In the first, Braunthal does a good job of describing the rise of socialist parties in Britain, France, Italy and Germany in the first years after World War II and the various efforts at cooperation with the communists which occurred at that time. This opportunity to reunite the international labor movement had a chance of success, he argues, had it not been undermined by the misunderstandings and antagonisms which led to the cold war. The blame for this is placed on the policies of both Soviet and Western leaders.

In the second section Braunthal describes how, as the cold war intensified following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, the split within the labor movement was once more solidified with the formation of the Cominform on the one hand and with the reconstruction of the Socialist International on the other. He pays particular attention here to the fate of the Socialist parties in Eastern Europe as the Communists consolidated their power there and also to the development in 1949-1951 of the Socialist International's new Frankfurt Program. He considers this program, on which he actively participated, to be as important a document as the Communist Manifesto itself in the history of the International.

The third section of the book moves away from Europe to examine the spread of socialism and communism in Asia. It contains an interesting discussion of the ways in which Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic and nationalist ideas intertwined with socialist ideals along with chapters which trace the development of the parties in India, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Indonesia, Japan, China and Israel. Undoubtedly due to Braunthal's involvement in it, the short-lived attempt in the 1950s to organize an Asian affiliate of the Socialist International is covered in some detail.

The fourth substantive section of the book is entirely devoted to a description of the major events in the "moral crisis of Communism" from Tito's break with the Cominform to the Sino-Soviet dispute. Considerable space is given to each of the outbreaks of demands for greater freedom and democracy in the post-Stalin era with the events in East Berlin in 1953, in Poland and in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, each receiving a chapter.

A major problem with this book as a general history of the International is that it lacks balance. In striving to cover certain events and countries in detail, Braunthal has excluded or chosen to ignore much that is important in the history of postwar socialism. Among other things, the major West European Socialist parties are discussed only up to the early 1950s. There is, therefore, nothing about the role of the French socialists in the failure of the Fourth Republic or about Willy Brandt and the SPD's Bad Godesburg Program. The activities of the Social Democrats of the smaller European nations, including the Scandinavian countries and Braunthal's native Austria, are completely passed over. The socialists and communists of the Western Hemisphere, of Africa and of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, have no place in this study except to be listed in the appendix. The lack of balance is also apparent in the section on Asian parties where the history of the Social Democrats of Nepal, whose rule lasted all of a year and a half, is given almost as much space as that of the Chinese Communists. And in discussing the deviations from Moscow, the Romanian and Albanian cases are ignored totally, presumably because the author felt they do not represent strivings toward a more democratic form of socialism.

But most disappointing is that Braunthal, who knew most of the leading socialists of this period, chose to treat his former colleagues with kid gloves, to base most of his narrative on familiar secondary sources, and to provide virtually no insights into the personalities, controversies and operations of the Socialist International.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS

Ohio University

A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe. By Andrew McLaren Carstairs. (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1980. Pp. 236. $28.50.)

Andrew Carstairs has written a useful and informative short reference work regarding the electoral histories of the traditional European democracies. The book is divided into two major sections. The first treats the general topic of electoral systems and covers such subjects as the party-list procedures of proportional representation, proportionality and the single transferable vote. The chapters in this section are somewhat technical but provide solid discussion and illustration of some of the difficulties associated with various electoral systems as well as identifying and explaining such procedures as the Droop quota, the D'Hondt method of election, the Sainte-Laguë system, *Panachage* and *Apparentement.* The second major section of the book is given over to a country-by-country description and analysis of the electoral systems of Western Europe, excepting Portugal and Spain. Each country is given approximately ten pages of consideration and an effort is made to describe the historical context of electoral reform, the impact of that reform on the political system, party alignments and popular voting patterns. The book closes with a chapter offering a general discussion of the major factors affecting electoral reform and evaluating the adoption of proportional representation in Western Europe.

It apparently was not Carstairs' intention to write a defense of proportional representation, but his loyalties are clear. He notes that he favors accuracy of representation over the alleged advantages of system stability provided by the relative majority electoral arrangements used in the United States and Great Britain. To buttress this support, he takes some pains to point out that proportional representation has not been the cause of the proliferation of political parties, but that numerous parties were frequently in existence prior to a country's adoption of proportional representation, as in Germany, or were the result of serious social divisions, as in Italy. Carstairs suggests that in the French case, since there is no stable two-party system, "the most stable system is likely to be one which is manifestly fair and achieves a high degree of correspondence between votes and seats" (p. 185).

This emphasis on the non-divisive quality of proportional representation systems is useful in the Anglo-American context where most of us have been raised on the virtues of the "first past the post" method, and, if we became political scientists, were given a strong dose of F. A. Hermens' association of proportional representation with anarchy. To be certain, the long debate about the comparative advantages of various varieties of proportional representation and those of single-member relative majority electoral systems will not be settled by this book, but it does provide the non-specialist with some guidance in evaluating the growing arguments for the institution of proportional representation in such countries as the United Kingdom and Canada.

Of course, as with any book, it is possible to cite small errors and wish for additional information. For example, the lower house of the Federal Republic's legislature is mistakenly labeled the Reichstag (pp. 167, 169) and, because of his book's historical dimension, Carstairs might usefully have included a chronological table of election results for each of the countries he examines.

There is little in this book which will surprise the specialist, but it is a convenient reference work with a good selected bibliography. Those wishing only contemporary information may be more attracted to the recently published *European Electoral Systems Handbook* (Geoffrey Hand, et al. (eds.), Butterworths, 1979), for it provides more technically detailed explorations of most of the same electoral systems. This comparison is in no way meant to be invidious because clearly Carstairs has set himself a different task—i.e., to examine briefly the historical context of democratic electoral reform in Europe—and he has accomplished this task very well.

WAYNE G. REILLY

Hollins College

Marxism in the Contemporary West. Edited by Charles F. Elliott and Carl A. Linden. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 177. $19.00.)

The editors of this collection of papers (which come from a 1979 conference at George Washington University) see their unifying theme as the political and philosophical examination of "the clash of Western and Marxist values" (p. iii). It is customary for reviewers to complain that the individual contributions to collections of this sort fail to achieve the thematic continuity and coherence that their editorial introductions promise. In the present case, such characteristics may be all to the good.

By "Marxism" is meant chiefly the ideological pronouncements of the leadership and closely allied intellectuals of a variety of national communist parties; by the "West" is meant something less sharply defined as "the modern democratic civil tradition" (p. xi) which is presumably embodied in the institutions and practices of liberal representative government. The "clash" between these is most forcefully asserted in the papers of the two editors themselves, which open and close the volume. Carl A. Linden rejects the democratic professions of the Eurocommunist parties as a merely strategic expedient, promising at best "euthanasia rather than a painful and violent death for the Western civil order" (p. 13). Charles F. Elliott examines "Solzhenitsyn's challenge to Marx" and finds the injunction to observe "moral self-restraint and self-sacrifice" (p. 160). All of this will strike some as a bit odd. For even if one entertains the view that places Marxism at fundamental odds with Western values—"a rupture of Western civic culture" (p. 3) is the way Linden puts it—it is far from clear what Solzhenitsyn's call for religious faith and repentance has to do with that tradition.

Fortunately, the remaining essays are only loosely concerned with the thesis that occupies the editors. In the best of these, Sharon L. Wolchik and Eusebio M. Muhal-Léon examine the vicissitudes of party doctrine and principle within the context of the recent political history of (respectively) the PCI and the PCE. Wolchik's essay is especially helpful in sorting out different elements in the Italian party's effort to establish non-Leninist foundations for a program of radical social transformation. Her analysis, which pays particular attention to the most recent stages of the debate, emphasizes the importance which party leaders place on "expanding the PCI's theoretical sources and emphasizing the party's roots in the domestic Italian situation and history" (p. 78). Muhal-Léon takes a broader historical compass in his fine survey of organizational and ideological changes in Spanish Communism. His conclusion (which is broadly similar to that reached by Wolchik for the CPI and by Joan Barth Urban in a paper which describes some of the multiple dimensions and contradictions of the Eurocommunist movement as a whole) is that "while we should not underestimate either the extent or the sincerity of those revisions, there are certain aspects of that evolution which are incomplete and could therefore stand clarification" (p. 96), most notably the promise to expand and strengthen intra-party democracy. Although the tactical motivation for democratizing reform is acknowledged, and although questions are raised (most sharply by Muhal-Léon) about the depth of the democratic commitment, all three authors suggest that the Eurocommunist transformation has been a real, substantial, and significant one.

The remaining essays are rather slight. Paul Sigmund surveys the 50-year history of Marxist parties in Latin America, appraising their political difficulties (weak ties to national labor movements, the divisive effects of links to Moscow and later to Cuba, the damage inflicted by periodic intense governmental repression), their ideological resources (critique of imperialism, exploitation, liberal capitalist individualism, Yankee intervention) and their theoretical innovations (such as *foquismo,* conceptions of *poder popular,* dependency theory). But doing all this in a scant 14 pages leaves the impression of a whirlwind lecture in an introductory survey course; few readers will discover anything new. Finally, Michael J. Sodaro examines some of the work of the French *nouveaux philosophes,* concluding quite reasonably that their attacks upon Marxism and the Soviet Union offer little to comfort defenders of existing liberal political institutions: "Most of the new philosophers have more in common with the radical inclinations of 1968 than with any other identifiable political orientation" (p. 126).

A reader who looks to this volume for a discussion of the contemporary condition of Marxism will be disappointed; to the student of comparative communist politics, however, it may prove modestly enlightening.

A. P. SIMONDS

University of Massachusetts, Boston

Pressure Groups in Indian Politics. By Babulal Fadia. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 295. $20.00.)

As the title suggests, this book is a general survey of pressure group activity in the Indian political system. Among the topics covered are: a classification of the multitude of pressure groups in India, the means and channels of access to political decision makers used by groups in India, a comparison of interest group activity in India with that of Britain and the United States, and case studies of a federation of Indian business groups, and of certain caste groups.

The major findings in the text can be summarized thus: Pressure groups in India have not as yet gained legitimacy in the eyes of the political leadership; they are regarded as extra-constitutional and extra-system, rather than as genuine partners in policy making. The traditional and primordial groups based on caste, language and regional ties are more important in India than associational and occupational groups like the labor, the business and the professional bodies. Many groups such as student, peasant and labor organizations are dominated and controlled by political parties. Pressure groups as yet have had little impact on the formation of public policy. Political parties have been faction-ridden, and the Indian politics has so far been dominated by a shifting coalition among such factions. Interest articulation has been dominated by politics of the street. All major groups, including political parties, have resorted to marches, demonstrations, strikes, and confrontational techniques generally.

Among the strengths of the book is a genuine effort by Fadia to cast his analysis in a comparative context. His classification scheme of the pressure groups in India is a familiar Almond-Coleman scheme first introduced in their *Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1959). Groups are classified in four categories, now familiar to all modern students of comparative politics: institutional, associational, non-associational, and anomic. The pitfalls of this classification scheme are also well known to modern students. For example, the "anomic" category is not a distinct category of groups, but more often a means of interest articulation used by all other categories of groups. In the Indian context, the use of the Almond-Coleman scheme is even more problematic. A major difficulty is that a clear distinction between political parties and pressure groups has not yet emerged in India. The difficulty is twofold: first, many of the pressure groups are fronts for party activity; few if any of the groups have achieved autonomy and freedom from party interference or outright party control. Secondly, in the Indian system, the political parties themselves behave more like pressure groups than parties. In a system which has been dominated by the Congress party through much of its history, the opposition parties do not offer a realistic alternative to the Congress rule; their role has been to seek concessions and accommodations much like the functioning of interest groups in the context of the Western democracies.

Yet it goes to Fadia's credit that he writes a book which uses the modern lexicon and the current jargon, thus making the book intelligible not only to students in India but elsewhere in the Western world, especially in Anglo-America, as well.

The book is well organized and well written. Essentially a textbook account, its approach is analytical, historical and "macro" rather than behavioral and "micro." A beginning student of Indian politics would benefit from reading the account. The book is also a testimony to the large impact that American analytic categories and models have had on the study and research of political science in post-Independence India.

M. LAL GOEL

University of West Florida

Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. Edited by Guy Gran, with Galen Hull. (New York: Praeger, 1979. Pp. xviii + 331. $25.95.)

The great merit of this collection of articles on Zaire is that it places the country's development in a world context and an historical context without, at the same time, neglecting detailed analyses of the internal system especially as it operates today. Guy Gran sees this endeavor as a contribution to a new multidisciplinary field he calls "international development systems analysis" and states that the different authors were challenged to view their particular interest within this broader perspective. Gran develops his thesis in two provocative and interesting chapters, but it has in no sense become a straightjacket for the other authors. If there is one conclusion which can be drawn from the whole book, it is that international forces, development aid and the internal political and economic system have created a situation in which the vast majority of Zaire's population is subjected to "one of the worst run, most inhumane economies on the globe" (p. 316).

The book is divided into four parts. First, a historical overview, second and third analyses of the modern urban and rural sectors, and fourth, international linkages. All the authors are, of course, Zaire specialists which means that one gets excellent scholarship on Zaire, but loses the comparative dimension. This is, however, warranted because Zaire is both an extreme and an important example of development gone astray. First it is vital to know what happened there; then comparisons can follow.

Bogumil Jewsiewicki offers a masterful summary and conceptualization of the political economy of Belgian colonial rule. He also focuses on how this system has been preserved after independence. He notes, "The authoritarian and centralized structures of the [Belgian colonial] state and the ideology that sustained it were taken over by the African bureaucratic bourgeoisie and used for its own ends. The Zairian state continued the policy of distrust toward small and middle-sized enterprises and was ever aware of the political danger of the development of a national business bourgeoisie that would be capable of assuming control of the political apparatus of the state" (p. 50). This conclusion certainly rings true, but the continuities do not explain the profound decline in the standard of living since independence. For this one must look at specifically Zairian elements in the post-independence system.

For instance, the radicalization measures in the mid-1970s all but destroyed commercial distribution by confiscating foreign-owned businesses and distributing them to party functionaries as personal property. It has puzzled some why the measure was also applied to bona fide Zairian business enterprises. The explanation may lie in the fact that the functionaries who took over these businesses were not real entrepreneurs. They "systematically depleted the working capital . . . in the fear that the radicalization decree which put them in power could just as quickly take them out of power" (p. 6).

Makala-Lizumu's and Mwana Elas' chapter on urban poverty sheds further light on economic decline. Between 1960 and 1976 the real wage index dropped from 100 to 25 (p. 112). It is well known that since 1976 it has declined even further. Some of the information offered on the rural sector shows that similar and even greater declines have occurred there.

With his usual élan, David Gould seeks to show the "futility of mismanagement curing reforms" (p. 88). This formulation goes to the heart of the problem of how Zaire is perceived by foreign development and diplomatic experts. Starting with a frequently exaggerated portrait of how "unprepared" Zaire was for independence, all failures and declines are explained away as being the consequence of a lack of expertise. Gould shows that there is a *system* which produces the conditions which prevail rather than a lack of skilled personnel or modern structures. Various policies which from a developmental perspective illustrate mismanagement represent something else for him: "the pursuit by a ruling class, in command of bureaucratic power, of an internally rational logic designed to maximize its own wealth" (p. 89). And the consequence of this system is that "the vast majority of the Zairian population is not uplifted, assisted, enriched, or 'developed' but rather peripheralized, repressed, impoverished and 'underdeveloped' " (p. 96).

If one can speak of a ruling class and an administrative bourgeoisie, there is a big question as to where on the social spectrum it begins and ends. Michael Schatzberg's analysis of the middle strata of the state administrative organization deals with this problem. He shows that "budgetary revenues do not trickle down into the Zairian hinterland" (p. 168). Indeed, citing one example, he notes that "for . . . three subregions only 178 out of 734" chiefs had been paid in 1969 (p. 169). Yet those bureaucrats who remain have to eat, and indeed they expect to eat relatively well, since they view themselves as members of an elite. They therefore make deals, especially with local merchants, and attain local power sufficiently great as to be able to replicate on a minor scale the system at the national level to which they theoretically belong, but from which they do not derive the expected material benefits. The conclusions Schatzberg draws are stark: one cannot assume "that government officials . . . genuinely wish to develop their country"; small urban centers "function as blockage points," but it will be virtually impossible, in a development effort, to bypass these centers because they are "dominated by members of a politico-commercial bourgeoisie who have a personal stake in seeing that resources do not trickle down into the villages" (p. 186).

In a fascinating historical analysis, Elinor Sosne shows that the process which Schatzberg describes for small towns can be taken even further down the social scale. Looking at a Bushi kingdom she concludes that "the elite . . . still derive from two basic social categories—those who had a stake in local government before the imposition of colonial rule and those who gained a foothold after receiving received an education in Catholic schools" (p. 207). Either way, they use their positions "for self-enrichment at the peasants' expense" (p. 207), with the result that "peasant progress will be blocked as the gap between peasants and elites widens" (p. 207). Admittedly, Ngweshe is a highly structured society with a strong traditional elite, not typical of Zaire in general. Nevertheless, the lesson to be drawn is that even in his pessimism, Schatzberg is too optimistic! Even if one bypasses his blockage points, the goal of raising—or to be more exact, stopping the catastrophic decline in—the peasants' standard of living may be difficult to achieve. However, the subject does raise a question. Is the issue unequal distribution or is it the generalized reduction of the standard of living for peasants and urban poor? If the elite of Ngweshe were to receive substantial government funds, would there be a trickle-down effect to the peasants even as the gap between the two "classes" grows wider?

It is perhaps astonishing that in this volume strictly political history and current developments ultimately receive less attention than economics, foreign aid, urban and rural poverty. Edward Kannyo's chapter on post-colonial politics divides Zairian political forces since independence into the "conservatives" and the "radicals" (p. 56), with the conservatives winning especially after the army coup of 1965 when Mobutu took over. The analysis of the Mobutu regime which follows is extremely schematic. For somebody who knows the history in detail, the conclusions and judgments are probably valid, but for the general reader it is doubtful that the cause-and-effect relationships as presented will be persuasive. And yet there are so many significant events worthy of analysis. Why, for instance, after having experienced the only mass-based social revolutionary movement in post-independence Africa, the so-called Congo Rebellions, has the ruling elite concerned itself so little with the standard of living of the poor? And why does this astonishing gamble appear to have paid off as opposition groups fail to organize serious threats to the regime in power? This question leads to Ghislain Kabwit's chapter on the internal and external opposition. It is extremely useful as a review of the relevant groups at a particular moment in time, but it sheds little analytic light on the reasons why the opposition is, when all is said and done, so ineffectual. "The main challenge confronting the opposition groups, still divided both at home and overseas, is how to channel . . . opposition into an organized and viable movement. . ." (p. 293). A "systems" analysis might do more than state the problem.

Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment has achieved two important results. First, the individual chapters present a realistic view of what has happened to the various sectors of Zaire's political and economic life. Second, the chapters dealing with linkages between Zaire's export-led economy, the international banking and aid system, and the priorities adopted by the Zairian political elite and its external allies, really break new ground. The evidence presented in this respect is all the more convincing because it comes largely from the reports of the IMF, IBRD, AID, etc. There is an apocryphal story of an American diplomat exclaiming after a few months in Zaire, 'This place is enough to make a Marxist out of you!" This volume goes far toward explaining this astonishing outburst.

HERBERT F. WEISS

Brooklyn College

Political China Observed: A Western Perspective. By Peter Harris. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. 229. $20.00.)

Peter Harris has written an excellent introductory text to the study of Chinese politics. It is sufficiently brief and to the point that the reader is not overwhelmed with the magnitude of the subject. At the same time, the more familiar student of China is from time to time treated to new perspectives and observations. Harris begins by suggesting that three broad approaches to the study of China have emerged in the West: the academic, the journalistic, and the governmental. These approaches share a common shortcoming, Harris believes, because they all tend to overlook, or at best play down, the culture of China and the effect of that culture on contemporary politics. Harris' observation (warning?) is well intentioned; however, it would seem that most contemporary scholars of China, as well as scholars of other political systems, have come to appreciate the significance of a political culture on the emergence of institutions and procedures within a political system. Surely, Harris exaggerates the denigration of culture as a potential explanatory variable by the Western analyst when he says that in the West "culture is supposed to be 'non-political' " (p. 32).

Building upon his discussion of Chinese culture, Harris then turns to an interesting discussion of Chinese totalitarianism, noting that "just as the liberal ideal is only a rough approximation to the pluralistic mode of politics, so totalitarianism is a useful approximation to 'monolithic' regimes" (p. 44). In the context of his discussion of China, what has emerged as a political system can be understood as "totalitarianism by consent" (p. 53). Harris is at his best when he discusses political conflict within this complicated political system. With the recent trial of the Gang of Four, it is well worth considering Harris' point of view with regard to political conflict or competition: "The essential ploy is to place the opponent in a totally 'losing' situation. For politics in China is a zero-sum game and recent Chinese politics is littered with the figurative corpses of losers. In political battles in China there are no easy parliamentary compromises" (p. 38).

Frequent references to the Soviet Union, its adaptation of Marxism-Leninism, and its perceptions of China lend a comparative flavor to Harris' effort. Harris feels it necessary to understand China's contemporary ideology in two ways and this leads him to the frequent references to the USSR. First, one must understand Mao and his "thought," and the legacy this will have for China. Second, one must appreciate Mao's political-cutural dilemma: "The more he [Mao] claimed to be a Marxist, the less he could claim to be Chinese" (p. 75). Thus, Harris is forced to blend an analysis of strict Marxism-Leninism (the Soviet version) with an analysis of those ideas as transplanted to what Harris believes is a special cultural environment. He does this quite well, save for his abrupt conclusion that "the sinification of Marx was unsuccessful and the mix was never achieved" (p. 75).

In conclusion, this is a respectable, well-documented text. Perhaps its most interesting aspect, for those who have some grounding in contemporary Chinese politics, is Harris' section on the "Non-Marxist Elements in Mao's Legacy." It is here that we are offered the well-conceived argument that both Mao and Rousseau shared some similar political visions. "Both were conscious of a relationship between the popular and the just," and "in reality, the visionary nature of Mao's China suggested Rousseau's concern with ethics rather than with Marxism" (p. 80). Harris has been for some years professor and head of the department of political science at the University of Hong Kong. One can hope that he will return to the West to assist more directly all who are concerned with the analysis of Chinese politics.

JOHN R. HANDELMAN

Washington and Lee University

The Fourth and Richest Reich: How the Germans Conquered the Postwar World. By Edwin Hartrich. (New York: Macmillan, 1980. Pp. 302. $12.95.)

The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century. By Karl Hardach. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 235. $22.50.)

In recent years, the economic and monetary performance of Germany and Japan has received increasing attention, in part no doubt because of the relative decline in American political and military-strategic influence and economic performance. A critical difference between the two countries, however, is the way their partners have responded to Germany's and Japan's economic and monetary preeminence. For while Japan's economic success is evaluated mostly in economic terms, Germany's is evaluated mostly in political terms. This is so for several reasons. West Germany is located at a fulcrum of the East-West balance of power which, after being contested intensely during the cold war, has now settled into a tentative equilibrium; it is a central element of the regional, semi-integrated West European configuration of power; it has persistently applied economic policies to advance political aims; it supports the largest conventional troop contingent in Western Europe; and its abiding concern with the question of German unity lends a somewhat unsettled (and, for some, unsettling) quality to its diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and East Germany.

Those who see the Federal Republic converting economic power into political power either suggest that this larger role was thrust upon the Germans by force of circumstance or they perceive a conscious German effort to translate economic power into political influence in order to realign regional and global balances of power to make them more congenial to German national interests. The problem with most of these assessments is that they confuse targets of opportunity with targets of design; they blur the difference between the style and substance of economic diplomacy; and above all, they fail to recognize that the dynamics of the German political economy stem from purposes that are simultaneously political and economic, domestic and foreign, amenable to as well as resistant to governmental direction.

Both books under review deal with the political meaning of Germany's economic performance, but in very different ways. Underneath its gaudy title and florid style, Edwin Hartrich's book provides a detailed, generally accurate, and readable account of the Federal Republic's economic development since the end of the Second World War. Hartrich, who worked in Germany as a journalist for the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Wall Street Journal* in the postwar period and later became an industrial consultant to some large German firms, is well informed; his narrative reflects a good deal of first-hand observation and experience; and his generally uncritical view of Germany's postwar economic development, coupled with a pronounced conservative political bias, does not seriously detract from the wealth of information and shrewd insights offered in the book. Hartrich is very good at portraying the economic and psychological atmosphere of the early postwar period; his chapters on the black market economy, the currency reform, and the ideas behind the "social market economy" are entertaining as well as informative. For an understanding of those early years, especially of the interplay between Americans and Germans on the local level, I would not hesitate to recommend Hartrich's book for the general reader or for undergraduate instruction. The major weakness of the book, which becomes debilitating when Hartrich turns to the period after the mid-1950s, is the failure to consider the larger political and economic context in which Germany's economic and monetary recovery took place. While Hartrich draws convincing connections between American intentions and the Germans' quest for economic "normalcy" within the confines of Germany itself, he ignores the wider framework in which the United States sought to create a worldwide liberalized economic and monetary regime for the postwar world, a regime in which the Germans soon began to play an essential and generally supportive role. While Aristotle Onassis and the Countess de Zichy make their way into the book's index, one looks in vain for Bretton Woods, GATT, OEEC, OECD, the various institutions of Western European integration, Germany's rearmament, and the question of German unity. These errors of omission, serious enough in themselves, lead to equally serious errors of judgment. Hartrich misjudges the then prevailing legal and political realities when he suggests that the German state became sovereign in 1949 (this took place in 1955 and even then with restrictions), which leads him to ignore Konrad Adenauer's tenacious efforts to extract more and more political-economic and legal concessions from the Western allies in return for a German contribution to the Western defense effort, first in the context of the abortive European Defense Community and subsequently (in 1955) in the context of NATO. By neglecting the issues of rearmament and reunification, Hartrich also arrives at an unbalanced account of Germany's domestic political scene. Hartrich's assessment of the Social Democrats, the major voice of opposition during the first decade of the Federal Republic, is totally negative because he does not consider that the SPD's obstructionist stance, which led them to oppose all major elements of Adenauer's Western policies between 1949 and 1959, stemmed in large part from their fear that these policies would further deepen the division of Germany and Europe.

The book by Karl Hardach, who is professor of economic history at the University of Düsseldorf, suffers from similar shortcomings. Hardach's book, which is a translation of the German edition of 1976, presents the thesis—a correct one, I think—that in the Germany of this century "economic events, indeed the entire economic system, have to a large degree been formed by political decisions" (p. xi), and that "the course of economic events in Germany during the last half century or so . . . has been determined by politics at the highest level" (p. 6). While some authors can be accused of pushing too hard against the evidence in making their analytical claims, it could be argued in Hardach's case (without questioning the validity of his main thesis) that he does not press the available evidence far enough. Hardach's book is relatively short (about 200 pages), with the first half taken up by a discussion of the political economy of Weimar Germany and the Third Reich, and the second half devoted to the postwar developments in the Federal Republic and (in one chapter) the German Democratic Republic. By and large, Hardach's stress on internal political determinants of Germany's economy is more convincing in the first half of the book, and much less so in the second. After the obligatory discussion of the German economy under the Western occupation, the doctrine and reality of the Social Market system, and the mainsprings of the economic recovery, Hardach gets to the core of the matter on p. 174 with the statement that "events on the international political stage in particular played a role of overwhelming importance in Germany's recovery." But this assertion—with which one could hardly disagree—is not sufficiently documented, considering the evidence that is available for supporting it. The restraining political as well as invigorating economic effect that European integration had on Germany's postwar development gets a most perfunctory treatment; there is no discussion of the persistent squabbles between the Germans and Americans over monetary policy and offset payments or of the difficulties attending the creation of a European monetary system and the reform of the EEC's agricultural support system; and Hardach ignores the Germans' political use of their economic capacity in dealing with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and East Germany. There is a certain dated quality to the book, not so much because it was written in the middle 1970s, but because Hardach gives the antecedents of current economic and political issues so little analytical attention. In a book that proclaims so insistently the primacy of politics over economics, the reader should be shown much more clearly how this primacy was imposed, where its sources were located, and how its conflicting purposes were compromised.

WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER

University of California, Santa Barbara

Northern Ireland: A Psychological Anslysis. By Ken Heskin. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 174. $17.50.)

Created in 1920 with a gerrymandered majority of Protestant unionists as Britain withdrew partially from Ireland in response to Irish nationalism, Northern Ireland has experienced controversy and periodic violence throughout its history. In this eclectic study, Ken Heskin combines insights drawn from more specialized literature with personal judgments in an attempt to offer profiles of selected aspects of the Irish periphery of the United Kingdom.

A Belfast-born social psychologist, Heskin depicts the complex psychological makeup of the Protestant unionist, with a fractured self-identity, and the simpler makeup of the Catholic Irish nationalist, who is in a minority in Northern Ireland but who identifies with an all-Ireland majority's aspiration for unification. A useful sketch of Rev. Ian K. Paisley, the Protestant loyalist MP, portrays a complex and dynamic figure rather than a man to be appraised chiefly by his evaluation of the Roman Catholic Church as heretical or his successful representation of the religio-political concerns of unionists. Heskin overstresses confessional differences as causes of the conflict, which has pre-Reformation origins. Ego-defense and bureaucratic stakes bar serious self-examination on both sides. The Irish Republic is reasonably faulted for not doing more to assuage Ulster Protestant fears of political Catholicism. But even the unlikely advent of a fully secular Ireland would not erase Ulster unionist attachments to Britain.

Heskin aligns with other liberals in asking for integrated education as a step towards the reduction of intergroup suspicions and the building of trust. Relying on a majority opinion expressed in 1969, he makes his recommendation against the opposition of most churches. Only a single-path, regime monopoly in education which is unacceptable to democratic pluralists, including the British regime, could impose the reform.

Acknowledging "political difficulties," Heskin supports an independent Northern Ireland as a psychological way out of competing British and Irish claims to the region. Virtually the only proponents of independence are loyalist paramilitaries, who periodically conduct sectarian or political murders. Again, Heskin meets intractable environmental problems.

Heskin applies clinical concepts to modest data about terrorists and concludes that the evidence undermines psychopathic images of the IRA. The IRA's indiscriminate violence of 1972-78 is not probed. Without condoning violence or advising granting special status to IRA prisoners, Heskin recognizes IRA political motivations. Heskin holds that the Catholic population has reason to believe that anti-terrorist laws are unjustly applied. A British military solution, he argues, cannot succeed.

Nonetheless, Heskin denigrates opinion surveys showing all-Ireland majority support for a united Ireland and holds that such an aspiration is a dead myth, a victim of the recent conflict. (He explains the persistence of the unification ethos as exaggerated Irish respect for the dead.) A key to understanding the author's outlook is his inability to reconcile evidence of Irish liking for the British people with Irish desires for a free, undivided Ireland. The history of decolonization in the

British Empire provides answers to the apparent riddle.

The author concludes with deserved tributes to the fortitude of the Northern Irish people. Politically, he is left with continuation of direct British rule, dissensus and a degree of anti-regime violence. To this somber scene may be added the failure of Anglo-Ulster talks in 1980 and the 1981 hunger deaths and polarization. Heskin joins others who have provided partial analyses of why conflict exists and of how little is being done about it in a shard of England's first overseas colony.

PAUL F. POWER

University of Cincinnati

Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective. By Donald L. Horowitz. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 239. $16.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

This fine book effectively illustrates how the case study approach can be employed in engaging in trenchant comparative analysis. Donald Horowitz has made a very useful contribution to the study of coup theories as they particularly apply to the states of the transitional area. He has advanced our knowledge of the factors related to a type of political change that is more common than the resort to the ballot box throughout the Third World.

Horowitz studies "the coup plot from inside" (p. 17). From extensive interviews lasting as long as four hours, he examines the motivation and perception of 23 individuals who were involved in the 1962 abortive seizure in Ceylon. Furthermore, he relates these findings to the complicated politics of Sri Lanka which is no mean task, given the crosscurrents of ethnic conflict that have conditioned the operation of politics since independence.

The first chapter, "Coup Theory: The Matter of Motive," provides a useful discussion of the different themes that have been used to explain the behavior of the military in the new states. Horowitz makes the following astute observation: "Theoretical emphasis has shifted so rapidly that there has scarcely been time to gather material that might support or refute the explanations being propounded" (p. 11). He then ably relates this problem to the broader questions associated with the various attempts to define the role of these young forces. Horowitz places these issues in perspective—is the military essentially separate from society, deeply conditioned by civilian politics, or "a trade union looking out for its own interests"? (p. 5).

Horowitz then proceeds to discuss the ethnic, caste, class and other cleavages that have influenced the direction of politics in Sri Lanka. He illustrates how the military and the police were not removed from these divisions that carried over from the colonial period. In chapter 4, "The Conspirators: A Profile," he provides a detailed analysis of the factors that motivated the plotters to embark on a dangerous course of action. His ability to relate the impact of politiccal forces and belief with subsequent behavior is very much in the fine tradition of Lucian Pye's pioneering work, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (Yale, 1962).

In developing the factors that led to a decision to attempt to seize power, Horowitz illustrates how the army's involvement in maintaining domestic order forced it to enter the civilian sphere and increasingly to question the ability of the government to deal with the political and economic decline as well as continuing ethnic violence. He also discusses how the police also entered the fray as a result of political intervention in the conduct of their duties. The analysis of the police is particularly useful since that force is often ignored in the comparative study of armed establishments.

In the long term, it is interesting to note that despite the division that characterized the conspirators' backgrounds, the following case is made: "The prevailing orientation of the conspirators is best described as liberal cosmopolitanism" (p. 145), and that it was this orientation which led to the coup attempt. Therefore, Horowitz ultimately contends that "ethnic, religious and class grievances played little role in moving the officers to action" (p. 181).

Horowitz' analysis suggests that "the Ceylonese conspiracy is probably representative of an important class of coups falling near one end of a spectrum. Coups of this sort occur in countries where democratic politics have been established but where its unforeseen consequences are distasteful to the officers" (p. 200). Horowitz maintains that this type of coup differs from later ones that might follow it in a particular political system. He cogently makes the case that an appreciation of these differences may assist the comparative scholar in predicting the future direction of "The Man on Horseback" in the new states.

This study is a welcome addition to the field.

STEPHEN SLOAN

University of Oklahoma

Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony? By Roberta Ann Johnson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980. Pp. xv + 199. $17.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

"Precious is your name to the sons of freedom" sing Puerto Ricans everywhere. For the more than one million islanders now living in the mainland of the United States, the song never fails to evoke sadness and longing. But the freedom referred to has evaded Puerto Rico for nearly 500 years, almost 400 of which were spent under the rule of Spain. Roberta Ann Johnson's book gives the non-Puerto Rican reader the best and most sympathetic understanding of why that freedom has not yet been achieved.

Why this is so is such a tangled tale that even Johnson's meticulous scholarship and lively prose cannot provide an unequivocal answer. After threading her way through the long and intricate history of Spanish and United States colonial rule (chapters 1 and 2), she observes (p. 77) that "Puerto Ricans writing about independence usually assume independence to be desirable (or inevitable)." This assumption is shared by many non-Puerto Ricans, including Cubans (p. 155). But when all the rest of Spanish America was fighting for and achieving independence during the period 1810-1824, "Puerto Rico remained as loyal as the docile lamb on its crest" (p. 76). Its one violent effort to break out of bondage to Spain, the *Grito de Lares* in 1868, was put down after two days. The 1950 uprising, initiated by the Puerto Rican Nationalist party, was more spectacular but equally unsuccessful, leading Johnson to remark that "building a mass movement for independence is almost an impossible task. . ." (p. 86).

In the chapter entitled "The Failure of Independence in Puerto Rico" (pp. 76-98), Johnson tries to come to grips with the complex psychology of the Puerto Ricans who, like Zerlina in Mozart's *Don Giovanni* "want and don't want" to take the decisive step. This is perhaps the least convincing portion of the book, but it is not Johnson's fault. To one who has strong affective ties with the island and its people (as I do) it is apparent that many Puerto Ricans have felt deeply the vulnerability that comes with smallness (3600 square miles) and poverty. They also yearn to be loved and respected, something that has been denied them by both metropolitan powers. The callous indifference of the United States Congress and bureaucracy toward the islanders' legitimate aspirations for more autonomy, as shown in the Senate's abridgement of the 1952 Organic Law (p. 36) and the bureaucratic rejection of the proposed 1974 New Pact (pp. 156-158) illustrate the one-sided nature of the relationship.

Puerto Rico's greatest twentieth-century political leader, Luis Muñoz Marín (1898-1980) began his political career as an advocate of independence and ended it as a defender of the commonwealth status, for whose creation he, more than any other person, was responsible. Probing the reasons behind his change of heart, Johnson concludes that Muñoz placed economic and social considerations above the question of political status. He emphasized the economic issue, she comments, not because he lacked principles or was an opportunist, "but because he was a humanist; not because he was hungry for power but because his people were hungry for food" (p. 105).

The problem of Puerto Rico's status has yet to be solved. It is a problem not only for Puerto Rico but also and perhaps more urgently for the United States, as Alfred Stepan has indicated ("The United States and Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* [1980], 679-80). Conscientious North Americans who want to understand why this is so could not find a better source book than this.

EVELYN P. STEVENS

University of California, Berkeley

West Germany: A European and Global Power. Edited by Wilfrid L. Kohl and Giorgio Basevi. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980. Pp. xv + 224. $17.95.)

This book treats important economic matters with which students of contemporary Europe should be conversant. No longer the "political dwarf" it once was, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is unmistakably an "economic giant." Its international influence is increasingly felt in disputes involving such questions, discussed in this book, as the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), "locomotive theories," export-led growth, trade liberalism, the European Monetary System (EMS), European Currency Units (ECUs), service, transfer, trade and current accounts. Arguing correctly that the political scientist is seldom trained to deal with such problems, Wilfrid Kohl and Giorgio Basevi also warn economists not to try to understand the FRG in purely economic terms. An approach which overlooks political, historical and sociological factors cannot explain such a phenomenon as the FRG's reluctance to allow the Deutschmark to play a larger reserve role despite its prodigious strength since 1971. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary.

The essays in this book focus almost exclusively on various economic dimensions of the FRG's foreign policy, but the 16 authors reach different conclusions. Wolfgang Hager examines the FRG's extraordinary trade performance since the early 1950s and concludes that West German prosperity is possible only in a world of stable and intensive interdependence. Because of the world recession since 1973, the FRG should, in the interest of the world trading system and therefore in its own long-term interest, deliberately reduce its persistent trade surpluses in order to help other countries balance their current accounts. Susan Strange supports this view, arguing that before 1978 the FRG had demonstrated a profound absence of any sense of responsibility for the global system.

Hans-Herbert Weber, an official of the Bonn Finance Ministry, admits that the FRG has no objection to incurring external deficits to help other countries. However, he doubts that a West German policy fundamentally to restructure its economy away from export-led growth would succeed, since no one could predict the long-term effect of such an attempt. Wilhelm Hankel argues that the FRG had come to the end of its export-led growth anyway, a kind of growth of which he is very critical. His argument is supported by developments since this book went to press. Since the end of 1979, the FRG's current accounts are in deficit, a situation likely to continue for at least the next five years because of the rise in West German imports, fierce Japanese competition and the global economic downturn stemming from the dramatic rise in oil prices. Even the FRG's trade balance with East Germany has at times swung into deficit. Also, the FRG's economic growth rate is declining, with no end in sight. Hankel's assertion that the FRG supported the EMS established in Bremen in July 1978 only in order to revitalize its sagging foreign trade is rejected by Norbert Kloten, who presents a good overview of West Germany's positions toward European monetary unification during the last 20 years.

A central question is the economic and political importance of the European Community (EC) for the FRG. Alfred Steinherr examines West German industrial and labor policy and concludes that the FRG's economy as a whole has not gained any more from EC membership than would have been the case if the FRG had merely pursued a worldwide liberal economic policy. He argues that its joining was based primarily on its desire to regain international respectability. Also, Beate Kohler argues that Chancellor Schmidt and all West German parties and interest groups favor enlargement of the EC chiefly in order to strengthen European democracy and security by promoting stability in Southern Europe. Political motives outweigh economic ones. As Hermann Priebe explains, the FRG also has strong political motives for supporting the CAP, though begrudgingly. Priebe is highly critical of this crutch for European agriculture, which creates monumental agricultural surpluses and distorts the EC's development policy. Storage costs for butter surpluses alone exceeded the EC's expenditure for the economic development of rural regions, and spending for price supports now swallows two-thirds of the EC's entire budget.

As the expectations for rapid European integration fade, the FRG increasingly acts unilaterally; that is, it now ventures out on its own on some international issues. Given its economic power, such moves arouse suspicions of renascent German nationalism. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, in an especially interesting survey of the basic assumptions of the FRG's foreign policy, rejects this proposition by drawing a careful distinction between nationalism as a goal and unilateralism as a process. He asserts that Bonn's basic foreign policy objectives remain unchanged, but that its enhanced economic weight has now made its international behavior more visible. He argues correctly that the FRG has not taken advantage of its economic power to establish for itself a position of hegemony in Europe. Because it has come of age, the FRG does indeed make more of its own decisions, as all sovereign states are expected to do. He contends that even NATO and EC decisions are the product of unilateralism since each member must agree individually to each decision.

In the book's only totally non-economic treatment of an aspect of West German foreign policy, Reinhardt Rummel discusses the FRG's role in the consultations known as the European Political Cooperation (EPC), conducted since the early 1970s. This multinational tool, intended as a pragmatic step toward political union, has served as another base, alongside the EC, for achieving a West European consensus in matters involving the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the UN, where the FRG prefers not to venture alone. Although the results of the EPC's efforts remain limited, it has helped the FRG assume a more active role in matters which transcend the EC's immediate concerns.

This book is a very well-edited collection of informed views on many aspects of the FRG's economy. It is not always easy reading for a political scientist unaccustomed to dealing in depth with economic subjects, but this fact merely underscores the editors' contention. It prompts any reader to reflect upon how liberal trade should be in a highly interdependent world and upon the seldom-asked question: is the West German economy really a near-perfect model for other countries to imitate?

WAYNE C. THOMPSON

Universität Freiburg

Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective. Edited by Kay Lawson. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. vi + 410. $35.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The recently reawakened interest in the study of political parties has served to draw together many of the divergent threads that have developed in comparative politics. Structural or institutional interests in how governments are organized have been combined with environmental, developmental, cultural, policy-oriented, sociological, systemic and historical approaches. By focusing on political parties as instruments of linkage which can connect citizens and states, Kay Lawson suggests in her introductory chapter, we can also evaluate states on the basis of their levels of representation and participation—hence, on their levels of democracy.

In addition to Lawson's introduction, the book includes 15 case studies of political parties from widely divergent geographic and political environments. All populated continents are represented, as are both competitive and non-competitive party systems, and developed as well as developing states. The essays are uniformly clearly written and they provide to non-specialists both an introduction and a cogent analysis of the role or place of party organization in various different political settings. Some of the essays report newly gathered data. Few of the essays, however, provide much in the way of original interpretation that will interest specialists in particular subfields. The aim of the volume seems to be to take a step in the development of a theory of the role of parties in political linkage.

The concept of linkage used in each of the studies was not precisely and uniformly defined beforehand. James Rosenau's broad characterization of linkage, as behavior in one part of a political system which is reacted to in another part, appears to be about all that was suggested to the authors. Each separate report is focused on what appeared to the separate researchers to be the most accessible or interesting research question. Therefore, as could be expected, the approaches used vary widely. Some of the chapters are precisely focused geographically, such as Marvick's study of Los Angeles and Somjee's essay on Anand, India. Other authors have written essays covering all European social democratic parties or all of Africa. Some studies report on specifically conducted behavioral research, while others develop their arguments from party histories. The concepts of linkage which are employed also differ. Several studies examine the links between socialist parties and the working class, others discuss the links between legislators and constituents, or between party patrons and their clients.

From the different conclusions drawn by these independent analyses, Lawson has attempted to develop a theory of parties and linkage. This is a task, she says, made "both imperative and possible" by the essays she has gathered together. Unfortunately, hers is the weakest essay in the book. Since Lawson's theory is derived from the independent research findings that were not all guided by the same principles or assumptions about parties and politics, the theory she develops presumes differences in the way parties handle the linkage function. In fact, such differences may be explained by the different approaches of the analysts.

One situation can be cited to illustrate this difficulty. Marvick's study of Los Angeles concludes that competition between relatively evenly matched parties with sharply contrasting policy preferences that can change in response to changing voter preferences will be very successful in linking citizen demands to actual policy. On the other hand, Corbett's analysis of Mexico argues that the dominant one-party system closes off much local influence over policy. These two studies are consistent, each supporting the view that it is competition between parties that allows effective linkage between citizens and state policy to develop. This view is contradicted by Hill's paper on the Soviet Union. Hill argues that even without competition, the CPSU has developed instruments to link citizens and policy and to develop some form of representation. This is a conclusion Lawson terms surprising. But, to be really useful, her theory would have to account for such surprises, raise the questions which appropriately follow and point out the directions in which to look for answers. Is what occurred in the Soviet Union possible in Mexico? Under what circumstances? How can the linkage functions achieved in the Soviet Union be compared with the experience in Los Angeles? Such questions can be answered only by the application of a single theory to all cases. Any theory that is derived from separate analyses of these cases will contain serious imperfections in focus. The purpose of any theory, particularly in a field as ripe for research as the study of parties and linkage, is to serve as an hypothesis-generating mechanism. Lawson's theory-building work does not do this well enough to be much of a guide for further research.

The book does have its uses, however, for those who wish to pursue their own theory-building effort. These analyses can be used to develop serious questions about the nature of political linkage. But we are still a long way from a comprehensive theory of the linkage role of parties.

CHARLES J. NAGY, JR.

Graceland College

Paraguay under Stroessner. By Paul H. Lewis. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 256. $22.00.)

This is the first and, so far, only book-length study of the Stroessner government in Paraguay to be published in English. That regime is both remarkable and traditional. It is remarkable because, having come to power in 1954, General Alfredo Stroessner as of 1981 has been in office longer than either any earlier Paraguayan dictator or any other Latin American chief executive currently in power. Viewed against the backdrop of all the history of the Americas, the Stroessner regime, from the standpoint of longevity, is entitled to membership in the same league with such seminal long-timers as Brazil's Emperor Dom Pedro II (1831-1889), Mexico's General Porfirio Días (1877-1911), the Dominican Republic's Generalissimo Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina (1930-1961), and Venezuela's General Juan Vincente Gómez (1908-1935). On the other hand, Stroessner's is a traditional dictatorship, cut from the cloth of the Paraguayan political culture and carrying on, essentially, in the patterns set by such earlier figures as José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia ("El Supremo"), in power from 1814 until 1840, and the elder (1842-1862) and younger (1862-1870) Lópezes.

Paul Lewis' book is carved into four sections. Part 1, concerned with historical background, tells us that the Francia-López legacy set up a natural Paraguayan habitat for the present authoritarian regime; part 2 relates the personal/political history of General Alfredo Stroessner; part 3 describes the machinery of his dictatorship; and part 4 smokes out and identifies his opposition.

The keys to Stroessner's continuing power, Lewis believes, include Paraguay's isolating geography and history, which conspire to lock in such a regime. The country's bloody civil war, which began in the late 1940s, is also considered. In an interesting section, Lewis compares this with the frightful Spanish civil war of the 1930s, resulting in the tendency of people to choose the authoritarianism of a Stroessner or a Franco over a resumption of the fratricidal bloodbath, where these appear to be the alternatives. Stroessner's manipulation and control of the *Colorado* party of Paraguay is also cited, presented here as the chief illustration of his ability as a politician. These pillars of the regime aid in its legitimation and the promotion of national pride in Stroessner's programs, among which economic development is prominent.

Dilemma and paradox run through *Paraguay under Stroessner.* A final, and disturbing, polarity left to the reader is the conflict between traditionalism and *personalismo.* In one sense, the Stroessner regime is a typical authoritarian dictatorship of the variety which flourishes easily in Paraguay. But, in another, so much depends on the personal *caudillo* that when Stroessner goes—as we must assume he will—the machinery of his personalistic authoritarian control will probably crumble, ushering in a new era of political chaos for Paraguayans. Thus it would appear that even the most traditional of regimes offers no sure defense against political upheaval.

Lewis thus provides us with a useful contribution to the existing literature on the current Latin American political scene. *Paraguay under Stroessner* is our first and only English-language study of an important regime. From the standpoint of political science, the book is descriptive and anecdotal rather than systematically analytical. This dichotomy will no doubt draw the line between the book's defenders and its critics. Both camps, however, must recognize the value of this work in adding to our familiarity with one of the most little-known, even if the longest-lived, governments in the Americas.

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN

Northwestern University

TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group 1868-1976. By Ross M. Martin. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 394. $42.00.)

The Trades Union Congress (TUC) is one of the oldest associational interest groups in existence in the United Kingdom and perhaps in the world. Organized in the 1860s, the TUC has grown and developed over the years, outstripping potential challengers as the central voice of the British trade union movement. We still lack a definitive history of the TUC, but Ross Martin has provided us with a partial view of the TUC and its relations with the British government with special emphasis on the period up to 1940.

Martin's basic thesis is to detail the increasing stature of the TUC over the years and its improved access to the government. His basically descriptive approach uses Harry Eckstein's framework which views pressure group activity as determined mainly by governmental structure, the scope of public policy, political culture and group attributes and resources (p. ix). Martin's use of these concepts provides an excellent demonstration of the strengths and weaknesses of Eckstein's framework.

The basic outline of the TUC's development as a pressure group is provided in the central portion of Martin's book. Each of the descriptive chapters (2-8) is broken down into sections on the government, trade unions in general, and the TUC. The section on the TUC gives attention to its position within the union movement as well as its stature vis-à-vis the government. In its early years, the ascendancy of the TUC was challenged by individual unions, the General Federation of Trade Unions, and ultimately the Labour party. But these threats to the leading position of the TUC faded after World War I as individual unions such as the Engineers found it increasingly expedient to grant some authority to the TUC, the GFTU declined and disappeared and an uneasy division of labor was worked out with the Labour party. Basically, Martin shows how the TUC gradually increased its authority within the union movement.

A second emphasis in the book is to document the TUC's increased stature with successive governments as they steadily expanded the scope of public policy. Access is Martin's variable and he is very good at demonstrating how the TUC was able to increase its access to successive governments. Martin's treatment of the TUC's position during both world wars emphasizes the change over time.

It is indeed this very concern with access that points up some of the weaknesses of the book. Martin provides a good discussion of pressure group effectiveness in chapter 1. His distinction between having access to officeholders and actually influencing them is important, and it is unfortunate, if perhaps inevitable, that the body of the book should stress the former to the almost total exclusion of the latter except for a footnote reference to unemployment insurance schemes and to the Beveridge Report (pp. 10-11). The content of public policy is clearly as important as the process through which it is made. But for Martin to deal adequately with the substantive results of TUC-government interaction would have called for a book written from a totally different perspective.

A second problem with this study is its almost exclusive reliance on the TUC as its major source when dealing with access to the government. It is unfortunate there was apparently neither time nor resources to consult ministerial records where available to gain a better perspective on the nature of the TUC's access. Perhaps the most obvious place where ministerial records would have been interesting would have been the contrast between the pre-Ernest Bevin era of the 1930s and the period after Bevin joined the wartime coalition.

A third weakness of Martin's study derives from his treatment of the authority of the TUC within the union movement. Again, his almost total reliance on the records of the TUC as opposed to its constituent unions (and/or rivals) is a problem and means that the real dynamics of relationships within the union movement are lost. In particular, it is regrettable that there is almost no reference to the records or histories of the various miners' unions, not even regarding the events of the 1920s, including the General Strike. Examining why some of the mining unions or the engineering unions finally affiliated with the TUC would also have been useful.

A fourth problem that confronts the reader is Martin's tendency to treat the TUC as a unified whole and not allow for conflicts between its various parts such as differences between the annual Congress and the Parliamentary Committee/General Council and within the Parliamentary Committee/General Council. The domination of the General Council by Citrine and Bevin in the late 1920s and 1930s is referred to but there is little other recognition that the TUC was not always unanimous on all topics.

One would have wished that Martin had dealt in detail with each of these problems but that would have required a second volume of a book that already cost too much and required far more time and effort than any one person can expect to give such a work. And these weaknesses do not undermine the real value of Martin's book as a systematic application of Eckstein's framework, as a useful historical case study of the evolution of one pressure group over a century or more and for its insights into at least one aspect of consultative politics in the United Kingdom.

WILLIAM D. MULLER

State University of New York, Fredonia

Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement. By Judith A. Merkle. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 325. $18.50.)

In this book, Judith Merkle traces the origin and diffusion of what she defines as Scientific Management. She sees it as a great movement, originating in the work of Frederick W. Taylor, which embraces all attempts at systematic rationalization of management and control in industry, society and government, including business administration, public administration, and industrial engineering.

Scientific Management, according to Merkle, has dominated American management thought in industry and government since early in this century and has spread worldwide, providing a large part of the distinctive shape and flavor of industrial civilization. As examples, she explores the reception of Scientific Management in Russia, France, Germany, and England.

According to Merkle, the dominating influence of Scientific Management was due to its role and nature as a tool in the growing industrial class conflict at the beginning of this century. It was, she says, a peculiarly middle-class answer to growing conflict over work and distribution between capitalist owners and labor. It created a needed worker discipline by mechanization; minute division of work; and creation of a new middle-class profession of staff management experts to do the thinking for both owners and workers, exercise the controls, and divide the spoils. It was "an ideology of organization for industrial civilization" (p. 243).

Combined with Progressivism, Scientific Management gave us our basic public administrative concepts and practices like "efficiency and economy," merit systems, civil service, and the policy/administration dichotomy. Extended, it gave us increasingly sophisticated mechanization of work, creating blindly along the way a growing class of unemployables.

Taylorism fitted the needs and even the vanguard ideology of early Russian Communism and was eagerly taken over by Lenin and Trotsky in place of the romantic notion of untutored worker management of industry and government.

Scientific Management infected France, but the older pre-Revolutionary and Napoleonic traditions of management were too strong, and so Taylorism in France was more a gloss on the operation of factories than a fundamental change in them.

Scientific Management was congenial to German aristocratic and autocratic bureaucracy, and to the ideals of the harmonious corporate state. It reinforced and speeded up the movement toward rationalization in industry and eventually the nation. As elsewhere, according to Merkle, it proved unable to examine goals and thus greatly promoted the effectiveness of Nazi brutality.

A stable class structure, Conservative traditionalism, and British pragmatism shaped nineteenth-century British management attitudes. Against this background, Taylorism did not flourish. Administrative studies were beneath the attention of a gentleman. Strong unions, a peculiarly British "managerial progressivism," and strong beliefs in economic *laissez-faire* further strengthened British resistance. Fabian socialism, Merkle says, developed another answer to industrial class conflict. The British went instead to human relations to tame industrial warfare.

Although Merkle's ability is quite apparent, there are a number of things about her book that bother me. Class conflict interpretations become themselves ideological. Even though I may agree with Merkle that much of Scientific Management is unsound, why could not the whole century-long effort be interpreted as part of the rationalization of life and institutions so basic to modernization and industrialization—as part of Weber's demystification of life? That Taylor, Gantt, Gilbreth et al. importantly shaped the modern world is very hard to accept. The fact that, as Merkle shows, Taylorism had such differential success in Russia, Germany, France and Britain would suggest that some other non-class explanation might be better.

I also have trouble with the large number of seemingly disparate things Merkle dumps into "Scientific Management." It includes the stopwatch, industrial engineering, the American human relations movement, the Hoover Commissions, automation, the computer revolution, public administration, and even the "Positive Thinkers" from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman Vincent Peale. There is much more. Can all of this be lumped into a class-conflict explanation?

Perhaps much of what she calls Scientific Management is really not ideology but the constant effort to rationalize and keep costs down, especially that category of costs which has risen most in this century, namely labor. In this connection, what one misses in this book is any suggestion that there may be an economy out there, with markets and competition, making the incessant search for cost-effectiveness necessary.

Although Merkle sees Scientific Management dominating the industrial world, her data on the differential reception of Taylorism in other countries do not support this contention. Reactions to Taylorism varied by culture.

I believe Merkle would prefer a more humanistic management, one based on tradition, experience, common sense, and interpersonal loyalties and responsibilities; that she fears the impersonalizing and technicizing tendencies of modern management thought and practice. I think I share these values. But I am not sure Merkle has chosen the best way to fight for them.

VICTOR A. THOMPSON

University of Florida

Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality. By George L. Mosse. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1980. Pp. xii + 362. $25.00.)

This well-made book is a collection of 14 articles, published in various journals mainly during the 1970s. While the parts range over a variety of subjects, the collection as a whole is concerned with the myths, symbols and stereotypes (identified through an analysis of popular literature) through which Europeans of the pre-fascist period sought to understand their environment.

The epistemological orientation is expressed in the observation that "men and women act upon reality as they perceive it, and thus they help to shape it as well" (p. 15).

Although there are pieces on French and Italian fascisms, the volume is predominantly concerned with Germany. It is full of the insights and nuggets of information one has come to expect, even to demand, from George Mosse. In this brief review, I will limit myself to comments on two of the chapters which most attracted me.

In "Towards a General Theory of Fascism," Mosse displays his firm grasp of the nature of that phenomenon. He rejects views of fascism which reduce it to a class reaction or an exclusively middle-class affair. Mosse knows that in Italy as in Germany fascism was a true mass movement with interclass support. Fascists viewed themselves as a third force, rejecting capitalist as well as Marxist materialism, as they sought to replace a parliamentary structure which had all but abdicated its responsibilities in the difficult postwar period. Fascism was able to provide a sense of real participation in public affairs to millions for whom the methods of parliamentary government had become dry and meaningless. In this as well as other senses, fascism was revolutionary. "Fascism was based upon a strong and unique revolutionary tradition, fired by the emphasis on youth and the war experience; it was able to create a mass consensus that was broken only by a lost war" (p. 169). In part that consensus was sustained by fascist ideology which gathered together concepts from many sources into "a coherent attitude toward life through the basic fascist nationalist myth" (p. 178). In part also the consensus rested on the widespread perception that fascist regimes had ended states of near-civil war, provided economic stability, and had won foreign policy successes. Mosse places welcome emphasis on the contributions of fascist leaders to the triumph of their movements. Both Mussolini and Hitler well understood and (especially in Hitler's case) shared the tastes and prejudices of their peoples. They thus were able to articulate and satisfy deeply felt yearnings of great numbers of Italians and Germans.

In the last chapter, "German Socialists and the Jewish Question," Mosse explains how and why "revolutionary socialism desired to put an end to Jews and Judaism" (p. 293). It is well known that Marx wanted to see Jews as such disappear; it is perhaps less well known how deeply this theme pervaded German socialist thinking for nearly half a century before Hitler came to power. Modern German socialist perception of the Jewish Question was largely shaped by Karl Kautsky (1854-1938). This dominant figure of German socialism saw Jews as representatives of the worst aspects of capitalism, lacking in humanity and perverted by the love of money; Jews were negative, aggressive and "dissolving." Judaism was nothing but a set of rituals to equip Jews for commercial practices. Jews as a group had to cease to exist through a "necessary infusion of fresh peasant blood" (p. 287). Kautsky, like many other Socialist leaders, opposed Zionism because it sought to preserve a Jewish people rightly destined for disappearance. While not all German socialists (Bernstein, for example) shared these views, German Marxism made a notable contribution to the general atmosphere of anti-Semitism before Nazism had even been heard of. Once National Socialism had become a major force, the German Communist party delighted to paint Nazis as agents of Jewish finance. German Communists boasted that not a single Jew sat on their central committee; their idea of effectively combating the Nazi menace included calling attention repeatedly to the "terribly Jewish" appearance of Joseph Goebbels (p. 300).

These and other revealing chapters on such topics as "What Germans Really Read," "Fascism and the Avant Garde," and "The Mystical Origins of National Socialism" add up to a valuable inventory and analysis of the images which dominated important segments of European society in the first three decades of this century, and especially "of that world of illusions in which so much of the German Left lived" (p. 315).

ANTHONY JAMES JOES

Saint Joseph's University

Balancing the Books: Financial Problems of Local Government in Western Europe. By Kenneth Newton. (New York: Sage Publications, 1980. Pp. vii + 218. $20.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

Balancing the Books was written in "good, plain English" as a survey of urban fiscal problems that would be intelligible to academics, practitioners and lay persons alike. The book includes Britain, West Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Italy and results from a collective effort by eight pioneering scholars of European urban studies. Part of the aim of the study, organized under the auspices of the European Consortium for Political Research, is to provide a genuine comparative analysis of urban financial problems. As Kenneth Newton himself recognizes in the conclusion (p. 209), the financial problems of cities are not simply local, but central-local. For this reason, the book becomes more an inventory of dilemmas confronting large cities, most of whom are under financial pressure, than an agenda for future studies of urban policy or an explanation of the plight of the cities themselves.

In the integration of their results, the research team has eschewed grand theories of political economy, but also wisely avoided relying heavily on the standard behavioral theories of participation. The very general concepts of the "local fiscal crisis," which essentially said that if cities had no limits on income they would have no spending problems, are neatly summarized and cast aside. The book aims to dissect the "local resource squeeze," but the problem is that public resources are no more a local monopoly than are taxes. Though the early chapters of the book tell us how the resource squeeze has adversely affected most large cities of Europe, the design of the initial country studies did not appear to include any independently structured evaluation of the varying nature of the resource problem at the national level. This exclusion means that there is no independently defined baseline on which to validate the comparison, although there is a great deal of useful information assembled in readable form on why large cities have problems in different countries.

The advantage of focusing on resources is that the contributors go on to assess a number of additional issues, such as the cost of services (Ch. 5), the visibility of taxes (Ch. 6), and fees and charges (Ch. 7), that are often left out of less comprehensive and more conventional studies of urban politics and policy. Newton does a good job of avoiding jargon and superfluous quantification, but the initial aim of straddling audiences comes back to haunt the contributors. For example, we are told (p. 19) that "the ranking of nations does not change a great deal whether one compares across nations according to the state of local finances, or whether one compares within nations according to the state of local and central finances." If this is true, then the data, at least as assembled at present, has difficulty distinguishing independent effects in relation to cities or systems. Because many of the book's intended readers do not want to pore over tables, one cannot tell from the published information which relationship actually exists, if any exists at all.

There is a similar problem with the evocation of the "free-rider" problem in later chapters. While the public choice theories have an obvious attraction in studying cities, the practical issue is glossed over. These theorists have yet to tell us how we can untangle the intricacy of intergovernmental dependence. Though the most enthusiastic advocates of assigning costs and benefits more rationally speak of decentralization, the task of persuading mayors, functionally defined regional agencies, and states and provinces in federal systems to adopt such solutions (assuming that we can assemble the information in the first place) implies much more national intervention in local affairs and much stronger, centralized policy making than any modern democratic nation has thus far found acceptable.

The admirable efforts to condense information sometimes leads to questions. For example, the civil service figures (p. 104) are difficult to judge without knowing the base on which they are figured. In relation to national government, the United Kingdom localities vastly outnumber national officials (about 2.5 million to half a million). Yet British localities, so far as we know, have never been able to mobilize this immense pool of expertise and experience in ways to deflect national policy in the direction suggested by Newton and his collaborators. Similarly, the alarming proportion of debt in Italian cities (p. 149) has to be weighed against the assets (not included in local accounts) of the elaborate system of municipal corporations. Mixing politics and economics is always a tricky business. Local taxation in Britain does provide a number of anomalies, but is it quite correct to imply (p. 138) that domestic (household) rates are unfair because occupants pay income taxes while commercial and industrial rates are not because businesses can deduct them from their national taxes? Economists are working with macro-models about the total supply of goods and services. Political and economic incentives are different, as are political and economic objectives, at least in democracies. We often do inefficient things and create economic disincentives to protect democratic values.

We are all the wiser for the efforts of Newton and his colleagues. The description and wide-ranging information they provide is essential to designing comparative studies. But having begun with what are probably our best-quantified analyses of fiscal and financial problems in each country, one wishes that time and resources (to repeat their theme) had enabled them to work out ways of pooling the data or introducing national-level structural variables so that we could validate their interpretation. Oddly enough, both neo-liberal and neo-Marxist champions will find much which will confirm their ideas in this book, but neither will have an empirical basis from which to determine whether or not they are right.

DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD

Cornell University

Answer to History. By Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. (New York: Stein and Day, 1980. Pp. 204. $12.95.)

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's last book, *Answer to History,* was completed almost literally on his deathbed. It is angry, bewildered, confused, and anything but the devastating answer to history the Shah hoped to compose. He is far better served in that purpose by such articulate defenders as Jehangir Amuzegar for his social and economic policies and Shahram Chubin for his foreign policy. Yet *Answer to History* is an important book for students of foreign policy.

In his chapter on foreign policy the Shah catalogues with surface accuracy many of his foreign policy achievements. He details, for example, the close political, economic, and even personal friendship relations he had with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The dust jacket tells us that he "considered himself the staunchest ally of the United States in the Persian Gulf area." And certainly he was perceived as such by many Americans. Yet he happily describes his purchase of "large supplies of military equipment from the Russians as well as the Czechs" (p. 132). He describes as well his good relations with the PRC, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, France and indeed with almost everyone except Qaddafi and Arafat. In the period of revolutionary upheaval preceding his fall from power, there was, just as the Shah describes, remarkably broad diplomatic support for his regime.

It would seem to follow, therefore, that one must look to some terrible internal vulnerability to explain the Shah's fall. But that is not how the Shah saw it. "I did not know it then—perhaps I did not want to know—but it is clear to me now that the Americans wanted me out" (p. 165). So did the British, he concluded, and at the Guadaloupe conference, January 4, 1979, "the French and the West Germans agreed with the British and American proposals for my ouster" (p. 171). These are not the thoughts of a man sick to the point of irrationality. These remarks are fully consistent with the Shah's world view. Iranian student demonstrations in the United States in 1962, for example, were "part of an organized effort to discredit me and my government. I can't help but believe that the oil companies and an organization like the CIA were somehow involved in fomenting and financing this campaign against me" (p. 146). The Western media were unfriendly and part of the conspiracy against him. The British hostility is even more evident. "They were always interested in forging links with diverse groups in nations they wished to control, and they had long exercised a good deal of control over Iran" (p. 59). Nor were the Russians left out of these Anglo-American conspiracies. The Tudeh party, for example, was a joint Russian and British operation (p. 59). And the Shah's suspicions of the United States were such that he had this conversation with Nelson Rockefeller: " 'Is it conceivable,' I asked him pointblank, 'that the Americans and Russians have divided the world between them?' " (p. 155).

This image of the Americans and British held by the Shah is not exceptional. On the contrary, it is close to the general norm for Iranians. But of course, opposing factions differ sharply in their attributions of which Iranians the British or Americans worked through. According to the Shah, British policy favored such men as Mossadeq (p. 88) and Shapur Bakhtiar (p. 171). For the revolution the unquestioned assumption was that the British and Americans worked through the Shah. It is within this perceptual climate that President Carter marched innocently with his human rights program. The Shah was acutely aware of the fact that he owed his dictatorship to Anglo-American intervention in Iran in 1953 and was dependent for survival on continued American support. How should he interpret the intent of a policy that called for liberalizing the dictatorship that earlier American policy had created? Or, to complete this thought, how important a factor was Carter's human rights policy in the Shah's downfall? *Answer to History* suggests implicitly that Carter's policy may have been of considerable importance. Seeing British support as always entirely conditional and suspecting the same of American support, the Shah looked for unequivocal evidence of full American backing. What he got was mixed signals. Believing on the one hand that American support was conditional on his liberalizing Iran and on the other hand that a liberalization program in the midst of an economic crisis in Iran might well bring him down (p. 170), the Shah vacillated. Because the Shah was already predisposed toward decisional paralysis in times of crisis, one can see his failure to move decisively against his tormentors in the last 14 months of his regime as surely in part a consequence of his reading of American policy.

The lay reader may see *Answer to History* primarily as a lament from a self-proclaimed friend of America at the blindness of American policy to "the grand design of Soviet expansionism" which reflects a "relentless striving toward world domination" (p. 12). But that theme is only occasionally present in the book, and its patent purpose is to take revenge on the Carter administration. The body of the book describes a Soviet Union that is easily containable even by a middle power such as Iran. For the close student of Iranian political history, there are some rare anecdotal gems in the book. For the student of foreign policy the book is important for two reasons: it is an autobiographical account of the perceptual impact of great power intervention on the beneficiary of that intervention and it is a case history of the inadvertent consequences of human rights as a main theme of American foreign policy.

RICHARD W. COTTAM

University of Pittsburgh

Venezuela at the Polls: The National Elections of 1978. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Pp. xvi + 287. $15.25, cloth; $7.25, paper.)

On December 3, 1978, Luis Herrera Campins, the Christian Democratic (COPEI) candidate, won Venezuela's 1978 presidential election. This was the third time, in five consecutive elections, that an opposition party candidate won the presidential election and a peaceful transfer of power was effected. In contemporary Latin America this is a record that catches one's eye. And in fact, a major portion of North American scholarship on Venezuela concentrates on electoral politics. The latest contribution to this literature is *Venezuela at the Polls.*

The contributors to the volume are, for the most part, well-known students of Venezuelan politics. John Martz, David Myers, David Blank, and Donald Herman have all made important contributions to the literature on Venezuelan politics. Robert O'Connor participated in the 1978 election (along with Myers) as a campaign consultant for Acción Democrática (AD), the government party from 1973 to 1978. Henry Wells, although not known as a specialist on Venezuela, has written an excellent outline of the complex legal structure within which Venezuelan elections more or less operate.

The strength of *Venezuela at the Polls* is the information the authors provide on the individual campaigns of the major parties. They all followed the election closely in the local press and Myers and O'Connor present material previously available only to party elites. The internal party conflict between factions surrounding ex-presidents Carlos Andres Pérez and Rómulo Betancourt in AD, and President Luis Herrera Campins and ex-president Rafael Caldera in COPEI are examined in their own right and with respect to such structural conflicts in the Venezuelan political system as competition between the state apparatus and government party apparatus, friction between national and regional party elites, and, to a lesser extent, the relationship between interest group politics and party politics.

The impact of the various leftist parties and personalistic political organizations on the 1978 election is examined but the tendency to group all parties to the left of AD and COPEI as the "radical Marxist left" is unfortunate. One of the more interesting phenomena in contemporary Venezuelan politics is the evolution of MAS (Movement toward Socialism) from a splinter of the Venezuelan Communist party to a position reminiscent of early twentieth-century European social democracy. The potential importance of MAS is noted, but the authors suggest that unless a major political or economic crisis occurs it is extremely unlikely that any leftist party will break the AD/COPEI lock on 80 to 85 percent of the electorate. The observation is valid, but it masks the actual role of the left in Venezuelan politics. As the authors note, the left is strongest among the well-educated and is the dominant force in the Venezuelan university system. In Venezuela votes count, but only once every five years. In the interim, political influence is concentrated among Caracas political, social, and economic elites. The left is certainly the third force in this arena but its influence is significantly greater than voting returns suggest.

One serious factual error is found in O'Connor's essay on the role of the media in Venezuelan elections. In 1968, an agreement between Rafael Caldera and Miguel Angel Capriles, a prominent publisher and industrialist, turned the Capriles publishing organization into a COPEI campaign tool. In return, Capriles and some of his associates were given favorable positions on the parties' legislative lists. O'Connor mistakenly identifies Capriles as the owner of *El Universal,* the oldest and one of the two most prominent and respected major daily newspapers in Venezuela (p. 173). Capriles' major publications are *Ultimas Noticias* and *El Mundo.* O'Connor also fails to mention the latter when he lists the major Venezuelan newspapers (p. 172).

There is a certain ambiguity in *Venezuela at the Polls* when it comes to assessing the impact of the electoral system on the total political system. The authors congratulate Venezuela on taking a further step towards institutionalizing "pluralist democracy" but present evidence suggesting the institutionalization of something rather different. The concentration of political and economic power in Caracas, the predominant role of the state in promoting economic growth and regulating interest group politics, and the structure of the party system suggest that a corporatist or consociational democracy model may be more appropriate.

Venezuela at the Polls is a good book. Readers unfamiliar with Venezuelan politics will learn a good deal. Specialists will find some intriguing morsels of information on the internal dynamics of party politics.

AUSTIN G. LINSLEY

University of Pittsburgh

The Constitution of Silence: Essays on Generational Themes. By Marvin Rintala. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 95. $15.00.)

Marvin Rintala's "essays on generational themes" is an interconnected set of three essays, plus a selective bibliographic review. The first, "Generations: The Key to Politics?" is a discursive introduction to the generations concept as it appears in history, philosophy, and literature. The second essay, "The European War Generation of 1914-1918," and the third, "Generational Conflict Within the Finnish Army," are excellent historical portrayals of specific generational groups, with the latter being a more detailed case study of the themes raised in the former.

If one were to read only Rintala's brief volume, one would receive the impression that modern social science concepts and research approaches have had nothing to say nor to offer to our understanding of the impact of generations on politics. First, Rintala ignores the generational research of the past quarter-century in general, and second, raises issues which are directly germane to this research and then fails to incorporate the results into his discussion.

Rintala says in the preface that the three essays move from the general to the specific, from concepts to application of the concepts to a particular case study of generational conflict within a single institution—the Finnish army. Indeed, the latter is Rintala's specialty, as he has written several excellent monographs and articles on Finnish political history using the generations concept.

At the outbreak of the Finnish Civil War in 1918, the Finnish army officer corps consisted of two distinct groups: Finnish officers who had been part of the czarist army when Finland was a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire (from 1809 to 1918), and Finnish officers from the Jaeger Batallion—about 2,000 young Finns who had (illegally) gone to Germany during World War I to obtain professional military training in the German army after Russia had abolished the Finnish army. While the former czarist officers shared the Russian army's non-nationalistic, cosmopolitan world view, the Jaeger officers found their cause in militant Finnish nationalism and were totally opposed to everything Russian.

The Finnish declaration of independence from Russia in 1918, and the ensuing civil war between the Finnish Reds and Whites, brought the Jaegers back to Finland. Thus the Finnish officer corps was made up of the Jaeger and the former czarist officers, thereby establishing the conflict which is the focus of Rintala's third essay.

Rintala argues that this conflict (which lasted until 1944 when a former Jaeger was appointed commander-in-chief of the Finnish army—appointed by President Gustav Mannerheim, the "George Washington of Finland" and a former czarist officer) was a *generational* conflict, because the two officer groups had been exposed in their formative years to quite different sets of experiences. To be sure, the two groups did have dramatically different early life experiences. Yet one must wonder how much is learned about the generations concept by this historical case.

To what extent, it may be asked, were these manifestly *political* differences rather than generational ones? After all, the Jaegers were a self-selected group of nationalistic students who joined an illegal movement in leaving Finland for training in the German army. And the Finns who had remained in the czarist army were also volunteers; strongly anti-Russian Finns did not join or stay in the Russian army, let alone marry Russian women—as Rintala reports many of them did. Thus Rintala's analysis raises the question: are all political differences which are based on differing experiences evidence of generational phenomena? Is all group conflict in politics, as Rintala's analysis suggests, a generational conflict?

In fact, contemporary Finnish domestic politics, albeit in a muted way, is strongly influenced by similarly opposing perceptions of the Soviet Union, and it would not be valid to conclude that all such current differences of political orientations in Finland are simply generational in nature.

Thus the social scientist would ask about "alternative explanatory hypotheses," i.e., other concepts or theories that might explain equally well the conflicts within the Finnish officer corps. By ignoring such analytic questions and simply labeling the conflicts as generational, Rintala's analysis blurs the explanatory value of the generations concept.

The problem of ignoring the generational research of modern political science is seen in Rintala's introductory conceptual essay. He defines a "political generation" as "a group of human beings who have undergone the same basic historical experiences during their formative years." Over the past quarter-century, political scientists have become increasingly concerned with the generational component of politics and political behavior. Perhaps it is Rintala's lack of concern with more recent literature that leads him to argue that "the alternation of generations may have explanatory value in biology, but probably not in the humanities or in the social sciences."

For example, in contrasting the generations concept with theories of aging, Rintala cites a pair of 1962 studies of aging and Republican party identification, and concludes that the political implications of aging are still unclear. He ignores, however, the at least half-dozen studies which directly followed from the cited 1962 research, dealing with the identical set of issues, which collectively suggest that the answer is not really so unclear.

A more general illustration, which reveals a notable weakness in Rintala's presentation, is his reluctance to recognize that over the past several years the study of politics, both in political science and in related disciplines, has been increasingly concerned with the conceptual and methodological issues of generational theory. However, this reluctance is not found in an unwillingness to cite the literature of generational analysis: the 48 pages of text presenting the basic essays are documented with 414 footnotes. Consequently, the incompleteness of Rintala's otherwise detailed review of the generations literature appears to reflect his earlier comment, "I am still not convinced that one can learn much about human society by reading IBM cards."

As birth cohorts of differing size and experience travel historically through, and affect a political system (such as the impact of the postwar baby boom on American politics and society), generational theory promises to provide important conceptual and analytic tools for understanding the interrelationships among history, population, and politics. The interested reader might do well to consider Rintala's richly documented historical essays as part of an introduction to this expanding literature, keeping in mind both their strengths and weaknesses.

NEAL E. CUTLER

University of Southern California

Do Parties Make a Difference? By Richard Rose. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1980. Pp. xii + 176. $8.95, paper.)

The conventional view of British government is that it is an outstanding example of "party government," and that such a system is both necessary and desirable for the country. By placing all the powers of government in the hands of a single party, such a system provides political leaders strong enough to make the necessary decisions of governing. In general elections, the electorate is thought to have a meaningful choice between the record of a party which has held office, and an opposition which offers genuinely different programs and policies.

In the 1979 general election campaign, all the parties made clear their opinion that the outcome would make a big difference in the country's future government. Margaret Thatcher, in her foreword to the Conservative party manifesto, wrote of an allegedly growing "threat to freedom" and "a feeling of helplessness" generated by Labour party rule, and warned that "this election may be the last chance to reverse the process." "We in the Conservative Party," she concluded, "think we can reverse it." The Labour party, in its 1979 manifesto, made equally clear its view of the differences between the parties. Labour described the Conservative program as one of "confrontation and social injustice," and its own as offering "cooperation in place of confrontation; instead of division, social justice." The Labour manifesto concluded that: "Too much is at stake to let the Conservatives frustrate the hopes of the coming decade by turning back the clock."

The present study concentrates on what British political parties do, once they have obtained office. Election rhetoric notwithstanding, does the record of a Conservative government differ significantly from that of a Labour government? In many ways, this volume is a sequel to Richard Rose's 1974 publication, *The Problem of Party Government* where he analyzed how British political parties compete in elections, how they are organized, and how party leadership roles are obtained.

The British party system and the workings of representative government in Britain are often looked upon as ideals by frustrated Americans. They see in Britain a clearer and more effective choice at elections. The Conservative and Labour parties have alternated in office between 1945 and 1979, the period used in this study, and each party has been in power for 17 years. The results of general elections fix responsibility for governing in the hands of a single party, which has won a majority of House seats in all but one election. And with the fusion of executive, legislative and party leadership in the same hands, the party winning a general election gains authority over all aspects of government. Separation of powers, federalism and judicial review all provide constraints on the exercise of political leadership in the United States.

The present study concentrates attention on the public actions of British parties and their governments. The first two chapters study the basic assumptions of party government and the basic models of such a system. Two adversary models and two consensus models are analyzed, and then these models are tested in the five subsequent chapters. This central portion of the book examines the views of the electorate, analyzes the party manifestos and how they are applied in office, studies the behavior of parties in office, and assesses the management of the economy by the parties.

In the concluding chapter of this study, Rose answers the question posed by the book's title. Yes, the parties do make a difference in how Britain is governed, but not entirely in the expected way. Even in a system like the British one, there are still many constraints on the operation of party government. These include "global politics," the entrenched civil servants, the need to appeal to a wide spectrum of electors and various internal restraints. In the period under study, Rose finds that consensus politics has been dominant in both major parties.

Richard Rose's book provides a fascinating and highly readable study of the recent operation of party government in Britain. Uppermost in the minds of many readers will be what will happen to consensus politics in the 1980s when a Margaret Thatcher-led Conservative party will face a Michael Foot-led Labour party.

CHARLES KUNSMAN, JR.

San Jose State University

Presidents and Prime Ministers. Edited by Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. Pp. viii + 347. $8.25, paper.)

In recent years the literature of comparative legislatures and comparative bureaucracy has grown impressively. The same cannot be said for the examination across systems of political executives. This volume aims to plug some of that hole. It contains essays on the position of presidents and prime ministers in eight First-World states: the United States and Great Britain (both by Rose), Canada (Campbell), France (Suleiman), West Germany (Mayntz), Italy (Cassese), Norway (Olsen) and Franco Spain (Alba). Although the selection of these few offices may limit the broadest generalizations, it is defended by the editors both as permitting comparison of similar types of systems and as providing especially instructive feedback to the United States scene.

Naturally enough, the essays vary somewhat in focus and approach. Some of them are almost entirely descriptive and scarcely go beyond standard textbook stuff; but new data or interpretations appear occasionally, and the overall impact of a seriatim reading is thought-provoking. To my mind, the essays that try to cover an elaborate range of executive roles and relationships (those on Britain, France and Germany) are less useful than those that achieve much the same result by examining discrete political situations, or by fixing on a few crucial relationships. Examples of the latter approach are the analysis of Trudeau's political leadership and the depiction of high level political-administrative life in Italy.

Clearly, there is much that is system-specific in the roles of top political executives. National differences are real, often substantial, and not simply marginal variations on post-industrial themes. Nonetheless, these essays do point to some parallel developments and shared features of interest to students of executive authority. One is that institutions still matter. Presidents and prime ministers are constrained by constitutional norms and accepted practices in ways that transcend personal leadership capacity. In most of these regimes the chief executive must make peace with, and remain under the influence of, cabinet colleagues and permanent officials. Even in as personalistic a regime as Franco's, this seems to have been true. Another theme is that apart from the United States, the top person's strength and tasks cannot be understood except in reference to party leadership and coalition management.

One of the essays—the final one by Rose on the United State—is exceptional is being both explicitly comparative and didactic. In it, the comparison of the American presidency with European counterparts is driven hard and produces a view of almost pathetic institutional and political weakness, not only in the White House but also in the political system generally. The president faces a fragmented political world in which he can muster only frail and isolated forces against the power of dozens of sub-governments. If only, says Rose, the president could command the kind of collective authority, or share out the blame, that European chief executives do, with their stronger cabinets and parties, the kind of effective government needed to solve this nation's problems could be within reach.

This position is familiar to readers who know their Burns or their Lowi. As presented here, its persuasiveness is reduced in two ways. The starkness of the comparison with cabinet-system politics tends to neglect the situation (whose nuances are shown in other parts of the book) that European-style cabinet government is much less coherent, chummy, pressure-free or, in output terms, successful than Rose implies. Second, even if the analysis based on these comparisons is valid, we are given few adequate guidelines or scenarios for getting from here to there. Short of advocating the adoption of parliamentarism or the introduction of structural changes sufficient to strengthen parties *vis-à-vis* sub-governmental power (neither of which Rose does), his few prescriptions seem to fall short of the level of his critique of the American executive.

These are some of the kinds of questions that these essays call forth. No single volume can possibly raise or treat them all, but this one makes a useful contribution to sorting them out in varied contexts. Published under its particular imprint, one might even be optimistic that it could get the White House readership it could not have commanded before last November.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH

Indiana University

Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa. By Robert I. Rotberg. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 311. $15.00.)

Robert Rotberg's study of three of the major countries of Southern Africa—South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe—is an informative yet curiously unsatisfying discussion of the issues facing the region. He draws upon his own firsthand knowledge, as well as years of scholarly research, presenting the dilemmas confronting the people and the governments of the countries he has singled out for attention. Yet, in the end, we are left with the impression that, for policy makers any choices they may make are likely to be inconclusive and will be lacking in any real possibility of successful outcome. In the case of South Africa, at least, this may well be the only honest, if unhappy, judgment.

Rotberg points out, "South Africa is a complex of contradictions"; for proof, one need only follow the tortuous efforts of Prime Minister P. W. Botha to initiate racial reform. Faced on the one hand with the ideological superstructure of apartheid and on the other with the grim necessity of breaking down the separation of races if South Africa is to survive, Botha has had to take one step forward and two backward in maintaining a political base for his own survival. A supreme pragmatist, he is only too well aware that, to achieve his real goal—the cultural survival of the Afrikaner people—he may well have to sacrifice the barriers of apartheid that he himself has been brought up to believe in. Sharing political power with the nonwhite majority remains anathema to him, as for most Afrikaners, but to achieve a lasting place for the South African whites, a compromise, perhaps of divided power, or even of a federal or confederal political structure, may become the ultimate solution. The supreme irony of South Africa today is that, in order to avoid the principle of one-person—one vote, Botha may have to sacrifice the vote itself. If Parliament cannot be persuaded that racial reform is the price of Afrikaner survival, the prime minister may be forced to impose his program of slow evolution by means of an executive presidency that can ride roughshod over his right-wing opponents, while at the same time keeping down the level of racial agitation.

Rotberg lays heavy stress on the economic strengths and vulnerabilities of South Africa. His detailed study of mineral resources and industrial development provides ample support for his conclusion that, however much the outside world may wish it, "Economic means [are] unlikely to provide the sole or even the primary motivating force capable of bringing about significant alterations of the political organizing principles of South Africa" (p. 140). The fate of Afrikaners lies in their own hands; outsiders can do little but patiently nudge the process of change toward a reasonable compromise.

Rotberg's detailed account of the Namibian question is a useful background to the present negotiations, particularly for those who may have little familiarity with the intricate political history of the area over the past few years. His conclusion that an independent Namibia depends on South Africa, SWAPO and the uncertain influence of international forces is as indisputable as it is evident.

The study of Zimbabwe was completed before the Mugabe government came to power but in recounting the story of the years of guerrilla warfare the author shows perceptive insight into the personalities of the major political figures in the new independent government. His emphasis on the importance of continued ethnic cleavages has been amply borne out by the uneasy relationship between the two major figures in the new government whose political base still rests ultimately on tribal support.

The specialist may find much to cavil with in Rotberg's volume, both in his choice of facts and in his conclusions. The overall effect is somewhat disjointed, and the reader might wish for more analysis of the mass of data presented. But his judgments are free from the emotional overtones that pervade much of the current literature on Southern Africa. It would be difficult to dissent from the forceful logic with which his argument is presented.

L. GRAY COWAN

National Foreign Assessment Center

The Rise and Rall of the Shah. By Amin Saikal. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. Pp. xiv + 279. $14.50.)

Of the recent spate of books purporting to help explain the complex events of the late 1970s in Iran, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah* by Amin Saikal is neither the best nor the worst. The book was an early entry in the publishers' rush to cash in on the extraordinary public interest in the subject. The fact that it is written by an academic and published by a university press in a first edition of 50,000 copies says much, not only about the relationship between media attention and the habits of the book-buying public, but also about the nature of the book itself. If one is looking for well-organized descriptive information, the lay person could do much worse in a choice of books on Iran. However, for those who have already been over well-worn ground, and for those seeking an analytical frame of reference explaining the rise and fall of the Shah, the book is disappointing.

The book is marred from the outset by a misnomer. It provides little insight into either the rise of the Shah or his fall from power, and in the latter case there is very little said. Only 20-some pages in a final chapter and a brief conclusion deal with "Repercussions of the Shah's Policies." Indeed, the entire book might better have been entitled, "The Emergence of Iran as a Regional Power," the heading of part 2 and the most enterprising part of the book, or some other title which more accurately reflects what the book is actually about. One suspects that the publisher had more to do with the title than the author. One also suspects that this book was essentially complete when the Iranian Revolution occurred and that Saikal simply added and changed a sentence here or there, tacked on a final chapter dealing with "the fall," and went to print.

Within its limitations, the book is reasonably sound. It is well researched and deals clearly and effectively with the Shah's goals and programs, both domestic and foreign, since his return to the throne in 1953. The Shah's primary objective after 1953 was to consolidate his rule and strengthen the monarchy. In order to do so, he had to enter into a "dependence relationship" with the U.S. Saikal details the interplay of these two demands chapter by chapter. Moving from an uninspired discussion of the heavy dependence of Iran on the U.S. in the 1953-63 period through the White Revolution of the 1960s and its consequences, Saikal then devotes a chapter to Iranian oil policy as it evolved in the decades of the fifties, sixties, and seventies. The latter part of this chapter, the era of the 1970s and Iran's role in the fundamental changes that were occurring in the international oil industry, is one of the stronger sections of the book. Here Saikal explains how the Shah played a key role in the price explosion of OPEC oil while remaining the darling of the U.S. Saikal attributes this remarkable feat almost entirely to skillful policy maneuvering on the part of the Shah. However, as important as the Shah's statesmanship may have been, it is curious that only brief mention is made of another factor—Iran's position as America's Persian Gulf surrogate within the context of the Nixon Doctrine. It was this role which allowed the Shah to buy sophisticated military equipment in immense quantities which was paid for with boosted oil prices. In the process, Iran emerged as a significant regional military power.

The military establishment that the Shah built was a major feature of impressive foreign policy accomplishments in the late 1960s and 1970s. Iran exercised significant influence on the local and regional levels and even attained a global influence unthinkable a decade earlier. This and other aspects of Iran's foreign policy Saikal treats well. However, as with his discussion of domestic policy, he seems to have mostly catalogued achievements with no new questions asked. Analysis suffers at the hands of description. Political issues of considerable importance concerning the rise and fall of the Shah are left unexplained. Even such an obvious issue as the Shah's failure to institutionalize a base of political support is dealt with inadequately. Saikal mentions the failure, but sheds no new light on the reasons, despite multiple attempts by the Shah to attain such a result.

Perhaps the greatest oversight, however, is the lack of discussion in the book on religion and politics in Iranian society. Saikal simply ignores this fundamental aspect of Iranian politics and, as a consequence, there is only a minute account of the role of religion in the Shah's downfall.

There is something good to be said about *The Rise and Fall of the Shah*. With some exceptions, the book does provide a decent journalistic overview of the Shah's rule, his objectives, both domestic and foreign, and a surface explanation of his failures. The non-specialist, if not greatly enlightened on the presumed subject of the book, is at least not misinformed. In sum, this book is disappointing for specialists, but might be recommended for a general audience.

JOHN H. LORENTZ

Portland State University

Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change. By Khalid B. Sayeed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980. Pp. ix + 195. $21.95.)

Pakistan has been subjected to radical and often violent political change in its slightly more than three decades of independence. The country's troubled history has featured recurrent alternation of military and civilian regimes, an enduring controversy over the appropriate political role of Islam, and problems of regionalism which split the country in two in 1971 and which still persist. In this book Khalid B. Sayeed analyzes several phases of this period, from the pre-independence Pakistan Movement to the present Zia-ul-Haq regime.

The first four chapters recapitulate, and to some extent reinterpret, developments to 1971 which Sayeed and others have dealt with more at length in earlier works: the pre-1947 maneuvering of the Muslim League and its regional competitors; the later decline of the League and the emergence of the civil-military oligarchy; the Ayub Khan decade (1958-1969); and the events leading up to the 1971 Bangladesh War. The treatment differs from many earlier writings in placing greater emphasis upon the social composition of Pakistan's ruling elites than upon personality factors.

The last half of the book attempts to deal with more recent developments. Chapter 5 treats the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) as a Bonapartist state, with emphasis upon the concentration of power in Bhutto's hands and the corresponding destruction of competing centers of power such as the bureaucracy and the courts. Although Sayeed draws upon Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* for his Bonapartist model, he neither develops nor applies the model as rigorously as he might have done.

Chapter 6 treats the increasingly significant question of Baluch and Pakhtun nationalism on Pakistan's western borderlands. As Sayeed demonstrates, such forms of national identity formation and assertion are related both to internal social and economic conditions and to the unwillingness of the central government—dominated by Punjab—to respond sympathetically to ethnic and regional consciousness in the smaller provinces.

The seventh chapter considers mass urban protests as "important and suggestive indicators of political change" (p. 139). The two major examples are the 1968-69 movement which toppled Ayub Khan and the 1977 agitation which led to Bhutto's downfall. The latter movement, as Sayeed suggests, was not only shorter in duration than the earlier one, but also more narrowly a middle-class reaction to the policies pursued under Bhutto. The concluding chapter assesses some of the policies and pronouncements of the current military regime.

Politics in Pakistan is worth reading for its up-to-date and fairly lucid treatment of Pakistani politics in an era when Pakistan's political future may be of greater strategic importance than ever before. The book's greatest shortcoming is its need for greater analytical integration. It is essentially a collection of eight articles, some previously published in professional journals, arranged chronologically, each with its own interesting, but somewhat discrete, argument. Consequently, despite the book's subtitle, the reader is not given an adequately clear and consistent picture of either the nature or the direction of political change in Pakistan.

William L. Richter

Kansas State University

The Autobiography of Federico Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain. By Jorge Semprun. Translated by Helen R. Lane. (New York: Karz Publishers, 1979. Pp. 271. $14.95.)

The autobiography of Jorge Semprun, while listed as a novel by its Spanish publishers, adds to our knowledge of the underground movement under Franco and the theory and practice of the Spanish Communist party (PCE) in the 1950s and 1960s. The work succeeds as others of the same approach by Orwell and Koestler have done.

Semprun is best known today as a major European novelist and screenwriter, author of novel *The Long Voyage* and the screenplays for *La Guerre Est Finie* and *Z*. For nearly a decade in the 1950s and early 1960s Semprun directed PCE's underground apparatus in Spain under the party name, Federico Sanchez. Semprun had been a Communist militant since his youth, fought in France with the Resistance and after being captured by the Germans endured two years at Buchenwald. In 1965 Semprun, along with Fernando Claudin, was expelled from the PCE for holding numerous differences over party strategy with party head, Santiago Carrillo.

When the book appeared in Spain in 1978, less than a year after the legalization of the PCE, it caused considerable dismay in the leadership of the Spanish party. Semprun's criticisms are summed up in the following comment: "The Communist Party is of no use . . . either for taking power or instituting socialism" (p. 130). While sharply critical of the party leadership that expelled him, Semprun is not a renegade from communism but rather a continuing advocate of revolutionary change in capitalist society.

Woven into a fascinating narrative of the life of an underground militant are numerous telling criticisms of the Spanish party and its leadership. Probably most important is Semprun's assertion that throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, unmoved by the significant changes that were occurring in Spanish society, the party blindly held to its vision of an apocalyptic end to the Franco regime. In acts of triumphalism the PCE declared every strike, regardless of its outcome, to be a political success which confirmed the strategy of the PCE. In reality the Franquist state had transformed itself, industrialized the country, and broken out of its international isolation. The PCE, with its leadership largely in isolation in Eastern Europe, was unable to break away from the framework that had been established by the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. By 1964 Semprun was arguing that the PCE had to discard its futile tactic of organizing periodic general strikes in favor of a more reform-oriented strategy aimed at working with all political forces opposed to Franco. Expelled from the party along with Claudin as "hare-brained intellectuals," Semprun exposes the ironic fact that several years later Santiago Carrillo was praised for adopting the policies that he had advocated several years earlier. Semprun may simply have been an early Eurocommunist.

Semprun's work also offers a close look at the effects of Stalinism in the West European party which may have worked the hardest in the 1970s to shed its Stalinist background. The evidence offered makes it difficult to believe that such de-Stalinization can be successful, at least as long as the current leadership lives.

The author establishes this point by exposing his own Stalinist past. He describes the personality cult that surrounded Dolores Ibarruri, heroine of the Civil War, and offers sections of his poetic tribute to La Pasionaria as evidence that he became a Stalinized intellectual. The poetry was simply one part of annual birthday celebrations where Ibarruri was declared to be the "incarnation of a better tomorrow." Semprun also notes that being a Stalinized intellectual also meant hiding the truth in the interests of the party. The Czechs executed Josef Frank in 1952 on the charges of being a Gestapo agent. Semprun knew Frank was innocent from their common experiences at Buchenwald, but he remained silent until after his expulsion from the party.

As the result of their deep-seated Stalinist past, Semprun is extremely skeptical that Carrillo and his followers have transformed themselves into revolutionary leaders. He calls their current practice a "Stalinism clad in slippers."

The weakness of the book lies in Semprun's attempts to chart a Marxist course separate from the current Eurocommunist policies of Carrillo. He vacillates between apparent support for reformist social democratic positions and the need for revolutionary policies in Western Europe. He acknowledges the democratic freedoms of the workers and yet argues for revolutionary overturns in both Eastern and Western Europe. While Semprun may have made some important theoretical breakthroughs in 1964 in his assessment of the Spanish situation, that wisdom does not appear to have carried over into the 1970s. However, such political failings detract only slightly from the importance of the work. It should be read by all persons interested in Spain or the West European Communist parties.

Gary Prevost

St. John's University, Minnesota

Savoir Scientifique et Pouvoir Social: L'Ecole Polytechnique, 1794-1914. By Terry Shinn. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1980. Pp. 261. FF 90.)

Francois Furet notes in his preface to Terry Shinn's *Savoir Scientifique et Pouvoir Social: L'Ecole Polytechnique, 1794-1914* that foreign scholars, especially American ones, continually show amazement at an educational system where the best secondary school students are lost to the university because they go to one of the *grandes écoles*. Shinn's book shows that the French themselves have never fully accepted this system. Nevertheless, the coexistence of two higher educational systems has endured so well that there is less likelihood today of a radical change in the system than at any time in the past. For the long foreseeable future, then, the *grandes écoles* are here to stay.

Terry Shinn has written a masterful history of one of the most prestigious of France's *grandes écoles*. It is, surprising as it may seem, the first such history of the Ecole Polytechnique. The chief merit of Shinn's book is that it shows how a school like the Ecole Polytechnique prepares an elite for tasks that come to be defined rather precisely. There are accepted ways of behaving, dressing, speaking and, it would appear, thinking. An elite has to share common values and it is the task of the formative institution to inculcate these values.

Shinn has exploited the archives of the school so thoroughly that his study gives a clear picture of the numerous changes that the school underwent throughout the nineteenth century. Essentially, he concentrates on what the students were taught, who they were and where they came from, where they went after they left the school and, finally, the place of the school in the larger educational system.

The Ecole Polytechnique was created in 1794 in the tumultuous period following Robespierre's execution. It rapidly became the gateway to certain important positions in the administration. The bourgeoisie which had not been favored by the ancien régime sought to gain entry for its children into the school so as to assure them a key position in the state apparatus. In 1804 Napoleon militarized the school and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. The objective of the school was "to forge a military mentality by imparting to every polytechnician the principles of hierarchy, discipline and patriotism" (p. 26). Under the Restoration, the militarization of the school was deemphasized (its jurisdiction was transferred to the Ministry of Public Instruction). The influence of scientists like Monge and Laplace was critical in returning the school to its original mission—scientific education.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the school sought an equilibrium between its military objectives and its scientific ambitions. Between 1830 and 1880, as Shinn shows, the school reached its "golden age." Its graduates succeeded brilliantly in the military and outside; its reputation was unparalleled; and it became the leading scientific institution in France. For half a century, notes Shinn, "polytechnicians formed a sort of entity that dominated all the professional sectors that employed them" (p. 98).

The coming of the Republic, whose objectives included a greater democratization of the society, clashed with the aspirations of the school. The battles fought between the school and the various governments of the Third Republic, the foot-dragging of the school's authorities and their refusal to comply with government regulations, the intransigence of the school when it came to altering its admission requirements, represent a sad chapter in the school's history and one that is splendidly detailed by Shinn. Shinn's meticulous research shows how autonomous such a school can become from the constituted authorities, and how the Ecole Polytechnique assumed that it could set its own laws even when they affected the entire secondary school curriculum. Its arrogance finally brought out the wrath and determination of the government, which forced "the bastion of conservative pedagogy" (p. 120) to accept part of the reforms that the school had opposed for some 30 years. The outbreak of World War I brought to an end the battles between the Ecole Polytechnique and the government. It is a pity that Shinn ends his story in 1914, and one can only hope that he will take up the history of the school during the post-World War I era. He would probably find that the school has experienced another "golden age," becoming again the major scientific institution in the country as well as training the nation's industrial and technical elite. It remains a military school only for administrative purposes, since few of its graduates become military officers. When it comes under attack, the school's defenders are everywhere, and always in top positions.

Readers of Shinn's excellent book will learn a great deal about how an elite is molded, as well as about French education and politics. The book is a model of careful and objective research whose results have already proved enormously useful to many of those who work on France.

EZRA N. SULEIMAN

Princeton University

Patrons and Partisans: A Study of Politics in Two Southern Italian Comuni. By Caroline White. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 197. $19.95.)

Political clienteles are united by ties of personal loyalty and the exchange of unequal goods and services in pursuing their exclusive political interests. They contrast with political groups that join persons of the same social position in pursuing the group's collective interests. The study of political clienteles has recently provided several theoretical advances in the analysis of political competition and of several national political systems. It has also joined political scientists and anthropologists in a beneficial exchange of theory and description.

This study by the anthropologist Caroline White examines two villages in the Abruzzi region of Italy and continues the development of this theoretical literature. White presents the villages as polar opposites. Trasacco contains all the manifestations of clientelist politics: Christian Democratic Control; political appointments in exchange for favors and votes; high levels of preference voting; frequent changes in electoral results as local notables move between parties; policy outcomes made by private bargains; village life dominated by a few local notables; and the overlap of kinship, job, and political loyalties. Luco exemplifies mass politics in a manner heretofore not examined in Italian villages: Communist rule; stable voting blocs tied to the political parties; very low preference voting; the nearly constant din of political discussion; the ongoing search for consensus as the way of making local policies; universalist criteria in political appointments. The study's central analytical focus is to explain the presence of such different forms of politics in two neighboring villages.

White's analysis of Trasacco emphasizes the purposive action of the political elite as well as scarce material resources and weak left-wing parties as the determinants of clientelist politics. As such, her argument moves well beyond the claim that clientelism derives from early or intermediate stages of modernization, which has so dominated the field. The argument is marred only when White links her claims to Gramscian and other Marxist notions than clientelist politics really mask class relations. Here the argument proceeds by assertion, not empirical detail or theoretical rigor.

The analysis of Luco stands at another level. White presents historical detail to show that it has had a different social and economic structure from those of neighboring villages for well over a century, since before the beginnings of industrialization. The Luchesi emphasize labor, collective action, and community values. Indeed, White maintains that it was this reputation that attracted the first Socialist activists there at the turn of the century. Mass politics in Luco results from factors that have characterized the people of the village for several generations.

White's mode of analysis raises a number of problems. Nowhere does she justify the shift from an analysis of clientelism that emphasizes the behavior of the political elite as the key explanatory factor, to an explanation of mass politics in Luco that rests on historical and mass factors. If the two communities exemplify the two extreme points on a spectrum of village politics (p. 7), the polar types should not require such different forms of explanation. The problem is compounded. In contradistinction to the analysis of Christian Democrat-dominated Trasacco, White provides almost no detail on politics within the political elite of Communist-run Luco. White notes that "it proved impossible" to do the same kind of research within the Communist party as she did within the Christian Democratic party. As a result, one cannot but wonder about the accuracy of the claims to consensual politics in Luco, especially within the political elite.

White's study provides an important theoretical contribution, but it raises questions about some of its own conclusions. She shows that there is no reason to argue that the Italian South is bereft of mass politics and that geographic region or even stage of industrialization does not explain the presence of either clientelist or mass politics. At the same time, she has not adequately analyzed the political parties. It is strange that the Christian Democrats' willingness to be studied leads to an implicit condemnation of the party, and that the inaccessibility of Communist party leaders produces implicit praise of that party. It appears too that these differences lead White to emphasize elite factors in the analysis of the DC and clientelist politics in DC-dominated Trasacco, and to emphasize mass and historical factors in the analysis of PCI-controlled Luco. Both these difficulties result from White's imposition of normative views on her theoretical and descriptive work.

ALAN S. ZUCKERMAN

Brown University

Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography. By Philip M. Williams. (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1980. Pp. xx + 1007. $45.00.)

Never at the top of Disraeli's famous greasy pole, Hugh Gaitskell became a major figure in twentieth-century British politics between 1955 and 1963 when he served as leader of the Labour opposition before his death at age 56. Earlier he had held cabinet office, as chancellor of the exchequer, for only one year. The political importance that he nonetheless achieved is amply demonstrated in Philip Williams' superb biography.

Gaitskell's widow and literary executors chose well when they asked Williams to undertake the study. If they could expect the biographer to have Gaitskellite sympathies, they could also count on the impeccable scholarship that has characterized all of Williams' substantial work. Admiring though he is, Williams treats Gaitskell's political career fairly, thoroughly, and even critically. To be sure, he is more often critical of Gaitskell's opponents. The result, however, is a full and balanced treatment. No doubt, Gaitskell's remaining adversaries, among Conservatives and especially the Labour left, will occasionally disagree with Williams' interpretations of events, but they will find their views reasonably considered. Most notably, Williams disputes the writings of Gaitskell's Bevanite adversary, Michael Foot, who himself became Labour's leader in 1980.

Williams' work is not only careful and intelligent; it is prodigious. The thousand pages are packed with information gathered from many sources, among them the papers and diaries of Gaitskell and of other political participants, party documents, newspaper files, and numerous interviews with Gaitskell's contemporaries. The interviews, feasible in large numbers because of the survival of contemporaries long after Gaitskell's early death, must have been especially helpful in providing a full biographical picture of a personality as well as a political career. We can appreciate Williams' caution in checking and evaluating oral evidence, and why he chose to work without a tape recorder, by reading his "Interviewing Politicians" in *Political Quarterly* (5 [1980]: 303-16).

Although Williams plainly learned, particularly from interviews, a good deal about Gaitskell's personal characteristics, he disclaims any effort to write more than a political biography. He adds, "I have avoided amateur psychology" (p. xiii). Nevertheless, Williams tells us much that is interesting about Gaitskell's family background, intellectual development, social life, and close friendships. And he writes specifically about Gaitskell's "characteristic shift from cautious judgment to total, even reckless commitment" (p. 436), the "passionate emotion" that he invested in great political battles (p. 559), and his gregariousness and warm-heartedness in private life (p. 774). Thus Williams provides material for amateur, or perhaps even professional, psychological speculation. I do not quarrel with him for going no farther; many readers might be grateful for the self-restraint.

The heart of the book consists of play-by-play accounts of each important crisis in Gaitskell's political career. Chapters are devoted to his first great clash with Aneurin Bevan over the health charges and rearmament program contained in Gaitskell's 1951 budget, his triumph over Bevan and Morrison to succeed Attlee at Labour leader in 1955, his strenuous and controversial attacks on Eden's Suez adventure in 1956, his successful partnership with Bevan in the late 1950s, his failure in 1959-60 to persuade the Labour party to qualify its traditional open-ended commitment to public ownership (Clause Four of the party constitution), and his success in recommitting Labour to its old NATO-oriented defense policy in 1961 after the provocative defeat of that policy at the 1960 party conference. The last of these crises, in which Gaitskell fought to save his leadership along with what he conceived to be the Labour party, still looks like his most shining hour. Certainly it was so in a personal sense. As Williams makes clear, Gaitskell emerged from his great 1960-61 battles with a dramatically fortified intra-party position and a greater general public prestige as a prospective prime minister. The personal accomplishment should not be dimmed by the fact that 20 years later Gaitskell's kind of defense policy again became controversial in a leftward-bound Labour party. At least, Gaitskell's own last year or so of leadership was secure against the left. In fact, he won more support from that quarter than from his usual moderate or right-wing friends when he spoke in 1962 against Britain's acceptance of the then-proposed terms of entry into the European Economic Community. Not exactly a crisis in Gaitskell's career, yet his experience with the EEC issue is significant enough to be described in considerable detail. The process by which Gaitskell developed his critical views reveals a fascinating mixture of hard-headed economic realism, independent-mindedness, emotional attachments to Britain and the Commonwealth, and political sensitivity.

For readers with little concern for Labour's mid-century internal party politics, the book has other rewards. Its story of Gaitskell's conversion to socialism and to Labour party politics helps to illuminate a pattern followed by several other notable members of his generation—upper-middle class university students who especially in the 1920s and 1930s were attracted by equalitarian responses to what they perceived as an unjust society. For Gaitskell, the process included the influence of the General Strike of 1926, experience teaching in a workers' education program in Nottingham (before becoming a university economics lecturer in London), and first-hand observation of the tragic working-class politics of Vienna in the 1930s. His socialist commitments were not transient. As Williams presents him, Gaitskell remained a believing socialist. Although greater economic and social equality rather than nationalization was his primary goal, he continued to regard nationalization as a means, in important instances, to move Britain toward that goal.

Among Labour party intellectuals and activists, Gaitskell's socialism may also have appeared moderate because of a gradualism grounded in electoral realities and respect for parliamentary processes, and because his devotion to political democracy led him to accept an alliance with capitalist America against the Soviet Union. Yet a socialist, mid-century British-style, Gaitskell surely was. His faith in socialist solutions was evidently not shaken as the similar faith of many other democrats has been especially in the last two decades.

LEON D. EPSTEIN

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work: Workers' Participation in an American Corporation. By John F. Witte. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 215. $20.00.)

Worker Participation and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy. By Sherri DeWitt. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xix + 168. $18.00.)

In American political science there has been a growing interest in workers' participation because of its profound implications for democratic theory, organization theory, and political economy. Though interest has been widespread in the APSA and discussion of the topic has found its way into the writings of several prominent American political scientists, actual research has been thin. In no small part this is attributable to the paucity of American examples available for study. Toward filling this gap John F. Witte makes a modest but very helpful contribution.

I must say "modest" because of the limitations of the example studied—limitations Witte notes and discusses. Some of these limitations are severe. The democratization studied is a case of a firm owned by a benevolent capitalist who has written a doctoral dissertation on work humanization. The projects implemented included a joint worker-manager council without formal powers and five quality of work life experiments of very problematic nature. The enterprise in question was not unionized and the work force was highly heterogeneous, including in native language. Democratization did not include significant changes in the hierarchical organization of the firm or in the reward structure.

The Witte study, despite its expansive title, is not a study of work democratization. It *is* a study of a quality of work life experiment, and therefore inferences may be drawn from it regarding strategies for democratization, though it should not be taken as a test of the concept of organizational democracy itself. Also, alienation is not the focus of this study, though Witte applies a scale based on Seeman. This intentionally superficial tapping of the alienation dimensions yields a measure which explains about 5 percent of the variance in belief in worker participation. The SRC political alienation and Srole anomie scales were also used, but were not reported since they didn't affect participation beliefs to any significant degree.

Witte begins with an intelligent discussion of the obstacles to democratization and then describes the nature of the experiment. He roots his work theoretically in Clegg, Emery and Thorsrud, Perlman, Tannenbaum, and especially Obradovič. This leads him into participant-observer roles and into content analysis of worker-manager meetings. Though he finds management ascendance, his measure of the initiative acceptance ratio is considerably more optimistic than that of Obradovič's work. Witte cites demonstration of worker competence in decision making as the most optimistic aspect of his study. As with Obradovič, the methodology employed completely obfuscates the central issue of power in cases where management and workers are in conflict, and therefore conclusions regarding democratization of power in the experiment are based on the indirect evidence of participation rates and aggregate acceptance ratios. It should also be noted that, compared to Obradovič, Witte was more a protagonist-facilitator than a mere participant-observer.

Witte concludes that the participative experiment did not lead to the spread of democratic norms in the work force as predicted, for example, by Pateman. Pateman would undoubtedly feel that, given the limited nature of the experiment, it was not a fair test of her theories. Witte indirectly recognizes this in his discussion of the structural contradictions between meritocratic hierarchy and the concept of organizational democracy. Radicals have long argued that quality of work life experiments lead to questions of more fundamental organizational change. Witte's study lends support to this view. As Witte concludes, "Differing assumptions about the reward structure, the assignment of responsibility, and the selection of leaders distinguish a democratic form of organization. Without their inclusion, schemes of industrial democracy are defined apart from an assumption of political equality and become merely exercises in organizational decentralization and humanistic management" (p. 163).

Ostensibly, Sherri DeWitt's title suggests she would pick up where John Witte left off: the potentially crisis-generating contradictions of the organizational base of liberal democracy. Instead, one finds an unoriginal review of *Work in America* concerns combined with a description of the Swedish and West German models of worker participation. Research is carried only to 1977 in spite of the book's 1980 publishing date, and as such is less current than other available forays into the same fields. The DeWitt volume is not intended to be original research, much less a case study of particular organizations. Instead, its value must be found in an eclectic commentary on the sociology of work and on worker participation. This commentary draws on such authors as Galbraith, Nisbet, Schumpeter, Bell, Locke, Weber, Dickens, Kristol, Dahl, Lindblom, Kornhauser, White, Maslow, Presthus, Bass, and the HEW study, to name a few.

DeWitt's theme is the same as that of the HEW report on "Work in America": the attraction of the Social Democratic models of worker participation in Western Europe. However, though Marx, Gorz, and Ollman are touched on, there is only the most superficial discussion of the criticism of these models by the left. Similarly, the managerial criticisms of participation, coming from the right, are also largely ignored. Broad generalizations (e.g., assuming the validity of Maslow's model, p. 84) are made without a serious review of the literature. The result is best seen as an essay combining DeWitt's own opinions with selected insights from leading social scientists to form a thesis in support of the liberal position on worker participation. Whether this provides a contribution to this field, readers must judge for themselves.

G. DAVID GARSON

North Carolina State University

Mirror of the Nation's Mind: Australia's Electoral Experiments. By J. F. H. Wright. (Sydney, Australia: Hale & Iremonger Pty Limited, 1980. Pp. 160. Aus. $14.95, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

With reapportionment of seats in the United States House of Representatives, most state legislatures, and numerous local governing bodies scheduled to take place before the November 1982 general elections, it is most appropriate to have published in late 1980 a book on election systems in the nation that originated the secret ballot and is the home of the largest number of electoral experiments. This small volume should be of particular interest to states and political subdivisions covered by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended because it analyzes election systems that may meet the requirements of the act.

J. F. H. Wright, one of Australia's leading experts on election systems, has written a book that is "must" reading for citizens and officials concerned with representational issues. The book is valuable not only as a source of information on current election systems in Australia, but also as a source of information on experiments conducted for the past century and one-third. Specifically, experiments with single- and multi-member districts, list proportional systems, and quota-preferential proportional systems are reviewed and analyzed.

Wright notes that "it is an unfortunate fact . . . that the fairness of electoral systems has a direct relationship to their complexity. For instance, what seems at first sight to be the most straightforward way of electing a parliament, 'first-past-the-post' in a system of single-member electorates, pretty much guarantees that as many as 49 percent of the electors are not represented by a candidate they voted for" (p. 13).

This comment is applicable to the promotion of the single-member district system by the United States Department of Justice in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act. While this system is easy to understand, it is encumbered by a number of major problems—"affirmative," deliberate, and silent gerrymanders; election of candidates who did not receive a majority of the votes cast; and failure to provide fair representation for minority groups. These problems are illustrated by Australian experience as well as American experience.

A "fair" electoral system for a governing body should ensure that each ballot is effective in helping to elect candidates, maximum participation at the polls, access to and responsiveness on the part of decision makers, equity in representation for all groups, and legitimization of the governing body. These canons can be employed to evaluate any electoral system.

Relating these criteria to Australian electoral systems, it is apparent that the system measuring up best is proportional representation (PR)—the most complicated system. The single-member district system does not provide equity in representation, produces party landslides, and fails to provide effective representation for large numbers of voters. Variations of single and multi-member districts "either limit the freedom of choice of voters or fail to ensure that the intentions of the voters are put into effect" (p. 140).

Experience in electing the Tasmanian House of Assembly by the Hare or single transferable vote system of PR demonstrates that it "has resulted in the choice available to voters . . . being wider than in any other state" (p. 141). Ninety percent of the voters see their first or second preferences elected (effectiveness criterion). Hence, it is not surprising that voter participation at the polls is high (participation criterion) and elected officials are accessible to and responsive to constituents (assessibility and responsiveness criteria). Furthermore, political parties are represented in the House in proportion to their voting strength (equity criterion) and the public has confidence in the House (legitimacy criterion) in contrast with elsewhere in Australia where "politicians are generally viewed with suspicion" (p. 150).

Relative to the charge that PR produces splinter parties and unstable governments, Tasmania has only two major parties after 70 years of PR as does Ireland which also uses the Hare system of PR. Where instability has been associated with PR, the instability has been caused by the "list" system of PR which differs significantly from the Hare system.

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN

State University of New York, Albany

International Politics

The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle and the Modern Security Problematique. By Richard K. Ashley. (New York: Nichols, 1980. Pp. xv + 384. $30.00.)

This invaluable effort is an attempt to use structural modeling to the study of the "limits to growth" literature. Richard Ashley advocates that his model contributes to and furthers the development of a theory of international relations. He acknowledges that his model is based on the "lateral pressure proto-theory" of Nazli Choucri and Robert North. The book is divided into three parts: The first deals with the U.S., the USSR and the PRC amidst long-term processes of differential growth, expansion, and intersections. This part argues that the policy orientations and purposes, internal characteristics, and security-political relations of these powers can be interpreted as reflections of their "asynchronous" and "equifinal" adaptations to long-term processes that they could not fully govern. The essence of "the security problematique" for Ashley is the web of relations that perpetuates differential growth, reproduces rivalry, disturbs violence-prone balances of power, and denies lasting peace.

In part two, Ashley presents three sets of empirically informed propositions which, taken together, portray a complex network of intertwined dynamics and reproducing dilemmas. He traces conflict behavior among the three powers in the last 25 years according to three dynamics, i.e., expansion, intersections and provocations. The main instrument in such rivalry is military capability. These processes, with the military as a policy instrument, are likely to create violence-prone antagonisms.

In part three, Ashley argues that the major problem of the rivalry system is that the people's consciousnesses are framed by a technical-rational grammar of thought. The way out of that dilemma, according to him, is the pursuit of the grammar of rationality proper. This kind of grammar acknowledges, contrary to the first, the dependence of all human beings and all social organizations upon their environments and the social processes of which they are parts. Ashley tries to support this logic by advocating that three now converging trends might open the way for the full expression of rationality proper. They are the cybernetic revolution, sensitivity to the deeper meaning of interdependence, and the strengthening of a transnational scientific community. Though these trends are empirically discoverable, the influence that they lead to more dependence on the environment might be over-estimated. Contrary to that, they might be able to articulate human will in order to manipulate their environment.

Ashley makes a theoretical contribution in his critique of the balance of power theory, integration theory, Marxian theory and liberal neo-mercantilist theory. However, there are three critical observations to make:

1. Ashley's model (i.e., expansion, transactions, provocations and conflict) is build on deterministic understanding of state behavior and it leaves little for human will; it leaves little room for reciprocity processes. In fact, Choucri's and North's model, i.e., lateral pressure, is not as deterministic as Ashley's. Choucri and North do not ignore the perception of each social unit of its own capabilities and hence the dynamics of the system as it responds to capability and perceptions. A major weakness of Ashley's approach is its undermining of the role of culture, ethnicity and identity as a basis for social conflict. In other words, Ashley's model, and in this case, the lateral pressure model, can explain some conflictive behaviors, and not others.
2. The search for peace could not be understood outside the realm of studying exploitation, inequality, and destructive elements of the human environment. These were deliberately left out by Ashley.
3. While Ashley has set out to deal with the human preoccupations of war and peace, his book focuses only on war and its conflict process. Ashley's model then is a partial one. With his model, Ashley cannot tell us much about cooperation, integration and the processes of peace.

I must congratulate Ashley for his work and I urge my colleagues to read this important book.

EDWARD E. AZAR

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

The Fractured Continent: Latin America in Close-Up. By Willard L. Beaulac. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 232. $11.95.)

This highly opinionated volume is a potpourri of extended musings on the contemporary Latin American condition by a retired U.S. diplomat.

Though many subjects are mentioned, none receives detailed (let alone analytic or scholarly) treatment. On the contrary, Beaulac blithely reduces even the most complex issues to ideological canards whose imperviousness to reality is truly astounding. The caricatures in this book are so blatant and the stereotypes so simplistic that, happily, even the most credulous neophyte to Latin American studies will not be taken in by them.

Beaulac paints the role of the United States in Latin America as unswervingly benevolent. Dollar Diplomacy is defended as an altruistic effort to provide economic aid to Latins, a forerunner of the Alliance for Progress. The concept of economic imperialism is thus dismissed as "a myth . . . helpful to Soviet Russia" (p. 72), and the whole body of dependency theory is likewise characterized as "Marxist dogma" (p. 91). The interventions of the Gunboat Diplomacy period are praised as U.S. "vigilance" in defending Latins from predatory European imperialists (p. 61). The nationalism catalyzed in Latin America by such interventions is decried as the "last refuge of scoundrels" (p. 81), among whom Beaulac numbers Cárdenas, Perón, Vargas, Kubitschek, and Goulart.

Marxists are dismissed as being "fully identified with the Soviet government's aims and purpose"—mere puppets through which "Russia intervenes systematically in the internal affairs of all the Latin American countries" (p. 43). The role of the Church is hardly much better; it has "become a destabilizing force" because "a new jet set of priests endowed with ample funds" serve as apologists for Marxism (p. 90). This, in toto, is Beaulac's analysis of liberation theology.

The only Latin American political actors for whom Beaulac has kind words are the armed forces. He applauds the military modernizers, citing the armies of Paraguay and Batista's Cuba as examples (if somewhat opaque ones) of what good works civic action can accomplish. He also hails the efforts of the armed forces in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay in "striving against great odds to eliminate terrorism and establish a base for political and economic freedom" (p. xii).

Beaulac's discussion of socioeconomic conditions in Latin America spans seven pages in which he blames poverty on the ignorance of peasants and laments that much of Latin America's attractive "quaintness" has recently come to be regarded as poverty (p. 96).

As for economic policy, Beaulac opposes agrarian reform (other than colonization) on the grounds that Communists are its "most ardent proponents," peasants really "doubt and fear it," and it opens the door to "state farms on the Communist model" (pp. 123-26). Similarly, all forms of economic planning should be eschewed because "in Communist countries planning is a substitute for freedom," and "the mere act of planning . . . tends to lessen freedom" (p. 110). State-run enterprises amount to "surreptitious socialization" of the economy (p. 145), and all efforts to regulate the practices of foreign investors are ill-conceived interference in the free enterprise system (p. 153). The very thought of nationalizing foreign enterprises is, of course, beyond the pale.

Beaulac reserves special vitriol for Allende's government in Chile, denouncing it in virtually every chapter. It was a "totalitarian" government (p. 43) that "engaged in gross violations of civil rights" (p. 200), "destroyed the country's free economy" (p. 111), "added to the poverty that afflicted Chileans" (p. 97), and "led to the bankruptcy of government and nation to the near extinction of Chile's democracy" (p. 80). The armed forces then "decided to end the Socialist-Communist threat" (p. 200) and "rescued Chile from anarchy and possibly saved it from Communization" (p. 51). Amid all this bombast, Beaulac conveniently forgets to mention that the Chilean coup replaced a constitutional democracy with military dictatorship.

In an epilogue written after the Nicaraguan revolution, Beaulac describes Augusto Sandino as the "originator of modern terrorism," and warns that the United States must jettison human rights and reassert its willingness to undertake direct military intervention against Marxism as "a legitimate exercise of self-defense" (p. 220). To do otherwise would be "the most dangerous of all possible courses" (p. 220). It would be equally dangerous to take these ramblings seriously.

WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE

American University

Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. By Louis René Beres. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 315. $20.00.)

To many serious students of contemporary world politics the danger of nuclear warfare appears to be growing. The stability of the central strategic balance has been eroded by a trend toward more accurate weapons which has diminished confidence in the effectiveness of deterrence based on invulnerable retaliatory arsenals. Incrementally, the superpowers are acquiring significant first-strike capabilities, and as confidence in the reliability of deterrence diminishes, pressures have grown for doctrines and programs oriented to nuclear war-fighting. Against a backdrop of deteriorating political cooperation, nuclear armed aircraft and ships of the superpowers shadow each other regularly. Moreover, political coalitions supporting active efforts at arms control have become weakened and fragmented and a new and dangerous spiral in the arms race appears to be unfolding—a spiral which will include weapons that increase fears of crippling first strikes. Compounding these dangers, the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons into especially unstable regions has increased markedly in the last decade. In the present situation there is indeed a need for books which draw to the forefront of public consciousness the danger of nuclear catastrophe.

In *Apocalypse,* Louis René Beres seeks to describe the risks of nuclear war as well as nuclear terrorism and to propose measures to avert the dangers identified. This is a book filled with scenarios and alternative scenarios, some more credible and instructive than others. *Apocalypse* offers more breadth than depth in its presentation of a range of spectres, from war between the superpowers to terrorist seizure of atomic power stations. At times Beres reiterates dangers which are well recognized; in other sections, however, his analysis illuminates dangers which have received insufficient attention. The discussion of the dangers of accidental war appears especially pertinent here, given the recently revealed deficiencies in U.S. warning and command systems. Beres' analysis of command and control conditions in Nth country contexts, in which new nuclear powers are likely to possess "use them or lose them" nuclear forces which will greatly increase the danger of escalation, is thought-provoking. While several of Beres' scenarios offer useful warnings of possible sequences of events, surprisingly, Beres devotes no detailed examination to the dangers of escalation of a direct superpower confrontation in Southwest Asia or elsewhere, nor does he examine in any detail the problems created by the deployment of new types of tactical nuclear weaponry and the augmentation of war-fighting postures.

While *Apocalypse* is long on catastrophic scenarios, it is less probing in its analysis of the evolution of national nuclear policies and in its discussion of ways to avert or minimize the dangers discussed. Beres urges the adoption of minimum deterrence postures, the conclusion of a CTB, no-first-use declarations and the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. While few would disagree with the desirability of these measures, they do not address directly many of the dangers discussed, e.g., the danger of accidental war, nor does the study address the problem of mobilizing political constituencies to act toward the realization of such objectives. On the problem of proliferation, Beres' suggestion that the superpowers set a good example by progress in SALT, and his suggestion for international control of the nuclear fuel cycle are not new. While Beres does suggest the need for sanctions against governments acting contrary to the interests of antiproliferation, he does not elaborate how such a regulatory regime would operate in practice.

Overall, this book does much to remind us of the danger of nuclear catastrophe, but less to illuminate practical solutions. The treatment of a range of dangers under the heading of "apocalypse"—from all-out nuclear war to the irradiation of an office building by terrorists—is clearly a weakness of the study. Beres has not always resisted the temptation to be emotive rather than analytical. His book does serve, however, to arouse the concern of the uninitiated with the multiple dangers of the present nuclear age.

WILLIAM D. JACKSON

Miami University

Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s. Edited by Christoph Bertram. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1980. Pp. 126. $19.50.)

This collection of essays by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, should be of interest to all save the Soviet specialist, since it provides a good survey of the dilemmas of Soviet power, internally and externally. However, much of the important data upon which the analyses are based is compiled by the United States government. This is not a serious weakness if one accepts the prevailing, but erroneous, view that the USSR has military might far in excess of its needs.

All of the essays are of high quality by specialists in the field, but they reflect the contradictions of most contemporary studies. They speak of the danger posed to the West by Soviet policy yet also adumbrate the very serious weakness of the Soviet economy and the numerous failures at extending Soviet power worldwide, especially in the Middle East. Perhaps the single most important contribution is by Alexander Dallin, "The United States in the Soviet Perspective." He clearly portrays the conflicting domestic forces determining Soviet policy and the leadership's continued focus on detente. Dallin demonstrates that the West might influence Soviet policy, but in light of our recent election and the uncritical acceptance of CIA estimates of Soviet power by the last administration, his skepticism regarding American contributions to improving the behavior of the next generation of Soviet leaders is well founded.

This presents a methodological question: to what degree are our assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities determined by our prejudices, particularly the failure to correlate Soviet behavior with ours? William P. Griffith's fine survey of Soviet policy in Africa illustrates the point. While he correctly points to the identification of the U.S. with South Africa as the final blow to our design for Angola, this insight is not applied to other areas of our policy. African leaders reluctantly turn to the Soviet Union or Cuba because of our continued support of the hated regime in Pretoria. Further, the dependence upon CIA projections beclouds the relationship between U.S. policy and Soviet responses. There is no reference in this volume, for example, to the possibility that vastly greater deposits of oil are yet to be found in the USSR by drilling deeper in old fields, as happened in the U.S. But this cannot be accomplished without American technology, an option foreclosed by the Carter administration's decisions, most notably by prohibiting Dressler Industries' assistance to the USSR. Further, David Holloway's essay, "Decision-making in Soviet Defence Policies," frequently refers to the possibility of influencing Soviet decision making, but includes only the option of "pressure" and never restraint or reward.

The uncritical reliance on CIA estimates of Soviet military expenditures is a catastrophic weakness of this book. The prevailing view that the U.S. is behind is just not correct, as revealed by close reading of official testimony by CIA and military officials before Congress. The problem of indexing (evaluation of two military forces in one currency), the different strategic position of the USSR, the low morale and training of Soviet troops, the much greater contribution to local defense by Western Europe compared to the Soviet Union's client states, and the serious technological inferiority, which are treated comprehensively by Franklyn D. Holzman in "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" (*International Security* 4: 86-104), or by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, are ignored.

Nonetheless, one would like to see hard-liners in Washington read this book carefully. They would find that "the Soviet Union is not seeking and will not seek military superiority" (pp. 9, 12 n.), that "the dialectics of weakness . . . is the framework in which to consider the role of the Soviet Union in the 1980s" (p. 21), that "it is not certain that Moscow is particularly anxious to tamper with the flow [of oil from the Middle East]" (p. 57), and that the High Command is trying to "stabilize the strategic relationship with the United States . . . [and is not] pushing for a risky or adventurous policy based on the use of military force abroad" (p. 91).

Unfortunately, like too many Americans, Ronald Reagan is reported not to read books.

RICHARD D. HUGHES

California State University, Sacramento

Humanity in Warfare. By Geoffrey Best. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 400. $25.00.)

Geoffrey Best has turned his talents from Victorian England to the analysis of the sources, expressions and results of the international law of war from the late eighteenth century to the present. It is fortunate that this task, usually left to international law scholars, was undertaken by an able historian of ideas who has addressed his scholarly skills to the examination of the idea of humanity in warfare.

Best transcends the parochial boundaries of international law, military history and science, as well as political theory and cultural history, calling on each discipline and field as necessary. His style is at once scholarly and conversational. He communicates equal parts of erudition, common sense, and an understated but pervasive moral concern, all eminently appropriate to the subject.

Best begins with the Late Enlightenment consensus that served to complete the transfer of natural law ideas into the growing positive international law of war. He is particularly insightful in his treatment of the influence of Rousseau's dictum that wars are a relationship of states, not men, on the development of the principle of noncombatant immunity. Ironically, he then shows the impact of the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars on the conduct of war. Abandoning Rousseau's restrictive view of war and society, Rousseau's revolutionary disciples fashioned the essence of modern total war. It was the general mobilization of French society, the introduction of mass armies and the introduction of ideological goals and justifications in the wars from 1792 to 1815 that provided the basis for the total-war concepts of our century.

Modern military technology, supported by the great industrial and scientific advances of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, completed the process of creating modern total war. Best traces these developments and their grim manifestation in the two world wars of this century and elsewhere. Concurrently, however, he provides a careful analysis of the humanitarian ideals which informed the development of the conventional law of war in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Protocols to the 1949 Conventions. He concludes with an endorsement of the 1977

Geneva Protocols and the continuing efforts to sustain and improve the humanitarian law of war.

Best's analyses are always candid and he is at pains not to let his hopes for humanity in warfare bias his account of the past and present accomplishments of the law of war and the obstacles to its success. While acknowledging the dilemmas of nuclear war, he rightly concentrates on conflicts that continue under the umbrella of the balance of terror. Best probes the issues raised by guerrilla warfare, first in partisan resistance to belligerent occupation and, more recently, as the usual strategy in wars of national liberation.

This leads Best to one of the major problems of the present law of war, *viz.*, the influence of communist and Third-World states on the international legislative process and the practice of belligerents. These states have re-introduced the idea of the "just war" in a perverted form that claims that communist or "national liberation" belligerents ought to be, in effect, immune from the restraints of the law of war, that their good ends justify all means. By the same logic, "imperialist aggressors" deserve no protection from the humanitarian law of war. Best quotes such sentiments from the delegations of the PRC and North Vietnam at the Geneva Conference that produced the 1977 Protocols. He might have added that these states conspicuously violated the law of war in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and spurned the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Another major obstacle to the realization of the goals of the law of war is the fact that modern warfare is often predetermined by the long-term strategic plans and weapons-system development decisions made by the major powers. Best demonstrates this well in his account of the origins and implementation of the RAF's area bombing strategies in World War II. This is a vital issue. Once the strategies and force developments are set, it is of little avail to oppose their logical application with appeals to the law of war. While Best is anxious to educate the public as well as the military about the law of war, there must be an underlying concern for enlightened defense policies that will make possible observance of the law of war.

Best concludes with hopes for the conventional humanitarian law of war that may be too optimistic. However, after such a searching and honest study of the idea of humanity in warfare, he has earned the right to his optimism.

WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN

Georgetown University

Individual Values and Global Sharing. By Earl R. Brubaker. (New York: New York University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 146. $17.50.)

This thin volume is addressed to a weighty, if largely ethereal set of topics, if the title is to serve as a guide to its contents. Unfortunately, it has little to say about either individual values or global sharing, let alone their interconnectedness. The main thrust of this work is laboriously and didactically to present a moralistic argument for allowing individuals to make personal contributions to "international organization programs for the orderly pursuit of justice (IOPOPS)" (p. 5), such as exist in the United Nations.

Brubaker's arguments for such mechanisms, which are currently forbidden in the UN peacekeeping framework, for example, are curious, confused, and convoluted. However, the active merits of such suggestions and the book must be judged in part from the case that is made for them. The first four chapters (48 pages) are largely devoted to (1) a highly abstract discussion of the imputed failure of "political" thinking to explain global sharing or lack thereof and (2) equally abstract, circular, and imputed repeated claims that "financing of programs creating benefits worldwide has an important economic dimension and that developments in the economic theory of public choice promise to add significantly to understanding and to effective practical arrangements for providing more nearly optimal revenues that international organizations need for their programs" (p. 10). These claims are abstract because they are made at a level involving neither empirical evidence nor theoretical insight. They are imputed because no clear line of refutation of "political" explanations nor any strong case for "economic" advances are made. This is perhaps to be excused, since the book is clearly not written for the audience of micro-economists, public-choice theorists, or international relations specialists, but appears to be somewhat mass-oriented, shielding the audience from the messy details of scholarly and policy thinking about these matters.

The crux of the argument is something like the following: certain international goods, such as security, are non-exhaustive and non-exclusive. Collective provision of these goods causes certain well-known problems such as sub-optimality, and free-riders, and large-scale non-participation. If however, we turn away from national governments toward individuals as the providers of these goods within an international organizational framework, these difficulties may be alleviated. This is in large part because individual contributions are demand-revealing, thereby allowing those who have the most to gain to pay the larger portions of the costs of providing the goods. We are told this will work because, among others, the International Red Cross is financed in such a manner. And, in the Soviet Union "the Patriachate of Moscow has contributed 3,000,000 rubles to the Soviet Peace Fund" (p. 90). Moreover, public opinion polls clearly reveal positive effect for the UN.

Thus, this book closes on a proosal that the UN Secretary-General attempt to fund specific international security programs by allowing the peoples of the world to vote on them with their pocketbooks (p. 123).

What is most striking about the book, beyond its naïveté, is in fact the absence of either political or economic analysis addressed to the problem of the provision of funds for the international provision of collective goods. The assumption is simply that dollars (plus rubles, rupees, and rials) can solve the problems which face the global collectivity. Thus, the answer to these questions must simply be to come up with the finances. This ignores the core of the problem: the lack of funds for the provision of international collective goods is tightly interwoven with the political and economic reasons why such goods are necessary.

MICHAEL D. WARD

Science Center Berlin

The Soviet Union and Africa: The History of the Involvement. By Milene Charles. English text edited and Soviet documents translated by Jo Fisher. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. Pp. v + 237. $18.50, cloth; $9.50, paper.)

The reviewer presented with a book like *The Soviet Union and Africa* faces a serious dilemma. Does one merely withdraw an agreement to review the volume in question or, rather, proceed with what will be an exceptionally harsh review? I have decided on the latter course in the hope that my review will encourage prospective authors (and publishers) to reconsider future decisions to publish books before they have really been completed.

My initial criticism is directed at both the editor-translator and the University Press of America for failing to provide the reader with an acceptable English-language text. The present version is filled with grammatical errors—both in the body of the book and in the translated documents—and, more important, it reads like an awkward translation. Since the author, Milene Charles, is not a native speaker of English, the responsibility for the linguistic quality of the English text falls upon the editor.

The study itself presents a number of other serious problems. Most significant is the fact that *The Soviet Union and Africa* adds virtually nothing to the existing literature on the subject. Anyone familiar with the earlier works of Helen Desfosses (Cohn), Arthur Klinghoffer, Robert Legvold, Christopher Stevens, Edward Wilson, and others will find virtually nothing in this book, except a few new citations of Soviet authors, that would warrant a complete reading. A second serious problem concerns the lack of tight organization in the author's historical survey of Soviet involvement in Africa and the failure to provide serious analysis of the material that is included. Finally, several "questionable" interpretations of historical events are included in the volume—for example, the claim that British reluctance to act forcefully against the Italian occupation of Ethiopia resulted from the fear of a communist takeover in Germany and Italy (p. 36).

The book consists of three short sections. Part 1 provides a very cursory overview of Soviet attitudes and policy towards Africa through the end of the Stalin period. The treatment is far too sketchy and disjointed, however, to provide an adequate picture of the evolution of Soviet views. The second part of the book presents a series of extraordinarily brief case studies of Soviet policy toward particular countries during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years. Here, too, the discussions are too short to provide adequate description—not to speak of analysis. The final section of the book, which comprises more than one-third of the actual text, consists of a miscellany of Soviet "documents"—excerpts from both official and nonofficial Soviet sources.

It would be nice to be able to conclude the present comments with a positive statement that, in spite of the enumerated weaknesses, the book did have its strong points as well. Unfortunately, in my view such a statement would be inaccurate.

ROGER E. KANET

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Weak States in the International System. By Michael Handel. (London: Frank Cass, 1981. Pp. viii + 318. $27.50.)

This is an intentionally and admittedly old-fashioned book. "The study of international relations is more of an art than a science," it argues (p. 50), and must be so approached, as it is here. To what purpose?

Michael Handel purports to be filling something of a need. Studies of the behavior of weak states in the international system abound, to be sure; this study itself contains a quite impressive bibliography of over 400 books and nearly 200 articles. Many of these, however, are justifiably enough dismissed as being too "vertical" in nature, that is, analyzing "in depth . . . the foreign policy of one (or a few) weak state(s) in a given period of history" (p. 4), whereas Handel intends in this work to be not only more "horizontal" but also, it would seem, more comprehensive. With what results?

Besides the introduction and the conclusion, both quite brief, there are five substantive chapters concerning the "definitions and characteristics" of weak states, their first "internal" and then "external" sources of "weakness and strength," their varying (political) "positions" in different kinds of international systems, and aspects of their "economic position" mostly as it has developed in fairly recent years. There are relatively unobjectionable accounts, and even categorizations, of these matters which the general reader will find informative.

But Handel's generalizations tend to become increasingly unglued by qualifications. One illustration will have to suffice. In the chapter on "definitions," we end up not with a definition but two comparative "ideal models" of the "characteristics" of "weak" and "strong" states, respectively (pp. 52-53). Four of the 18 adduced, however, are themselves "characteristics frequently found in the literature with which [Handel does] not entirely agree" and, when it comes to applications, "any one state is a mixture of characteristics found in each model" (p. 54). It is difficult to know, then, why we are even seeking definitions if we cannot identify a real example of the conceptual construct being sought when we see it, or understand it as such from its operation.

On at least one occasion the analyst even seems to contradict himself. On page 128 we are advised that whereas the great powers used to compete to acquire bases on the territories of small states, now in the missile age "it is the weak states . . . which are trying to find a way to secure the permanent presence of the great powers on their territory"; several pages later, however, we learn that weak states are wary of allowing superpowers to do that very thing, since it would put the weak state in question "on the target list of the opposing super power" (p. 151). This is the sort of embarrassment that basically unsystematic thinking, no matter how carefully considered, is likely to produce.

There is also the embarrassment of simply bad timing. In a 1981 publication, alas, "Persia" should not be explicitly offered (p. 147) as an example of a "client" state, presumably of the United States, nor "South Vietnam" as one of those small states seeking to have superpower bases (again presumably American) located in their territories. Nor will it do anymore to say that "Rhodesia" has, "until recently, restored its trade to an almost normal level" (p. 241). Most seriously perhaps, India is identified (p. 203) as one of the countries that "might decide to obtain their own nuclear weapons"—which India did in May 1974, Handel's own plaintive footnote informs us (p. 215, n. 19), "after this chapter was written." "Persia" and "South Vietnam" may be only incidental misfortunes, but the "Rhodesia" reference helps to argue a (negative) point about sanctions that recent events have made less than self-evident, and India's acquisition of a nuclear capacity raises questions about the identifiable "characteristics" of "weak" states—even while that definitional point, a rather crucial one to this study, is being (again) inconclusively argued.

Despite these lacunae, this is indeed a comprehensive analysis. Information and illustration are richly abundant. Very useful generalizations, however, are not. This last outcome seems mainly to be a failure of the method employed. That employment, as we have seen, is deliberate; the failure, by and large, is inescapable.

KEITH S. PETERSEN

North Carolina State University

The Neutralized Unification of Korea in Perspective. By In K. Hwang. (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1980. Pp. vi + 186. $15.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

The division of the Korean Peninsula at the end of World War II has proved to be one of the most costly undertakings in recent history. It led to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which not only cost millions of lives and billions of dollars but also contributed significantly to exacerbating the cold war and strained Sino-American relations. It was instrumental in breaking up an estimated ten million Korean family members who have yet to be reunited. It has led to the emergence of two implacably hostile regimes whose heavily armed troops, a million strong, face each other across the Demilitarized Zone almost three decades after the Korean Armistice. Should there be another conflict between them, it would have serious international repercussions. For the strategic interests of the four Pacific powers—the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and Japan—intersect precariously in the Peninsula; in fact, all but Japan have entangling military alliances with one of the potential belligerents.

One way, perhaps the only way, to defuse the Korean powderkeg is to put an end to the anomaly of division once and for all—that is to say, to unify the peninsula. It is to the problem of how to bring about such unification that In K. Hwang addresses himself. As a native of Korea, the author has more than a scholarly interest in the subject; he is deeply committed to the goal of Korean unification. He makes it plain at the outset that he has the dual aim of description and prescription: his solution to the Korean impasse is neutralized unification on the pattern of Switzerland or Austria.

Hwang begins his study by probing the concept of neutrality in its various forms, ranging from its legal manifestations in the days of Grotius to the concept of nonalignment in the contemporary world arena. He then examines three practical applications of the concept—in Switzerland, Austria, and Laos. From his theoretical and historical survey, Hwang concludes that neutralization is appropriate to the Korean Peninsula, which, in his view, meets all of its theoretical preconditions—namely, Korea is both a geographically definable area "in which two or more external actors have substantial and competitive interests" and a relatively minor state "that by reason of strategic or symbolic political value, [has] become the focal [point] of contests for control or dominant influence between principal regional or global rivals" (p. 92).

Hwang then examines the attitudes, both actual and probable, of the four Pacific powers toward the neutralized unification of Korea, concluding that they all would have much to gain and little to lose from such a solution. In his view, all the major powers have a stake not only in preventing a recurrence of hostilities in Korea but also in maintaining a power balance so that no single external power would have hegemony in the peninsula. Insofar as the interests of the two Korean governments are concerned, Hwang believes that their enlightened self-interest calls for the adoption of the neutralization option, for none of the other alternatives has worked in the past and perpetuating the status quo is suicidal folly.

Hwang stresses that neutralization is not a terminal condition but only a way station in the long journey toward the peaceful unification of the Korean nation. His blueprint envisages not only the meeting of minds between the ruling elites of the two Korean regimes with respect to a common ideology and the distribution of power, but also a system of four-power guarantees, complete with enforcement machinery and a tribunal. As he is amply aware, there are formidable obstacles to realizing such a scheme, of which the most intractable is how to induce the rulers of the two Koreas to overcome their deep-seated mutual distrust and to initiate serious negotiations with each other. The dismal record of inter-Korean relations over the past three decades makes it unlikely that the initial barrier can be surmounted in the foreseeable future.

In brief, although this study succeeds admirably as a descriptive survey of the theory and practice of neutralization, its prescriptive thrust founders on the rock of harsh reality.

B. C. KOH

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World. By Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 229. $22.50.)

Nearly 500 years ago the Portuguese established their influence in Angola. Their colonial presence thereafter was marred by occasional sporadic resistance by black Africans. The most serious challenge to Portuguese colonialism occurred in 1961, first with a revolt by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in Luanda on February 4, 1961, then with a massive uprising led by forces, known today as Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), in Northern Angola. Later, a third movement, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) joined the struggle. When a revolution toppled the Portuguese government in April 1974, the process of decolonialization was speeded up; in early 1975 a provisional government of the three nationalist movements was established to prepare Angola for independence. Portugal withdrew its forces, but then the reconciliation effort deteriorated into a civil war and external involvement.

Given this background, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer has written a case study of international influence in the Angolan civil war of 1975 and 1976. He addresses the question why a localized conflict became the focus of extensive global concern. He notes that prior to 1974 neither the United States nor the Soviet Union looked to Angola as strategically important, even though both superpowers had supported opposing liberation movements as early as 1961. He uses a foreign policy framework which emphasizes "causality rather than morality or legality and the application of foreign policy rather than its formulation" (p. 3), and he examines the struggle for independence alongisde the civil and external war.

The book somewhat pretentiously analyzes a number of hypotheses which are juxtaposed to reflect different perspectives on foreign policy. At the same time it provides extensive detail and objectively reports the findings of contemporary research and writing on Angola. The result is interesting reading and a carefully drawn synthesis of a fascinating case study.

Roughly half of this account deals with the interaction of Soviet foreign policy with various levels of the Angolan conflict, as elaborated in chapters 2 to 6. First, Klinghoffer affirms that the Soviet support of the MPLA was consistent with its past assistance, but that Soviet arms transformed the MPLA into the strongest Angolan military force and, with the introduction of Cuban troops, assured its victory. While the triumph of the MPLA was beneficial to the Soviet Union, the MPLA was not necessarily subservient to the Soviet Union. Second, the author believes that Soviet policy toward Angola was affected by events in Portugal; the Soviet Union expected the Portuguese revolutionary government to guide Angola to the left. Third, Soviet policy was influenced by the military roles of South Africa and Zaire and fear that those two countries would align to promote a capitalist government in Luanda, but as the MPLA emerged victorious in early 1976, Zaire sought reconciliation and the Soviet Union emerged as a major influence in the affairs of Southern Africa. Fourth, the Soviet Union expressed support for involvement of the Organization of African Unity in reconciling the conflict in Angola, but departed from this position as MPLA supremacy was assured; this was followed by support of most OAU states for the MPLA. Fifth, the Soviet Union saw its role in Angola as an opportunity to reverse other international setbacks, yet it was not interested in exploiting Angolan resources, and today the MPLA has not cut back its trade with Western countries.

A substantial portion of the book (chapters 7, 8, 9) delves into the American, Chinese, and Cuban involvement in Angola. Klinghoffer argues that the United States implemented a covert operation there in order to preserve detente with the Soviet Union. He outlines a number of U.S. miscalculations in the area, and concludes that the role of the United States was "limited, uncohesive, and ineffectual" (p. 99). He affirms that Soviet actions may have been more a response to China than to the United States, but that by the end of the war Chinese involvement was inconsequential. Finally, Cubans, he believes, more firmly supported the MPLA than did the Soviet Union, and their sending troops to Angola was undertaken without fear of reprisal by the United States because of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

Students of comparative and international politics will benefit from reading this case study. It is clearly presented through an analysis of the many nations that diplomatically and militarily competed for a position of influence in the affairs of Southern Africa and of the three national liberation movements competing for power in Angola. This account is well documented with references to the major writings and research on the area. Different perspectives and interpretations are identified from which the author is able to extract his own findings and conclusions.

RONALD H. CHILCOTE

University of California, Riverside

Propaganda and Communication in World History: Vol. 1, *The Symbolic Instrument in Early Times;* Vol. 2, *Emergence of Public Opinion in the West;* Vol. 3, *A Pluralizing World in Formation.* Edited by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979-80. Pp. 631, 561, 562. $25.00, each.)

Fifty chapters by more than 40 qualified authors comprise this important summary of the main contours of the evolutionary route taken by communication and propaganda since their emergence in the riparian civilizations of the third and second millennia B.C. In addition to the editors, the list of contributors includes other prominent political scientists and an impressive array of historians, sociologists, economists, and other specialists (e.g., in Assyriology, theology, international law and Oriental literature). Some chapters are reprinted, but most appear here for the first time, and even those chapters whose inclusion is problematic make for interesting reading. As might be expected, the scholarship is extraordinary, and the writing styles display an engaging prebehavioral opulence which is itself endangered due to communication's evolution.

In volume 1, which ranges from early Mesopotamia (2500-1000 B.C.) to the Middle Ages, we are reminded that the earliest writings were intended to inform and record rather than persuade or justify official policies, for in those days, as in early childhood, the legitimacy of authority was not among the issues presented for public airing. This is not to deny the importance of popular sentiment, however, for evidence exists that many a monarch reconsidered desired courses of action or operated under the cover of darkness lest a rambunctious crowd elect to remove more than just his crown. Hymns and tales of praise were among the "public relations" activities popular during the reign of the Ur III kings (early third millennium), but the naming of years in honor of kingly deeds is among the first recorded examples of communications traceable to obviously political motivations, hence deserving of being called propaganda. This premeditated slanting of communication for self-glorification reached its zenith under Nebuchadnezzar I of Babylon (1124-1103 B.C.), and was later adapted for more justificatory purposes, as in the letter of Sargon II (721-705 B.C.) which sought to appease the indignant citizens of Assur for the king's unprincipled sacking of a neighboring capital.

Once the advantages became obvious to the vainglorious, ambitious, and highly motivated, the potential for communicability unfurled with as much dispatch as technology, skill and opportunity could afford. From the fifth century B.C., for example, Indian Buddhists appealed over the heads of existing authorities by compiling *sutras* in the vernacular rather than in Sanskrit—almost 2000 years later (it will be recalled), Galileo followed a similar strategy by publishing his heresies in Italian rather than in Latin—enabling them eventually to penetrate China during the disintegration of the Han dynasty (second century A.D.).

Mass media did not await printing: Sui Wen-ti, for instance, in an effort to reunify China, ordered 300,000 broadsheets copied by hand and distributed in his opponent's territory in 588 A.D., a year before his successful military invasion; and Chu Yüan-chang, founder of the Ming dynasty, urged an uprising in 1368 by smuggling a manifesto inside "moon cakes" eaten during autumnal festivities. By the Middle Ages, propaganda in the West had become a way of life, according to Brentano, "the characteristic gesture" of medieval societies—not as a divisive force, however, as it had been and as we think of it today, but as a cohesive and unifying provider of reassurances for the insecure against vague recollections of a shattered world. The function of communication in this era was to convey Truth to an admiring and receptive audience.

Volume 2 picks up the chronology with the Renaissance and the Reformation, with special emphasis on the decline of the religious idiom and the importance of movable type. Sermons and public speeches before that time had required the physical presence of the audience, whereas printing not only expanded the audience but also permitted decentralized participation in society. Consequently, social and political thinking became less controllable, and the elites, no longer in a position to read facial expressions, became understandably restive at this unexpected turn of events. The new communicational possibilities were augmented by an emergent humanism and reformist attacks on the Church, both of which stimulated propaganda and counter-propaganda efforts aimed at enticing and/or neutralizing the faithless, bored and wrong-headed. New miranda and credenda waxed as the Truth-transmissive function of communication waned, and in the process communication itself was transformed into a social bond as the individual's capacity for identification and projection became increasingly important for the routines of daily living. A new mentality was in the making.

A major feature of this new mentality involved acceptance of opinion formulated publicly through discussion. Especially from the Enlightenment onward, the new expectation was that government would have to justify itself, and that the public would then discuss and evaluate, but there was always a reluctance to let the cards fall as they may. Consequently, parallel with public opinion grew the science of impression management and other deceits invented for the engineering of consent. Also associated with the rise of public opinion, as authors in volume 3 as well as volume 2 point out, has been a proliferation of symbolism—exaggerated by the crown-to-nation transformations of the past century—as well as developments in technology (film, radio, television, communications satellites) which have spurred that proliferation. Specialized chapters in volume 3 are devoted to examining the current status of the defining variables of the communication process—content, audience, channel, and effects. The final two chapters focus on the trajectory of the world social order and on the future of communication.

Thanks to Weber, Marx and to some extent Freud, we now take for granted the importance of work in Western society, and of its connection through the Protestant ethic to guilt and achievement. But what our work-oriented existence frequently hides from view is the value of play in its widest cultural sense, and it is the playful element which is notably missing in these three volumes. Johan Huizinga's *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Beacon, 1955, recently reissued by Routledge and Kegan Paul) is a corrective for the one-sidedness of Marx and Weber, yet it is passed over because of our puritanical tendency to regard as frivolous and unimportant whatever is faddish, fun or otherwise nonserious in life. Yet play is quite serious (according to Huizinga), and the very foundation of culture itself, and is ultimately opposed, not by seriousness, but by reality.

Consider, as an illustration, Herbert Goldhamer's chapter on "The Social Effects of Communication Technology," apparently written about 1969, in which the author sketches the benefits and likely courses of development stemming from semiconductor and other technologies: a better informed electorate, instant referenda through cable TV feedback channels, improved information storage through the use of ultramicrofiche, computer-assisted instruction, etc.—all in the language of achievement. Nowhere in Goldhamer's ruminations is there the slightest hint (to reverse the theorems of elite theory) that the mass public might manipulate these new media possibilities for playful purposes, producing in a few short years a dazzling array of technological gadgets from electronic football and tennis games to simulations of interplanetary warfare, not to mention hand-held calculators and other devices which help disguise the surreptitious play of intellectuals—all for one's own pleasure and of harm to no one, hence painlessly conducive to the growth of culture and to the new languages, interests and feelings which are spawned in the process. Similarly, in his chapter on "Love and Intimacy," Arnold Rogow at points borders on indignation in his criticism of the phallic culture "whose sexual ethic regards women and men as primarily outlets for gratification" and which has effected a shift in norms from rectitude to "fun and fashion." Although there is much of value in Rogow's insights, there is no acknowledgement that a bit of ludenic and essentially harmless self-enhancement may be found alongside the alienation, and who is to say which elements will be of most importance to the positive growth of a society in the long run? Of such possibilities these many chapters are silent.

The three volumes are an intellectual feast, nevertheless. Many of the chapters will have general appeal to political scientists, especially (of course) to those interested in the burgeoning field of political communication. Specialists in Middle Eastern studies will benefit from the chapters on Islam and the Ottoman Empire; students of public opinion will value volume 2 in particular; and political psychologists will enjoy chapters on the psychology of the prophets (Weber), political fanaticism (Barbu), millenarian movements (Lewy), elites and world symbolism (Lerner), changing world identities (Isaacs), and the history of the unconscious (Rolle), plus the chapters by Rogow and especially Lasswell, whose guiding hand can be seen throughout this trilogy.

For those committed to enlightenment as a central value, knowledge of historical trends, current conditions and projected futures provides what religion does for the pious—i.e., a secure sense of place in the flow of past, present and future—and in this connection we can only express our gratitude to Lasswell, Lerner and Speier and their associates for this edifying collection. Applause, trumpets and loud cheers!

STEVEN R. BROWN

Kent State University

Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980. By William M. LeoGrande. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980. Pp. vii + 82. $3.25, paper.)

This is a concise, sober and largely detached assessment in detail of Cuba's involvement in Angola (since 1975) and its slightly less successful identification with and support for the Ethiopian government of the Dergue (especially since 1977). Overall, the coverage is a useful antidote to the nationalistic orientation of much of the American news media and the official United States government line. LeoGrande joins a small cadre of scholars (including Edward Gonzalez, Nelson P. Valdés, Jorge I. Dominguez, and Sergio Roca) less befuddled by cold-war rhetoric than their predecessors. Washington has accused the communists of bringing the cold war back to Africa. It regards the Cubans as "proxies" for Soviet expansionism and Ethiopia and Angola as captives of the Socialist bloc. LeoGrande does not hold with such simplistic notions. It is his main contention that:

> Cuban policies have evolved independently, and despite their compatibility and increasing coordination with Soviet policies, they are different both in concept and application. Cuba is not the Soviet Union's proxy in Africa; the two are partners, and though the partnership is asymmetrical, it is reciprocal nonetheless. Through cooperation, each partner is able to attain policy objectives which neither could attain if acting alone (p. 68).

In LeoGrande's mind, U.S. policy in these two crises has been "worse than ineffectual." It has positively contributed to the escalation of the wars in Angola and the Horn of Africa, helping to create the very conditions for close Soviet-Cuban collaboration. United States covert aid subverted the Alvor Agreements between the three contending parties in Angola. In the Horn, U.S. efforts to wean Somalia from the Soviet camp prompted the Somalis to misinterpret American intentions and led them to think that the U.S. would assist them in their expansionist war in Ogaden. Result—massive military presence by Cuba endorsed by the OAU. Cuban and Soviet policies and interventions are "essentially reactive." They did not initiate the internationalization of those conflicts. But Cuba and the USSR were prepared to match escalation for escalation, and aware that quantum leaps in support for one of the parties to a dispute might (as it did) lead to the West backing off, at least insofar as direct military intervention is concerned. As LeoGrande states: "In both cases, the ineptitude of U.S. policy provided Cuba and the USSR with opportunities to intervene on the 'right' side (i.e., with substantial regional support), while leaving U.S. policy makers with the Hobson's choice of openly backing the 'wrong' side or disengaging" (p. 70).

In my estimation, LeoGrande is a bit unfair to Carter's policy in southern Africa, especially in Zimbabwe. Yet he is correct in perceiving that the United States is not at all comfortable with change and majority rule in the region. There seems to be a sort of death-wish in Washington to identify with unpopular regimes like Mobutu's in Zaire. According to LeoGrande: "To pursue a policy of propping up governments indiscriminately whenever and wherever the precepts of cold war geopolitics appear to dictate is to build castles in the sand. Eventually the tide will come in" (p. 74).

Cuba's vigorous policy in Africa is an object lesson in a little socialist country carving out an important niche for itself in world politics. Cuba today is a leader of the Third World, is widely respected in Africa, and enjoys a role considerably more impressive than its weak economy and small size would seem to merit. Yet Cuba also carries the burden of association with Moscow. When the USSR invades Afghanistan, for example, Cuba is tarnished. The recent General Assembly election for the "Latin American" seat on the Security Council illustrates well how Soviet aggression punished Castro's international aspirations. This brief study provides us with an excellent introduction to this important aspect of Cuban affairs, and helps us to understand these larger policy issues.

KENNETH W. GRUNDY

Case Western Reserve University

East European Integration and East-West Trade. Edited by Paul Marer and John Michael Montias. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 432. $32.50.)

The stated purpose of this volume is "to establish a comprehensive and up-to-date Western perspective on where the field of foreign trade in CPEs [centrally planned economies] stands today and to help set directions for future research" (p. xiii).

Pursuing this objective, Paul Marer and John Michael Montias have assembled a large number of essays and discussions dealing with a wide range of specific issues in the fields of international trade, economics and politics in centrally planned economies of East European countries, with an emphasis on integration in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The last part of the work presents views on integration and East-West trade issues from the point of view of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.

In their introductory essay, "Theory and Measurement of East European Integration," Marer and Montias give an overview of the symposium that is very useful to all students of politics and economics of the Soviet bloc. The essay summarizes the major issues at hand.

Generally speaking, some of the papers and discussions in this symposium are excellent, while a few other contributions are submitted to critical evaluation by discussants. Several authors point out that there is no separation of economics and politics in the countries of the Soviet orbit, that their historical, political and socioeconomic conditions differ from those in Western Europe and that therefore the theories of integration applicable in the latter area are of little, if any, use in the former.

Excellent essays by Arpad Abonyi, Ivan J. Sylvain, and James A. Caporaso debunk the theories of those few political pseudo-scientists who substitute their wishful thinking for reality and who are unable to see the obvious, namely, the close interconnection of politics and economics in the evolution of the CMEA countries. Those individuals assume that interdependence is "good" and should be fostered, while, in fact, what is involved here is *dependence* on the Soviet Union. That may not be "good" either for us, the people of Central East Europe, or both. The inequality of interstate relations within the CMEA states and a further economic integration of the bloc could lead to Soviet absorption of the other East European countries, as has been noted by the more knowledgeable students of the area. Therefore, Abonyi's and Silvain's suggestion that "both political scientists and economists devote more attention to consideration of political-economic dependence and development in CMEA 'integration,' " is worth considering.

Equally excellent is the essay by Adam Zwas on Poland and CMEA in which he compares the approaches of Gomulka with those of Gierek. Zwas explains why Poland has found itself in a difficult economic situation and suggests that the outlook for solving Poland's economic problems is not very promising. Hardly anyone could argue with that today.

In a brief review one cannot do justice to such a large collection of papers and discussions of topics ranging from "Political Economy Perspectives on Integration" to "Impact of Western Technology: The Soviet Mineral Fertilizer Industry" and including treatments of individual countries—Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, but not the other states of the bloc. It is fair to say, however, that Marer and Montias have done an excellent job of integrating such a great number of disjointed essays on East European integration and

East-West trade. This volume is a source of useful information for both lay persons and advanced students of the Soviet bloc and makes a substantial contribution to knowledge of the area.

JOSEF KALVODA

Saint Joseph College
West Hartford, Connecticut

Egypt and the United States: The Formative Years. By Gail E. Meyer. (Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980. Pp. 230. $18.00.)

This book provides an incisive analysis of American-Egyptian diplomatic relations from 1952 through 1957. Thus, it begins with the Nasser-led revolution and ends after the initial tests of the Eisenhower Doctrine in Jordan and Syria.

Gail Meyer is a graduate of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, and the work under review appears to be almost wholly the product of her doctoral dissertation at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. Some of her research was done in the Middle East, particularly Egypt, while she served as a correspondent for a Swiss trade journal. She currently works for the UN in Geneva as a trade promotion officer.

Although Meyer has not attempted to state or test any hypotheses, she does more than the traditional diplomatic historian. Proceeding from the fact that "after the Second World War . . . America's chief objective was to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of diminishing British influence" in the Middle East, she explains and evaluates the means by which the United States attempted to pursue this goal in the context of Egypt's primary postwar objective, namely, "to rid itself and the Arab world of the vestigial manifestations of colonialism, a desire that sprang from considerations unrelated to the cold war struggle" (p. 27). Meyer thus focuses on the conflicts that "arose when the measures adopted by the United States to accomplish its objectives appeared inimical to Egypt's own goals and Egypt reacted by trying to frustrate implementation of America's decisions" (pp. 27-28). In Meyer's view, the principal impediments to the success of America's policies included a "patronizing" approach to the Arabs, an aversion to Arab nationalism and to Egypt's aspirations for a leading role in regional reform and development, "failure to make any practical distinction between communists and Arab nationalists," and "support for unpopular regimes" that stood in the way of Egypt's thrust for Arab "unity" and socialism. For the most part, American policies "drove wedges between the United States and these same nationalists ever deeper and actually forced the nationalists to turn to the Soviet Union for help." In final analysis, she sees "historical irony in the fact that America's primary goal—that of containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East—was largely the achievement of those very nationalist forces that were so feared. . ." (p. 29). This conclusion is arguable, since it depends on the word "largely" and since the author accurately notes that Soviet influence expanded significantly during these years.

Meyer demonstrates clearly that during the first half of the five years covered by this study American prestige was very high in Egypt. The United States used its influence to dissuade Britain from intervening during the revolution, and subsequently supported Egypt in its successful quest to effect the withdrawal of some 80,000 British troops from the Suez Canal area and to turn their bases over to the Egyptians. What "soured the well" of goodwill, apart from U.S. domestic politics and various other factors, was America's failure to insist on Israeli compliance with UN resolutions concerning the Palestinian refugees; insistence on a collective self-defense arrangement (ultimately the Baghdad Pact), with Great Powers preponderance, as the means of effecting the security of the Middle East; refusal to respond to Nasser's need for arms following Israel's massive invasion of Gaza in January, 1955; denial of more than token economic assistance and revocation of commitments to finance the Aswan Dam; and formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, together with its use as an instrument for opposing anti-status quo movements in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

Meyer contends that it was these American acts and omissions, among others, which permitted the USSR to leap over the Baghdad Pact and expand its influence in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, notwithstanding the credit due the Eisenhower administration for its role in forcing Israel, France, and Britain to evacuate the Canal Zone and the Sinai after they were seized in 1956. In reaching these conclusions, Meyer is scholarly and analytical. Her work is also carefully documented, with some 50 to 155 footnotes per chapter. In addition to a 20-page bibliography that cites an impressive array of primary sources, she provides a list of high-placed participants in American and Egyptian decision making who were interviewed during the course of her research (p. 11).

As in all such works, especially one as brief as this, there are disturbing omissions of relevant facts, and there are sound grounds for rejecting some of the analyses and conclusions. For example, when the United States helped save the Jordanian monarchy in 1957, it was contributing to the ouster of a pro-Nasser prime minister and vitiating the principle of self-determination, but its action may also have prevented Israeli intervention to preserve a buffer on a hostile frontier. This case is illustrative of many such problems faced by American policy makers that might have been treated as tough dilemmas rather than "lost opportunities." Even so, the author's key point, set forth on the book's dustjacket, remains sound: that "America's inability to come to terms with Arab nationalism . . . still casts a shadow over the more promising [?] contemporary efforts to establish peace in the Middle East." Although Meyer does not say it, this study provides a sound basis for regarding the continuing Camp David "peace process" as little more than shoveling sand in the eye of a hurricane.

H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY

Washington State University

NATO—The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting. Edited by Kenneth A. Myers. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. xxiii + 469. $35.00.)

This book contains the background papers and major addresses for a conference held in September 1979. The first chapter was written by a former U.S. secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, the last by (at that time) a future one, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. They and 25 other contributors, one-third of whom were associated with one of the conference's sponsors (Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University) addressed three sets of problems facing the North Atlantic Alliance: strategic and military, political and economic, organizational and leadership problems.

As NATO enters its fourth decade, several perennial issues of alliance relations are challenging what have been some basic assumptions of the post-World War II era.

(1) Doubt about the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent is hardly a new problem. What is relatively new is the growing strength of arguments favoring counterforce strategy and attacking mutual assured destruction. In his opening chapter, Henry Kissinger, who in 1974 asked, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority?" and who helped shape "the historically amazing theory . . . that vulnerability contributed to peace and invulnerability contributed to risks of war" (p. 6), strongly argues for a U.S. counterforce capability to balance the enormous quantitative and qualitative advances of Soviet strategic forces. An American counterforce capability "may make a crisis more risky but it may make a crisis also less likely" (p. 16). Critics argue, however, that this understandable search for alternatives to choosing either mutual destruction or surrender, should deterrence fail, chips away at an assumption that has differentiated nuclear from pre-nuclear strategy: that *fighting* a nuclear war is not an appropriate instrument for achieving foreign policy ends.

Despite the Soviet military buildup, writes Ian Smart in his analysis of "European Nuclear Options," Europeans generally have confidence in the American deterrent. For two decades they have preferred deterrence over defense—i.e., preventing the outbreak of war rather than influencing the outcome—because Europe would be devastated by either a nuclear or conventional conflict. To this end, Europeans have sought to prevent the decoupling of strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces. These levels of deterrence and the connections between them are explored further in chapters by Uwe Nerlich, Edward N. Luttwak and Kenneth Hunt.

(2) The interdependence of nations and (3) domestic forces are two additional factors that are affecting long-standing alliance issues. Emphasizing the significance of Persian Gulf oil, Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas H. Moorer urge the extension of NATO's geographic and issue boundaries. Their proposal for a minimum of 15 aircraft carriers in peacetime is placed in perspective by Amos A. Jordan's chapter on energy: one million barrels of oil are required for 60 days' operation of one carrier task force or the movement of four army divisions to Europe; one million a day are needed for allied military forces in peacetime. Pierre Hassner reminds us also that enlarging the NATO map of responsibility would lose support in alliance constituencies who disagree about energy and intervention in the Third World but agree on "the need for collective resistance to Soviet military domination in Europe" (p. 394).

While Alexander Haig calls for U.S. leadership "free of bullying insensitivity" to allies' concerns and constraints (p. 445), Irving Kristol threatens that West Europeans will end up as "allies of inconvenience" if they do not recover the "patriotic temper" that has been replaced by a "social-democratic" one (p. 363). Kristol's "new American nationalism" implies rejection of Hassner's conclusion that America is "dependent on a world that it cannot control" (p. 391) and of Michael Howard's judgment that the "liberal, pacifistic tradition" is an "admirable element in the Western political system" that furnishes "a conscience and a critical intelligence," and whose questions about Western defense postures are "more often than not . . . entirely legitimate" (p.

350). In light of recent changes in the American political system, Samuel P. Huntington suggests the possibility that a "more nationalistic, more assertive, more unilateral" U.S. foreign policy may open the way for "dramatic initiatives, dramatic achievements, and dramatic disasters" (p. 250).

To appreciate fully the diversity of alliance views, one should read most of the 26 chapters in this substantial volume; especially insightful and balanced are those by Michael Howard, Pierre Hassner, Samuel Huntington, and, on the Soviet challenge, by Dimitri K. Simes. The book would have been improved by including a coherent treatment of (a) the Rapid Deployment Force, and (b) the political economy of the industrial democracies. The chapters on business and labor by Giovanni Agnelli and Irving Brown are not sufficient. Thomas A. Callaghan's rational approach to cooperation in arms production contrasts nicely with David Greenwood's criticism of "grand designs with their mouth-watering payoffs" and his plea for appreciation of values other than efficiency in an alliance of sovereign nations. (c) The book also should have considered alternative futures that extend beyond the next five years and are not "surprise-free."

Events since this book was written—including the return of the U.S. hostages from Iran and the American election—should encourage those who applaud America's new nationalism. Contrary to some expectations, however, reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have reflected more than they have reconciled conflicting transatlantic perspectives. In any case, did the conferees who wrote this book and deliberated about NATO's future imagine that Alexander Haig, now the self-described "vicar" of U.S. foreign policy, would have the opportunity to practice in 1981 what he judiciously preached in September 1979?

EUGENE J. ROSI

Monmouth College

Regional Development in a Global Economy: The Multinational Corporation, Technology, and Andean Integration. By Lynn Krieger Mytelka. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979. Pp. xvi + 233. $17.50.)

The Andean Common Market includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. No other provision of the Andean Common Market has attracted as much attention as controversial Decision 24, the investment code governing foreign investment and technology transfer in the five pact countries. Dependistas have hailed Decision 24 as the key to development, while orthodox economists have assailed it as a cause of stagnation.

Lynn Krieger Mytelka's book contains a painstaking, empirically based analysis of Decision 24, technology transfer, the role of multinational corporations and other major aspects of Andean integration. Neither integration nor Decision 24 has delivered the Promethean developmental fire to the five pact countries, but Mytelka provides solid insights into the birth and evolution of the pact and causes for its limited success.

In chapter 1, Mytelka claims to set forth the political economy framework within which she analyzes the interrelationship of international capital, technology, and regional integration. This "framework" emphasizes the internationalization of production and attempts to illustrate how the import-substituting strategies of the post-1930 era made possible, in the late 1960s, the adoption by the Andean member countries of an integrative system based on regulation and planning. Although chapter 1 is provocative and rich in insights, the ideas presented in this chapter merely reflect Mytelka's dependency ideology or perspective of the development process, while hardly providing a novel or comprehensive framework for analyzing the issues of foreign investment, integration and technology transfer.

Interstate conflicts over costs and benefits of integration are carefully analyzed in chapter 2. Mytelka strongly and correctly favors an independent tribunal capable of resolving conflicts arising out of the operation of integration processes.

Chapter 3 on regional regulation of direct foreign investment contains one of the best discussions in the literature of the objectives, implementation and impact of Decision 24 which governed direct foreign investment and regulated the transfer of technology:

> Decision 24, as it emerged from a lengthy process of negotiation, became, within a capitalist framework, a mechanism to regulate *selected* external linkages in the interest of a potential national bourgeoisie. It was designed to strengthen the national sector by reinforcing the bargaining power of national firms vis-a-vis their foreign licensors and parents, thereby ensuring that direct foreign investment and technology imports made effective contributions to Andean development. . . . In sum, Decision 24 was not a thoroughgoing mechanism for the reduction of dependency (p. 107).

In chapter 4 on licensing and technological dependence, Mytelka aims to provide the reader with a detailed description and analysis of the morphology of the technological dependence syndrome. She also brings out the state's inability to attenuate this dependence either through regulation or direct participation in production.

Chapter 5 contains an analysis of how multinational corporations, despite regional planning efforts, have maintained market segmentation and managed specializations within the regional market.

External forces are responsible for Latin American poverty, underdevelopment and inequality according to a group of theories including the metropolis-colony, center-periphery, structuralist and the neo-Marxist dependency theory espoused by Lynn Krieger Mytelka. Among monographs of the dependency school, this book is unusual in that it is well researched and full of solid statistical evidence.

The book, however, is also full of such unfounded and inaccurate statements as: "The Andean Group emerged in the mid-1960s when the contradictions of an import substituting industrialization policy managed by multinational corporations had become very evident" (p. 190), or, "The 'industrialization by invitation' strategy facilitated the development of mechanisms for the transfer of surplus abroad."

In spite of its narrow, preconceived perspective and basic analytical weaknesses, this book is a welcome addition to the literature of Latin American economic development.

MARKOS MAMALAKIS

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross. By Archimedes L. A. Patti. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xx + 612. $19.50.)

The theme of this book is that colonialism was obsolete after World War II, that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt knew this and his policy was not only not to assist the colonial powers return to their colonies but actively, in his own words: "I want no French returned to Indochina," that with Roosevelt's death this policy was frustrated or ignored or overcome by events, that if only the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh had been given due recognition and assistance by the United States as the dominant nationalist force in Indochina, the French/Vietnam war might not have occurred at all, and if it had, it could not have dragged out into the tragedy it became with American assistance to the French, and finally that there would have been no Vietnam/American war and consequently no "Albatross" to hang around our national neck. According to Patti, the Vietnam War was our own fault because of our failure to perceive and cooperate with the inevitable course of history (n.b.: the Roosevelt quotation above was in his own handwriting on the margin of a policy paper drafted by this reviewer in the Department of State).

Archimedes L. A. Patti is either a modest man or his work in intelligence fostered an occupational habit of anonymity which makes it difficult to find him in his own pages. His book contains some pages devoted to personalities in which he appears once, saluting. I have a feeling he is handsome and from his own tale know he is a man of courage. I had to turn to R. Harris Smith's book, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (California, 1972) to discover that Patti had been a captain on the Indochina desk first in Washington and then Kunming, and rose to be major and then colonel in command of the OSS unit that went in first to Hanoi after the Japanese accepted defeat (pp. 329, 345, 348-57).

Patti's first intimation that his mission ranged further than secret intelligence, was given him by Colonel Paul L. E. Helliwell, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Branch, OSS China theater, that "[his] job included the total spectrum of clandestine operations and political warfare" (p. 97). The term "political warfare" was novel and without definition. Brigadier George H. Olmsted was chairing a meeting in the U.S. Embassy on China theater operations when Patti's mission to Indochina came up for discussion. There was no problem with intelligence or clandestine operations but, wrote Patti,

> I posed a final question . . . to wit: was it the sense of the group that I should continue to conduct political warfare activities in Indochina? Olmsted and his staff officers exchanged inquiring glances and sat silent. At length Olmsted asked what I meant by the term political warfare. . . . Quite candidly Olmsted admitted he did not understand my question, but that if my instructions were to conduct political warfare and if whatever I did in that political warfare was within the context of U.S. policy, then I should by all means "carry on." Everyone smiled, and the conference adjourned (p. 269).

Patti's book is replete with the political warfare he felt the Americans should have engaged in to support Roosevelt's policy to keep the French out, the insidious efforts by the French to get back into their Indochina colony, aided and abetted by the British who also were determined to reestablish themselves in their colonies, and the frantic floundering by Ho Chi Minh and company to outmaneuver other Vietnamese political groupings as well as the French, British and Chinese while imploring the Americans for recognition and support. A reader sympathetic to Patti's views will find it easy to loathe French intransigence, stupidity and intrigue, to deplore British efforts in behalf of the French in excess of their mission to accept the surrender of the Japanese south of the Sixteenth Parallel, and to lament American departure from the enlightened policy of President Roosevelt.

Unfortunately there were other and greater problems facing the United States government in Europe and Asia which overwhelmed the Indochina situation and during a crucial time diminished it in world events to a problem of incidental importance. The fact that the infant problem grew to adult and then giant size informs Patti's book and, as he apparently feels, justifies his unwavering advocacy of independence for Indochina under the strongest political organization: the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, regardless of whether Ho was a communist or a socialist or whatever. Patti takes his place, in a sense, with some foreign service officers who become identified with their clients because of special knowledge and experience and overlook larger issues beyond their view. And of course, sometimes, they are proven right later on when it is too late to heed them. This was the experience of some of the old China hands who were cashiered during the McCarthy era.

The most fascinating part of the book is Patti's excellent and detailed narrative of the greatest adventure of his life—and who needs more than one such—which runs unabated in drama to page 374. The final scene between Patti and Ho (pp. 366-74) is a tearjerker as the lights dim and the two intimate figures do a fadeout as they lament their parting and the end of Patti's mission. The stage lights go out and the curtain drops!

KENNETH PERRY LANDON

American University

The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-79: Regional Integration among New States. By Anthony Payne. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 299. $25.00.)

With the number of new states and secessionist movements increasing rapidly, it might appear surprising that the world is also experiencing a surge in regional integration movements. In fact, these two trends—centrifugal and centripetal forces—appear intimately related. The primordialism of ethnicity or similar "sacred" sentiments generate national exclusivism, while inescapable and secular economic and political forces compel some form of regional integration. Because he believes that this is a new world phenomenon, Anthony Payne is dissatisfied with the explanatory powers of the existing theoretical literature on regional integration. The case study approach, he maintains, is the only way to move towards an understanding of the politics of integration among new states. To understand the process in the West Indies and elsewhere, Payne attempts to derive "an appropriate framework" from a brief historical review of West Indian integration attempts prior to 1961.

It is notorious, however, that a descriptive "historical backdrop" (to use C. Wright Mills' phrase) seldom provides an adequate framework for political analysis. This study is no exception. What is provided is a detailed description of the various attempts at Caribbean regional integration of interest mostly to the West Indian specialist or the historian of the period 1961-79. The occasional attempts at theoretical summary in the midst of an ongoing diachronic and descriptive treatment results more often than not in a disjointed causal analysis. Two examples will suffice.

In the mid-1960s West Indian leaders took a new interest in regional economic integration. Payne attributes this change to the publication in 1965 of a small study by the then head of the Economic Planning Division of the Trinidad Government, William Demas: *The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean.* "Demas is in every way the central figure of our story" (p. 56).

Nowhere does it occur to Payne to ask why the West Indian leaders who called all the shots on a highly personalist basis (as he continually reminds us) settled on Demas' proposals for a free trade area and customs union, rather than on "production integration and central planning" advocated by an equally brilliant group of West Indian economists. What we are given are descriptions of each school of thought, rather than an analysis of the dynamics of interest group lobbying or a profile of the power configurations necessary for the adoption and implementation of either case.

This confusion between surface phenomena and structural causes is evident also in the analysis of the role of Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley. In a chapter entitled "From Crisis to CARICOM," Payne maintains that the ultimate crisis of disintegration was avoided by Manley's election in 1972: "The integration movement took on new life immediately" (p. 142). Since he later concludes that despite all the rhetoric and change of name (from CARIFTA to CARICOM), the integration movement remained at the level of a free trade area (cf., pp. 186-87), one must conclude that what Manley did in 1972 was little more than provide a momentary rhetorical boost to the *idea* of West Indian integration. By failing to place Manley's early behavior within a proper framework for political analysis, Payne is at a loss to explain his subsequent decisions which were in fact highly detrimental to the process of integration.

Similarly, by dealing with such issues as the creation of a regional bank or airline in a purely descriptive fashion, the book fails to educate us on the overall political processes and dynamics of integration in the West Indies and elsewhere.

On the very last page, Payne asks whether his assessment of West Indian integration has a validity beyond the case study. "Unfortunately," he tells us, "there is no way of answering that question until further research has been done. It would certainly be unscientific to advance a general theory on the basis of one case study, and we have no intention of making that mistake" (p. 287). Having at the outset demolished existing "neofunctionalist" theories of regional integration and having offered his own study as a guide to new theoretical insights, Payne finally abandons his passengers with the excuse that, having come this far, he really only knows the road just covered. At this juncture there is only one thing to do: return to the old much-critiqued but still standing theories of regional integration.

ANTHONY P. MAINGOT

Florida International University

Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. By Barry Rubin. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 426. $17.50.)

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 shook the international community of nations to the core. Among the many traumatic political effects of this revolution was the transformation of Iran-American relations from an exceedingly close, if unequal, partnership to a sudden bitter confrontation. The new revolutionary regime in Tehran placed fundamental blame for the excesses and sins of the *ancien regime* directly at the feet of America and took immediate actions to ensure that the United States would never again intervene this way in their internal affairs. American policy makers badly misread the revolution and embarked upon a policy of consecutive blunders that only hastened the breakdown in relationships. The Iranian reaction, built upon an evident rational paranoia about American intentions, itself became excessive as both sides lost the capacity to communicate and mutual misunderstanding and distrust came to prevail.

The story of Iran-American relations is one in which ironies abound. After supplying a nation with $16 billion worth of its most sophisticated arms in the five years prior to the revolution, the United States suddenly found itself faced with the serious possibility of going to war against the very nation now possessing those arms. How could such a dramatic turnabout have occurred between two nations who had until 1953 maintained the warmest and most cordial of relationships? The answer to this question is not easily found, as the story is a complex one requiring deep understanding of the politics and cultures both of America and of Iran. The answer lies at the crucial point of overlap between the related fields of comparative politics and international relations.

The book under review is the first of what promises to be a long parade of studies about Iran and America. It is a play-by-play account of Iran-American relationships as these relations developed historically. The long descriptions of events are interspersed with a great deal of ad hoc analysis and evaluative commentary. In short, the study is a provocative chronicle of the relations between two nations and the agreements and disagreements, personalities and programs that marked these relations. Readers are left to draw their own conclusions about what might be the central theme of the study.

Paved With Good Intentions is both a fascinating and frustrating book to read. It is filled with intriguing information as Barry Rubin obviously sifted through mountains of material in preparing his work. He made especially good use of the National Archives in the first two chapters and later relied profitably upon personal papers and presidential libraries. He also drew upon an extensive network of interviews with a wide variety of Americans closely associated with Iran over the years. The book's major strength is as a handbook or chronicle of Iran-American relations, with a special emphasis upon the period of the 1970s. In his interpretations of events, the author makes a valiant effort at objectivity and fairness in areas where emotions run high and controversy abounds. One does not always have to agree with the conclusions to appreciate the author's intellectual honesty and integrity here.

Yet the book is seriously flawed. Even as a handbook of events and stances taken by various key actors, it must be used with great caution. An enormous amount of the material presented as fact is undocumented and is in many cases of questionable accuracy. As is stated in the preface: "To avoid overwhelming the reader with footnotes, I have generally attributed only direct quotes." The reader would have been better overwhelmed than to risk being misled. Throughout, the writer proceeds by assertion. Numbers abound without substantiation. We are told that there were 80,000 Jews in Iran in 1979 (p. 305), that 300,000 weapons of all types including 75,000 submachine guns had been passed out to various factions in Tehran in February 1979 (p. 281), that the government had cut the subsidy to the religious establishment from $80 million to $30 million a year in 1977 (p. 270), that there were 60,000 bazaar merchants in Tehran (p. 265), that there were 180,000 mullahs in Iran (p. 333), and that there were slightly over 3,000 full-time SAVAK employees in Iran in the 1950s (p. 179). Such numbers are of questionable accuracy, but ultimately the reader cannot judge since there are no sources for them. This problem becomes very serious when issues of greater import are discussed. Surely much of the crucial information is correct. Yet, what is one to think of the important conclusion that "the National Intelligence Estimates and the reports from the State Department, the CIA, military intelligence, and the MAAG all discounted the likelihood of any domestic upheaval" (p. 169). If Rubin had seen all the National Intelligence Estimates, for example, he would have realized that the one prepared in 1975 stressed the existence of opposition and took the question of domestic upheaval very seriously indeed.

The second major area of difficulty with this book concerns its presentation of the Iranian side of the relationship. There is too little understanding of the politics of Iran that shaped Persian responses to American policies. I find no Persian sources consulted at all. Instead, interpretations are based on information provided by the *New York Times* and translations of speeches presented by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Joint Publications Research Service. Thus it is not altogether surprising that Rubin can give the shah the credit for the land reform program when its real architect, Hassan Arsanjani, is not even mentioned. Also, the writer's claim notwithstanding, the shah's choice for prime minister in the critical days of fall 1978, Jaafar Sharif-Emami, was in no way "a man with a pious reputation" (p. 210). There are several other examples of the author's unfamiliarity with Iran. He badly misinterprets the political role of Ayatollah Khomeini after the revolution and fails to judge him as a tactician within the Iranian context. Ali Shari`ati, the man whose ideas inspired much of the opposition to the shah, is only mentioned quickly and in passing. Rubin is obviously more at home in Washington than in the elusive environment of Iranian politics. Yet, it is impossible to analyze adequately American policy without a sound grasp of realities in Iran.

Despite these rather serious reservations, this book must be required reading to those who seek to understand the politics of the Iran-American relationship. It is strongest in its description and evaluation of the policy-making system in Washington. If one approaches these sections of the book gingerly and with caution, there is much to be learned. In the end, the writer throws out a number of insights and interpretations for examination. He does so in an interesting, if not authoritative, manner. These conclusions may or may not stand the test of further inquiry. *Paved With Good Intentions* is the first major attempt at a thorough, post-revolutionary investigation of the political story of Iran and America.

JAMES A. BILL

University of Texas, Austin

Tokyo and Washington: Dilemmas of a Mature Alliance. By Frederick L. Shiels. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980. Pp. xiii + 202. $20.50.)

"No relationship is more important to the United States than our alliance with Japan," said Henry Kissinger in 1976. *Tokyo and Washington* is a credible effort to address that relationship. Frederick Shiels' approach is to analyze the course of the Japanese-American alliance since 1952 within a framework of international relations theory. Shiels introduces his work with references to the alliance theories of Kaplan, Liska and others. The chapter entitled "Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice" notes the work of Snyder and Paige on decision making, Rosenau on linkages and that of Allison and the bureaucratists, before settling upon consensus theory as, obviously enough, applicable to Japan. Curiously, consensus theorists such as Mitrany and Deutsch go unmentioned. Shiels rightly attributes Japanese concepts of consensus decision making (*ringisei*), fraternal spirit (*haragei*) and superior-subordinate symbiotic relationships (*amae*) to policy practice. His compendium of foreign policy actors in Japan and the United States, however, completely omits the role of military actors in the latter. Moreover if the Gaimushō is a "less developed central policy-planning and coordination mechanism [than the Department of State]" (p. 38), but "has often been more relied upon" (p. 39), the reader is left to ponder the seeming contradiction. Reviving the "bowl of jelly" and "fudge factory" shibboleths only confuses explanation.

The volume is more successful as a chronicle of the Japanese-American alliance, although Shiels' trendy, conversational style ("Teng-ruled China" [p. 133]) detracts from the narrative. His characterization of the occupation as "seat-of-the-pants" rule (p. 67) by a "strange blend of right-wingers and New Deal-style social engineers" (p. 68) will hardly appeal to the Japanologists who were architects of occupation policy. A chapter entitled "Alliance Communication in the 1970s and 1980s" recounts a mixed record of successes versus failures arising from misperceptions and miscalculations. The author cites the work of Destler, Neustadt, Allison and others as having relevance to the record. His familiarity with personality characteristics of individual Japanese and American foreign policy actors strengthens his presentation.

Another major portion narrates security problems encountered by the alliance beginning with the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, and assesses retrospectively the degree of accuracy of prognostications by Japan specialists (Morley, Brzezinski, Kahn, Osgood) about likely developments in the alliance during the 1970-1980 decade. Unfortunately, Shiels' own prognosis that Japanese "mental blocks" will likely inhibit "innovative" (p. 128) security options in future was made on the eve of significant political changes in Japan which have implications for the alliance. A revived, clear Liberal Democratic party majority in both houses of the Diet as the result of the elections of June 1980 assured renewed support for the alliance. In March 1980 a committee on security was formed in the Diet, the first such committee in the postwar period. According to Alexis Johnson and George Packard in a statement of December 3, 1980, some 63 percent of the Japanese public approves the security treaty with the United States and 83 percent approves of the Self-Defense Force, degrees of support heretofore unprecedented ("The Common Security Interests of Japan, the United States and Its NATO Allies," *NATO Review,* February 1981, p. 8).

Tokyo and Washington concludes with a recitation of Japanese-American relations during the first half of the Carter administration followed by 20 pages of appendices in a 202-page volume. Familiar export overload problems concerning television sets and steel products are addressed, but the problem of Toyotas and Datsuns is not. Shiels falls short of developing the "strategic and diplomatic calculus" he attempts regarding the Japanese-American relationship from 1977 to 1979 as it was affected by Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese interaction. His dismissal of the "value of [the] American deterrent for Japan" in one paragraph is lamentable, given the fact that Northeast Asia is the only area in the world where the interests of China, the Soviet Union and the United States converge geographically.

The book contains errors. There never were "over 460 thousand (sic) American troops in Vietnam" (p. 86). Teng Hsiao-ping (or Deng Xiaoping) was not 79 years of age when this volume was published in 1980 (p. 133). William P. Bundy was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (p. 20), not Far Eastern Affairs, and *Weltanschauung* is badly misspelled and misused (p. 29). End-of-chapter notes are useful and the bibliography is adequate.

JOHN H. ESTERLINE

California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968. By Wallace J. Thies. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Pp. xix + 446. $20.00.)

For American scholars the Vietnam War will probably generate as large and unending a series of decisional histories, documental exegeses, and causal analyses as World War I. The "how-could-it-happen?" question underlined by the searing effects of the experience may never be answered satisfactorily. Wallace Thies' study of the attempt to use limited bombing to induce North Vietnam to moderate its aims and negotiate is a worthy entry in this burgeoning literature. This very good book presents a detailed review of U.S. strategy making and implementation—which were not always consistent—in the bombing program and the quest for diplomatic contacts with Hanoi. Thies' special contribution is to link this discussion with an assessment of the DRV's internal political struggles over war aims and strategy. His analysis contradicts some of my own research (for example, I still believe he overestimates both the optimism of American leaders about the odds for success and the length of the war and the sincerity of both sides' interest in meaningful negotiations prior to 1968), but he makes his case admirably.

The principal theme is a critique of the feasibility of elaborate finely tuned "compellence" strategies. The Vietnam record is filtered through the theories of Allison, Jervis, and George to chasten Schelling and Kaufmann. "Orchestration" of military actions for signaling purposes is frustrated by political fragmentation and operational constraints. Thies capsulizes the verdict on page 392: *"There may be significant discrepancies both between the actions intended by senior officials on Side A and the actions undertaken by A and between the message intended for transmission to B by A's leaders and the message read into A's actions by senior officials on Side B;"* and on page 355, where he notes the tradeoff between the requisites of maintaining bureaucratic consensus and controlling escalation.

With an original marshaling of old data, Thies demonstrates that the initial execution of graduated bombing could not have conveyed the desired message to North Vietnam's leaders because its scale and phasing were not logically linked to the specific Communist military provocations to which it was meant to respond, or to the prior public warnings issued by Washington. Thies is on shakier ground when he attempts a heroic analysis of the internal hawk-dove policy struggle in Hanoi, because the evidence is scant, but he develops a fascinating argument about the similarity of internal confusion and dilemmas of decision making in both capitals.

Thies might be faulted for overemphasizing President Johnson's commitment to the elegant signaling strategy favored by his civilian advisors, and his misrepresents somewhat the debate over bombing strategy, skewing the span of views to the left. He cites Rostow and Taylor as the "right-wing" critics, leaving most of the military (who opposed the graduated pressures strategy altogether) off the spectrum. And I still maintain that he misses the forest for the trees in focusing insistently on the botched diplomatic initiatives of 1965-67. Before the Tet Offensive neither side (especially North Vietnamese) really wanted negotiations except on conditions that would constrain the other's military operations during the talks.

In general, though, Thies' analysis is persuasive, and always careful. The writing is clear, though excessive concern for nuance produces substantial repetition. The book could have been at least 10 percent shorter, but demands attention and close reading nonetheless.

RICHARD K. BETTS

The Brookings Institution

Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth-Century Theorists and the World Crisis. By Kenneth W. Thompson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 249. $20.00; $6.95, paper.)

Kenneth Thompson's masters are 18 in number, born between 1888 and 1913. They are the generation preceding Thompson, born himself in 1921. He claims that his choices are both objective and subjective. Objective grounds for mastery are a "critical mass of serious work" (p. x) and an impact on scholarly and journalistic opinion. Masters have "had a formative influence, and enjoy successive revivals of interest after the more faddish and transient approaches have passed" (p. x). An obvious problem with these criteria is that if they fit Thompson's masters they also fit many other thinkers whom Thompson has excluded without a word of justification. Inasmuch as some of his inclusions meet his own criteria only marginally—John Courtney Murray and Louis J. Halle, Jr., are examples—his exclusions are all the more glaring.

Thompson groups Herbert Butterfield, Reinhold Niebuhr, Murray and Martin Wight in search of normative foundations. Why not include in this group F. S. C. Northrop (b. 1893) or Adda B. Bozeman (b. 1908) for their efforts to comprehend non-Western systems of thought as they bear on international relations? Again, how can he plausibly exclude Harold and Margaret Sprout (b. 1901, 1903) and William T. R. Fox (b. 1912) from a power-oriented group that includes E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Nicholas J. Spykman, Arnold Wolfers, John H. Herz and Karl W. Deutsch? Or, in a group that concerns itself with the cold war—Walter Lippmann, George F. Kennan, Halle and Raymond Aron—where is Robert Strausz-Hupe (b. 1903)? (Revisionists we may exclude by virtue of their youth.) Finally, among "world order theorists" such as Quincy Wright, David Mitrany, Charles De Visscher and Arnold J. Toynbee, how can we leave out Myres S. McDougal (b. 1906)? Lest we be swayed by Thompson's groupings, where are all those figures associated with the logical and psychological determinants of international behavior: L. F. Richardson (b. 1881—too old?), Otto Klineberg (b. 1899), Harold D. Lasswell (b. 1902) and Kenneth E. Boulding (b. 1910)? Lasswell is surely the oddest omission of all, since there is no group of masters identified by Thompson to which he does not properly belong.

A second problem with Thompson's criteria is that they fail to relate mastery to a defined domain of intellectual activity. Thompson has something in mind both wider than the postwar American academic edifice called International Relations and, considering his omissions, something much narrower. In the absence of grounds for delimiting the domain of international thought, we are left to infer them for Thompson's subjective criteria, which he states simply: all of these men have influenced his own thought, and most have been friends and teachers. What we have then is an implicit, necessarily pallid intellectual autobiography of a man whose life work may qualify him as a master in his own right.

Judging Thompson's assessments individually yields decidedly mixed results. Essays run from 4 to 22 pages. Each includes a brief biographical sketch and review of that master's major works (a list of which is appended to each essay), as well as a critical appreciation. The shortest essay, devoted to Herz, is inevitably superficial. Herz might just as well have been passed over. This essay also contains an aside which points to one of the book's larger deficiencies. We read that "Herz is one of the very few self-acknowledged political realists who has been invited to contribute to *World Politics*" (p. 110). Implied here is the curious view that *World Politics* is a mouthpiece for a cabal set against realism, presumably meaning scientific schools. Inspection finds that quarterly epistemologically pluralist, frequently publishing realists like W. T. R. Fox, not to mention these many scholars who feel they have moved beyond realism without having to renounce it. The fact that *World Politics* does not invite contributions further vitiates Thompson's remark. Distaste for recent scholarship is thus disclosed in an almost ad hominem way. Thompson's stand-offish treatment of Deutsch creates the same impression. One begins to wish for an open assault on trends after realism if that is what really bothers the author.

The longer essays are generally more satisfying. An exception is the one on Mitrany. Here Thompson distracts with a labored description (pp. 204-13) of his own experiences with higher education for development as a test of functionalist theses. We are not surprised to find that functionalism fails, but the test's worth is hardly beyond questioning. The larger consequence is to convey a judgment that functionalist thinking is passé. A better strategy would have been to trace Mitrany's influence on "present-day theorists of transnationalism," who get only a few lines (p. 213), and to explore functionalism's obvious relevance to trends in late capitalism. A weakness of Thompson's is again revealed only indirectly: he possesses little interest in the world economy and its impact on political life.

One essay, last and longest, stands above all others as an original and substantial exercise in scholarship. Thompson on Toynbee shows impressive control over a huge mass of material and skill in balancing criticism and sympathy. Had Thompson found half as many masters to guide him but always put so well what he learned from them, then this book would certainly chronicle the makings of a master. Thompson's much earlier *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics* (Princeton, 1960), part 1, does greater justice to those several masters who mattered most to him and stands today the better tribute, both to them and to himself.

N. G. ONUF

American University

Reference Sources

Sourcebook on the New Immigration: Implications for the United States and the International Community. Edited by Roy Simón Bryce-Laporte. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979. Pp. xv + 511. $29.95.)

This collection of 43 essays examines the phenomenon of the new immigration, defined as occurring after 1965, the date of passage of comprehensive immigration legislation by the U.S. government. The essays fall into three broad topical areas. First, the effects and implications of the new immigration upon sending and receiving nations are assessed, as well as the policies formulated in response. Characteristics of the immigrants, such as sex, race, legality, and reasons for immigrating, differ from those of earlier immigrants; these are studied along with the implications their adjustment has on their new area and themselves. The theoretical and methodological considerations of such studies are also examined. Finally, overall views and commentaries on the subject of immigration are found in the appendices and the afterword.

American Social Attitudes Data Sourcebook, 1947-1978. By Philip E. Converse, Jean D. Dotson, Wendy J. Hoag, and William H. McGee III. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 441. $25.00.)

Comparable social opinion data, collected over a 30-year period through a variety of surveys undertaken by investigators at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, are compiled in this volume. Survey items are sorted into nine general categories focusing on attitudes toward: self and others, race, women, family life, work and retirement, personal and national economic prospects, government spending, and war and peace. Most frequently, data are presented in the form of percentage distributions across as many surveys as the item appears. When code categories lack exact comparability across surveys, the authors employ scoring procedures aimed at standardizing comparisons. For nonnominal items, means are also provided. Items are broken down by theoretically interesting subsamples after an initial full sample presentation.

An introduction describes procedures followed in compiling, scoring, and presenting the data. In each chapter there are specific descriptions of items included in that chapter. Indices and descriptions of each survey are provided.

Countries of the World and Their Leaders: Yearbook 1980. (Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research, 1980. Pp. 1265. $44.00.) **Countries of the World and Their Leaders: Yearbook 1980—Supplement.** (Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research, 1980. Pp. viii + 358. $20.00, paper.)

These volumes provide a background against which contemporary political, economic, and social events can be assessed. The principal work is divided into two parts. The first is a compilation of lists: chiefs of state and cabinet members of each state; newly independent states, arranged both alphabetically and chronologically; several lists on the status of the world's nations and dependencies; and the location of U.S. embassies, consulates, and foreign service posts and the key officials at each. The second part gives background information on every nation through concise profiles of their characteristics, such as political parties, religions, history, types of news media, and government personnel and policies. The supplement provides an update in these areas with a new list of chiefs of staff and cabinet members, a revised list on the status of the world's nations, and 35 background profiles which have been completely rewritten in response to new developments. Both works draw their information from U.S. government documents and reports, and neither duplicates the work of the other.

Europe Votes I: European Parliamentary Election Results 1979. Edited by F. W. S. Craig and T. T. Mackie. (West Sussex, England: Parliamentary Research Services, 1980. Pp. viii + 152. $6.50, paper.)

The first volume in a series that will provide the electoral results of direct elections to the European Parliament, this edition records the 1979 election results in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It lists the name, parliamentary group, party, and country of each member of the European Parliament, as well as voter turnout figures.

African International Relations: An Annotated Bibliography. By Mark W. DeLancey. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. Pp. xviii + 365. $26.50.)

This volume presents a bibliography of pamphlets, journal articles, and books written since 1960 on the subject of African international relations. The 2840 annotated entries are categorized by main subject matter into one of 11 areas and then cross-referenced to other pertinent areas in an index. The categories include General Works; Inter-African Conflicts, Borders, and Refugees; Southern Africa; and the relations of the U.S., USSR, PRC, U.K., France, and other states with Africa. A list of commonly used abbreviations and acronyms accompanies the bibliography.

Dictionary of American Diplomatic History. By John E. Findling. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xviii + 622. $39.95.)

This volume provides brief analyses of individuals, places, events and treaties prominent in U.S. diplomatic history from the colonial period to the present. The work notably includes biographical sketches of the U.S. secretaries of state, ambassadors and other foreign policy decision makers, as well as contextual definitions of terms relevant to the conduct of foreign affairs. Entries, listed alphabetically and referenced in a general subject index, include biographical citations for research purposes. Five appendices complete this work, featuring a chronology of major events in American diplomacy, a list of key diplomatic personnel of each presidential administration, a table noting the initiation, suspension and termination of diplomatic relations, a listing of secretaries of state by place of birth, and a directory to the manuscript collections of key diplomatic personnel.

The International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion 1978. Edited by George H. Gallup. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1980. Pp. xxiv + 510. $49.50.)

The first of an annual series, this volume presents some of the results from surveys undertaken by national and regional affiliates of Gallup International. Twenty nations are included. Most of the surveys are single-nation in scope, but multinational data on the European Economic Community and from the Youth of the World Survey are also provided. Emphasis is on opinion about political, social, and economic matters. The sections of the volume are organized by subject and issue areas, and for each issue area survey questions and responses by individual country are presented. Also included are a chronology of major events for 1980 and a 108-page index.

United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary: Vol. 3, **Africa.** By Rosalyn Higgins. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. xiii + 472. $87.00.)

This volume, third in a series of four on the subject of United Nations peace-keeping operations during the years 1946-1967, concerns itself with the Opération des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC, 1960-1964). The text is organized by functions and actions of a UN peace-keeping operation, facilitating comparative studies between ONUC and other such operations. The sections, brief synopses of which preface the main body of the text, cover ONUC from inception to phase-out and provide both commentary and documents relating to that function or action. Also included are a checklist of documents, chronology of events, bibliography, index, and maps showing the Congo in 1960 and UN force deployment on August 19, 1960.

International Handbook of Historical Studies: Contemporary Research and Theory. Edited by Georg G. Iggers and Harold T. Parker. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. Pp. xii + 452. $35.00.)

This collection of essays examines and illustrates the direction historical studies have taken in reference to the methodology used by the contemporary historian in the past two decades. The present approach uses methods and concepts from other disciplines which have been adapted to form a new methodology. Because of this approach, in sharp contrast to the traditional narrative form which focused primarily on political events, new perspectives on past events have emerged. The essays are divided into two parts: the first reviews the methodological reorientations; the second explores how the new approach has been applied in historical studies of 14 nations and regions. A bibliography and an index are also included.

Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey. By Kenneth Janda. (New York: Free Press, 1980. Pp. xviii + 1019. $100.00.)

This work describes and analyzes the results of the International Comparative Political Parties Project, which covers 158 political parties in 53 nations in the 1950-1962 period. Some information is also included on these parties for the 1963-1978 years, and 50 additional parties in this later period are examined.

Using a stratified random sample, the project includes countries from ten world regions. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are included, although they were not a part of the initial sample. The framework employed includes 12 principal concepts, some involving party internal structure (e.g., centralization of power, degree of organization) and others pertaining to a party's external relations (e.g., governmental status, goal orientation). These 12 principal concepts are operationalized in terms of basic variables. More than 100 such basic variables are used, with a range of 5 to 33 per concept. Coding of the variables in nearly all countries is based on a literature search and retrieval method using microfilm and computer systems. The first part of the book (p. 3-173) examines and validates the basic conceptual framework, while the second section (pp. 175-1019) presents the findings for each political party in each country. Sections on each nation include a summary commentary on the party system during the period under study, followed by graphs and tables which provide information about the legislative representation, electoral performance, and sociological composition of the parties in that country; after these data, the basic variable codes and comments are presented. A bibliography of the sources used, organized by country, is included.

Social Science Reference Sources: A Practical Guide. By Tze-chung Li. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xvi + 315. $25.00.)

This volume serves two purposes: it introduces the researcher to basic reference works and it outlines social science reference techniques. The reference literature of eight disciplines and general resource works are reviewed as well as bibliographic needs and ways of coping with methodological problems. The references treated include traditional ones, such as dictionaries and yearbooks, and contemporary ones, such as computer search systems and government documents. Over 900 sources are reviewed and are listed in an appendix.

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Vol. 33. **April 17, 1915-July 21, 1915;** Vol. 34, **July 22, 1915-September 1915;** Vol. 35, **October, 1915-January, 1916.** Edited by Arthur S. Link. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980-1981. Pp. 575, 567, 563. $30.00, each.)

These volumes continue the chronicling of Wilson's presidency, covering the period from April 1915, to January 1916. As in previous volumes, personal and professional correspondence, memoranda, and presidential statements are presented verbatim in order to give one a sense of the man, his thoughts, and his philosophy as well as a description and commentary of the events occurring during his presidency. The events of the time span covered include the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the diplomatic resolution of that crisis, conclusion of the Middle Eastern crisis of 1915, the genesis of the Wilson-House peace plan and the beginning of House's peace mission, the condemnation of the British blockade of the Central Powers, and the end stages of his courtship of Edith Bolling Galt, which culminated in their marriage.

Encyclopedia of Black America. Edited by W. Augustus Low and Virgil A. Clift. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Pp. xx + 921. $49.50.)

This collection of facts, articles, and biographies on black Americans, their history, culture, and contributions can serve as a source of background material and references to political scientists. The majority of the volume consists of articles which describe, define, analyze, and interpret subjects taken from black history and culture, such as religion, slavery, and music. About half of the articles are grouped together with others on the same topic in what the editors call "clusters" so as to give a sense of the scope of the topic; the remaining are presented alone. The biographies present information on those who have made contributions to society, past and present, in such areas as politics, education, and business. Entries are cross-referenced throughout the work and listed in an index. Lists of contributors and acknowledgements preface the main portion of the volume.

Japan's Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report. Translated and edited by John M. Maki. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981. Pp. x + 413. $25.00.)

This volume presents the essence of the study of the Japanese constitution of 1947 undertaken by Japan's Commission on the Constitution from 1957 to 1964. The commission considered all matters relating to the constitution in making its report and recommendation to Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. These matters include the impact of the circumstances surrounding the constitution's enactment via its imposition on Japan by the Allied occupation forces and a full range of constitutional questions, issues, and problems, such as the efficiency of its operation and the question of its revision. This analysis has applicability beyond the specific case of the Japanese constitution, for it addresses concerns in the areas of constitutional, comparative, and international law. The editor addded a preface introducing the report, an appendix giving biographical sketches of the commissioners, and a selected bibliography pertaining to the work of the commission.

Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979. By Edward F. Mickolus. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xxxvii + 967. $75.00.)

The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography. Compiled by Edward F. Mickolus. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xi + 553. $55.00.)

These volumes share a common *raison d'être:* they were created to fill perceived gaps in the burgeoning literature on terrorism. From this point they diverge, but in a complementary manner. Each can be used on its own, or to supplement the information provided by the other.

Transnational Terrorism provides a base of information on more than 4000 terrorist incidents occurring between 1968 and 1979. Historical events, starting with a biblical account, have been included to add perspective. The notes on each case, drawn from unclassified reports and literary sources, state the date, place, and the description and disposition of each event and the participants. Lists provide a chronology of aerial hijackings throughout history and a complete accounting of threats and attacks on nuclear facilities. An introduction gives a general background and statistical tables on such items as frequency of incidents on the subject. At the end is a glossary of terrorist organizations and acronyms and indexes of the dates of the terrorist incidents studied by country of occurrence and type of attack.

The Literature of Terrorism, through the annotation and categorization of studies on terrorism, gives an encyclopedic view of the literature on the subject. The 3890 entries were chosen primarily from popular and scholarly works, although some news accounts are included. The majority of the entries are from American sources; however, there are numerous foreign ones, illustrating the breadth of the literature. While each entry is placed under the most appropriate section, it is also cross-referenced to other pertinent areas throughout the volume. Section headings by topic and geographical area include General Treatments, Tactics, Terrorist and Guerilla Philosophies, Responses, Fiction, and Bibliographies. The book is indexed by author and title.

Edward F. Mickolus is an Intelligence Analyst in the Office of Political Analysis, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. These volumes result in part from his own work, and the data base he has created from his studies, ITERATE, or International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events.

American National Elections Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978. By Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. iv + 388. $25.00, paper.)

This oversized plastic ringbound volume contains time series data (1952-78) compiled from the biennial American national election studies of the Center for Political Studies (formerly the Political Behavior Program) of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan. Virtually every item appearing in comparable form in two or more of these studies is included. Data are presented in tabular and graphic form under six headings: Social Characteristics of the Electorate; Partisanship; Positions on Public Policy Issues; Support of the Political System; Involvement and Turnout; and The Vote. Social characteristics and partisanship are employed as the major independent variables for bivariate cross tabulation over time. The introduction describes the studies and the survey sampling methods employed, and each chapter contains a specific description of the items tabulated.

International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide. By Augustus R. Norton and Martin H. Greenberg. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. x + 218. $20.00.)

This volume, part of the Westview Special Studies in National and International Terrorism, provides a bibliography of approximately 1,000 entries, covering all aspects of the literature on international terrorism. About one-third of the entries are annotated. The works are primarily divided into geographical and topical sections; if a work deals with a subject that cannot strictly be placed within a regional boundary, it will be found under the appropriate topical heading. Additionally, the geographical origin of a terrorist group generally determines the appropriate geographical section. Also included are sections on General Works and Terrorism in Fiction, appendices outlining relevant publications and a list of recommended titles, and an index.

Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979. By Philip Norton. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. xxxiv + 524. $79.00.)

Examining the incidence of intraparty dissent within the Conservative and Labour parties in the House of Commons from 1974 through 1979, this book both lists the names of the dissenters and gives a comprehensive picture of the issues over which intraparty dissent occurred. Philip Norton argues on the basis of his data that an unprecedented level of dissent characterized the parliaments of 1974-79. The appendix consists of a list of all government defeats in the House of Commons 1974-79.

Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1978: An Annotated Compilation. By Grant F. Rhode and Reid E. Whitlock. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. ix + 207. $24.50.)

The purpose of this volume is to investigate the People's Republic of China's use of treaties as a means of pursuing foreign policy aims. The treaties studied here are *t'iao yüeh,* a distinct subset of international agreements defined as "the most important of international documents, regulating the political, economic, or other relations between contracting states" (p. 3). The *t'iao yüeh,* which are fully presented within the work, are divided into five categories: Friendship, Boundary Commerce and Navigation, Consular, and Dual Nationality. Before each section is an essay analyzing the importance of selected treaties. A summary list of the *t'iao yüeh* precedes the main body of the text; boundary maps follow that section. This is the only compilation of these treaties in English, and it includes several treaties that had not been previously translated into English.

The Latin American Political Dictionary. Edited by Ernest E. Rossi and Jack C. Plano. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1980. Pp. xi + 261. $25.25.)

The editors of this dictionary have compiled over 1000 Spanish and Portuguese expressions, social science terms, historical events, etc., central to the study of Latin American politics. Each term is defined and its significance to Latin American politics and societies is explained. Entries are divided into ten subject areas and organized alphabetically within each. Additionally, entries are cross-referenced and a comprehensive index is provided. The volume is designed as a teaching aid for undergraduate and graduate courses dealing with Latin American politics, economics, history, and geography.

International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization: Contemporary Developments. Edited by Donald C. Rowat. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xv + 626. $45.00.)

This collection of 48 essays by 51 political scientists, public administration specialists, and government officials describes and analyzes recent changes and formal reorganizations of local governments in all parts of the world. The book is organized into five parts: part 1, The Government of Metropolitan Areas; part 2, Regional, or County Government; part 3, The Basic Units in Developed Countries; part 4, The Basic Units in Developing Countries; and part 5, Conclusion: Trends and Problems. There is a bibliography of materials that deal with two or more countries, and an index. Tables are used by individual authors in most of the essays; there are 24 tables and 3 figures.

Marx-Engels Dictionary. By James Russell. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xxv + 140. $19.95.)

This book was designed to provide an aid for those having difficulty with the particular terminology used by Marx and Engels in their work. Over 400 terms and concepts are defined within the context given to them by Marx and Engels. The entries are cross-referenced throughout the work, and are grouped according to their subject area in an appendix. A selected bibliography of Marx, Engels, and commentators is also included.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1980. Edited by Richard F. Staar. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. Pp. xxxi + 486. $35.00.)

This volume profiles communist parties in 94 countries in Eastern and Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Americas, and Africa and the Middle East, providing current information and historical background on leadership and organization, auxiliary and mass organizations, party internal affairs, and domestic developments and foreign affairs issues involving these parties. Additionally, activities of international communist-front organizations are reviewed. A final section provides biographies of prominent international communist figures. This is the fourteenth such yearbook produced by the Hoover Institution.

Political Parties in Europe. By Theo Stammen. Translated by Gunda Cannon-Kern. (New York: Nichols, 1980. Pp. x + 321. $22.50, paper.)

Translated from the German edition, this book discusses "the historical development of political parties in Western Europe in the context of the present policy of European unification" (p. iii). It examines the party systems of both EC and non-EC countries, discusses the transnational relationships between the parties of Europe, and analyzes the various parliamentary groups in the European Parliament. The appendix includes the results of the 1979 Direct Elections to the European Parliament.

Index to International Public Opinion, 1978-1979. Prepared by Survey Research Consultants International, Inc. Edited by Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. Pp. xxiv + 386. $59.95.)

The initial installment in an annual series, this volume contains the results of surveys taken by various research institutions around the world. Intended audiences include academicians, business people, politicians, and journalists. Cross-national as well as single-nation surveys are included, and the scope of coverage is global, with approximately thirty countries in six continents represented. The surveys pertain to economic, political, social, and cultural issues, and the volume is organized according to issue categories and subcategories, with the results for individual nations following. The work contains a bibliography of data sources, as well as indexes of subjects and countries.